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nv assessment of the performance of the armies of the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-1939) must take into account two factors that 
influenced the Spanish military as a professional body from 1899 
to 1936. These factors were corporate factionalism within the 
service, and a concept of warfare as a psychology-based contest. 
Corporate rivalries divided the Spanish officer corps internally 
and stood in the way of reforms intended to put an end to military 
vested interests and oversized army lists under Alfonso XIII. This 
situation harmed army professionalism, but the government depended 
on the loyalty of the army and could not implement effective 
reforms until the Second Republic. Misdirected longing for 
corporate responsibilities and prestige also affected the 
introduction of the machine gun and the tank, when different army 
branches claimed their responsibility for operating them. The 
concept of morale as the decisive war-winning factor was 
influential in the development of offensive-minded tactical 
doctrine before 1914, and shaped quite a few essayists' visions of 
future conflicts as manoeuvre warfare (as opposed to fire-power- 
based warfare) after 1918. This pattern of thinking also led the 
military to underrate the machine gun and the tank, since their 
mechanical nature allegedly did not help to strengthen the 
soldierly virtues which were reckoned essential to conquer. The 
limited interest in mechanization led to an unremarkable use of 
armour in the Civil War, whereas the build-up and performance of 
both sides' officer corps and major field units in this conflict 
reflected different pre-war professional views about the problems 
posed by factionalism and new ways of warfare. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND MILITARY VOCABULARY. 
This writer has made all the translations from sources in 
Spanish. In order to make some texts more easily understandable, 
readability has sometimes prevailed over literality. Arabic names 
have been transliterated following common usage in Spanish 
sources. 
Excepting officer ranks (which follow British usage), the 
military terms used in this thesis do not follow the usage of any 
specific English-speaking army (e. g. the artillery battalion is 
currently called regiment in the British army, whereas a cavalry 
squadron is equal to a troop in the United States cavalry). 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that their meaning will be easily 
understood by the reader (in case of doubt, see Appendix II). When 
a Spanish military man is introduced as `General', this only means 
that he had general officer rank. 
ABBREVIATIONS. 
CEDA Confederaciön Espanola de Derechas Autönomas (Spanish 
ý federation of Autonomous Rightist Groups). 
CGG Cuartel General del Generalisimo (the nationalist general 
headquarters during the Civil War). 
ECT Escuela Central de Tiro (Central Firing School) 
EESM Escuela de Estudios Superiores Militares (Higher Military 
Studies College). 
EMC Estado Mayor Central (the Spanish army's general staff). 
ESG Escuela Superior de Guerra (the Spanish army' s staff 
college). 
GOC General Officer Commanding. 
SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS. 
AGMS Archivo General Militar de Seqovia (secciön/division/ 
legajo). 
AMA-CGG Archivo General Militar de Avila: Cuartel General del 
Generalisimo (armario/legajo/carpeta). 
AMA-ZN Archivo General Militar de Avila: Zona Nacional 
(armario/legajo/carpeta). 
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1. Definition of subject. 
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) was one of the greatest 
military conflicts between the two world wars of the twentieth 
century. It was a domestic struggle for political supremacy in 
Spain, but it was also seen as a battlefield for conflicting 
ideologies and became a major focus of international tension, 
which involved (with different degrees of commitment) several 
European powers. Such involvement could reach as far as sending 
combat forces, in addition to the supply of all kinds of ordnance. 
The ideological nature and the `foreign connection' of the Spanish 
Civil War have been attractive subjects for historians, and there 
has been plenty of historical scholarship about them. 
However, although both sides profited from the assistance 
provided by foreign intervention, Spain's civil conflict was 
essentially fought by Spanish armies. Surprisingly, this fact 
seems to have gone unnoticed for most historians, especially the 
academic ones. Non-Spanish scholars can be excused to some extent 
because it is natural that they are inclined to be more interested 
in the involvement of their own country (or a contemporary rival 
one) in the war. The real surprise is that Spanish historians have 
not taken much interest in the armies which the fate of the 
conflict finally depended on. This situation stems from the scarce 
interest of Spanish academic scholars in military history. It is 
not that the Spanish army is missing from the historians' works, 
but that they deal with the military as a political faction or a 
social group. This is not surprising if the reader bears in mind 
the history of Spain for almost two centuries after 1800, with an 
endemic presence of the military in politics. Unfortunately, the 
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scholarship on civil-military relations and `armed forces and 
society' has not fostered a similar interest in warfare-related 
issues. 
To say that the armies of the Spanish Civil War are unknown is 
an exaggeration, but there is more than a grain of truth in it, 
especially in relation to military professional matters such as 
tactics, logistics, training, small unit leadership, and so on. 
Anyone interested in the government or republican army can turn to 
the works of Michael Alpert (a British academic historian) and 
Ramon Salas Larrazäbal (a senior air force officer), but they 
still leave the reader insufficiently informed about the issues 
mentioned above. And, so far as this writer is aware, there is no 
comparable work about the rebel or nationalist army. On the other 
hand, the regular officer corps of the armies of both sides were 
the heirs of the pre-war Spanish army. Therefore, the performance 
of those armies on the battlefield depended greatly on the way the 
Spanish military prepared for war before 1936. This last issue has 
been neglected in academic scholarship, and it is precisely the 
subject which the present writer is to address. 
This thesis intends to study from a historical viewpoint the 
attitudes of the Spanish military towards the evolution of warfare 
during the early decades of the twentieth century, and their 
influence on the armies of the Spanish Civil War. Although this 
thesis emphasizes professional topics, it is necessary to include 
a survey of the conflictual civil-military relations which 
influenced - and were influenced by - the internal problems of the 
officer corps during this period. On the other hand, this writer 
has left aside almost all the campaigns which the Spanish army 
fought in Morocco during the period surveyed by this thesis. They 
were a case of colonial warfare, and their influence on Spanish 
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army doctrine was limited. An exception has been made with the 
campaign of Melilla (1909), since it was a testing ground for new 
Spanish infantry tactics and the machine gun, which are discussed 
in this thesis. 
This thesis also tries to bridge a gap between the field of the 
historians interested in the Spanish military (who rarely are 
versed and interested in warfare-related issues) and that of 
military historians in general (who have rarely paid attention to 
the Spanish army from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the civil 
war of 1936-1939). The former are provided with information on the 
Spanish military's efforts to cope with changes in warfare brought 
by technological innovation in the early twentieth century. The 
latter are given an introduction to the political-military 
background of the period, the corporate problems and a case study 
in the subject of professional modernization in an army of limited 
resources. 
Perhaps readers not well-versed in military history would have 
wished more detail on the general evolution of warfare, but there 
are many works in English which satisfy their needs. By contrast, 
much of the literature on Spain's political-military history is in 
Spanish and its availability outside Spain will often be limited. 
Therefore, priority has been given to the political-military 
narrative. 
2. Historians and the evolution of the Spanish army. 
Literature specifically on this thesis' subject is virtually 
non-existent. Admittedly, this is a highly severe statement. But 
this writer thinks that it is justified. Academic interest in the 
history of the Spanish army from 1898 to 1939 has been focused on 
political and social matters. Most of the literature can be 
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classified as studies in `armed forces and society' or political 
history, featuring the military as a protagonist. As a whole, 
these studies leave the reader ignorant about the Spanish 
military's professional response to the evolution of warfare. 
Therefore their usefulness for a military history is limited to 
the role of background reading. 
Given the extended scope in time of the thesis and its specific 
subject, the following survey includes only the most significant 
works dealing with the Spanish military during this thesis's 
chronological scope (with one exception) . Their common feature is 
the scarce attention paid to professional matters. Literature on 
the Civil War (with three exceptions) has been left aside for two 
reasons. One of them is the sheer amount of published works, whose 
analysis would well deserve a full dissertation. The other reason 
is the virtual absence of significant works dealing with the 
issues tackled by this thesis. 
Basic - and still among the best - introductory reading is the 
pioneering work of Stanley G. Payne: Politics and the Military in 
Modern Spain (1967); a slightly updated Spanish edition reaching 
until the Civil War - Ejercito v sociedad en la Espana liberal 
1808-1936) - was published in 1977. Despite being mainly based on 
published sources, the range of bibliographical research make 
these works starting points for any further study. They are quite 
balanced in their judgements and the narrative gives a good 
picture of the Spanish military after the late nineteenth century, 
as far as the scholarship available allowed by the mid-1970s. 
However, the emphasis is put on political issues and its value as 
a source about professional matters is limited. Carlos Seco's 
Militarismo y civilismo en la Espana contemporänea (1984) is a 
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study on civil-military relations from the early nineteenth 
century to the Civil War. Seco stands out by his defence of the 
alleged supremacy of civilian power under the Restoration regime, 
which prevailed until 1917. This view has been disputed, and Seco 
probably takes the military's inactivity - due to the lack of 
motives serious enough to intervene in politics - as indicating a 
civilian power stronger than it actually was. 
Mention must be made of the work of Julio Busquets, El militar 
de carrera en Espana (originally published in 1967). It was a 
pioneering work in social science research about the Spanish 
military. Its third edition (1984) includes more background 
historical narrative. In relation to the subject of this thesis, 
Busquets' work is interesting for its chapter on the graduates of 
the Saragossa military academy in the 1927-1931 period. 
Other works deal with more limited chronological periods. The 
book of Daniel R. Headrick, Ejercito y politica en Espana (1866- 
1898) (1981), is a comprehensive study of the Spanish military in 
the three decades before 1899, which provides handy reading about 
the immediate background of the period tackled by this thesis. 
Headrick analyses the social background of the officer corps, the 
conditions of service of enlisted men and the evolution of civil- 
military relations during that period. In contrast with many 
Spanish scholars, Headrick pays some attention to 
issues such as 
organization and ordnance, though he does not 
deal with them in 
depth. Carolyn P. Boyd has studied the political-military crisis 
of 1917-1923 in Praetorian Politics 
in Liberal Spain (1979; an 
updated Spanish edition, La politica pretoriana en el reinado 
de 
Alfonso XIII, was published in 1990). Hers is the most thorough 
survey of the subject, and also includes a fine chapter on 
the 
decay of the Spanish military before 1917. Carlos Navajas 
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undertakes the study of the Spanish army under Primo de Rivera's 
dictatorship in Ejercito, estado y sociedad en Espana (1923-1930) 
(1991). Actually Navajas surveys the dictator's military policy 
and reforms in the officer corps, the secondment of officers to 
government and civil service posts, and how the regime tried to 
turn Spain into a military-minded country through indoctrination 
programmes for conscripts. 
Of those works approaching the period of the Second Republic, 
Michael Alpert's La reforma militar de Azana (1931-1933) (1982) is 
the most interesting for military historians. This work deals with 
the reform of the army carried out by the first republican war 
minister, Manuel Azana, especially in relation to personnel policy 
for the officer corps. Alpert uses published sources but makes a 
sound analysis of the subject and pays a little attention to the 
Spanish army's attitudes towards military developments in Europe 
after the First World War. Another two books cover the events from 
1931 to 1936, though in a rather straightforward narrative way. 
Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, in El ejercito espanol durante la 
Segunda Republica (claves de su actuacion posterior) (1986), 
depicts the military as a misunderstood social group facing high 
external pressures to play an undesired partisan role in the 
Second Republic's political life, whereas Gabriel Cardona's El 
poder militar en la Espana contemporanea hasta la querra civil 
(1983) takes a more critical line on the military's role 
in the 
republican regime. 
The military operations of the Civil War have been tackled 
in 
the series of monographs written by Jose Manuel Martinez Bande 
for 
the Spanish army's historical branch (Servicio Histörico Militar), 
most of which were published in the 1970s (a second revised 
edition appeared several years later). This series 
is the nearest 
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thing to an official history of the war, despite some bias in the 
author's judgements, and can be used as a reference work for its 
operational narrative (each volume often embraces more military 
operations than suggested by the title). 
Ramon Salas Larrazäbal's Historia del Ejercito Popular de la 
Republica (1973) is a bulky history of the government or 
republican army during the Civil War (albeit two of its four thick 
volumes are documentary addenda). It is a comprehensive work which 
makes extensive use of captured republican records, thus offering 
a picture of the losing side's conduct of the war more reliable 
than those accounts based mainly on personal memories. Salas (who, 
like Martinez Bande, fought in the nationalist army) provided a 
fresh, albeit not unbiased, view of the conflict by contrast with 
the often self-glorificatory accounts published in Franco's Spain 
after 1939. Nonetheless, this work does not discuss in detail 
professional matters such as training, tactics and so on. The 
common feature in the works of Martinez Bande and Salas Larrazdbal 
is that both scholars blame the left-wing ideologies' alleged 
disorganizing nature for the underperformance of the republican 
forces. 
The republican army has also been studied by Michael Alpert in 
E1 ejercito republicano en la guerra civil (1973; a slightly 
revised edition was published in 1989) . It 
is focused on the 
organizational evolution of the army and the officer corps. Alpert 
points up the handicaps of the republicans' internal political 
rivalries, which could not help affecting their military effort, 
and the awkward relationship of the pre-war regular officers with 
the revolutionary left, which tried to make a revolutionary army. 
According to Alpert, the republican army was overcoming its 
organizational problems by late 1938, but the nationalist side had 
14 
already achieved an overwhelming military superiority. 
Some of the authors mentioned so far (Martinez Bande, Aguilera 
Olivencia, Salas) are military men. Cardona, a former officer, 
perhaps might be included within this group, but he left the army 
to pursue an academic career; Busquets was also an army officer, 
but he was dismissed because of his pro-democracy underground 
activities in the early 1970s. Despite their military background, 
many of them were more concerned with the social and political 
sides of the subject than with the professional ones. Besides 
those already mentioned, the most outstanding member of this group 
is Miguel Alonso Baquer, whose works often display influences from 
the social sciences. Although his style sometimes is nearer to 
abstract reflection than to the historian's learned argument, 
Alonso Baquer's writings often provide interesting, thought- 
provoking insights. Besides contributions to journals and edited 
works, two of his books have been useful for this thesis: El 
ejercito en la sociedad espanola (1971) - an essay on the problems 
of military reform from the late eighteenth century to the 1930s - 
and Aportaciön militar a la cartoarafia espanola en la Historia 
contemporänea. Siglo XIX (1972) - where he makes interesting 
points about the history of the staff corps. 
Much of the work of these and other military writers has been 
published in the army historical journal (Revista de Historia 
Militar) or edited works. The most useful of the latter - which 
also includes some civilian contributions - is Las fuerzas armadas 
espanolas. Historia institucional y social (1986). This multi- 
volume work, edited by Miguel Alonso Baquer and the historian 
Mario Hernandez Sanchez-Barba, is a history of the Spanish armed 
services focused on their evolution as state and social 
institution, with three volumes dedicated to the 1900-1939 period. 
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In general, the contributions are learned syntheses which can 
provide updated or complementary information in relation to older 
or more specialized works. 
3. The limitation of primary sources. 
A major problem for this thesis' purposes has been the archival 
evidence. There certainly are lots of records of the Civil War 
waiting to be exploited. By contrast, the archival sources 
available for the period 1899-1936 are fragmentary and dispersed. 
This fact makes it very difficult to reach definitive conclusions 
about some of the topics discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, 
the present writer has tried to carry out as thorough a research 
as possible in the records filed in the military archives of 
Madrid, Segovia and Avila. 
Another primary source are the works written by the military men 
themselves. These can be either professional essays or personal 
reminiscences. Unfortunately, there are not many memoirs of 
military men, and those which deal with events before 1936 
(Martinez de Campos, Cordon, Franco Salgado-Araujo) are not very 
informative on professional matters, although they are useful to 
know the career conditions of junior officers in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. As regards contemporary essays, some of 
the most interesting ones are those focused on the discussion of 
the problems of army organization and those of the officer corps, 
and their range of views goes from moderate reformism (e. g. 
Gallego) to heated criticism (e. g. Cebreiros, who also wrote under 
the pseudonym of El Capitän Equis). The works on professional 
issues are often tedious due to their highly descriptive nature, 
but they provide snippets of information which help to build a 
picture of Spanish military thinking during this period. 
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Besides contemporary essays, the research for this thesis has 
relied much on the professional periodicals. The use of this 
source must be careful, because there were differences in the 
character of professional journals. There were official journals 
and journals privately published by military men. Most periodicals 
used for this writer's research on the period from 1899 to the 
mid-1910s, when only the artillery and engineer corps had journals 
of their own, were private journals. Since they were not official 
publications, it can reasonably be assumed that their contributors 
could voice personal views on professional matters with few 
restraints, if any. In turn, the official journals (La Guerra y su 
preparaciön and the Memoriales of the arms of the service) have 
been the essential periodicals from the late 1910s to 1936 because 
all the private publications had disappeared by 1920. The views 
expressed in La Guerra y su preparaciön can often be assumed as 
fully or near coincidental with the official ones, since this 
journal was edited by the General Staff. The corps' Memoriales 
seem to have been somewhat more open-minded in relation to their 
contributors' views. Finally, a mention must be made of the 
existence of political-military periodicals, although their value 
as a source of professional information is limited. The present 
writer, indeed, limited himself to a selective sampling, which 
provided some fruit with the 1908-1909 issues of La 
Correspondencia Militar. 
When dealing with the professional essays and periodicals, the 
researcher must be careful in assessing the value of 
their 
contents, since he or she will often find contradictory views on 
many topics. Nonetheless, after extensive surveying, the present 
writer thinks it possible to identify at least major streams of 
military opinion, although there is no way to assess accurately 
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the support they got within the military. 
4. Organization of the thesis and areas of research. 
The thesis has been broadly arranged in a chronological order. 
Although some topics must be tackled before 1899, this year has 
been chosen as a starting point because it marks a significant 
milestone in the history of Spain and her army. The defeat in the 
war against the United States (1898) meant the end of the old 
Spanish empire and its overseas commitments, and the start of a 
slow but definitive decay of the Restoration political-military 
balance. 
Chapter 1 surveys Spain's civil-military relations in the 
Restoration and the Spanish officer corps' social background until 
the mid-1910s in order to assess how influential these factors 
were in preventing the Spanish army from implementing 
institutional arrangements for its professional modernization. 
Chapter 2 deals with the internal problems caused by corporate 
rivalries and tackles the question of how these rivalries affected 
the Spanish military's professionalism during this period. 
The following two chapters study the way the Spanish military 
coped with the most significant development of warfare 
in the 
1899-1914 period: the increase of firepower on the battlefield. 
Chapter 3 examines the reactions within the Spanish military to 
the tactical problem stemming from the increase of firepower 
by 
analysing the evolution of infantry tactical 
doctrine and its 
discussion in the Spanish army. Chapter 4 surveys how the machine 
gun fitted the Spanish military's intellectual 
framework by the 
time the introduction of this weapon took place, and how this 
affected tactical doctrine. The argument of these chapters 
turns 
around the infantry tactical doctrine, given that the 
infantry 
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bore the burden of fighting in the 1909 campaign and that the 
introduction of the machine gun was to affect mainly infantry 
tactics. 
Chapter 5 surveys the political-military events from the mid- 
1910s to 1936, the military reforms that they brought about, and 
their effects on the officer corps' professionalism, and then it 
proceeds with an analysis of the reforms of military education in 
1927 and 1932 and how innovative these reforms were. 
Chapter 6 surveys the Spanish army's assimilation of the 
transformations in warfare brought about by the First World War, 
focusing on how much this conflict affected the evolution of 
Spanish military doctrine from the late 1910s to 1936 and the 
thinking on major unit organization -a process which led to the 
development of a new model of major unit: the composite brigade. 
Chapter 7 surveys the views expressed in the professional 
literature and the official regulations in order to analyse how 
the Spanish army coped with mechanization and theories of armoured 
warfare during the 1920s and 1930s, and the development of its own 
doctrine on mechanization up to 1936. 
Chapter 8 is an extension of the three preceding chapters to the 
Civil War, since it surveys the development of some of the issues 
discussed before 1936. The first part of the chapter surveys how 
much pre-war features weighed on officer training and promotion 
during the war years; the second part compares the organizational 
effectiveness of the republican army (which adopted the composite 
brigade as its basic major unit) with that of the nationalist 
army, and assesses which factors affected the performance of both 
side's major units; and the third part surveys how effective was 
the use of armour in the republican and nationalist armies. Given 
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the amount of published and archival sources, this writer's 
research has not been comprehensive and the chapter must be seen 
as a probe on topics which (excepting perhaps the training of 
officers) have usually been left outside the historiographical 
mainstream hitherto. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this chapter - 
although its conclusions are not definitive - will enlighten the 
issues addressed and will show the usefulness of bearing in mind 
the Spanish military's pre-war professional background. 
The thesis can also be read in a two-tiered way. One of the 
tiers (Chapters 1,2 and 5) surveys the problems of the 
professional core (the officer corps) of the army and the attempts 
to reform it. It is the background of the picture which the reader 
must bear in mind when reading the other chapters. Since there is 
a lot of literature on related topics, these chapters re-arrange 
much evidence provided by other scholars in order to offer a 
critical analysis of it, stressing those issues more influential 
on the Spanish officer's professionalism. 
The other tier (Chapters 3,4,6,7 and 8) forms a series of 
case studies on significant military professional issues of the 
first four decades of the twentieth century. Here there is more 
primary evidence and this writer hopes to have been able to 
unearth `new' facts or, at least, to shed more light on issues 
scarcely researched. 
The present writer realizes that, due to the limitations in 
primary sources, the conclusions about the issues addressed by the 
thesis probably fall short of fulfilling the expectations the 
latter raised. Nonetheless, there remains the fact that, so far as 
this writer is aware, no other academic work dealing with this 
subject has been written before. It is hoped that the contents of 
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this thesis will shed new light on issues scarcely surveyed by 
scholars and will encourage further research. 
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1. - THE SPANISH MILITARY UNDER THE RESTORATION 
UNTIL 1916. 
The professional evolution of the Spanish army cannot be studied 
in isolation from other contemporary issues affecting Spain's 
military as a whole. This chapter surveys the background of civil- 
military relations during the Restoration regime, whose 
developments led to the military's increasing weight in politics 
after 1900, and which were influential in the problems surrounding 
the creation of a general staff. Finally, the influence of career 
conditions and prospects on the professional core of the army - 
the officer corps - will be analysed in the last part of the 
chapter. 
1. Politics, society and the military, 1875-1916. 
a) From political-military appeasement to military defeat. 
The restoration of the Spanish Bourbon dynasty - which had been 
overthrown with Queen Isabel II in 1868 - was achieved through a 
bloodless military rebellion. The pronunciamiento of General 
Martinez Campos on 28 December 1874 closed a period of unstable 
government which started in 1868 and culminated in the first 
republican experience (1873-1874) in the history of Spain. But 
Martinez Campos' action was not exceptional, because, after the 
end of the war against Napoleon (1808-1814), political life in 
Spain had featured the meddling of military leaders supporting 
political factions. 
The usual way to meddle was the pronunciamiento. Pronunciamiento 
(pronouncement) comes from the declaration (asking for a change of 
cabinet or its policy) with which a local commander began a sort 
of military revolt, often bloodless. If a significant number of 
garrisons followed his example, thus reflecting the lack of 
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military backing of the politicians in power, the pronunciamiento 
was successful. An essential feature of the pronunciamiento until 
the Restoration was that it did not reflect the political views of 
the military as a whole. It promoted the interests of political 
factions and parties, which used sections of the officer corps as 
spearheads in the pursuit of power. This kind of intervention 
ended with the First Republic. The first prime minister of the 
Restoration, the conservative liberal politician Antonio Cänovas 
del Castillo, set up a parliamentary regime in which two 
`dynastic' parties (the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party) 
would take turns in power after peaceful elections. There were no 
major ideological differences between these parties, since both 
grouped the politicians supporting the dynasty and the prevailing 
social order, and Cänovas' system was actually based on oligarchic 
rule, local bossing and election rigging. Nevertheless, this 
arrangement gave stability to the country for the next quarter of 
a century. Once the dynastic politicians accepted common rules of 
the game, their calls for help to army leaders disappeared as a 
cause of military intervention. 
Another reason for the military's unwillingness to take direct 
action in politics after 1875 was the rise of a new generation of 
generals, who had witnessed the events of 1868-1874. These 
generals helped in bringing the latter events to a close after 
seeing the effects of leftist and radical liberal ideologies, and 
becoming apprehensive at anything resembling a threat against the 
social order. 2 Moreover, the Restoration cabinets pursued a policy 
of conciliation through the granting of promotions and sinecures 
(e. g. a seat for life in the Senate) to the generals most 
loyal to 
Daniel R. Headrick, Ejercito y politica en Espana (1866-1898) (Madrid, 1981), pp. 134-9,215-9; 
Carlos Seco Serrano.. Militarismo y civilismo en la Espana contemporänea (Madrid, 1984), p. 14. 
Seco, p. 194. 
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the regime. 3 On the other hand, the military were allowed a 
limited participation in political debates through legal channels. 
Thus a number of politically reliable officers were elected 
deputies for the lower parliamentary house or could write 
political articles. 4 
It was also fortunate that King Alfonso XII (Isabel II's son and 
the first monarch of the Restoration) displayed a noticeable 
military spirit: he liked to dress in uniform and attend army 
ceremonies and manoeuvres. This helped to accommodate the military 
within the regime. However, he was not a soldier-king in the 
Prussian way: his constitutionalist ideas prevented him from 
thinking of the army as a political instrument. ' 
Although they ran into much self-interested opposition within 
the army and the parliament, there were attempts at military 
reform during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 6 In 
1882, War Minister General Arsenio Martinez Campos (military head 
of the pronunciamiento of December 1874) set up a centre providing 
a common military education to all the officer candidates: the 
Academia General Militar (General Military Academy) of Toledo. 
However, it was closed in 1893 due to alleged financial reasons 
and the pressure of the artillery and engineer corps to preserve 
their interests. Martinez Campos also set up in 1882 the escala de 
reserva retribuida (paid reserve list), a separate officer list 
formed by non-commissioned officers promoted to commissioned rank 
without passing through the military academies. Although this 
somewhat odd arrangement was devised to prevent conflicts with the 
Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modem Spain (Stanford, 1967), p. 45; 
Headrick, Ej ercito, p. 221. 
4 Headrick, E'ercito, pp. 221-2; Payne, Politics, p. 45. 
Payne, Politics, p. 45-6. 
6 The following overview of these reformist policies is based on Miguel Alonso Baquer, El 
eiercito en la sociedad espanola (Madrid, 1971), pp. 184-9; Headrick, Ejercito, pp. 236-40; and 
Seco, pp. 207-17. 
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academy graduates, the latter still displayed mistrust towards the 
new reserve officers. 
The boldest reformist proposals of the period were made by 
General Manuel Cassola, the war minister in 1887-1888. Three of 
them concerned conscription, the general staff and the staff 
officers. One of these proposals was the abolition of exemption 
from military service through payment in cash or through the 
purchase of a substitute - though conscripts posted by the draft 
to overseas garrisons could still use these means to get an 
appointment in the home army. Another proposal would turn the 
Higher Advisory War Board - the army council - into an embryonic 
general staff, by assuming new tasks. A third proposal would 
suppress the staff corps (Cuerpo de Estado Mayor), which would be 
replaced with a general staff service, based on the German model, 
with the staff officers remaining in the lists of their corps of 
origin. Altogether Cassola's reforms aimed to adapt the army more 
closely to the successful Prussian-German example. But they also 
threatened too many vested interests, whose protection guaranteed 
the regime's stability, so the reforms were condemned to be 
rejected, as they were. However, their inherent soundness was 
proved by the fact that most of them were adopted piecemeal over 
the next fifty years. 
The military system of the Restoration was shaken by the 
Desastre (disaster) of 1898: the loss of the last colonial 
territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific. ' Independence 
movements had started armed conflicts in Cuba (1895) and the 
This account of the 1895-1898 wars is based on Payne, Politics, pp. 69-82. For a more detailed 
study of the background and the events of the war against the United States, see Joseph Smith, 
The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895-1902 (London and 
New York, 1994). The figures about the army's pre-war strength (including the para-military 
police forces) are this writer's guess; they are based on official data (which, in relation to the 
enlisted men, provide only theoretical figures and are unreliable until 1891) taken from Headrick, 
E't 'rcito, pp. 272,277. 
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Philippines (1896). The government made a great effort to crush 
the rebels: 140,000 regular troops were serving in Cuba in 1896 
(during the 1880-1895 period, an approximate average of 38-43,000 
out of 137-163,000 troops might have been garrisoning overseas 
territories). By early 1898, the Philippines had been almost 
totally pacified through a blend of military action and bribes to 
rebel chiefs, whereas the Cuban rebellion had reached a military 
stalemate. 
However, the Spanish presence in these territories clashed with 
the interests of the United States, which started flexing its 
muscles as a great power. The casus belli was the alleged Spanish 
responsibility for the blowing up of an American warship visiting 
a Cuban harbour in early 1898 (later inquiries pointed to an 
internal explosion) . On 25 April 1898, the United States declared 
war on Spain. From the strategic point of view, the war was 
decided once the Spanish naval squadrons were destroyed in Cavite 
(Manila Bay) and Santiago de Cuba. American expeditionary forces 
landed in Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba, but there were no 
major land clashes (excepting the fight in front of Santiago de 
Cuba, which is surveyed in Chapter 3) .A ceasefire was concluded 
by August and the peace treaty was signed in December. Spain gave 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States and Cuba 
became an independent state. 
The colonial campaigns revealed a poor professional ethos in the 
Spanish officer corps: despite the disproportionate number of 
under-employed officers at home, non-commissioned officers and 
(after a shortened training) very young officer candidates had to 
be commissioned to officer the units in the colonies. The 
officers' reluctance to serve in a tropical campaign was 
understandable in view of the appalling logistical organization of 
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the Spanish army. The conscripts sent overseas in 1895-1898 (more 
than 200,000) had no alternative and paid a heavy price: in the 
Cuban conflict, 2,159 Spanish troops were killed in action and 
more than 53,000 were killed by disease. 
b) The aftermath of the Disaster. 
The Spanish army entered the twentieth century with the painful 
scar of the Desastre. In the aftermath of the war there was a 
search for who was responsible. The self-sacrifice of the rank and 
file was not in doubt but the competence of the command was. A 
senator, Count of Almenas, expressed his affection for the 
`victims of the war, these soldiers who [returned] to the 
Fatherland worn down by sickness and bullets... ' but he lambasted 
their commanders, who had not known how or had not been able `to 
lead them to victory or even to an honourable defeat. '8 
Although the army hierarchy had allowed the neglect of Spain's 
military organization and preparation during the two previous 
decades, it would be unfair to attach all the blame to the field 
commanders, faced with poor logistical support from home 
governments and corrupt colonial administrations. Actually the 
inner moral cohesion of the officer corps did not seem to crack 
after the defeat in the Spanish-American War. According to the 
scholar Miguel Alonso Baquer, after the Desastre, the 
Spanish 
military did not feel any resentment against commanders who 
tried 
to do their best to use the means available in an effective way. 
Moreover, the cabinet in Madrid was equally accountable 
for the 
strategic conduct of the war of 1898. 
What had been a 
disproportionate aim was the goal of the war itself. And the blame 
for this lack of balanced judgement remained at the political 
I Quoted in Payne, Politics, p. 84. 
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level. 9 
Furthermore, since the stability of the Restoration regime was 
dependent to a great extent on not upsetting the corporate 
interests and status of the military, searching for scapegoats 
within the army would have been dangerous for the government. The 
army was allowed to carry out an inquiry of its own, which left 
the hierarchy unscathed. With their face saved this way, generals 
and politicians shelved the subject after 1900.10 Moreover, once 
the last overseas territories were lost, there were no foreseeable 
conflicts in sight and the regime could return to business as 
usual. The Spanish military certainly had no interest in foreign 
adventures. 11 
The colonial disaster also highlighted the flaws of the 
Restoration regime, which was not overlooked by an officer corps 
embittered by a feeling of public scorn. Indeed many - if not most 
- officers became resentful of a political system serving the 
interests of the wealthy oligarchy alone. Moreover, the government 
increasingly used army troops to preserve order in urban areas 
against working-class unrest after 1900. The officer corps did not 
like to do the police's work; it only accepted such a task because 
it saw left-wing doctrines and regional nationalist movements 
(such as the Catalonian one) as threats to the social order and 
the integrity of the fatherland. Against such developments, some 
military essayists proposed the regeneration of the country 
through the indoctrination of military values in conscripts, who, 
once released, would spread those values to the rest of the 
9 Miguel Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana de 1898 y sus efectos sobre las 
Instituciones militares espanolas', Revista de Historia Militar (hereafter RHM), XXVII. 54 
(January-June 1983), p. 130; Jose Antonio Olmeda Gomez, Las fuerzas armadas en el Estado 
Franguista Participaciön politica, influencia presupuestaria y profesionalizaciön, 1939-1975 
(Madrid, 1988), pp. 97-8. 
'o Payne, Politics, pp. 83-6. 
11 Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana', pp. 128-9. 
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population; thus the army would become `the school of the nation'. 
However, their proposals never turned into reality. 12 To 
complicate things, a new monarch, King Alfonso XIII, was to use 
the military - unlike his father - as a card in the political game 
after 1902. As a result of all this, the army's voice became 
l3 louder in political matters. 
The reduction of the army budget was a main goal of military 
policy in the 1900-1910 period. However, its achievement was 
complicated by the officer surplus left by the 1895-98 colonial 
campaigns. Since the government was unable to find a satisfactory 
way out of the army for unnecessary officers, the savings were 
made at the cost of overall standards of preparation for war. 14 
Thus, during the 1900-1910 period, the army and naval officer 
corps felt that the armed services were the victims of the 
politicians' peacetime budgets, whereas the politicians believed 
that the poor professionalism of the Spanish officers turned them 
into insatiable wastrels of large budgets. 15 In view of the 
reciprocal mistrust between military men and politicians, it is 
hardly surprising that the relationship between the military and 
the civilian authorities was increasingly tense. 
These distrustful civil-military relations could not help but 
have repercussions on the preparation for war. In 1907, a report 
of the Fourth Military Region (where only 60,000 out of 130,000 
reservists reported to the annual review in 1906) complained of 
ý 
the lack of cooperation of the local authorities in issues related 
to mobilization and reservists, a complaint repeated by the 
12 Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, pp. 196-7; Payne, Politics, pp. 89-91. A good example 
of the military literature on the army as `the school of the nation' is Joaquin Fanjul, Misiön social 
del Eiercito (Madrid, 1907). 
13 Payne, Politics, pp. 91-3. 
la Ibid., pp. 86-8. 
15 Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana', p. 143. 
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Second and Fifth Military Regions. 16 
c) The military's return to politics, 1905-1909. 
The tension between the military and the civil authorities 
turned after 1905 into a tendency of the military to cast into 
doubt the supremacy of civil power and challenge the government. 
The first significant exhibition of this tendency was caused by 
Catalonian nationalism. The defeat of 1898 stimulated the 
nationalist movements of the Basque provinces and Catalonia; their 
most radical demonstrations were tolerated by the government, but 
the military considered these nationalist displays unacceptable. 
There were some small incidents between nationalist supporters 
and army officers in the period 1900-1905. The government took no 
action; this actually was to encourage future indiscipline of the 
military. 
In November 1905, the Catalonian nationalists won a local 
election in Barcelona. A Catalonian satirical weekly used this 
event to publish a cartoon which made fun of the military by 
comparing the army officers with the civilians, who were able to 
achieve victories. The response of the army came on 24 November 
1905: in the evening, about two hundred officers of the Barcelona 
garrison stormed the presses of the weekly and the editorial 
offices of another nationalist newspaper. Once the news became 
known, the officer corps as a whole expressed its support for the 
action. Moreover, the military urged the government to pass 
legislation to put attacks against the army in the press under the 
jurisdiction of military courts. 
16 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 2a Region Militar, 1907, Servicio Histörico 
Militar, Archivo Central, Secciön Primera: Colecciön Adicional de Documentos (hereafter SHM- 
CAD) 8/2; Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 4a Region Militar, 1907, SHM- 
CAD 8/4; Revista de lnspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, SHM- 
CAD 8/5. 
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The cabinet tried to face up to the military pressure. However, 
the army hierarchy - including War Minister General Weyler - 
thought that this attitude could bring about a major breach of 
discipline in the junior officers (who were the main instigators 
of the military protest). So the senior commanders closed ranks 
with their subordinates in order not to lose control of the 
situation. King Alfonso XIII displayed his support for the 
military as well, therefore forcing Prime Minister Montero Rios to 
resign. A new cabinet headed by Segismundo Moret presented to the 
parliament, by early 1906, a bill which satisfied the army's 
demands. The bill, allowing the military to put on trial civilians 
whose writings in the press had allegedly offended the fatherland 
and the army, was passed on 20 March 1906 and became commonly 
known as the Law of Jurisdictions. Although it was not to suppress 
totally the criticism against the military in the press, it meant 
a serious limitation of the right to freedom of speech, guaranteed 
by the 1876 constitution. 
The whole affair had shown the weakness of the dynastic 
political elite as well. Unable to find a peaceful solution to the 
conflict between the Catalonian nationalists and the military, the 
civilian executive and legislative powers finally bowed to the 
stronger side. '7 
The next major involvement of the military in domestic politics 
(the so-called `Tragic Week' of Barcelona) was due to the outbreak 
of the Melilla campaign in the summer of 1909 (which is surveyed 
in Chapter 3). 16 The War Ministry called up reservists in order to 
bring some expeditionary units to war strength. In Barcelona, the 
" This account of the 1905-1906 events is based on Carolyn P. Boyd, La politica pretoriana en el 
reinado de Alfonso XIII (Madrid, 1990), pp. 25-31; Seco, pp. 235-44. 
18 This account of the `Tragic Week' is based on Boyd, Politica pretoriana, pp. 35-7; Seco, pp. 244- 
53. 
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order affected several hundred reservists of classes released 
several years earlier. Most of these reservists were family men 
from the city's working class quarters. This fact and the memories 
of the suffering caused by the colonial wars of 1895-1898 combined 
to unleash a popular protest. This turned into a series of violent 
riots and strikes in the last week of July, later known as `the 
Tragic Week' of Barcelona. The final toll was 130 casualties in 
the army and police forces, and around a hundred rioters dead plus 
another five executed after being court-martialed. Besides 
increasing the mutual mistrust of the military and the working 
classes, these events reinforced the officer corps' belief that, 
due to the ruling politicians' incompetence, the army was the only 
safeguard against social disintegration. 
Thus, after a quarter of a century of quiescence, the military 
returned to the political stage after 1900. The combination of a 
foreign policy and military fiasco (the Spanish-American War and 
the loss of the overseas colonies) and the rise of new political 
and social forces broke the stability of the Restoration regime. 
Unwilling to undertake reforms and lacking a social base wide and 
strong enough, the ruling elite had to resort to the army as its 
pillar, but in the process the military gradually stopped being 
the government's servant. The dynastic politicians could still 
keep a rein on the officer corps as long as the top ranks of the 
army hierarchy preserved their authority over their subordinates. 
But when the latter no longer trusted the former, as was to happen 
in 1917, the government became a hostage of the military. 
2. Military policy and the beginnings of the general 
staff. 
a) The state of the army: the problems for military planning. 
There were some reforms in the army force structure after 1900. 
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By 1913, the standing major units were fourteen infantry 
divisions, one cavalry division, three light infantry brigades and 
three separate cavalry brigades, distributed amongst eight 
peninsular military regions (territorial commands equivalent to an 
army corps area). The Balearic and Canary Islands were separate 
commands. There were also garrisons in the enclaves in Northern 
Morocco (one infantry brigade in Ceuta and two infantry brigades 
in Melilla) . 
19 Due to Spain's increased involvement in Morocco 
from 1909 on, these garrisons were reinforced by expeditionary 
units, whose strength varied according to the intensity of 
military operations. 
However, most of the home army was only a paper force, because 
many units were understrength, ill-trained and ill-equipped. In 
fact, some regiments seemed to have no reason to exist other than 
providing appointments for the underemployed officer corps. After 
1900, the average peninsular infantry regiment had in peacetime 
two standing battalions (four companies each) plus the cadre for 
another one to be formed with called-up reservists; the total 
strength was about 500 officers and men (a regiment at war 
strength was 3,000-strong). 20 A report of the Fifth Military 
Region stated in 1907 that the small numbers of enlisted men in 
the units and the frequent releases of conscripts made impossible 
any effective training at battalion and regimental level. The 
report argued that the disbandment of a number of regiments would 
increase the strength of the remaining units to 500 troops per 
infantry battalion and 100 troops per cavalry squadron; these 
levels of strength would make more feasible a realistic unit 
19 Anuario Militar de Espana (hereafter AME) 1913. For the evolution of the force structure, see 
the annual issues of AME. 
20 Historia de las fuerzas armadas, 5 vol. (Saragossa, 1983), II. 43-4; Eduardo Gallego Ramos, 
Proyecto de reorganizaciön y mejora del ejercito de tierra (Guadalajara, 1905), p. 32. A graduate 
of the General Military Academy and commissioned in the engineer corps, Gallego (1873-1959) 
served in the Philippines (1895-1898) and Melilla (1909-1910), and reached the rank of brigadier. 
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training. 21 
The financial constraints did not affect personnel only. They 
caused excessive delays in the construction of fortifications: for 
instance, Fort Alfonso XII and La Sagueta battery (two 
strongpoints for the defence of the Pyrenees border) were still 
unfinished after thirty and twenty years of building, 
respectively. 22 The state of many army barracks was deplorable. 23 
The First Military Region pointed out in 1907 that, besides the 
lack of adequate training grounds near the barracks, the cavalry 
could not train on rainy days because there were no roofed riding 
schools. 24 And the replacement of outdated material could take a 
long time: the engineer corps' magazines in Granada stored, in 
1907, sapping tools made in 1848.25 
Besides its deplorable material state, Spain's army lacked 
clear guidelines to conduct its professional affairs. The Spanish 
military policy of the first years of the century neglected 
planning for the two kinds of conflict in which the army could be 
engaged in the near future: a colonial campaign in Northern Africa 
and intervention in a war between European coalitions. The former 
perhaps was neglected due to the desire to forget the sad 
experiences of Cuba and the Philippines, whereas the 
latter went 
against the isolationist attitudes of the military. 
Certainly 
those generals who were war ministers in this period and 
had 
fought in the overseas wars of 1895-1898 (Weyler, Linares, 
Luque) 
did not want to change this state of affairs: 
they preferred to 
erase memories of the past and accommodate 
to the neutralist 
policy of the government, even if this 
harmed the modernization 
21 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, 
SLIM-CAD 8/5. 
22 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 
8/5. 
23 The reports of the 1907 army review, filed in SUM-CAD 8/1 to 8/8, provide many examples. 
21 Revista de Inspeccion al Ejercito: Capitania General, P Region Militar, 1907, SUM-CAD 8/1. 
25 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 28 Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/2. 
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of the army. 2o 
The ministers' short terms in office did not favour a steady 
direction of military affairs either. From 1900 to 1917 there were 
twenty five changes in the ministerial chair, which amounts to an 
eight months' interval on average between each change. In 1905- 
1906 the portfolio changed hands six times. 27 Although some 
ministers were in office several times, their alignment with 
cabinets with different priorities in military policy hampered 
sound planning (conservative politicians were interested in the 
organization of the higher planning and command establishments; 
liberal ones focused instead on issues related to compulsory 
military service) . 
28 
b) The political problem of the General Staff. 
The problem of short-lived ministers was made worse by the lack 
of an efficient professional body able to make up for the 
ministerial turmoil. The issue of the supreme command of the army 
in peacetime was passed over by the Constitution of 1876 and by 
the 1878 and 1889 army acts. The terms of the 1889 act assigned 
the everyday administration and conduct of the army to the war 
minister. So the minister actually became the commander-in-chief 
(leaving aside the king, who was the nominal supreme commander of 
the armed forces), but this also implied that organizational 
authority over the military was tied to political-administrative 
authority, and therefore to the repeated swings of 
Spanish 
political life. Nonetheless, the 1878 act set up a Junta 
Superior 
Consultiva de Guerra (Higher Advisory War Board), whose advisory 
mission partially resembled the role of a general staff. 
General 
26 Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana', p. 144. 
27 Calculation based on data taken from AME 1935. 
28 Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, p. 235. 
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Cassola tried unsuccessfully to enlarge the board's role by 
allocating it some responsibilities for war planning, training and 
recruitment. 29 
The War Board disappeared in 1904, when War Minister General 
Linares, who had realized the need for an institution for war 
planning, at last set up the army's General Staff - Estado Mayor 
Central (EMC) - on 17 July 1904, through an act whose content 
concerning the EMC was developed by a decree on 9 December 1904.30 
The General Staff had executive power and its chief could order 
territorial commanders to carry out the decisions taken by the EMC 
(the war minister only intervened when the orders were so 
important as to need the king's signature for their approval). 31 
Nevertheless, the EMC soon became entangled in a conflict with the 
War Ministry apparatus over their respective responsibilities. Who 
would assume the conduct of operations in wartime, the minister or 
the chief of general staff? Would the War Ministry become reduced 
to a sort of administrative manager of the General Staff as in 
Germany? Politicians certainly desired the war minister's 
supremacy, which assured them a tighter control of the army. 32 But 
the EMC could also be their ally against a war minister's policy. 
Comandante Beta, a reformist military essayist, disagreed with the 
General Staff's role as an instrument for military reorganization, 
separate from the ministry. It was true that the EMC should 
provide a continuity of approach to military reform, but actually 
the argument of the need for such continuity was used by the 
29 Fernando Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis de la Restauraciön. Las Juntas 
Militares de Defensa', in Mario Hernandez Sanchez-Barba and Miguel Alonso Baquer (eds. ), Las 
fuerzas armadas espanolas. Historia institucional y social, 8 vol. (Madrid, 1986), V. 91-2. 
'° Colecciön Legislativa del Ejercito (hereafter CLE) 1904, No. 135 and No. 240 (articles 20 to 
36); Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, p. 237. 
31 Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 92. 
32 Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, p. 237-9. On a contemporary case of military doctrine 
affected by malfunctioning of the high command and general staff system, see Douglas Porch, 
`The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900-14' in Brian Bond and Ian Roy (eds. ), 
War and Society. A Yearbook of Military History (London, 1975), pp. 121-2,124-8. 
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parliament as a way to hold back the war ministers' reformist 
proposals on military organization issues. 33 Thus, according to 
Comandante Beta, the General Staff turned into a tool the 
politicians used `to tame ministers as if they were yearlings' . 
34 
The concept of a self-contained body in charge of the 
reorganization of the army, separate from the traditional 
bureaucracy of the War Ministry, was not accepted unanimously. It 
was even argued that the General Staff was unconstitutional, 
because its head could usurp the role of commander-in-chief. The 
supporters of the General Staff denied any contradiction with the 
constitution. The decree of December 1904 defined the General 
Staff as a branch of the army's administrative framework without 
any organizational link with the other major branch - the War 
Ministry. Its mission was the preparation for war and the 
supervision of the staff officers' training, and it was 
subordinate to the war minister. Therefore the minister's final 
authority was not lessened by that of the chief of general staff. 
This meant no change in the spirit of the constitution, which 
designated the king and the war minister as the heads of the army. 
But this subordination was also the key to the problems affecting 
the General Staff, as the scholar Aguilar Olivencia points out. 
The General Staff, in order to fulfil its function properly, 
had to limit such subordination. This was necessary in a country 
like Spain, where even successive war ministers of the same 
political party in power could support very 
different views on the 
same military issue. 
35 
33 Comandante Beta [pseud. of Jose Garcia Benitez], Apuntes Para historiar tres anos 
de reformas 
militares (1915-1917) (Madrid, 1917), pp. 21-5. Garcia Benitez 
(1872-1948) was a student in the 
General Military Academy and commissioned in the engineer corps; he saw service 
in the 
Philippines (1895-1898), the War Ministry's military cabinet (1915) and the General 
Staff (1916- 
1918); he reached the rank of brigadier. 
34 '[D]omar Ministros como si fueran potros. ' Ibid., p. 24. 
31 Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, `La opinion püblica militar', in Hernandez Sanchez-Barba and 
Alonso Baquer (eds. ), V. 156-9. 
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c) Early organization of the General Staff. 
Standing for the General Staff did not necessarily mean 
agreement with the shape it had taken in Spain. Capitän Equis, a 
highly critical essayist, thought that the Estado Mayor Central 
was badly organized for the tasks expected from a general staff. 
After a reform in 1906, its structure and responsibilities from 
this year to 1912 - when it was dissolved - were as follows: 
-Secretariat: administration, staff corps personnel affairs, 
War College, military history, technical studies on 
communications and signals (staffed by eighteen officers). 
-First Section: organization and operations - i. e. strength 
and territorial deployment of units, training of officers 
and enlisted men, allotment of conscripts and reservists, 
mobilization, war planning, military transport (twenty 
officers). 
-Second Section: foreign intelligence (nine officers). 
-Third Section: ordnance and supply (nine officers). 
-Fourth Section: fortifications and military buildings (eight 
officers). 
-Fifth Section: map-making and publishing (two officers). 36 
The bulk of duties usually assigned to a general staff were put 
together in a single section. Thus only twenty out of sixty six 
officers were employed in true staff work. Excepting those in the 
Second Section, the rest dealt with administrative matters or 
technical studies on ordnance and fortifications more appropiate 
for inspectorates or technical staffs . 
37 Capitän Equis also 
complained that this mixture of military and technical matters led 
to the EMC officers coming from too many backgrounds: 
Grouping in the same centre so hetereogeneous a 
personnel [without common training and criteria to deal 
with military problems] - and all this reinforced by the 
background of prejudices, rivalries and confluency of 
ambitions, which divided the officers [of the different 
36 A[E 1912. 
37 E1 Capitän Equis [pseud. of Nazario Cebreiros], El problema militar en Espana. Apuntes para un 
estudio sincero y al alcance de todos, 2 vol. (Burgos, 1916-1917), I. 51-2. 
38 
corps] - meant... bringing down the best initiatives ... 
38 
Moreover, the chiefs of the general staff were not above the 
political struggle because, according to Capitän Equis, `there 
were conservative chiefs and... liberal ones; not only this, there 
were [after the name of contemporary generals] luquistas, 
linaristas, polaviejistas, primorriveristas... `39 That is, the 
appointment and the performance of the chiefs of general staff 
were not foreign to the play of political and personal sympathies 
which weighed so much on the top of the military hierarchy. 
d) Disbandment and rebirth of the General Staff. 
The General Staff was abolished by War Minister General Luque 
in late 1912, by the time of the parliamentary debate on the 
budget for 1913. Luque argued the need for thinning down the 
army's bureaucracy as a justification to remove this branch of the 
military structure. His critics, though admitting that the EMC had 
become an unworkable organization, reckoned that the solution 
should be a reform, instead of disbandment. 
4° But the disbandment 
also was a drastic way of resolving the political conflict about 
the General Staff's alleged incompatibility with the terms of the 
1876 constitution and the final accountability of the minister to 
the parliament . 
41 Luque created at the same time a general staff 
section within the War Ministry. The section was headed 
by a 
brigadier and divided into three bureaus (staff corps personnel, 
War College and military attaches; manpower management, ordnance 
stocks, transport and communications; mobilization, planning and 
38 `Agrupar en an mismo Centro a personal tan hetereogeneo... -y reforzado todo esto por el 
fondo 
de prejuicios, rivalidades y concurrencia de ambiciones que separa a la oficialidad... - era... 
dar en 
tierra con las mejores iniciativas... ' Ibid., I. 52. 
39 ' [Hiubo jefes conservadores... y liberales; menos todavia que eso, los hubo luquistas, linaristas, 
polaviejistas, primorriveristas... ' Ibid., I. 54. 
40 Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 92, V. 101. 
41 Beta, pp. 55-6. 
39 
operations), manned by eighteen staff corps officers. 42 
Comandante Beta reckoned that the trouble with the EMC was the 
political-military authorities' desire for cure-alls which solved 
at once all the problems of the army. Thus he criticized the 
creation at one stroke of a full-fledged general staff, instead of 
pursuing a policy of gradual enlargement from a smaller 
establishment, better suited to the Spanish army's needs. 43 
Comandante Beta's views were a result of his experience in 
General Echagüe's military cabinet. Echagüe, war minister in 1913- 
1915, announced a project of military reform to the parliament in 
December 1914. Given the ambitious range of his reform plans, and 
the lack of a department in the War Ministry able to undertake 
their preparation in detail, Echagüe set up a military cabinet in 
4 the ministry in late April 1915.4 Comandante Beta saw in this 
body a sort of general staff in embryo. Nevertheless, this 
organization had allegedly aroused ill-will among those who had 
interests in the restoration of a large general staff (especially 
4 the staff corps officers) .5 
General Echagüe's project, among many others reforms, also 
created the new Army Supreme Council (Consejo Superior del 
E'ercito), which would include former war ministers and provide 
steadiness in military policy and planning. The solution of 
professional problems raised by the preparation for war would be 
the task of the re-born General Staff, turned into an advisory 
branch without any command and administrative responsibilities. 
The conservative and liberal parliamentary groups broadly agreed 
on the contents of the reforms. However, at the time of their 
42 CLE 1912, No. 254. 
a3 Beta, pp. 20-2,62-4,66-7. 
44 Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 103. 
as Beta, p. 64. 
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discussion in late 1915, the conservative Prime Minister Dato 
insisted on passing first a much-contested bill on the reduction 
of the retirement age for officers. Facing strong opposition on 
this issue, Dato resigned on 6 December 1915. The fall of his 
cabinet also paralysed any further discussion of Echagte's 
reforms. The reasons for Dato's odd conduct remain obscure, but 
they had little to do with military policy, given the previous 
46 consensus on the reforms. 
The next cabinet, headed by the liberal politician the Count of 
Romanones, included General Luque as war minister again. And 
Luque, who disbanded the EMC in 1912, brought this body back to 
life on 24 January 1916.47 Nevertheless, the new General Staff had 
only a consultative role (a feature which caused criticism from 
some sections of the military) and its relationship with military 
units in peacetime was limited to inspection duties. 48 The EMC was 
to be headed by a captain-general or a lieutenant-general (who 
would perform as commander-in-chief of the field army in wartime, 
or as its chief of staff if the king took command) and a deputy 
chief of general staff. Its organization was as follows: 
-Secretariat (three officers). 
-First Section: organization, mobilization and training 
(twelve officers). 
-Second Section: operations and military communications 
(eight officers). 
-Third Section: ordnance and war industry (five officers). 
-Fourth Section: statistics and requisition 
(five officers). 




The missions assigned to the Fourth Section reveal a greater 
concern about the problems of economic mobilization (a consequence 
of the experiences of the First World War), but uniting 
46 Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 103-7. 
47 CLE 1916, No. 22. 
48 Equis, I. 83; Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 107. 
49 CLE 1916, No. 22. 
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intelligence matters and technical studies in the same section 
still seems an oddity in the General Staff's functional division. 
Luque also presented another reform bill in the autumn, in order 
to make up for the EMC's lack of executive power. The mission of 
giving stability to military policy was assigned to the Junta de 
Defensa Nacional (National Defence Board). This had been created 
in 1907 and was formed by the prime minister, the war and navy 
ministers, the army and navy chiefs of general staff, and former 
prime ministers. The board would set the guidelines on which the 
General Staff would develop the war minister's initiatives on 
organizational issues. Once having finished its work, the General 
Staff would send the project back to the war minister, who would 
carry out its implementation. Although the bill did not raise any 
significant political discussion, Luque's reform did not succeed 
in being passed due to the adjournment of the parliament in 
February 1917.50 And after this date, military policy in Spain was 
to be dominated by the crisis of the juntas de defensa (which will 
be surveyed in Chapter 5). 
The turbulent early life of the General Staff was hardly 
surprising given the involvement of the Spanish army's hierarchy 
in politics and the uneasy civil-military relations under the 
Restoration. Though the dynastic politicians realized the need for 
a professional body in charge of organizational and planning 
matters, they were suspicious of anything resembling a core of 
autonomous military power (though, due to their 
inflexibility in 
coping with social and political changes, the 
dynastic parties 
became increasingly dependent on the military). But such a 
fear 
was unfounded to some degree. The refusal of 
the Restoration 
cabinets to make any reform seriously affecting military vested 
50 Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 92, V. 107. 
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interests was successful in integrating the top of the army 
hierarchy (the so-called `political generals') within the regime. 
As a result, senior generals became so bound to the dynastic 
parties' politics that they did not worry about preserving enough 
professional autonomy to keep military policy on a steadier basis. 
War ministers yielded to political interests, and a strong General 
Staff could not help being an embarrassment in this situation. 
But, at the same time, limiting the power of the General Staff 
deprived this body of its raison d'etre. 
Hence the nature of the Restoration political-military 
establishment was a major factor in preventing the implementation 
of military reforms which increased the Spanish army's 
effectiveness for warfare. Due to the excessive interdependence 
between the ruling politicians and the military, only a deep 
change of Spain's political order could open the way to the 
necessary reform of the Spanish army. The alternative spur for a 
reform of the army -a major military defeat, such as the French 
one in 1870 - was too remote, due to Spain's keeping out of the 
arena of international politics. 
3. The officer corps: the professional consequences of 
its social background. 
a) The transformation of the Spanish officer corps after 1808. 
The officer corps of the Spanish army, like many other European 
armies, was recruited mainly from the scions of the nobility by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the war against 
Napoleon (1808-1814) broke the traditional structure of the army. 
Many officers of the old army died in the fighting or were 
captured by the French in the early years of the war. The Spanish 
authorities therefore opened the officer corps to candidates whose 
proven ability on the battlefield or educational qualifications 
43 
made up for their lack of noble blood. On the other hand, the 
French invasion, in overthrowing the go vernment system of the 
Ancien Regime, encouraged the development of a new government in 
non-occupied Spain, whose policies were based on the libe ral 
political ideology. One of these policies was the creation of an 
army which valued professional competence, instead of lineage, as 
the basic requirement for the officer commission. 
Thus the Spanish officer corps was no longer reserved for the 
nobility by 1814. Moreover, after the end of the Napoleonic wars, 
a number of former guerrilla leaders (many of peasant origins) got 
regular commissions, which diluted even more the surviving 
aristocratic elements. The campaigns against the independence 
movements in Spanish America and the civil war of 1833-1840 
between the liberal government and the carlists (supporters of the 
absolute monarchy under a different branch of the Bourbon dynasty) 
brought into the ranks of the officer corps more candidates of 
non-aristocratic origins. Despite the attempts by anti-liberal 
governments to maintain the proofs of lineage as an essential 
requirement for a commission, the definitive rise to power of 
liberalism in the 1830s led to the suppression of such proofs in 
1836.51 
Though a number of aristocrats still pursued the military 
career, a large part (about 60 per cent) of 
the officer 
commissions were given to candidates with a middle or 
lower class 
background by the mid-nineteenth century. This fact also 
had to do 
with the increasing importance of self-recruitment 
(i. e. the 
increasing numbers of new officers whose fathers were already 
military men), which was the most remarkable 
feature of the social 
s1 For a brief survey of the transformation of the Spanish officer corps 
in Julio Busquets, see El 
militar de carrera en Espana, 3rd edition (Barcelona, 1984), pp. 
48-66. 
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evolution of the officer corps during the nineteenth century, as 
the research of the historian Fernandez Bastarreche has shown. 52 
Education in military academies was comparatively expensive, but 
the sons of officers were entitled to advantages in admission and 
financial benefits. Thus many officers were encouraged to direct 
their male offspring towards a military career. The rise in self- 
recruitment had important consequences for the relationship 
between civilian society and the military from 1874 onwards. The 
officer corps, which had been open after 1808 to any candidate 
possessing gifts and ambition, became again a sort of closed, 
self-renewing caste by the end of the nineteenth century. Kinship 
links with other professional groups grew weaker during this 
process, and the Spanish officers ended up thinking of themselves 
as a separate group, apart from the rest of society. 
53 
b) Professional concerns of career officers. 
The life of the average officer in the Spanish army during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century was distinguished by 
financial difficulties and professional dissatisfaction. The roots 
of this situation lay in the surplus of officers caused 
by the 
civil wars and political upheavals from the 
1830s to the mid- 
1870s. The problem was that, once the military need 
had 
disappeared, the government was unable to find a suitable way 
to 
release the officers who had no usefulness 
in peacetime. Since the 
retirement pay was low, few officers were ready 
to leave the army 
prematurely. The only solution lay 
in long-term policies which 
reduced the strength of the officer corps 
through a process of 
natural wastage (for instance, by slowing 
down promotions). 
52 Fernando Fernandez Bastarreche, El ejercito espanol en el siglo XIX (Madrid, 1978), pp. 
8-12, 
103-23. 
53 Busquets, pp. 63-6; Headrick, E'et rcito, p. 78. 
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Unfortunately, new conflicts broke out before the benefits of such 
policies could be reaped. Thus the policy pursued by the 
Restoration cabinets after 1879 was ruined by the colonial wars of 
1895-1898: the refusal of many officers to fight overseas obliged 
the government to commission in a hurry large numbers of students 
of the military academies (after abridged training courses) and 
non-commissioned officers. 54 
The officers' unwillingness to leave the army was due to their 
social origins and status. The average officer came from a family 
of the middle classes (which most military families can be 
assimilated to in social terms), whose sources of income were 
often jobs in the civil or armed services. The backwardness of the 
Spanish economy did not offer many chances to make a living in 
industry or business. So, unless they had got substantial private 
means, officers were very reluctant to give up the safety offered 
by a place on the payroll of the state. Moreover, the officers' 
living standards improved after a rise in pay in the 1880s. 55 
Besides the economic issues, the other major concern in an 
officer's career was promotion. The Spanish army had no uniform 
policy to promote officers until the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. To simplify, it will suffice to say that the artillery 
and engineer corps (the so-called facultative corps) had adopted 
seniority as the only way of promotion (closed list), whereas the 
general corps (infantry and cavalry) kept a system which opened 
their officer lists to selective promotion by merit (though many 
times merit was political rather than military) in addition to 
seniority. Seniority was slower than selection as a path to high 
rank but it prevented arbitrary promotions. The difference in 
54 Headrick, E'er 'rcito, pp. 75-6; Payne, Politics, p. 76. 
55 Headrick, E'er 'rcito, pp. 85-7. 
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promotion systems caused bitter disagreements among the arms of 
the service during the nineteenth century. A compromise was 
reached at last in 1889: all the officers would be promoted in 
peacetime by seniority up to the rank of colonel and would get 
merit promotions in wartime (although artillerymen and engineers 
could exchange war merit promotions for a special pensioned medal 
56 - the Maria Cristina Cross). 
c) The 1898 defeat and its consequences. 
The military defeat of 1898, which highlighted the flaws of the 
Spanish military establishment, did not foster reform in depth. 
There was no single culprit for the decay of the army. It was true 
that the military had displayed a shameful image when many members 
of the oversized officer corps refused to fight overseas. But, on 
the other hand, the dynastic politicians and their social 
supporting groups were too comfortable with the existing military 
system to undertake any serious reform, and their criticisms after 
the defeat were no more than a search for military scapegoats to 
57 erase their remorse. 
The explanation for this situation lay in the interdependence of 
the Restoration's civilian power and the army. The latter was the 
shield of the ruling elites against the new political and social 
groups (e. g. left-wing parties and trade unions, and the 
Catalonian nationalist movement) which threatened the traditional 
foundations of the Spanish government. Despite its dislike of 
56 Ibid., pp. 88-97. The artillery, engineers and staff corps were called "specialist' because their 
officers received more technical and scientific education than those of the 
infantry and the cavalry 
(corps which were known as the `general arms'): Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo- 
americana (hereafter Enciclopedia Espana), 80 vol. plus biennial supplements 
(Madrid, 1908 
onwards) sv `Arma', VI. 428; ibid. sv `Cuerpo', XVI. 1017. The system of promotion combining 
seniority and merit was called `open list' (escala abierta) to differentiate 
it from the `closed list' 
(escala cerrada): ibid. sv `Escala', XX. 588. 
57 Fernando Fernandez Bastarreche, `El Ejercito', in Historic General de Espana y America, 25 
vol. (Madrid, 1981-1992), XVI-1.674. 
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civilian politicians and unwillingness to perform the police 
forces' role, the officer corps loathed still more what it saw as 
threats to the social order and unity of the fatherland. The 
dynastic politicians, in turn, refrained from any professional 
reform which damaged the vested interests of the military section 
of their middle class clientele (one of the pillars of the 
Restoration's political system). Thus this interlocking of 
interests meant that the rise of military professional standards 
was tied to political reform. 58 
The ruling politicians' fear of losing their middle class 
support deterred them for a long time from implementing an obvious 
solution, adopted in other European countries, to the problem of 
the surplus of regular officers: the creation of a reserve of 
civilians trained as officers during their compulsory military 
service, who could be called up in wartime and released after the 
conflict was over. The educated middle classes were the natural 
suppliers of this kind of officer at that time. But the Spanish 
middle classes were actually exempt from military service (with 
the consent of the ruling elites) until the early 1910s: a payment 
in cash or the purchase of a substitute avoided any service with 
the colours. Thus conscription affected the illiterate lower 
classes alone. The 1912 military service act suppressed exemption 
from military service by means of cash payment or substitution: 
every able-bodied man could be drafted into the army for a three- 
year term. However, those who paid a certain amount and proved a 
satisfactory level of military training could be released after a 
few months' service. So the main burden of conscription still fell 
on the lower strata of Spanish society. The 1912 act provided 
for 
the creation of a reserve of officers (the `complementary list', 
58 Carolyn P. Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain (Chapel Hill, 1979), p. 26; Payne, Politics, 
pp. 89-90. 
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whose members had to satisfy certain educational requirements and 
pay for their personal equipment), but it was not very successful 
because most of the would-be candidates among the educated middle 
and upper classes preferred to take advantage of the short- 
service terms as enlisted men. 59 
The colonial disaster of 1898 worsened the professional 
prospects of the officer corps. The demobilization left only 
79,000 enlisted men in the colours; they were officered by a cadre 
21,500-strong (there were also 530 general officers). 60 This meant 
a ratio of enlisted men to officers of 3.6: 1 (and Fernandez 
Bastarreche suggests that in practice the ratio was nearer to 
2: 1) . In contrast, the ratio in other European armies was between 
17: 1 and 24: 1.61 
The effects of such a situation for the preparation of the army 
and for the military careers were appalling. Officer salaries 
absorbed 58 per cent of the 1900 army budget, which devoted only 
9.5 per cent to ordnance. About a decade later, 35 per cent of the 
budget was still spent on the salaries of officers (Germany and 
France devoted only half of this percentage). 62 
Reductions of officer personnel were the only solution in the 
long term, but they could not be carried out resolutely by the 
government because they harmed the vested interests of the officer 
corps, and no cabinet wished to fall out with it. The military 
academies (which had been closed after the 1898 war) opened 
their 
doors again in 1902 under the pressure of officers whose sons 
aspired to a military career. The alleged reason was 
the shortage 
s9 Headrick, Ei6rcito, pp. 101-4; Payne, Politics, pp. 99-101; Michael Alpert, La reforma militar de 
Azana (1931-1933) (Madrid, 1982), pp. 49,95-6; Gabriel Cardona, El poder militar en la Espana 
co_poränea hasta la guerra civil (Madrid, 1983), pp. 8-9. 
60 Headrick, Ej rcito, pp. 272,276-7. 
61 Fernandez Bastarreche, `El Ejercito', XVI-1 657; Headrick, Ejercito, p. 75. 
62 Fernandez Bastarreche, `El Ejercito', XVI-1.657; Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 32. 
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of subalterns. Such a shortage was real, but it was due to the 
eagerness for fast promotions in the early years of an officer's 
career, which depleted the junior ranks. Spanish lieutenants 
needed only nine to twelve years' service to reach the rank of 
captain (a Prussian lieutenant needed from sixteen to eighteen 
years), and infantry officers often became majors when they were 
about forty years old (French officers on a fast-track career 
could reach this rank at forty but others had to wait until they 
were forty nine years old). But the Spanish officers' careers 
stagnated afterwards due to the surplus of field officers in the 
army lists (in contrast, the German army's personnel policy cut 
down the number of officers suitable for field grade, but their 
careers speeded up thereafter). This eagerness for promotion also 
reduced the usefulness of the policy of amortization of vacancies. 
The government decided in 1899 to suppress one out of every two 
vacancies of the same rank (so that there would be one promotion 
only). The junior officers did not welcome the decision because it 
meant they must stay longer in the lower paid ranks, and the 
unrest forced the war minister, General Weyler, to reduce the rate 
of amortization to 25 per cent of the vacancies. 63 
The failure of policies to cut substantially the number of 
underemployed officers (8,000 out of 18,000 officers had no active 
appointment in 1906) also meant that any rise in salaries was out 
of the question. This could not help fostering the interest of 
officers not to stay too long in the junior ranks, which therefore 
6 
caused the need for a steady flow of new junior officers. 
4 
d) The officer corps' reluctance for military reform. 
The roots of the officer corps' resistance to a significant 
63 Headrick, E'er 'rcito, p. 76; Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 27-8. 
64Payne, Politics, p. 98; Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 28. 
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reform in the way personnel policy was managed did not lie in 
their alleged fear of a deterioration of the army's military 
effectiveness. Actually such a reform would have been the base for 
an improvement of the army as a whole. The reality was that the 
Spanish officer corps had become something rather close to one 
more branch of the state bureaucracy, whose corporate vested 
interests seemed to be more important than professionalism. The 
average officer acted in practice as if his career was a way to 
earn one's living instead of a professional vocation, and any 
reform meaning cuts in personnel was rejected by arguing that this 
generation did not have to pay for the mistakes of the previous 
ones. This situation was tolerated by the regime's political 
leaders in order not to lose the support of this influential 
65 clientele . 
Comandante Beta saw this military problem as a derivation of the 
country's overall problem with the middle classes. Spain's limited 
economic development did not offer many employment opportunities 
to these classes. Since the doors of industry and commerce were so 
narrow, they looked for and hoarded jobs in the government 
branches; the army was no exception. Moreover, as another military 
essayist, Colonel Modesto Navarro, pointed out, education 
in the 
military academies was comparatively short and offered a sure wage 
at its end, unlike university education 
(which was rather 
expensive as well). Comandante Beta concluded 
that the Spanish 
army was no more than a productive cow which 
fed good, educated 
citizens whose military spirit had 
become impoverished, if it ever 
existed. 
66 
65 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 27. 
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This self-interested concept of the military career was not new 
in 1900. Probably, it was already noticed in the 1880s. A 
professional journal article reproduced the comments of General 
Galbis, the first commandant of the General Military Academy, on 
the `advantages' offered by the different corps in that period. An 
officer of military administration (quartermaster corps) found 
cushy, danger-free appointments more easily. The engineer officer 
could use his professional education (and thrive) in both military 
and civil life. The staff corps offered a fast track to the 
highest ranks. The artillery officer alternated regimental service 
and quieter appointments in army factories. The cavalry offered as 
a compensation the joys of horsemanship. Finally, the infantry 
officer found only routine barracks duty, rubbing shoulders with 
the rank and file, and the prospect of being killed because of the 
command' s incompetence. 67 
The self-interest was also partly a consequence of the lot of 
the Spanish officer after being commissioned. For instance, 
Second-lieutenant (later Lieutenant-general) Franco Salgado-Araujo 
went to an ordinary provincial garrison in his first appointment 
after graduating at the Infantry Academy in 1911. He found that 
the strength of the company in which he was to be a subaltern was 
about fifty men (the theoretical strength of one platoon was 
around eighty men). He felt a great 
disappointment: `For this 
reality, I told myself, did I spend 
three years studying the 
campaigns of Hannibal, the Great 
Captain [Gonzalo Fernandez de 
Cordoba], Napoleon, the Franco-Prussian and Russian-Japanese 
Wars, 
logistics, tactics of the three fighting arms, and so on? 
' Franco 
Salgado-Araujo decided to apply for an appointment 
in one of the 
units operating 
in Morocco in order to satisfy his professional 
67 X., `El espiritu de la juventud militar', Revista Tecnica de Infanteria y Caballeria 
(hereafter 
RTIC), XIII, 2 (July-December 1903), pp. 32-3. 
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eagerness. 68 However, many others conformed to the atmosphere of 
inactivity. 
The poverty of professional life was not made good by the joys 
of a dazzling social life. Though the military academy educated 
him to get on with the upper strata of society, the tight salaries 
confined the officer to the quarters of bleak barracks and modest 
boarding houses. Unless he came from a wealthy family, an officer 
could not permit himself to haunt the select social circles. As 
the scholar Mariano Aguilar Olivencia sums it up: `Under the 
glitter of the military uniform, a bleak history of tears, grief 
and poverty was hidden. '69 
The bulk of the officer corps drew annual salaries ranging from 
2,500 pesetas (lieutenants) to 5,500 pesetas (majors) by the 
beginning of the century. After deducting the income tax (from 5 
to 18 per cent of the basic salary), these amounts were enough to 
cover the essential expenses of the average officer and his family 
- despite the lack of housing benefits and subsidized foodstores 
for the military. Nonetheless, they were far from allowing classy 
living standards. A captain at forty, on the eve of promotion to 
major, earned 3,500 pesetas per year plus an additional amount of 
600 pesetas after ten years in his current rank. But a civil 
servant of an equivalent rank could drew from 3,500 to 
4,000 
pesetas, whereas a bank clerk earned about 3,700 pesetas after 
twenty years in his job. So the average officer had lower middle 
class earnings, while he was supposed to 
live as a gentleman. 
68 `j, Para esta realidad, me decia, he pasado tres anos estudiando las campanas 
de Anibal, del Gran 
Capitän, de Napoleon, la guerra franco-prusiana y la ruso japonesa, logistica, täctica de las tres 
armas, etc, etc? ' Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida 
junto a Franco (Barcelona, 1977), p. 
23. Franco Salgado-Araujo (1890-1975) was a cousin of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde, 
nationalist generalissimo (1936-1939) and Spain's 
head of state (1939-1975); his professional 
career from the mid-1920s to the early 1970s developed mainly as 
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Actually the Spanish officer devoted much of his home budget to 
maintaining such a gentlemanly appearance and behaviour, since he 
was anxious to display his self-image in front of subordinates and 
civilians . 
70 
Some posts brought extra earnings (e. g. appointments to the 
regiments in Morocco meant a 50 per cent rise in pay, and officers 
in the Pyrenees border garrisons got better salaries as well). 
Nevertheless, most officers could not ask frequently for new 
appointments. On the one hand, the expenses of moving to another 
garrison were not paid by the army and became a heavy burden for 
officers who could hardly make ends meet on their salaries. On the 
other hand, the concession of appointments was subjected to the 
whim of ministerial authorities. The Spanish army lacked fixed 
criteria to appoint officers at the beginning of the twentieth 
century: any vacancy could be awarded by the minister's free will, 
and the senior officers of the branches (secciones) of each corps 
in the ministry were also very influential in the posting of 
personnel. Comandante Beta thought that this state of affairs 
fostered patronage and the loss of self-esteem within the 
military. An officer who had no patron in high places could even 
be posted compulsorily to a different garrison in order to create 
a vacancy needed to satisfy the application of a protege. 
According to the artilleryman Antonio Cordon, only `select' 
officers were appointed to the Horse Artillery Regiment 
(the so- 
called `artillery hussars') due to its `aristocratic' 
life style 
and its close relationship with King Alfonso XIII. 
This situation 
ended in May 1917 thanks to a sensible decree of 
War Minister 
General Aguilera, which regulated the concession of appointments 
70 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 32-4,310 n 28; Puell de la Villa, `Las fuerzas armadas en la 
crisis', V. 90. See also an overview of the social and economic situation of the officer corps 
based 
on the contemporary military press in Aguilar Olivencia, `La opinion püblica militar', 
V. 166-78. 
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from the rank of second-lieutenant up to that of colonel according 
to the strict seniority of the applicants. There would be only a 
few exceptions, such as appointments to the General Staff and War 
Ministry, teaching staff of the military academies, and military 
71 
.1 
Since only a limited number of officers could ease their 
financial difficulties within the army, the rest had no 
alternative but to look for relief outside it. Officers in reduced 
pay situations ('substitute' and involuntary unassigned') and 
unpaid supernumerary officers could work full-time in civilian 
jobs without losing their seniority in the army list. Artillery 
and engineer officers could get ready profits from this situation 
because their scientific-oriented military education fitted easily 
with the civil economy's demands. However, few infantry and 
cavalry officers found suitable jobs, and most of them limited 
themselves to work in part-time civil jobs (for instance, teaching 
in private preparatory schools for the military academies) . 
72 
General de Santiago, who inspected the Infantry Academy in Toledo 
in the autumn of 1907, remarked on the effects of an order 
recently issued (5 October 1907) banning officers in active 
service from teaching in preparatory schools, unless they applied 
for leave as unpaid supernumerary officers. The result was that 
the teaching in the preparatory schools of Toledo had to stop due 
to the shortage of staff. And this mean a financial loss for the 
officers, since even full-time teaching in those schools did 
71 Gallego, Proyecto de reorganizaciön, p. 28; Puell, `Las fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 94-6; 
Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 33; Beta, pp. 47-8; Antonio Cordon, Trayectoria (Recuerdos de un 
artillero (Paris, 1971), p. 65. Commissioned in the mid-1910s, Cordon (1895-1969) left the 
service under Azana's volunteer retirement decree (1931); he rejoined the army on the republican 
side in the Civil War and held senior staff appointments on the Andalusian and Aragonese fronts; 
posted to the army general staff, he was dismissed by Minister of Defence Prieto under allegations 
of promoting communist influence within the republican army (Cordon was indeed a member of 
the Spanish Communist Party), but he later became Ministry of Defence undersecretary (1938) and 
chief of staff of the eastern army group, and was raised to general officer rank in February 1939. 
72 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 33. 
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not make good the loss of army pay. 73 
e) A review of the Spanish officer corps in 1907. 
General de Santiago's remarks were included in one of the 
reports of the inspection review carried out in 1907. They were 
submitted by the captain-generals of the military regions (the 
general officers commanding these territorial commands) and 
display an interesting picture of the situation of the officer 
corps by this year. 
The report of the First Military Region noted the sad impression 
caused by the struggle of most officers to maintain a proper 
appearance with their pay alone. If a rise in salaries was not 
possible, the abolition of the income tax for state employees 
would at least remove the need for usury. The Fourth Military 
Region included in its report a list of officers who were not 
recommended for an appointment as commanding officers: thirteen 
out of nineteen had got into debt problems. 74 The limited salary 
maybe was not the only cause of indebtedness for some officers. 
Gambling proliferated in Spain in the early years of the twentieth 
century, and the officers were not immune to its temptation - as 
the airman Hidalgo de Cisneros witnessed. 75 
The report of the Fifth Military Region reckoned that the root 
of the indebtedness and poor morality of many officers lay in 
their formative years in the military academies. The report 
recommended the implementation of compulsory boarding, since those 
73 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, P Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/1. 
74 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, la Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/1; 
Revista de Inspeccion al Ejercito: Capitania General, 4a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/4. 
75 Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros, Cambio de rumbo, 2 vol. (Barcelona, 1977), I. 56, I. 89-90. After 
being commissioned in the quartermaster corps in order to join the army air service (there was not 
direct entrance to it), Hidalgo de Cisneros (1896-1966) took part in the Moroccan campaigns of 
the 1920s (achieving the dubious glory of pioneering aerial gas bombing - which was almost 
useless against the Riff natives) and became the commander-in-chief of the republican air 
force in 
the Civil War. 
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officer candidates who lived outside the academy walls did not get 
used to the essential disciplinary habits. The boarding system was 
reckoned essential to inculcate deeply the military customs and 
ethos and spare the officer candidates' parents from fears and 
expenses . 
76 
The report of the First Military Region also denounced the fact 
that some officers were in the habit of obtaining temporary 
releases from the service, or appointments such as posts in 
conscription offices (zonas de reclutamiento) or military courts - 
far from the close supervision of their commanders - in order to 
improve their own qualifications. For instance, a cavalry officer 
who worked as a military judge had got good qualifications despite 
his propensity to get into debt. " This situation had been 
denounced a few years before by Captain Eduardo Gallego, who 
stated that the lack of any stimulus and supervision caused a 
deplorable average level of professional proficiency. Personal 
records were filled up year after year with no criteria other than 
the officer's punctuality and health. And if assessing the ability 
of an officer in a regiment was difficult because of this 
procedure, the assessment was even more difficult if the officer 
was appointed in a bureaucratic post. 
78 
It was too easy to obtain temporary releases, which removed the 
officers from professional service for too long (a staff corps 
lieutenant-colonel in the First Military Region reached this rank 
despite spending most of his career years in such releases, either 
for his private business or to fulfil his duties as deputy or 
senator in the parliament). The report of 
the Fifth Military 
Region stated that the supernumerary status, created to 
have a 
76 Revista de Inspeccion al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/5. 
" Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, la Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/1. 
78 Gallego, Proyecto de reorganization, p. 18. 
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reserve of officers, had lost its purpose. The supernumerary 
officers became so devoted to their private business that they 
forgot their military professional expertise. Even so, they did 
not lose seniority in their rank, could get the San Hermenegildo 
Cross (an endowed award for long service) and were entitled to 
retirement pay (or a widow's pension for their family), just like 
those who had performed active service for all their military 
career. 79 
The reports of several military regions also observed the 
difference between the age suitable for every post in the service 
and the actual age of the holders. Many young officers were 
appointed to conscription offices and reserve units (outfits which 
only performed bureaucratic duties), while officers advanced in 
years still performed regimental service. 80 This had repercussions 
for the training of the fighting units. An observer of the 
manoeuvres in the Sixth Military Region in 1902 remarked that many 
infantry company commanders and subalterns were too old, and fast 
combat movements were slowed down due to their inability to 
command their soldiers from a leading position. 81 
The report of the Fifth Military Region displays several cases 
of physical or professional inability in serving officers that the 
careless personnel policy had allowed. A senior administrative 
officer held his post for a year though he was paralysed and 
unable to speak; an infantry lieutenant-colonel who could not walk 
had been promoted three times without performing regimental 
service; one major on temporary release turned down a proposal to 
79 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, la Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/1; 
Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/5. 
80 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 2a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/2; 
Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 4a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/4; 
Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 7a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/7. 
81 Domingo Arräiz de Conderena, `Las präcticas y ejercicios militares de la 6a Region en octubre 
de 1902', RTIC, XIII, 1 (January-June 1903), p. 562. 
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command two companies because he considered himself `ignorant' 
(lego); and, faced with the same proposal, several majors `started 
to quake' (se pusieron a temblar) - one of them asked for six 
months in order to get ready. The list was completed by an 
infantry colonel, suffering from a hernia, who could not ride; a 
major unable to walk due to a softening of the marrow; and three 
`mad captains' (capitanes locos). 82 
This report found it strange that these cases were ignored by 
their immediate commanders. The report attributed such neglect to 
a misplaced kindness, which conceded too many highly positive 
comments in the individual proficiency reports. In the Fifth 
Region, this practice was frequent in the infantry, the cavalry 
and, to a lesser extent, the artillery corps (on the contrary, the 
engineers and the staff corps were sparing with such comments). 
For instance, officers whose annual records included rebukes for 
incompetence saw their ability later described as good. The 
reports of the Sixth and Seventh Military Regions also commented 
on the lack of reliability of the personal qualification 
reports. 83 
The reports of the other territorial commands did not mention 
this problem. This suggests that their captain-generals maybe 
consented to such practices and turned a blind eye to officers 
whose professional performance was less than satisfactory. The 
cases recorded in the Fifth Military Region were perhaps the 
oddest ones, but then it seems fair to wonder how many cases of 
less exaggerated professional decay existed. Surveys of officers' 
personal records and the army lists (a task which 
is outside the 
82 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/5. 
83 Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 5a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/5; 
Revista de Inspecciön al Ejercito: Capitania General, 6a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/6; 
Revista de Inspeccion al Ejercito: Capitania General, 7a Region Militar, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/7. 
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scope of this writer's research) maybe would make possible a 
quantitative analysis of the degree of professional commitment of 
the Spanish officer corps. According to Comandante Beta, who took 
the data from the 1913 edition of the Anuario Militar de Espana 
(the military yearbook), 850 out of 1,836 infantry field officers 
(46 per cent) held bureaucratic posts in conscription offices and 
reserve depots or were on temporary releases. 84 
The consequence of the underemployment and the poor professional 
and financial prospects was an unsatisfying personal life for the 
average officer of junior and middle rank. This produced 
frustration and over-sensitiveness to criticisms from the 
civilians, who thought the military were not worth the money spent 
in the War Ministry budget. The civilians were partly unfair, but 
the officer corps - in opposing to personnel cuts - was 
responsible for the situation as well. 
85 
This survey of the social background reveals a very inadequate 
environment for the achievement of good professional standards. 
This was partly a consequence of external factors (such as the 
restless internal and external politics of Spain during the 
nineteenth century) which too often obstructed any sort of 
long- 
term military policy. But, on the other hand, the actual 
behaviour 
of the officer corps itself shows a comparatively 
limited 
professional ethos, due to a too self-interested concept 
of the 
military career (which appeared easily 
in underemployed officers) 
and the acquiescence of the civil authorities, 
which rather than 
cutting away the useless elements of 
the military, left untouched 
corporate vested interests to safeguard 
their own political ones. 
84 Beta, pp. 203-16. 
" Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 34-5; Aguilar Olivencia, `La opinion püblica militar', 
V. 171. 
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2. - SPANISH MILITARY CORPORATISM IN THE EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY. 
External factors (such as financial constraints, or the 
cabinets' awkward military policies) were not the only explanation 
for the Spanish military's professional weaknesses. The officer 
corps itself also had much to do with the professional decay of 
the military. The army suffered from its branches' corporate 
factionalism. This fostered a petty-minded, parochial spirit 
which, far from promoting cooperation, strengthened distrust and 
hindered the efforts at military modernization. This chapter 
surveys such corporatism, which took root during military 
education and affected even the professional elite of the officer 
corps: the staff officers. 
1. The educational divide: the system of separate 
at-adAmi oa 
a) Spanish military education from 1800 to 1893. 
The evolution of officer training during the nineteenth century 
was closely affected by the upheavals of Spain's wars and 
politics. 1 At the beginning of the century most of the officer 
candidates of the Spanish army of the Ancien Regime were trained 
in the regiments, excepting those of the artillery and engineer 
corps, who went to their respective specialist schools, located 
in 
Segovia (artillery) and Alcalä de Henares (engineers). The French 
invasion of 1808 threw the whole system into disarray, like the 
rest of the military organization. During the war against 
Napoleon 
(1808-1814), the Spanish authorities set up several improvised 
military schools. Three of them (for infantry and cavalry officer 
candidates) survived after the war and, 
in addition to the 




restored artillery and engineer schools, carried on training 
officers under King Fernando VII's first period of absolute rule 
(1814-1820) and the years of liberal government after a military 
revolt in 1820. 
The military schools were closed in 1823, when Fernando VII got 
back his absolute power and undertook a thorough reform of the 
army. A new, single military academy - the Colegio General Militar 
(General Military College) - was opened in Segovia in 1825. Its 
syllabus was five years long, and the students came from the 
wealthy nobility, in order to guarantee the loyalty of the future 
officers. However, its work was harmed by the First Carlist War 
(1833-1840) - which brought about a demand for officers which 
could only be met through new, additional officer schools - and by 
criticism of its unified teaching for all arms despite their 
different requirements. The occupation of Segovia by carlist 
forces caused the closing of the military college in 1837. 
Nevertheless, the policy of a single centre stood up for a while 
and the Colegio General - now with a three years syllabus - was 
set up again in Madrid (1842) and moved later to Toledo 
(1846). 
After a few years, the idea of separate specialist training 
for 
each arm finally prevailed and a decree dated 
5 November 1850 set 
up a system of separate academies 
for staff corps, infantry, 
cavalry, artillery and engineers. 
Alongside the academies, the 
system of regimental officer cadets - which 
was abolished and 
restored several times after 
1814 - went on training a number of 
officers until its final abolition after 
the Third Carlist War 
(1872-1876). 
The idea of a single military academy was revived 
by War 
Minister General Martinez Campos, who ordered 
the creation of the 
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Academia General Militar (General Military Academy) in 1882. 
Admission was through examination and, after 1890, a secondary 
education diploma was required for entrance; candidates had to be 
fifteen years old at least and younger than eighteen. The officer 
candidates took basic officer training for two years and, after 
passing the second year, went to the infantry or cavalry academies 
(where they graduated after one year), or followed a preparatory 
course for the staff corps, artillery or engineer academies. Those 
who passed the course were commissioned as second-lieutenants 
before joining their specialist school. 
The General Military Academy aspired to the improvement of the 
internal harmony of the Spanish officer corps by diminishing the 
tense relationship among the branches of the service. A major flaw 
of the system of separate academies was its failure to provide a 
corporate spirit for the officer corps as a whole. Each academy 
doubtless impressed an indoctrination of general military values 
and attitudes in its graduates. But this was not enough to 
overcome the inward-looking corporatism of the branches of the 
service, eager to advance their own interests. Since the officer 
candidates of a general academy had to live together and received 
a common indoctrination, it was easier to develop sympathetic 
attitudes to fellow-officers of other corps and reduce social 
differences. The esprit d'armee would prevail over the esprit de 
corps and its petty corporate interests. Thus, it was hoped, the 
officer corps would turn into a more homogeneous, stable group 
under the Restoration regime. 
The General Military Academy was not as successful as intended. 
The syllabus did not reconcile sufficiently the educational 
requirements for the different arms. Since the artillery corps 
had 
responsibilities for the manufacture of weapons and 
the engineer 
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corps was in charge of military buildings, they required more 
scientific training than the infantry and the cavalry. Different 
syllabi - according to the arm the students aspired to - were 
introduced. A candidate for a : specialist, corps (artillery, 
engineers or staff corps) also took a risk of being forced to join 
an undesired arm because of a lack of vacancies in his original 
choice. These factors, plus a desire to cut military expenses, 
were influential in the closing of the academy by War Minister 
General Lopez Dominguez in 1893. But the pressures of the 
specialist corps, eager to preserve their touchy esprit de corps 
and recover the whole training process of their officers, must 
also be taken into account. And Lopez Dominguez, an artilleryman 
himself, was doubtless receptive to their arguments. 2 
b) The reform of 1893. 
The decree (dated 8 February 1893) which ordered the closing of 
the General Military Academy also laid down the new organization 
of military education. Officers would be trained in separate corps 
academies again: infantry (Toledo), cavalry (Valladolid), 
artillery (Segovia) and engineers (Guadalajara) . There would also 
be a staff college in Madrid. The introduction to the decree 
pointed out that the system of separate academies allowed the 
numbers of annual admissions to be settled accurately according to 
the needs of each corps. 
3 
The reform abolished an unhealthy practice as well. Candidates 
coming from the rank and file were entitled to several 
benefits (a 
higher age limit, exemption from secondary education, subsistence 
grants, free preparatory studies). In practice, many sons of 
families with some private means (including large numbers of 
2 Headrick, Ejercito, p. 240. 
3 CLE 1893, No. 33. 
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officers' sons) who aspired to the military academies joined the 
army as volunteer privates. Since the taxpayer's money paid for 
the studies of those officer candidates who came from the rank and 
file, volunteering had become a simple (and much abused) way to 
get a commission free. This had spoiled a measure thought to 
assist deserving enlisted men. After 1893, the benefits were to be 
limited to conscripts alone .4 
The decree established that the aspirants should have completed 
secondary education studies and had to prove their proficiency in 
specific subjects through examinations. Those who got the best 
marks in the examinations would be admitted. However, as long as 
they got the minimum marks, orphans and brothers of military men 
killed on campaign would be admitted besides the approved number 
of students. 5 
The duration of the syllabus was three years (infantry, cavalry 
and military administration) or five years (artillery and 
engineers) . The last two years 
in all of them had to be attended 
in the academies, while the previous years could be studied 
privately and passed through examination alone. The students of 
the cavalry, artillery and engineer academies would be external; 
the decree does not clarify if there was a compulsory boarding 
regime for the infantry students. After passing 
the third year, 
the students would be commissioned as second-lieutenants. 
6 They 
were promoted to lieutenants after graduation 
at the academy 
(specialist corps) or after two years of service 
(infantry and 
cavalry). 
' The graduates of the specialist corps' academies also 
got a professional degree equivalent 
to an university degree in 
4 Ibid. (Introduction). 
5 mid. (articles 7 and 8). 
6 Ibid. (articles 10,11,13 and 17). 
7 Busquets, p. 81. 
65 
engineering (industrial engineering for artillery officers and 
civil engineering for engineer officers) .8 This degree was very 
useful when an officer looked for an accompanying job out of the 
army -a not uncommon case. 
The requirement for a full secondary education (bachillerato) 
was not demanded in practice by the military authorities, which 
were content with a few subjects from the first four years of 
secondary education. 9 On the other hand, the case for suppressing 
the General Military Academy based on the alleged benefits of 
allowing the candidates to choose their arm at the outset was 
rather contradicted by their freedom to sit the examinations in 
several academies in the same year: for instance, Antonio Cordon 
was examined (and got admission) in the infantry, artillery and 
engineer academies in 1911.10 If many candidates really wished to 
become officers in a specific arm alone, they should have no 
reason to apply for admission to other corps at the same time. In 
short, the 1893 reform did no more than suppress the intermediate 
step of the General Military Academy, and it could still produce 
officers allegedly dissatisfied with their arm of the service. 
However, if this kind of dissatisfaction was so great a problem 
as the partisans of separate academies avowed, the fact is that 
the affected officers adapted themselves to their situation 
remarkably well, or at least did not complain aloud. A plausible 
explanation lies in the motivation of candidates for the military 
career. As has been shown in Chapter 1, the economic safety given 
by a job on the state payroll was a major incentive (if not the 
only one) for many middle class candidates to take a career 
in the 
8 Enrique Ruiz-Fornells and Alfredo Melgar Mata, Organizaciön militar de Espana y algunas 
potncias extranjeras, 9th edition (Toledo, 1901), p. 119 
fn 2; Busquets, p. 118. 
9 Busquets, p. 80; Cordon, p. 23. 
10 Cordon, p. 23. 
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army. The effects of such a mind-set on the Spanish army's 
professionalism were deplorable, and the military academies and 
their educational system were partly responsible because of their 
failure to select the right officer material. 
c) The criticism of Spanish military education after 1893. 
The flaws of the system implemented after 1893 started with the 
admission procedures, which were unanimously condemned by 
contemporary critical literature. There was no real inquiry about 
the family and moral background of the candidates, so the 
selection depended finally on the examination results alone. " The 
problem got worse due to the limited scope of these examinations, 
which could not assess the candidate's specific fitness to be an 
officer, since they only tested his mathematical knowledge. 12 This 
limitation in content made admission easier for young teenagers 
whose later performance in the academy proved their physical or 
intellectual handicaps (and even their limited basic education: 
for instance, spelling mistakes were frequent amongst the 
13 students) . 
The syllabi of the academies were another common target for 
contemporary critics. Spanish military education was dominated by 
theoretical studies, whose utility for junior officers was 
doubtful, to say the least. On the other hand, professional 
matters such as the essential tasks of junior command and field 
service were relegated to a secondary status, behind scientific 
and mathematical subjects. 
14 The Infantry Academy, when it had to 
°1 Capitän Subrio Escdpula, `Reformas militares', Revista Cientificc- Militar (hereafter RCM), 
XXVI (1901), pp. 134-6; for a heated and thorough criticism of the Spanish military academies see 
also Equis, II. 41-78. 
12 Beta, p. 128. 
13 Revista de inspecciön, Reformas que se proponen en las Academias y Colegios Militares, 17 
June 1907, Archivo General Militar de Segovia (hereafter AGMS) 2/3/123. 
14 Critön [pseud. of Ricardo Burguete Lana], Hä ag se Ejercito. Infanteria, Caballeria, Artilleria. 
Estudios täcticos all alcance de todos (Barcelona, 1899), pp. 41-4; Efeele, El desastre nacional y los 
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shorten the training of officers to one year due to the colonial 
wars of 1895-1898, still kept the higher scientific subjects, 
while it did not take care of the students' physical fitness. 15 
Within this context, the reader may guess which armies Captain 
Herrera was thinking of when he wrote in his report on the Russo- 
Japanese War that the Japanese army's officer training lacked 
syllabi which used up the energy of 
... the unfortunate group of people who, in some 
countries, turn up to nourish the officer corps, to the 
point of turning them into engineers, doctors in 
science, architects, astronomers, geodesists, and so on; 
[these are] very respectable professional 
qualifications, but they are useless for developing 
leadership skills, getting used to command duties, 
deploying large masses of troops, being a good sapper or 
pontonier, or correctly handling a gun, a rifle or a 
horse. ' 6 
Moreover, teaching methods were based on rote learning of huge 
quantities of information from textbooks, without any room for 
personal work. '' This sort of education has been reckoned prone to 
produce a tendency to conformity and uncritical acceptance of 
orders and established procedures. '8 Perhaps this is the origin of 
the passive obedience which, according to a contemporary military 
essayist, prevailed among the Spanish officers during the Melilla 
campaign of 1909.19 Several decades later, General Kindelän 
deplored the lack of initiative displayed by the nationalist 
army's commanders during the Civil War. According to Kindelän, 
this was a result of the mental inertia prevailing in the Spanish 
vicios de nuestras instituciones militares (Madrid, 1901), pp. 291-5; Gallego, Proyecto de 
reorganizaciön, p. 17. 
15 Efeele, Desastre, pp. 243-4. 
16 `[L]a desgraciada porciön de humanidad que en algunas naciones acuden a nutrir la oficialidad 
del Ejercito, hasta el extremo de que esos oficiales resulten Ingenieros, Doctores en ciencia, 
Arquitectos, Aströnomos, Geodestas, etc, titulos todos muy respetables pero que no hacen falta 
ninguna para tener don de gentes, adquirir la präctica del mando, mover grandes masas de tropas, 
ser un buen zapador o pontonero, manejar bien un canon, un fusil o un caballo. ' Capitdn Herrera 
de la Rosa, Impresiones recogidas de la campana ruso-japonesa con el ejercito del general baron 
Nogui, p. 19,30 November 1905, AGMS 2/8/152. 
i' Equis, II. 58. 
18 Corelli Barnett, `The Education of Military Elites', Journal of Contemporary History, 2,3 (July 
1967), p. 25. 
19 Juan Aviles, 'Ensefianzas de la guerra del Rif, RCM, XXXV (1910), pp. 371-2. 
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officer corps, whose members were reluctant to think up solutions 
of their own for operational problems. The Spanish officer had `an 
extraordinary fear of responsibility, a desire of being given 
detailed and precise orders which save him from the duty of 
thinking things over and having his own criteria. '20 Most 
professional officers of both sides during the Civil War had 
passed through the military academies after the reform of 1893. 
The few memoirs which recall with some detail the life in a 
military academy at that time were written by the artillerymen 
Martinez de Campos and Cordon. They both reflect the bookish 
nature of their training. Carlos Martinez de Campos, who entered 
the Artillery Academy in 1903, recalled those years as endless 
lessons in the classroom, six hours every day. This burden was 
lightened by the afternoon gathering with his classmates, in which 
playing cards often replaced textbooks. Apart from the morning run 
to be present at the roll call, physical training was reduced to a 
weekly fencing session, horsemanship during the fourth year, and a 
march to the firing ranges on some Saturdays. Martinez de Campos 
did not hesitate to define such a life as absurd for a career 
soldier. 21 
Antonio Cordon reckoned that the academy's education was 
unsatisfactory. `The training of the students for engineering was 
20 `Mn terror extraordinario a la responsabilidad, un deseo de recibir 6rdenes detalladas y 
precisas que le libren del deber de pensar y tener criterio propio. ' Alfredo 
Kindelän y Duany, Mis 
cuadernos de guerr (Madrid, c. 1947), pp. 207-8. Kindelän 
(1879-1962) was commissioned in the 
engineer corps (1899); a pioneer of the Spanish military aviation, 
he became chief officer of the 
army air service (1926); a staunch monarchist, Kindelän 
left the service in 1931, but he returned to 
command the nationalist air force throughout the Civil 
War; although he stood for the election of 
Franco as the nationalist side's head of state, Kindelän asked unsuccessfully 
for the return of the 
monarchy in the 1940s and finished his career half-ostracized. 
21 Carlos Martinez de Campos y Serrano, Ayer, 2 vol. (Madrid, 1946-1970), I. 28-9. Martinez de 
Campos (1887-1975), a graduate of the Artillery Academy (1908) and the staff college 
(1918), 
held appointments on the General Staff and as military attache 
in Japan and Italy; during the Civil 
War, he was artillery commander of the nationalist Navarrese Brigades and the 
Army of the North; 
he became chief of army general staff in the early 1940s; after holding senior commands 
(1946- 
1953), he was appointed military tutor of the future King Juan Carlos I. 
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actually much more valued... than the specific military training. ' 
The principal, more demanding, subjects were the scientific ones, 
while the military matters - artillery firing, tactics, and so on 
- were considered secondary subjects. `This method. . . meant that 
the artilleryman, after finishing his academy years, had limited 
military knowledge and not very deep and complete civilian 
knowledge. '22 Cordon, like Martinez de Campos, was lodged in 
external accommodation (the boarding regime was established after 
mid-1914), but he had the opportunity to live for a while in the 
Infantry Academy as a visiting student in 1913-1914. He concluded 
that, by contrast with Segovia, life at the Toledo academy was 
more military, harder and nearer to that of the soldier in the 
23 barracks 
. 
In fairness, it is necessary to point out that some of the 
deficiencies of the military academies mirrored those of the 
contemporary Spanish educational system as a whole. Theory 
prevailed in the academic syllabi over practical teachings. And 
there was an emphasis on the sheer cramming of information, with 
little or no regard to the benefits of vigorous sports and 
2 physical fitness, which were neglected in Spanish society. 4 
The emphasis on science was also seen as detrimental to the 
indoctrination of military morale and ethos. This could not help 
being lamented by those military essayists stressing the 
importance of moral factors on the battlefield. Colonel Navarro 
complained in 1901 about the young officers coming out of the 
22 `A la preparaciön de los alumnos como ingenieros se concedia en realidad mucha mäs 
importancia... que a la especificamente militar. [... ] Este metodo ... conducia a que el artillero, al 
terminar los anos de academia, tuviera escasos conocimientos militares y no muy profundos ni 
completos conocimientos civiles. ' Cordon, pp. 29-30. 
23 Ibid., pp. 25,37. 
24 Criton, p. 46; Leon Fernandez Fernandez, De la ensenanza militar (Madrid, 1907), pp. 32-3; 
Manuel Espadas Burgos, `La Instituciön Libre de Ensefianza y la formaciön del militar espanol 
durante la Restauraciön', in Temas de Historia Militar, 2 vol. (Madrid, 1983), 1.498-9. 
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academies: they were well-versed in scientific theory, sometimes 
to the point of pedantry, but they lacked real military spirit and 
interest in the everyday details of the profession. 25 A decade 
later, Ricardo Burguete lambasted an education allegedly oriented 
to produce cool, rational-minded officers: the heavy mathematical 
content crushed `the ardent youthful fantasy, poetical and 
overwhelming, which makes up the most powerful lever of the 
warrior. ' 
26 
What the academies seemed to produce was no more than another 
class of bureaucrats, without any regard for their real 
proficiency for military command. 27 This state of affairs was 
worsened by the shortage of manoeuvres - which prevented the 
officers from putting into practice and improving their training - 
and the failure to assess and encourage the officers' professional 
proficiency during their later careers. Thus, after leaving the 
academy, many officers limited themselves to reading the tactical 
regulations before an exercise in order to remember the procedures 
for carrying out the movements. 28 
d) The lingering idea of a general academy. 
The idea of a common centre for the training of officers did not 
remain completely dead. Eleven years after the 1893 reform, War 
Minister General Linares - aware that basic officer training 
should be as standardized as possible for all the corps - 
decreed, 
25 Navarro, To moral', p. 65-6. 
26 `[L]a ardiente fantasia juvenil, poetica y avasalladora, que constituye el resorte mds poderoso 
del guerrero. ' Ricardo Burguete, La guerra y el hombre. Psicologla 
de las tropas (Madrid, 1911), p. 
70. A graduate of the General Military Academy, Burguete (1871-1937) was commissioned 
in the 
infantry and fought in Cuba and the Philippines (1896-1898), and Morocco (1909-1913), where 
he 
later became high commissioner (1922-1924); in the last stage of Alfonso XIII's reign, Burguete 
displayed republican leanings and his doubtful conduct turned the court martial against republican 
leaders he chaired in 1931 into a republican propaganda success; he went into retirement after the 
proclamation of the Second Republic. 
27 Beta, pp. 130,135. 
28 Efeele, Desastre, pp. 300-6; Gallego, Proyecto de reorganizacion, p. 18. 
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on 21 July 1904, the re-opening of the General Military College in 
Toledo. 29 But this decision was never implemented because of the 
rapid turnover of cabinets at that time. The cabinet which Linares 
belonged to left office in December 1904, and, after two short- 
lived cabinets, War Minister Weyler, through a decree dated 17 
August 1905, suspended the implementation of those reforms whose 
funding depended on a budget plan which had failed to get 
parliamentary approval. 30 One of those reforms was the General 
Military College. All the same, a setback like this did not 
dissuade Captain Herrera from expressing his favourable view of 
common training for officers, since this was `the best way... to 
create the same spirit in all its [the army's] branches..., 31 
Nonetheless, the general academy was not a panacea. As a critic 
of it pointed out in 1905, the benefits of a common indoctrination 
and training would be very small if they were not accompanied by a 
reform of the promotion system, since the current one allowed 
different promotion speeds in each corps. 32 This fact certainly 
would continue to cause bitterness among members of the same 
class. 
Thus the officer corps was already a not so united institution 
when its new intakes entered the academies. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the officers later developed parochialism and 
mutual mistrust which seriously damaged the professionalization of 
the army as a whole. Moreover, the contents of their training 
displayed a much-criticized remoteness from the professional 
29 CLE 1904, No. 143; Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, p. 237-8. 
3o Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra (hereafter DOMG), 19 August 1905. 
`[E]s el mejor medio... de crear el mismo espiritu en todas sus ramas... ' Capitän Herrera de la 
Rosa, Impresiones recogidas de la campana ruso-japonesa con el ejercito del general baron Nogui, 
p. 19,30 November 1905, AGMS 2/8/152; another instance of support for a single academy is 
Miguel A. Moreno y Alvarez, `Inst1ucci6n y reclutamiento de la oficialidad', RCM, XXXVI 
(1911), pp. 260-1. 
32 Capitän Subrio Escäpula, `El Colegio General Militar', RCM, XXX (1905), p. 43. 
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realities of the junior officer's service. Nonetheless, the 1893 
organization remained intact for over three decades. There were 
two reasons for its survival. First, the separate education fitted 
the exclusive corporate spirit of the specialist corps better 
than a general academy. Second, this organization suited the 
vested interests of the officers whose careers (and extra incomes) 
were closely bound to the teaching in military academies. 33 For 
this group, the more academies, the better. Even a moderate 
reformist essayist, Captain Gallego, wrote of officers who sought 
to get and remain in teaching appointments at any cost because 
these were a handy way to increase their earnings. 34 As a result, 
there was no stimulus for any reform from within. 
2. The corporate rivalries and their milita 
consequences. 
a) A social divide: the reserve officers. 
By contrast with the early and middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, when heavy politicization, factionalism, and a dangerous 
toleration of insubordination were rampant within its ranks, the 
Spanish officer corps developed an increased corporate feeling 
after 1874.35 But it still fell short of overcoming completely its 
internal differences in the early years of the twentieth century. 
For instance, besides the separate education of the arms of the 
service (surveyed above) and the professional rivalry among 
them 
(which will be discussed below), the Spanish army maintained 
two 
categories of regular officers. On the one 
hand, there were the 
officers trained in the military academies, who were grouped 
in 
the army `active list' (escala activa). On the other 
hand, there 
were the rankers, who formed the `paid reserve 
list' (escala de 
33 Equis, II. 43-4, II. 62-3, II. 71-8. 
34 Gallego, Proyecto de reorganizacion, p. 18. 
35 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 3; Headrick, Et 'rcito, pp. 96-7. 
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reserva retribuida). The officers of the active list had a middle 
class background, while the reserve officers, like the rank and 
file, usually came from the peasantry. In times of military 
conflicts, the non-commissioned officers often provided the 
subalterns which the military academies could not. The existence 
of a separate list for the rankers (called chusqueros in the 
Spanish military slang) preserved the promotion prospects of the 
active officers, who also used to get better appointments. With 
poor salaries and professional prospects, the reserve officers saw 
themselves as a group discriminated against by social prejudices. 
For example, the artillery corps prevented the creation of the 
artillery reserve list until 1908; before this year, artillery 
non-commissioned officers had to be commissioned in the infantry 
or cavalry lists . 
36 Even so, artillery rankers did not perform any 
command duty as battery officers, but they were appointed as a 
rule to the ammunition supply services. 37 
b) The specialist corps' struggle for responsibilities. 
The division caused by the way of entering the officer corps 
was less significant for the latter's internal conflicts than the 
rivalry among its branches. The artillery and the engineer corps 
were those whose officers displayed the highest degree of inner 
cohesion (though most of the evidence used in this chapter 
concerns the artillery, since they were the largest and most 
influential of the specialist corps). This cohesion stemmed from 
the common education in their corps academies and the adherence to 
a career pattern based on the closed list (that 
is, seniority 
promotion). 
36 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 28,36. The term chusguero alluded to the alleged large amount of 
chuscos (the army issue small loaves) which these officers had eaten 
during their career in the 
enlisted ranks; another army slang nickname was `spoon officer' 
(oficial de cuchara): Rafael 
Garcia Serrano, Diccionario para un macuto, 3rd edition (Barcelona, 1980), p. 528. 
37 Cordon, p. 51. 
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A foreign observer, the French journalist A. Houghton, provided 
a portrait of the artillery corps in the 1870s, which is also 
valid for the following decades. Houghton pointed out that the 
artillery officers made up a select network (une espece de franc- 
masonnerie aristocratique et severe), which turned them somewhat 
into a separate branch from the rest of the officer corps. Zealous 
to hold their ground, they supported each other like an 
aristocratic oligarchy and their manner was distinguished, 
bordering on haughtiness, with the other corps. Such an attitude 
was allegedly based on higher professional standards, which - 
according to Houghton - well bore comparison with all the European 
armies. 
38 
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many artillery 
officers stood for the abolition of merit promotion (at least 
within the corps). According to Cordon, during the late 1910s and 
early 1920s, the junior officers of the corps still thought the 
closed list a small price to pay for securing fairness within the 
military, and this did not affect the artillerymen's conduct in 
peacetime or in wartime. 39 In order to satisfy such a desire, the 
corps board decided in 1891 to collect in an album the signatures 
of those artillery officers who agreed to give up promotions by 
war merit. All the officers signed in the album, and from that 
year on all the new graduates of the Artillery Academy did it as 
well. The heading of the album was as follows: 
The artillerymen who sign this album want to conserve 
in the corps and transmit by example to those who will 
serve in it later, the traditional spirit of honour, 
union, and fellowship that they received from their 
forerunners and that led to the glory and prestige that 
the corps enjoys, both for the well-being of the 
fatherland and the honour of its members. 
And in considering that the closed list is the 
38 A. Houghton, Les origines de la restauration des Bourbons en Espagne (Paris, 1890), p. 13. 
39 Cordon, p. 43. 
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indispensable condition for the attainment of such high 
goals, they resolve to maintain it among themselves, 
offering on their honour to renounce (through the ways 
allowed by the law) any promotion within the corps or to 
a general officer vacancy assigned to it, that is not 
conceded due to seniority. 4o 
The artillery and the engineer corps looked after their cohesion 
through their own semi-official boards (juntas) 
. The artillery 
corps organized its central board (Junta Central de Artilleria) in 
1888. This body also assumed the function of watching over the 
morals of the artillery officers, and corporate prestige and 
traditions. Due to this system, fellowship was strengthened and 
inner resentment disappeared within the corps, which developed a 
gentlemanly (hidalgo) spirit, fond of tradition and hierarchies, 
and pleased to record the honours and awards of its members. 
Perhaps, according to one of its own historians, the corps became 
too snobbish, thus stirring desires for imitation in the rest of 
41 the military as well. 
The Artillery Central Board also meddled in issues which were 
clearly outside its original field of responsibility. For 
instance, it vetoed in 1903 the publication in the corps journal 
(Memorial de Artilleria) of an article which questioned the 
artillery's alleged monopoly on the use of machine guns. Even 
Vigön, an officer and historian of the corps, puts into doubt the 
competence of the board to judge the matter. 42 
'0 `Los artilleros que firman en este album quieren conservar en el Cuerpo, y transmitir con su 
ejemplo a los que vengan a formarlo, el tradicional espiritu de honor, union y companerismo que 
recibieron de sus antecesores, con el que alcanzö las glorias y prestigios que goza para bien de la 
Patria y honor de sus individuos. 
Y considerando que la escala cerrada es condiciön indispensable para el logro de tan altos fines, 
resuelven mantenerla entre si, ofreciendo por su honor renunciar (por los meritos que la ley 
permita) todo ascenso que obtengan en el Cuerpo o en vacante de general a este asignada, y no les 
corresponda por razones de antigüedad. ' The text is taken from Jorge Vigön, Historia de la 
Artilleria espanola, 3 vol. (Madrid, 1947), II. 134-5. 
41 Jorge Vigön, `Breves notas para la historia de las Juntas de Defensa y de la Dictadura', 
mimeograph (n. p. or d. ) filed in Archivo General Militar de Avila: Zona Republicana 47/73/8, p. 
3; and Vigön, Artilleria espanola, II. 134. 
42 Vigön, Artilleria espanola, 111.240. 
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This example illustrates the mistrustful attitude of the 
specialist corps on issues of technological innovation. 
Artillerymen and engineers were jealous to preserve their 
privileged status (due to their academic education) in military 
technological and scientific matters, while they competed with 
each other for responsibilities in these issues . 
43 Actually 
General Lopez Dominguez, when he was war minister in the period 
1892-1895, strengthened the corporate spirit of self-sufficiency 
by emphasizing the scientific and industrial responsibilities of 
the specialist corps (artillery, engineer and staff corps), and 
even the cavalry (on horse breeding and remount issues) . 
44 Thus, a 
reformist work of the early 1920s complained about `the internal 
struggles between corps, trying to take away responsibilities from 
each other, not because of a noble desire for a better 
performance, but from a spurious interest in holding vacancies 
[i. e. in getting appointments for officers of one's own corps]. ' 45 
Indeed, the specialist corps often seemed more interested in 
scientific knowledge than in warfare, an attitude deplored by a 
number of contemporary military essayists. Captain Gallego, an 
engineer officer himself and not too harsh a critic, remarked in 
1910 on the extraordinary contrast between the interest given in 
the Spanish army to the technical and educational institutions 
(firing schools, laboratories, technical commissions, and so on) 
and the neglect of the troops' combat training. 
46 Two decades 
43 Equis, II. 114. This jealousy was not limited to the military field alone; for instance, in 1892, the 
general inspectorate of the engineer corps sent a memorandum to the war minister to 
defend the 
right of the corps' officers to work as professional civilian engineers outside the army, through the 
assimilation of their commissions to an academic degree: Inspecciön General 
de Ingenieros, 
Secretaria to Ministro de la Guerra, 24 May 1892, AGMS 2/3/183. 
44 Miguel Alonso Baquer, Aportaciön militar a la cartografia espanola en la Historia 
contemporänea. Siglo XIX (Madrid, 1972), p. 170. 
45 '[L]as luchas intestinas de Cuerpo a Cuerpo, tratando de quitarse mutuamente servicios, no por 
la noble emulacion de desempenarlos mejor, sino por el bastardo interes de tener mäs vacantes. ' 
A. F. B. y P. de A., Nuestro ejercito. Lo que es y To gue puede ser (n. p., 1923), p. 55. 
46 Eduardo Gallego Ramos, La campana del Rif (1909). Origenes, desarrollo y consecuencias 
(Madrid, c. 1910), p. 306 fn 1. 
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later, Brigadier Emilio Mola, an infantryman, was still 
criticizing harshly the excessive interest in scientific issues, 
which reflected and fostered the corporate rivalries: 
I can offer even more proofs of petty corporatism. The 
fight between the corps to increase each one its 
importance and extend its influence over the army as a 
whole has reached anarchical proportions. There are 
laboratories and special establishments without 
discernment. A lot of chemistry, a lot of mechanics and 
a lot of ballistics!, and, above all, too many sages! 47 
Moreover, such rivalries often meant the unnecessary squandering 
of state funds. Gallego pointed out in 1905 that three brand new 
laboratories (run by the military engineers, the artillery corps 
and the state civil engineers) had been set up in the period 1898- 
1899 for a similar task of testing materials. He argued that it 
would have been more economical and rational to create a single 
laboratory whose equipment and funding might well have been shared 
by its three corporate users. 48 
c) The corporate rivalry's effects on military effectiveness. 
How far the thinking of `the more technical responsibilities, 
the more prestige' could lead is displayed by a manifesto written 
by the artillery officers of the Mahon garrison in the Balearic 
islands in November 1914. They complained that the artillery corps 
had been deprived of any corporate role in the development of 
military ballooning; it had no overall responsibility for military 
motoring nor involvement in its industrial matters; and it was 
4' `Puedo aducir aim mäs pruebas sobre el particularismo. El pugilato entre los Cuerpos por 
acrecer cads uno su importancia y extender su influencia sobre el conjunto del Ejercito ha llegado 
a extremos andrquicos. Hay laboratorios y centros especiales a tutiplen. iMucha quimica, mucha 
mecdnica y mucha balistica! y, sobre todo, idemasiados sabios! ' Emilio Mola, Obras completas 
(Valladolid, 1940), p. 972. Emilio Mola (1887-1937) pursued a successful career in the Moroccan 
campaigns and was promoted to brigadier in 1927; dismissed by the republican 
government due to his work as director of state security during the last stage of Alfonso XIII's 
reign, Mola returned to active service in 1935 under a right-wing cabinet; he became the organizer 
of the 1936 military rebellion and commanded the nationalist army in northern Spain until his 
death in an air crash in June 1937. 
48 Gallego, Proyecto de reorganizaciön, p. 44. 
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kept out of railway issues. 49 
They also complained that the artillery corps' (in their view) 
exclusive scientific authority over the matters of ballistic 
science had decreased, because the infantry and cavalry sections 
at the Firing School compiled their own firing tables for rifle 
and carbine. These officers also deplored the fact that the 
infantry had got, thanks to the machine gun, responsibilities for 
crew-served weapons (which had been a traditional monopoly of the 
artillerymen); according to them, this proved that the artillery 
corps had not received its fair share of responsibilities as the 
number of new military devices grew. 50 
Thus these artillery officers felt aggrieved because the 
infantry corps was fully responsible for the ballistic studies of 
its own weaponry. And they lamented the fact that technological 
innovation did not always mean an extension of their authority 
over ordnance and its use. Faced with such obstacles, the general 
corps - and especially the infantry - had to fight hard to 
overcome the bureaucratic opposition of the more technical-minded 
corps and develop their own tactical doctrines. 
An instance of the way the overlapping of corporate 
responsibilities could hamper the infantry's own experimental 
labour was the Central Firing School - Escuela Central de Tiro 
(ECT). This was formed in 1904 from the Artillery Firing School 
and divided into four sections (field, fortress and siege 
artillery; coastal artillery; infantry; and cavalry). The creation 
of the school had been opposed by the artillery, which wanted to 
monopolize the `legal responsibility' for all weaponry and 
firing 
matters. The existence of the cavalry section was odd anyway, 
for 
49 Equis, II. 118-9. 
50 Ibid., II. 119. 
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the cavalry weapons' firing was similar to the infantry firing; 
actually an inspection report of 1907 wondered if it would be a 
better arrangement to fuse the infantry and cavalry sections into 
a `portable arms school'. 51 
Perhaps it was reckoned that the cavalry section provided active 
appointments for a number of officers. The school itself was also 
an oddity because no other country had combined infantry and 
artillery firing schools: their respective modes of firing were 
too different and the infantry schools were rather tactical 
training centres. On the other hand, the ECT did not work as a 
testing centre either, because this role was performed - even for 
small weapons - by the Artillery Section of the War Ministry. To 
add insult to injury, the infantry and cavalry sections' own 
firing ranges were under the authority of the engineer corps. 
According to Capitän Equis, worse than the organizational flaws 
was the almost worthless tuition. The courses had an `informative' 
character only. Generals and regimental commanders were exempted 
from any course at all. Other corps' officers attended the 
artillery courses but artillery officers did not follow the 
infantry courses. Moreover, according to Capitän Equis again, the 
teaching staff did not keep its expertise up to date and easily 
lost track of new doctrines. 52 
Given this situation, it is not surprising that, as late as 
1918, a military essayist, Captain Gascuena, complained about the 
lack of tactical agreement between the fighting arms. The 1913 
infantry tactical regulations did not offer a comprehensive 
picture of combined arms combat, which had become the most usual 
case, while the 1910 artillery tactical regulations did not define 
51 Revista de Inspecciön: Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/20. 
52 Equis, II. 89-100. 
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in a clear way the mission of direct support to the infantry. 53 As 
Gascuena put it: 
Neither of the two regulations considers these more or 
less lasting groupings of artillery and infantry with a 
common mission, those frequent cases in which artillery 
elements are charged with directly supporting an 
infantry attack with subordination in mission, though 
not in command, or those exceptional ones in which 
temporary groupings are formed, by making up a tactical 
unit with subordination of the artillery to the 
appointed commander for such a unit. 54 
The need for tactical cooperation would not remain a matter of 
theoretical analysis because the Spanish army was to wage in the 
1910s a low intensity war in the Moroccan Protectorate, where all- 
arms columns played an important role. During the first phase 
(1911-1916) the artillery seems to have performed poorly. Vigön 
blames the dispersal of artillery units in penny packets attached 
to the columns for this. 55 But it can also be asked if a less 
corporate attitude to tactical training would have provided a 
better insight into combined arms operations. 
Moreover, the scientific haughtiness of the : specialist corps 
may well have been responsible for fostering a fashion for bookish 
scholarship among the infantry officers, who tried to make up for 
their lower academic education. This trend seems to have been of 
no benefit for their professional performance. After the campaign 
of 1909 in Melilla, the General Staff itself complained about the 
predominance given in the qualifications of infantry officers to 
manifestations of written brainwork - which fostered the 
production of superfluous works on military theory - over the 
53 Epifanio Gascuena, El principio de la cooperaciön y enlace de las Armas y nuestros vigentes 
reglamentos täcticos (Toledo, 1918), pp. 14,16. 
54 'Ninguno de los dos Reglamentos considera esos agrupamientos mäs o menos duraderos de 
Artilleria e Infanteria con misiön comün, esos frecuentes casos en que fracciones de Artilleria 
estän encargadas de apoyar directamente un ataque ae lnfanteria con subordinaciön de mision, 
aunque no de mando, 6 aquellos otros excepcionales en que se forman agrupaciones temporales, 
constituyendo una unidad täctica con subordinaciön de la Artilleria al jefe que se nombre para 
dicha unidad. ' Ibid., pp. 16-7. 
55 Vigön, Artilleria espanola, III. 183. 
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proficiency displayed in regimental service. 56 
Later scholarship offers somewhat contradictory views about this 
issue. According to the French scholar Andree Bachoud, there was 
an increase in Spanish professional literature, fostered by the 
military authorities, after 1909 (at least until the mid-1910s). 
Actually a decree of 17 January 1912 turned the writing of 
original scientific works into a requirement for promotion to the 
rank of brigadier, though the quality of this literature was 
sometimes poor, `as if the author were more concerned to add up 
pages than to make a new point. '57 On the contrary, the scholar 
Andres Mas has pointed out that non-fighting appointments and 
scientific training lost prestige among the officers most engaged 
in the Moroccan war. And the historian Victor Morales Lezcano, 
based on the social scientist Julio Busquets' work, even states 
that the attitude of anti-intellectual pragmatism displayed by the 
officers fighting in Morocco was due to their limited military 
education. 58 This last assessment is rather questionable. As has 
been shown above, the criticism of military education recorded in 
the contemporary professional literature alleged that the academic 
content was excessive. Perhaps it was the excess of theory in 
their academy years which produced in many officers a dislike of 
formal professional education for the rest of their careers. 
In any case, many officers in Morocco paid small attention to 
the more cerebral side of military operations. Such a dislike of 
intellectual effort in warfare could lead them to scorn 
56 Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Ensenanzas de la campana del Rif en 1909 (Madrid, 1911), 
pp. 76-7. 
57 `[C]omo si el autor estuviera mäs preocupado por sumar päginas que por expresar un nuevo 
punto de vista. ' Andree Bachoud, Los espanoles ante las campanas de Marruecos (Madrid, 1988), 
pp. 105-6. 
58 Andres Mas Chao, La formaciön de la conciencia africanista en el ejercito espanol (1909-1926) 
(Madrid, 1988), pp. 58,60-1; Victor Morales Lezcano, El colonialismo hispanofrances en 
Marruecos (1898-1927) (Madrid, 1976); Busquets, p. 97. Morales uses an early edition of 
Busquets' work, but the content about this specific issue is the same in the 1984 edition. 
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methodical staff and logistical work, less glamorous than an 
infantry assault with fixed bayonets. 59 Stanley G. Payne describes 
this attitude with a graphic sentence: `Even when qualified staff 
officers were available their advice was usually ignored by the 
combat officers, who liked to boast of their reliance on cojones 
("guts" or, literally, testicles) alone. ' 60 
The corporate rivalries were thus influential in disturbing the 
Spanish military environment, and stood in the way of developments 
in military doctrine. Corporate rivalries were not unique to the 
Spanish army, and were found in armies all over the world. 
Nevertheless, some armies overcame the worst effects of them on 
military doctrine thanks to a type of organization developed in 
parallel with the mass armies of the late nineteenth century and 
whose authority stood above all the corps of the military: the 
general staff. 61 Unfortunately, the development of the general 
staff in Spain was linked to another case of corporate struggle. 
This is better understood through a survey of the odd position of 
the staff corps within the Spanish officer corps. 
3. The odd corps out: the struggle against the staff 
corps. 
a) The staff corps from 1810 to the 1880s. 
A precedent for the staff corps (Cuerpo de Estado Mayor) can be 
found in a small group of officers attached to the field 
headquarters in the brief war of 1801 against Portugal. But the 
staff corps of the Spanish army was really born in 1810 after a 
59 Cardona, p. 36. During the campaign which led the Melilla district forces, under the command 
of a cavalry general (Fernandez Silvestre), to the disaster of Annual (July 1921), the staff officers 
played a very small role - if any - in the operational planning, and their functions were often 
reduced to passing on orders: Expediente Picasso. Documentos relacionados con la informaciön 
ins=por el senor general de division D. Juan Picasso sobre las Responsabilidades de la 
actu. aciön espanola en Marruecos durante Julio de mil novecientos veintiuno, facsimile edition 
(Mexico, D. F., 1976), p. 311. 
60 Payne, Politics, p. 154. 
61 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, 1976), pp. 99-101. 
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proposal of General Joaquin Blake. The liberal-oriented government 
approved Blake's proposal for two reasons. on the one hand, the 
war against Napoleon's army had shown the need for highly 
efficient officers helping the senior commanders in the conduct of 
operations. On the other hand, these officers, hand-picked 
according to professional proficiency, were expected to be more 
receptive to liberal ideology; so, besides their duties as 
military advisers, they were supposed to play a useful political 
role within a high command which was still dominated by 
aristocrats. This implied political function led to the 
suppression of the corps under King Fernando VII's periods of 
absolute power (1814-1820 and 1823-1833). After a few years of 
provisional existence, the staff corps was formally restored in 
1838.62 
The creation of the staff college in 1842 marked the end of the 
first period (1810-1842) of the corps' historical evolution, 
according to Miguel Alonso Baquer. From 1842 to 1893, the staff 
corps reached its maximum degree of corporate autonomy and 
specialization; Alonso Baquer divides this long second stage into 
four shorter periods. 63 
In the first period (1842-1850), the corps extended the duration 
of the staff college's syllabus and required an entrance 
examination for the candidates coming from the General Military 
College, whose preparation was reckoned unsatisfactory. From 
1850 
to 1867 the staff corps sought to put its college on a level with 
those of the other corps: it recruited candidates straight 
from 
civil life, and made an effort to win prestige through scientific 
62 Busquets, pp. 189-90. More details of the early history of the corps can also be found in Jose 
Ignacio Muro Morales, `El Estado Mayor: el nacimiento de un cuerpo facultativo encargado de la 
direcion de la guerra', RHM, XXXV, 70 (January-June 1991). 
63 Alonso Baquer, Aportaciön militar, pp. 150,159. 
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proficiency (especially in the fields of geodesy and cartography). 
By the early 1860s the corps thought its position safe enough to 
claim that its mapmaking activities were comparable to the other 
corps' military functions, and therefore it deserved operational 
command appointments as well. After a decline caused by the 
upheavals following the fall of Queen Isabel II in 1868, the corps 
recovered its previous standards from 1875 to 1882 and displayed 
more attention to military issues proper. The period 1882-1893 
featured a crisis of the scientific-oriented corporatism within 
the army, after the creation of the General Military Academy; the 
staff college focused the training of its students on military 
operations, lessening the scientific education. This stage 
finished in 1893, when General Lopez Dominguez closed the General 
Military Academy in order to preserve the autonomy of the 
specialist corps. 
b) The problem of the reform of the staff corps. 
Although the general arms and the specialist corps distrusted 
each other, nonetheless they shared a common mistrust towards the 
staff corps. This mistrust was based, in this writer's view, on 
the corps' somewhat hybrid nature. The general arms reckoned that 
its elitist attitudes (based on higher educational standards) 
resembled too much those of the facultative corps, whereas the 
artillery and the engineer corps saw the staff corps officers as 
rivals (due to their high educational standards) and as parvenus 
of sorts (because their careers were not ruled by a closed list 
system). Indeed, the artillery officers even kept a tacit 
commitment not to join the staff corps. 
64 
The staff corps certainly did not keep the solidarity with the 
64 Cordöre, p. 142. 
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specialist officers in the defence of the closed list. The bonds 
linking the staff corps and the other specialist branches of the 
service on this issue were broken in January 1894, after a staff 
corps officer, Captain Picasso, accepted a promotion by war merit 
won in the small Melilla conflict of late 1893. This meant the 
actual acceptance of the open list by the staff corps. 65 Such 
behaviour was born from the staff corps officers' realization - 
from 1875 on - that the prestige won through their performance on 
campaign could be more influential than scientific achievement. 
Thenceforward, they sought to reach the general officer ranks with 
first hand knowledge of the realities of combat and life in 
fighting units, which would support their claims to hold high 
operational command appointments or high political-military 
office. Actually some staff corps officers (such as the future 
General Weyler) had stood out by following this career model, 
which was in line with General Martinez Campos' policy of 
fostering the moral unity within the military through 
6 participation in the fighting. 6 
Nevertheless, such a policy could be overstretched by self- 
interested officers. A harsh critic of the Spanish military at the 
end of the nineteenth century reported that, in the Cuban 
campaigns of 1895-1898, many army corps and divisional chiefs of 
staff, instead of performing their essential staff duties, took 
command of operational columns with the backing of the general 
officers commanding the major units. Therefore, the staff work was 
never organized properly in the headquarters. Even if the needs of 
colonial warfare were different from those of a European regular 
campaign, a good general staff organization was still required to 
65 Alonso Baquer, Aportaciön militar, pp. 159-60. In 1921, Picasso (then a major-general) 
headed the commission of inquiry on the Annual debacle, whose proceedings were later known as 
the `Picasso dossier'; he was an uncle of the painter Pablo Ruiz Picasso. 
66 Ibid., pp. 171,191. 
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maintain 200,000 troops in a theatre of operations of over 100,000 
square kilometres. 67 
The way staff duties should be performed, either through a 
separate corporate branch of the military (the staff corps) or 
through the temporary appointment of officers with special 
training (the concept of a `general staff service'), was an 
issue much discussed during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. By the 1880s a small group of reformist officers drew 
conclusions about the military events of the 1860-1880 period 
(especially the Prussian-German victory in the 1870-1871 war 
against France). One of these conclusions was that an efficient 
general staff was indispensable for the command of modern mass 
armies. The success of the Prussian model had convinced the 
reformists of the need to reform the mobilization system and its 
territorial organization, in order to make effective use of the 
reserve manpower in wartime. Such a reform meant changing the 
current organization of the staff corps, focused on its 
traditional mapmaking role. 68 
General Martinez Campos, the leading military personality of the 
early decades of the Restoration, was a moderate reformist, who 
thought that the mapmaking missions of the staff corps (though 
they had to be entrusted to a scientifically trained branch of it) 
played only a supporting role and were not essential for the staff 
work. 69 However, he did not undertake any actual reform of the 
organization of the staff corps. 
On the contrary, General Cassola, war minister in 1887-1888, was 
a more resolute character. He reckoned that proficiency in 
67 Efeele, Desastre, pp. 22-3. 
68 Fernando-Maria Puell de la Villa, `El general Cassola, reformista militar de la Restauraciön', 
RHM, XXII, 45 (July-December 1978), pp. 180-1. 
69 Alonso Baquer, Aportaciön militar, p. 170. 
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cartography was not the monopoly of any corps, and therefore 
should not determine the role of staff officers. Moreover, Cassola 
thought that general staff appointments were nobody's monopoly. 
So, after being appointed as war minister, he included among his 
reformist plans the abolition of the staff corps: staff duties 
would be performed by especially trained officers of all the other 
corps, after the Prussian-German model. These officers would 
remain in their corps' lists and perform regimental service after 
every tour of duty in staff appointments. On the other hand, 
although the traditional, overspecialized mapmaking tasks were 
discarded, the staff officer's position was enhanced by turning it 
into a more influential advisory and executive appointment near 
the commander . 
7° 
Although the reformist proposals of Cassola were finally 
defeated by the pressure of the vested interests within the 
military, the debate about the staff corps and the general staff 
service remained alive. General Lopez Dominguez tried to solve the 
problem through a middle-of-the-road approach in 1893. He retained 
the staff corps, whose new members thenceforth would be graduates 
of the staff college who decided to leave their corps of origin; 
those who supported the idea of the general staff service would 
return to their corps as diplomados de Estado Mayor (staff 
graduates) . 
71 As will be shown later, however, this arrangement 
did not solve the fundamental problem. 
c) The training of staff officers after 1893. 
Lopez Dominguez's reform also affected the training of staff 
officers, so a summary of the evolution of this training before 
1893 is a necessary preliminary step. A staff college (Escuela 
70Alonso Baquer, Aportaciön militar, p. 170. 
71 Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, p. 196. 
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Especial de Estado Mayor) was created in Madrid in 1842. After 
three years of studies at the General Military College, staff 
corps officer candidates spent one more year at the staff college; 
in 1845, the staff college's syllabus was extended to three years 
of studies plus one year of practice. 
1850 saw a significant change with the closing of the General 
Military College: after this year the staff college (whose 
syllabus was extended to four years of studies) would admit 
straight from civil life those candidates able to pay for their 
studies and train them separately from the other corps. The 
college - whose name was changed in 1867 to Academia de Estado 
Mayor (Staff Academy) - kept this system until 1882. After the 
creation of the General Military Academy, the college turned into 
a specialist school (Academia de Aplicaciön de Estado Mayor) for 
students coming from the military academy. The new syllabus was 
three years long plus a period of practice which became four years 
long by 1889. However, only one class graduated through this 
system, since it was abolished by Lopez Dominguez's reforms. 
72 
The staff college was renamed as Escuela Superior de Guerra 
(ESG) in 1893. Requirements for entrance were the rank of 
lieutenant or second-lieutenant and at least three years' 
seniority after commissioning as second-lieutenant (including one 
year of regimental service); if the student wanted to join the 
staff corps after graduation, he must not be older than twenty 
nine years when entering the ESG. Since commissioning officer 
candidates when they were (or were about to be) eighteen years old 
was not unusual, a Spanish officer could be an ESG student at 
twenty one. 73 In the German army, in contrast, most officers were 
72 Alonso Baquer, Aportaciön militar, pp. 148-9. 
73 CLE 1893, No. 33 (article 27). The students of the intake of 1898 were twenty years old on 
average: this writer's own calculation based on data taken from AME 1899. 
89 
commissioned at twenty one and had to serve in a regiment for four 
years before applying for admission to the Krie gsakademie. The 
theoretical studies in the ESG lasted three years but the 
syllabus' military contents seem small in comparison with the 
academic ones: 
-First year. 
i)Elements of astronomy, topography, fortification, military 
bridging, castramentation. 
ii)Artillery and engineer ordinances, regimental internal 
service, foreign tactical regulations. 
iii)Algebra, spherical trigonometry and analytical geometry, 
general geometry and general history (optional subjects). 
-Second year. 
i) Descriptive and strategic military geography, telegraphic 
and telephonic signals, railways, ballooning, cryptography. 
ii)Outline of military and naval organization (in Spain and 
major powers), military art, staff duties and regulations, 
survey of floating material. 
iii)Descriptive geometry, calculus and rational mechanics, 
chemistry, gunpowder and explosives, and ordnance manufacture 
(optional). 
iv)Foreign language (English, German or Arabic). 
-Third year. 
i)Survey of Spanish naval artillery and foreign artillery. 
ii) Political economy, military administration, political and 
administrative law, international law, survey of medical and 
quartermaster equipment. 
iii)Astronomy and geodesy or elements of zoology and botany, 
mineralogy and geology. 
iv)Foreign language (English, German or Arabic). 
This academic orientation repelled many artillery and engineer 
officers (actually no new student came from these corps in 1896), 
who thought their scientific `exclusivity' under threat. This did 
not benefit the prestige of the ESG. 74 
The German army's Kriegsakademie, by contrast, had the following 
syllabus (though this is the syllabus set up in 1907, its contents 
seem not to show significant changes with regard to previous 
years) : 
-First year: Tactics, military history, fortification, 
ordnance, medical service, general history, military and 
international law; (optional subjects) pre-1648 history, 
mathematics, physics, foreign languages. 
74 Equis, I. 132-5. 
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-Second year: Tactics, military history, fortification, 
topography, communications, naval warfare, general history; 
(optional subjects) pre-1648 history, mathematics, foreign 
languages, chemistry, physical geography. 
-Third year: Tactics, military history, staff duties, siege 
warfare, general history; (optional subjects) pre-1648 
history, 
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mathematics, foreign languages, topography, 
geodesy. 
Comparing the German syllabus with the Spanish one, it can be seen 
that the former had a clear-cut core of military subjects centred 
around tactics and history, 
remained optional. On the 
matters look underdeveloped 
and all its scientific subjects 
contrary, tactical and historical 
in the Spanish staff college's 
syllabus. 
The teaching of the ESG was judged unsatisfactory in the early 
years of the twentieth century, and the college was reorganized in 
1904 by War Minister General Linares. Linares realized the need to 
increase the number of officers qualified to perform operational 
staff duties and stood for giving priority in promotion to general 
officer rank to officers who had passed the staff college. 76 The 
new ESG syllabus was as follows: 
-First year. 
i)Military and strategic geography, basic notions of geology. 
ii) Political economy and military administration, hygiene, 
international law, medical field service. 
iii)Topography, notions of electricity. 
iv) Conversation and writing in French. 
v)Horsemanship, fencing, photography, practical sessions of 




ii) Mathematical algorithm, astronomy, geodesy, meteorology, 
military industry, technical and practical studies in 
military communications (optional). 
iii)Art of war, grand tactics, military 
iv) Foreign language (English, German, 
fencing. 
v) Landscape sketching, horsemanship, 
subjects of ii) and iii). 
law. 
Arabic, Portuguese), 
practical sessions in 
75 Luis de la Gändara Marsella, El oficial alemän de la escala activa y de reserva (Madrid, 1916), 
pp. 236-7- 




ii)Use of artillery and fortification in warfare. 
iii)Staff duties, wargaming, communications as a means of 
war. 
iv) Foreign language (English, German, Arabic, Portuguese), 
fencing. 
v)Panoramic military sketching, horsemanship, practical 
sessions in subjects of iii), practical journey for staff 
work exercises and geographical surveys. 7 7 
The non-military scientific content was substantially reduced 
(although one cannot help but wonder how far the staff officer's 
proficiency depended on his skill with the sword). As a whole, 
this new syllabus bore more resemblance to those of other foreign 
staff colleges. For instance, in the French army, whose studies 
for the staff diploma lasted two years, the contents included the 
following subjects: military history, applied strategy and 
tactics, staff duties, fortification, ballooning, international 
law, geology and geography, military law and administration, 
mobilization, German, Russian (optional), railways, hygiene, 
medical service, naval warfare, and horsemanship. '8 
The teaching methods of the ESG were changed as well. Official 
textbooks were abolished ; instead the teaching staff was to 
encourage the development of analytical skills and judgement 
through the writing of essays, and through group projects and 
group debates in the classroom, which allowed the display of the 
students' personal views. In short, any teaching only based on 
rote learning had to be banished. 79 Nevertheless, it is not clear 
how successful this change of methods was. A graduate of the ESG 
argued in 1921 that the college was still inflexible and unwilling 
to accept critical views (at least in some subjects). And, the 
same year, a Spanish student at the French army's staff college 
" Equis, I. 142-3. 
78 Ibid., I. 109-10. 
79 Memoria del Jefe del Estado Mayor Central, 1907, SHM-CAD 9/1. 
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commented, via Colonel Garcia Benitez (the military attache), on 
the too erudite learning system of the ESG, by contrast with the 
French institution, where teaching was based on case studies taken 
from recent campaigns. 80 
d) Attack and defence of the staff corps. 
The reforms after 1893 did not stop the antagonism towards the 
staff corps. One of its most heated critics, Capitän Equis, even 
lambasted the quality of its officers. According to Capitän Equis, 
the root of the problem lay in the system of entrance into the 
staff corps. After the reform of 1904, candidates for the ESG had 
to be captains or lieutenants with two years' regimental service. 
An officer who got the staff diploma remained in his corps after 
leaving the ESG. In order to join the staff corps, an ESG graduate 
had to apply for admission whenever there were vacancies in its 
list, before being promoted to the rank of major in his parent 
corps (the career in the staff corps started at the rank of 
captain) . 
81 But only the youngest officers (that is, those who 
could presume a career advance) applied for admission to the 
corps. However, they often graduated with the lowest marks of 
their class, due to their relative immaturity. Thus the worst 
qualified students got into the staff corps whereas the best ones 
- most of them older men with many years of service as captains - 
preferred to stay in their corps rather than joining a new officer 
list and starting again behind younger captains belonging to a 
previous college class, and who had been able to apply for a 
vacancy before. In order to attract the brightest graduates, the 
staff corps pursued a policy of fast promotions which was only 
ß° Enrique Maquieiria, `Hombres e ideas de la guerra europea', Memorial de Infanteria (hereafter 
MI), X, 109 (February 1921), p. 80; Juan Garcia Benitez, `Nuevos metodos de enselianza en la 
Escuela Superior de Guerra francesa', La Guerra y su pre araciön (hereafter LGP), VI, 2 
(February 1921), p. 133. 
81 CLE 1893, No. 33 (article 32). 
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feasible through the creation of as many appointments for staff 
corps officers as possible. 82 
Capitän Equis also pointed out that another result of the co- 
existence of the staff corps and the diplomados was the rivalry 
between the two groups of staff officers. The staff corps officers 
wanted to cut the number of diplomados to prevent them from 
occupying staff appointments - if not, the policy of fast careers 
within the staff corps would be under threat. The fact that 
appointments near the high command were almost deemed a passport 
into it also spurred this attitude (which was not unjustified: in 
1895, eleven out of the Spanish army's thirty nine lieutenant- 
generals came from the staff corps, whereas thirteen came from the 
infantry). What made this competition an even more lamentable case 
of corporate selfishness was the decaying state of the Spanish 
army. Since the budgets did not allow an efficient preparation for 
war, the term `staff work' (outside the forces in Morocco at 
least) and its alleged `technical' complexity - which the staff 
corps used as a justification of its existence - actually 
concealed more and more red-tape. Indeed this corporate self- 
interest even fostered more bureaucracy. 83 As Capitän Equis 
concluded: `Mainly due to the fault of the staff corps, the 
Spanish army is a lie wrapped in notepaper. '84 
Nonetheless, the reader must bear in mind that Capitän Equis was 
an infantry officer and therefore his criticism suffered from 
corporate bias as well. So, how justified was the antagonism 
towards the staff corps? 
82 Equis, I. 137-8. 
83 Ibid., I. 125, I. 138-9, I. 159-62. The fear which the competition of the diplomados caused 
among the staff corps officers is voiced in Pio Suarez Inclän, Organizacion del Cuerpo de Estado 
Mayor, 1810-1910 (Madrid, 1912), p. 192. 
84 Tor culpa principalmente del Cuerpo de Estado Mayor, el ejercito espanol es una mentira 
envuelta en papel de barba. ' Equis, I. 160. 
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The military archives file primary evidence which shows that the 
staff corps was not very pleased that diplomados received the same 
training as the candidates to the corps. There is no evidence to 
find out the extent of such a mood, but the fact that two staff 
corps officers of very different rank and writing a decade apart 
proposed similar solutions to cope with the diplomados suggests 
that the mood was shared by large sections of the corps. 
The first piece of evidence comes from the report on the 
inspection of the ESG carried out by General Suarez Inclän (who 
had been promoted from the list of the staff corps) in 1907.85 It 
is not clear if the points made in the report are actually General 
Suärez's own ideas, but it seems plausible that his views were 
influential in the conclusions of the report. It was certainly a 
good opportunity to defend corporate interests. The report pointed 
out that it was not a good idea to allocate equal value to all the 
subjects of the syllabus, because this meant that a student who 
excelled in general academic matters could get a better place in 
the graduation list than another who obtained high marks in the 
essential professional subjects. So the report proposed allocating 
to each subject a quotient which indicated its relative importance 
for the overall qualification of the student. So far, so good. But 
then the report remarked that the ESG students had different 
motivations in their training as staff officers. The proposed 
change would not affect the students merely aiming for the 
diploma, but it would affect those aspiring to join the staff 
corps since their place in the graduation list settled the 
priority for admission and the place in the corps' officer list. 
Therefore the report questioned the policy of teaching the same 
syllabus for both groups, since it could be deficient for staff 
85 Memoria del Jefe del Estado Mayor Central, 1907, SHM-CAD 9/1. 
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corps candidates and too demanding for those just looking for an 
extension of their professional expertise. The solution to this 
problem put forward in the report was to divide the syllabus into 
two parts. The first one would be a common course including the 
essential military matters; the second part would be a more 
demanding course reserved for those called to perform permanent 
staff duties (i. e. the staff corps officers). Thus, more officers 
would come to the Escuela Superior de Guerra to improve their 
military education without any need to turn themselves into 
`perfect' staff officers after five years of theoretical studies 
and practice. 
The implied consequence of this proposal was to render 
diplomados unfit for staff appointments, since only the officers 
of the staff corps would be fully qualified to hold such posts. 
Therefore, the corps would be able to justify its enlargement (and 
new promotions) whenever there were staff vacancies. There is no 
evidence in the files consulted by the present writer about the 
later fate of the proposal, though it obviously was not accepted 
by the higher military authorities because there was no 
significant change in the syllabus of the Escuela Superior de 
( iicrra 
The second piece of evidence dates from early 1918, so it is 
contemporary with the political-military crisis caused by the 
juntas de defensa after 1917 (which will be surveyed in Chapter 
5) . The Higher Defence committee 
(Junta Superior de Defensa) of the 
staff corps consulted its officers in December 1917 about the need 
for preserving a corporate organization performing staff duties. 
An officer posted in Valladolid, Captain Benavides, argued, in his 
answer dated 2 January 1918, for the absolute need for keeping the 
staff corps, instead of replacing it with a general staff 
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service. 86 His first argument was that the common training, the 
constant performance of staff duties and the cohesion caused by 
belonging to a single corporate branch provided unity in working 
procedures and methods. On the contrary, the different corporate 
background of the diplomados - though they carried out similar 
tasks - would damage the unity of the whole if the general staff 
service was implemented. 
Another of Benavides' arguments was that the staff corps, due to 
its own corporate organization, limited unhealthy ambition among 
its members, because all of them had the same legal rights. On the 
contrary, according to Benavides, the diplomado of the general 
staff service would be placed on a different level in relation to 
his corps' fellow-officers because of his separate staff duties 
and the special training for the staff diploma, whereas he would 
be keen to please his senior officers, who could back his career 
up. Therefore the general staff service would offer more fertile 
ground for unlimited personal ambition. Finally, Benavides 
reckoned it very difficult to achieve a good performance in staff 
duties if these were alternated with regimental service. 
Captain Benavides also pointed out several dangers for the 
survival of the staff corps. One of these was the corps' decaying 
state, which was partly a reflection of the decay of the army as a 
whole, but it was also due to its own neglect and lack of 
collective effort. Another major danger he saw (and this point 
shows the degree of ill-will between the two groups of staff 
officers) were the diplomados. Their numbers (and their 
foreseeable increase) and their deeds caused and fostered 
hostility towards the corps in the press and in political circles; 
86 Captain Nicolas Benavides to Junta Superior de Defensa del Cuerpo de Estado Mayor, 2 January 
1918, Archivo General Militar de Avila: Zona Republicana 47/73/7a. 
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even the archbishop of Tarragona, who held a seat in the Senate, 
had allegedly displayed antagonism! Benavides expressed fears that 
the political debate could bring about a cut in the number of 
admissions to the staff corps, which would lead to a consequent 
increase of diplomados. Some political groups and sections of the 
press - mostly of leftist leanings - also were especially hostile 
because the corps (according to Benavides) strengthened the unity 
of the army (the major support of government), and therefore this 
held back their ambitions. 
Benavides recommended the case for the staff corps to be 
presented to leading politicians, who could defend its cause in 
the parliament. He also recommended the establishment of a secret 
record of data on the main foes of the corps, especially the 
dipiomados (a proposal with somewhat sinister tinges) . Benavides 
concluded with a proposal to turn the ESG into an institution 
which would graduate staff corps officers only. Those officers who 
did not want to join the corps would make up a sort of adjutant's 
service, after two years of studies plus one more of practice. 
These officers would perform ancillary staff duties and become a 
reserve of staff officers in wartime; they would serve usually 
within their corps, though they could be called up to work in 
manoeuvres under the orders of staff corps officers. 
The essential coincidence of Captain Benavides' last point about 
the staff college with General Suärez's views is significant. The 
ultimate aim of both was to turn the diplomados into second-class 
staff officers, who would therefore be denied the responsibilities 
and benefits of being real staff officers. Thus the staff corps 
would recover a monopoly of the main staff duties, at least. This 
monopoly had been broken by the 1893 reform, which gave the same 
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professional qualification to staff corps candidates and those who 
aspired to the diploma alone. Therefore, the staff corps had to 
remove this equality if it wanted to maintain its raison d'etre. 
The fact that a general officer in 1907 and a captain one decade 
later shared rather similar solutions to this problem makes it 
plausible to think that corporate self-interest was highly 
developed in the staff corps and hence that criticism of the staff 
corps as a whole on this ground was not unfounded. 
Furthermore, Benavides' papers bear witness to the deep 
rivalries within the military; the suggestion to spy on the staff 
graduates illustrates clearly how far the deterioration of the 
inter-corps relationship could reach. 
e) The staff corps and the development of the General Staff. 
What made the rivalry of the staff corps with the rest of the 
military even more serious was its consequences for the 
development of the General Staff. According to Comandante Beta, 
the staff corps worked against the military cabinet set up by War 
Minister General Echagüe; it could not tolerate ideas alien to the 
corps on issues related to the reorganization of the army. Any 
crisis within the military caused by a reorganization project 
meant a crisis for the existence of the staff corps, so its esprit 
de corps and its instinct of survival urged the corps to take 
control of the reform. The result was the preservation of the 
corps without any real improvement of the army. 
87 
Echagüe's military cabinet was kept idle by his successor, 
General Luque, while the General Staff's rebirth was prepared 
under the guidance of staff corps officers. According to 
Comandante Beta, their aim was to turn the General Staff into `an 
87 Beta, pp. 64-5. 
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organization which saved the hegemony so endangered by that 
inconvenient military cabinet, which had to be destroyed in a 
hurry, and this [the cabinet's disbandment] was carried out, to 
the relief of many people. '88 
Comandante Beta, despite his criticism of that corporate 
attitude, stated that he did not underrate the individual value of 
the members of the staff corps, whose educational standards were 
higher than those of the other corps. But this superiority also 
made more dangerous their corporate selfishness. And, since they 
were facing up to another group with similar professional 
qualifications (the diplomados), the struggle was waged on grounds 
which damaged the reforms which the army badly needed. The other 
corporate rivalries seriously affected the effectiveness of the 
army as well: 
But these struggles among `guilds' do not have the 
[same] importance... as that one waged by the guiding 
`guild' against all the guided `guilds'; and its result 
is that an army whose general staff functions are still 
in embryo has got the following organizations to carry 
them out: the staff corps, a staff college and a legion 
of staff graduates; three sources of unsurpassable 
material, and a very deficient service, the most 
deficient one of our weak military body. 89 
Certainly, a reform in depth of the army was not a very 
realistic goal when the officer corps was divided about who were 
the best qualified to direct such a work. That the root of such 
division lay in corporate factionalism is proven by the fact that 
there was no criticism (excepting Capitän Equis) of the 
professional proficiency of the staff corps officers as 
88 `{U]n organismo en el que se salvara la hegemonia tan comprometida por aquel malhadado 
Gabinete Militar, que era preciso destruir a toda prisa, y asi se consumö para tranquilidad de 
muchos. ' Ibid., pp. 70-1. 
89 `Pero estas luchas entre gremios no tienen la transcendencia... que la que se entabla por el gremio 
director contra todos los gremios dirigidos; y resultado de ello es que en un Ejercito donde las 
funciones de Estado Mayor son bien embrionarias, tenemos los siguientes organismos para 
cumplirlas: el Cuerpo de Estado Mayor, una Escuela de Guerra y una 
legion de diplomados: tres 
filones de inmejorable material, y el servicio deficientisimo, el mäs deficiente de nuestro enteco 
organismo belico. ' Ibid., p. 72. 
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individuals: what displeased the rest of the military were their 
behaviour and their privileges as a group. Nonetheless, a general 
staff service would not necessarily have been a panacea: the 
French army had adopted the general staff system after 1871, but - 
according to Douglas Porch - this did not prevent its staff 
officers from turning into `inward-looking bureaucrats sunk in 
routine, in their personal careers and in defending their 
privileges against poachers. '90 This description applied even more 
to large sections of the Spanish military, due to the strength of 
corporate spirit. Corporate factionalism had got so much out of 
hand by the mid-1910s that it became a serious obstacle to the 
reforms which would increase the effectiveness of the Spanish 
military, and in defending so zealously their corps' particular 
interests, the Spanish officers were an obstacle to their own 
professionalization. 
90 Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871-1914 (Cambridge, 1981), p. 
58. 
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3. - THE DEBATE ON FIRE 
TACTICS, 1899-1913. 
POWER AND INFANTRY 
Warfare was in a process of transformation during the late 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century. 
The infantry was very much affected by this transformation, caused 
by the development of increasingly effective firearms. This 
chapter describes and assesses how the Spanish military coped with 
the new conditions, by looking at the evolution of tactical 
doctrine for the infantry, and the performance of this arm in the 
campaign of Melilla (1909). 
1. Fire power and the problem of the offensive. 
a) The impact of new firearm technology on the battlefield. 
The Spanish army was not ignorant of the changes that technology 
had brought to warfare in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. Weapons like quick-firing artillery, the magazine rifle 
and the machine gun delivered so much fire power on the 
battlefield as to transform its traditional features. 
' A shrewd 
observer of technological evolution, Colonel Marva, described the 
change in this way at the beginning of the twentieth century: 
Fire's extraordinary accuracy and destructive energy 
force the masses to disperse and look for protections 
which cannot be found already in the metal breastplate 
nor behind the wooden fence. The entrenchments have had 
to leave their artistic profiles...; the host hides 
itself in the ground folds, and the skirmishing line 
disappears from sight ... 
2 
A distinguished military essayist, Lieutenant-colonel Banüs, 
I Concise surveys of technological innovations are found in Hew Strachan, European Armies and 
the Conduct of War (London, 1985), pp. 111-21; and Martin van Creveld, Technology and War. 
From 2,000 BC to the Present (London, 1991), pp. 170-5. 
2 `La extraordinaria precision del tiro y su energia destructora obligan a desenfilar las masas ya 
buscar protecciones que no pueden encontrarse ya en el peto de metal ni tras la cerca de madera. 
Los atrincheramientos han tenido que abandonar sus artisticos perfiles...; la hueste se oculta en los 
pliegues del terreno, y la linea de tiradores desaparece de las vistas... ' Jose Marva y Mayer, 
Ciencias aplicadas al arte militar (Madrid, 1902), p. 91. 
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elaborated on this point. Due to the increased range of the rifle, 
infantry troops had to adopt combat order at a distance of 1,500 
metres or more from the enemy. Moreover, this order had turned 
from closed ranks, elbow to elbow, into dispersed lines of 
skirmishers. Thus the soldier was no longer under the close 
supervision of his officer, and this situation had negative 
effects on his morale. On the other hand, the advance under fire 
was slow and, since the distance to cover became longer, the 
fighting was more prolonged. The longer the battle and the more 
difficult the advance, the easier it was for the attacker to get 
demoralized and call off the assault. So the offensive had become 
a very difficult operation, and frontal attacks would be almost 
impossible - unless combined with enveloping ones. 
3 
Nevertheless, the contemporary professional literature, while 
recognizing the growing importance of fire power, asserted that 
armies could not remain motionless shooting at each other. Though 
the value of the bayonet had diminished, the attacking side could 
not do without the pursuit of a clash if it wanted to complete the 
work of fire power and defeat the enemy. 
4 This meant taking the 
offensive whenever possible, despite the difficulties caused at 
the tactical level by the improvement of weapons, in order to 
impose one's will on the enemy. And since the major wars from the 
last third of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First 
World War were won by the side which displayed the most offensive 
spirit and plans, the military doctrines in vogue all over 
Europe 
in this period emphasized the offensive. 
5 
3 Carlos Banüs y Comas, Reflexiones acerca de la guerra anglo-boer (Madrid, 1902), pp. 63-4. 
Commissioned in the engineers corps in 1872, Banüs (1852-1934) fought against the carlists 
(1873-75), was a teacher at the Engineers Academy (1877-1890) and director of the army 
engineers laboratory; he won professional and academic renown through 
his writings on military 
and technical issues. 
4 Antonio Aleixandre, `Formaciones de combate', RTIC, XI, 2 (July-December 1901), pp. 73-6. 
5 For an overview of military doctrine in this period, see Jay Luvaas, `European 
Military Thought 
and Doctrine, 1870-1914' in Michael Howard (ed. ), The Theory and 
Practice of War (London, 
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b) The Spanish army and its war experiences, 1873-1898. 
Although Spain was not involved in any major international 
conflict, the Spanish army had experienced the effects of the 
growing power of firearms in the Third Carlist War (1872-1876). 
Any position occupied by the attacking troops had to be fortified 
at once. General Ruiz Dana observed the same year the war was over 
how modern firearms gave to the tactical defensive and to field 
fortifications an importance they had lacked before. The carlist 
troops in the Basque-Navarrese theatre of operations had learnt to 
make an extended use of field fortifications, and - according to 
Ruiz Dana - only a shortage of offensive spirit prevented them 
from turning their defensive successes into major victories. 6 
Actually the carlist forces suffered many casualties from rifle 
fire in the combat of Puente la Reina (in October 1873, during the 
beginnings of the regular operations in the North), when they 
threw themselves in packed battalion columns against the rear 
? 
guard covering the withdrawal of the government army. So they 
fought in open order during the battle of Montejurra (November 
1873). Moreover, since they fought defensively, the carlists took 
advantage of hedges and fences to build earth and stone 
breastworks. However, the high profile of the works made them easy 
targets for the government artillery. In December, in the combat 
of Velabieta, the carlist defenders dug ditches and raised small 
breastworks with the removed earth; but the ditches were too wide 
(1.5 metres) and the breastworks still offered a clear target 
to 
1965), pp. 82-91; and Michael Howard, `Men against Fire. Expectations of 
War in 1914', 
International Security, 9,1 (Summer 1984), pp. 45-57. 
6 Federico de Madariaga, `La Infanteria espanola', RTIC, XIV, 1 (January-June 1904), pp. 6-7; 
Pedro Ruiz Dana, Estudios sobre la guerra civil en el Norte, de 1872 a 1876 (Madrid, 1876), pp. 
151-4. Ruiz Dana (1822-1891) was a staff corps officer and reached the rank of lieutenant-general 
in 1876; he was director-general of cavalry and captain-general of Puerto Rico. 




In the battles of Somorrostro (early 1874), the carlists' whole 
battle front was covered by a line of trenches, linked by 
redoubts, and very low turfs replaced the breastworks in order to 
reduce the profile. Nevertheless, the artillery still took a heavy 
toll of the carlist defenders (almost half of their casualties in 
the fighting from 25 to 27 March were due to the government 
cannon). 8 The experience of the combats of February and March 
proved to the carlists the need to improve their field 
fortifications. The trenches became deeper (almost a man's height) 
and narrower (half a metre) : thus shells could not get into the 
trench and the defenders could avoid their fragments by crouching. 
The artillery also had a less clear target since the removed earth 
was now scattered. 
This new model trench was used in the battle of Estella (June 
1874), but instead of forming long, continuous lines the carlists 
dug shorter trenches (15-20 metres); these also had hook-like ends 
which allowed troops to avoid enemy fire in case of evacuation. 
Their success led the carlists to protect the access routes to the 
territory under their control with lines of this sort of field 
fortification, which obliged the government forces to carry out 
major operations of strategic envelopment (the carlist army did 
not have enough troops to man permanently all the fortified 
sectors). 
Besides improving their fortifications, the carlist defenders 
polished their tactical skills. They occupied only the trenches 
directly threatened by the enemy. If the shelling was too heavy, 
they moved in single file, taking advantage of the ground, to 
Vigön, Artilleria espanola, III. 123. 
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other trenches in the flanks and the rear. When the cannonade 
stopped to allow the infantry's advance, the defenders came back 
quickly and fired once the enemy troops came within easy range 
(300-400 metres). These defensive tactics were possible because 
the attacking infantry, in order not to expose themselves too much 
to the enemy fire, had to start the advance from a distance of 
1,000-1,500 metres from the trenches. 
The experience of this war was doubtless taken into account when 
new infantry tactical regulations were edited in 1881, since they 
stated: `[B]ecause of the range, the accuracy, the flat trajectory 
and the speed of fire of the current rifle, fire is the main, 
almost exclusive way of fighting for the troops in the front 
line. '9 However, after twenty years of peace, the memories of 
those battles had probably faded when the Spanish army again went 
into action, in the colonial conflicts of Cuba and the Philippines 
after 1895, and the war with the United States in 1898. 
Since this last war was fought in far off islands and the naval 
superiority of the United States was overwhelming, Spain could not 
aspire to overall victory. However, it seemed reasonable to think 
that a successful defence on land could make up for the naval 
defeats and secure better terms at the negotiating table. The 
commander-in-chief in Cuba, General Blanco, followed a strategic 
defence to preserve key places, which would be the bases for 
operations in the field against any American expedition. 
10 There 
was no shortage of soldiers in Cuba at the outbreak of war: 
196,000 troops (including 41,000 irregulars), of which 34,000 were 
deployed in the Santiago de Cuba province. 
" However, these 
9 '[P]or consecuencia del alcance, de la precision, de la tension de la trayectoria y de la rapidez del 
tiro del fusil actual, el fuego es el medio principal y casi exclusivo de combate para las tropas que 
estdn en la primera linea. ' Täctica de Infanteria. Memoria general (1881), p. 
16. 
10 Miguel Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana', pp. 134-6. 
11 Herbert H. Sargent, The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba, 3 vol. (London, 1907), III. 157-9. 
106 
numbers were not all available for operations against an invading 
force since the figures included many men in hospitals and a lot 
of troops on garrison duties. Another handicap was that this 
colonial army had fought against guerrillas since 1895 and lacked 
preparation for regular warfare: the Spanish field artillery in 
Cuba was weak, there were not enough transport means to move large 
forces, and the troops were unused to fighting against a regular 
army (though any fighting experience was better than no experience 
at all) . 
12 
An American expeditionary corps (17,000-strong) landed in late 
June 1898 near Santiago de Cuba, a major city and harbour in 
southeastern Cuba, where a Spanish naval squadron had taken 
refuge. The American force did not encounter serious resistance 
until it reached the external defences of Santiago. About 1,700 
Spanish troops barred the way to the city from the east. 1,200 
Spaniards were entrenched on San Juan Heights; the rest occupied 
the fortified hamlet of El Caney. On 1 July, the Americans 
attacked both positions. 6,600 troops needed most of the day to 
drive the stubborn defenders out of El Caney. The other assault 
force (8,400-strong) took a shorter time in seizing the trenches 
on San Juan Heights, but the American troops suffered so heavily 
(nearly a thousand casualties) that they were unable to carry on. 
The Spanish troops lost about 600 men; the American casualties 
amounted to almost 1,400 men. After these clashes, the fighting 
was limited to some skirmishing (the Americans actually reckoned 
their position so weak as to think of a withdrawal to the 
beachhead). Meanwhile, the Spanish naval squadron was destroyed in 
front of Santiago de Cuba when it tried to escape on 3 July. The 
Spanish command no longer saw purpose in defending the city, and 
12 Efeele, `La guerra con los Estados Unidos', Estudios Militares (hereafter EM), XVIII, 1 
(January-June 1899), p. 294. 
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the garrison capitulated on 17 July. 13 
c) The debate on the tactical lessons of the 1895-1898 wars. 
The few Spanish officers who reflected on the combats of the 
Spanish-American War concluded that a factor in the Spanish defeat 
had been the lack of offensive spirit and the overconfidence of 
some commanders in the strength of defence. 14 Such criticism was 
not limited to professional voices. A civilian essayist and 
journalist, Damiän Isern, also charged the Spanish senior 
commanders with lack of initiative. General Blanco, for instance, 
allegedly remained passive when Santiago de Cuba was threatened 
and failed to reinforce its defenders. 15 As for contemporary 
military critics, one of them thought that the local command in 
Santiago suffered from lack of resolution: due to its concern for 
protecting all the perimeter, it had dispersed its forces instead 
of keeping them concentrated to go to the aid of the threatened 
sector. 16 Major Ricardo Burguete, writing under the pseudonym 
`Critön', voiced angrily the feeling that the opportunity to 
achieve a major success had been missed by the fainthearted 
Spanish command: 
Who ever saw a campaign start by giving the troops 
such a passive role as that given to ours? Confined to 
the perimeter of trenches after three days of gallant 
defence, after receiving reinforcements [Burguete 
referred to a column of 3,000 men arrived from other 
places of the province], watching the symptoms of 
discouragement and exhaustion in the attacking troops, 
why was the flag of truce hoisted when the smallest 
offensive demonstration would have been enough to bring 
about the withdrawal arranged beforehand by the 
13 This summary of the campaign of Santiago de Cuba is based on Jose Müller y 
Tejeiro, 
Combates y capitulaciön de Santiago de Cuba (Madrid, 1898); Severo Gomez Nünez, La ug erra 
hispano-americana. Santiago de Cuba (Madrid, 1901); Efeele, Desastre, pp. 54-6; Sargent; and 
Smith, pp. 119-59. 
14 Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana', pp. 134-6. 
15 Damian Isern, Del desastre nacional y sus causas (Madrid, 1899), pp. 490-7. 
16 Efeele, Desastre, pp. 55-62. In the less important theatre of operations of Puerto Rico, the 
obsession of the Spanish command to defend the capital prevented the garrison 
from creating a 
reserve able to counterattack the isolated columns of the American 
invasion forces: Ibid., pp. 118- 
20. 
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Americans ? 17 
The essayists agreed in criticizing the Spanish senior command's 
conduct of the operations against the Americans. However, there 
was no similar agreement when the tactical teachings of the 
campaigns of the late 1890s as a whole were discussed in the 
professional literature. 
One line of thought stated that the Spaniards had put too much 
reliance on fire power, which had led them to a lack of offensive 
drive. Major Ricardo Burguete - who had fought with distinction 
against the Cuban insurgents - blamed the current tactical 
regulations for fostering a spirit of excessive caution and 
hindering the exploitation of success after seizing enemy 
positions. Though the Spanish troops had rarely been defeated by 
the Cuban rebels on the battlefield, the former limited themselves 
to carrying on firing while the latter made good their escape, so 
the fruits of victory were wasted. 18 
This view was not accepted by other officers, who thought the 
Spanish troops had not displayed lack of aggressiveness. Quite the 
contrary. They achieved tactical victories continuously, since 
they always took the offensive in the combats in the bush against 
the insurgents, even if the fire preparation was short. Actually, 
these essayists said, the nature of those conflicts and the 
Spanish conscripts' poor training in musketry and skirmishing made 
the development of real fire tactics like in regular warfare 
17 `LQuien vi6 jamäs empezar una campana dando a las tropas el papel pasivo que se di6 a las 
nuestras? Encerradas en el recinto de trincheras despues de tres dias 
de bizarra defensa; recibidos 
los refuerzos, viendo en la tropa asaltante todos los sintomas del desfallecimiento y 
del cansancio, 
'que pas6 para arbolar bandera de parlamento cuando la menor indicaciön ofensiva 
hubiera 
bastado pars pronunciar la retirada de antemano dispuesta por los norteamericanos? ' Critön, p. 
101. Nonetheless, a Spanish naval officer who witnessed the campaign thought an offensive 
reaction against the Americans very difficult: Müller, pp. 275-6. 
18 Jose Yumrep, `De la disciplina del fuego', RTIC, X, 2 (July-December 1900), p. 432; Ricardo 
Burguete Lana, Nuevos metodos de combate. Proyecto de reglamento de ejercicios y maniobras 
pars infanteria (Madrid, 1903), pp. 22-4,153; Criton, pp. 34-5. 
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impossible. According to Colonel Modesto Navarro, the usual 
tactical procedure was to form in line, open a heavy fire (which 
wasted a lot of ammunition), and charge with the bayonet after a 
very short time. Any excess of caution or lack of boldness imputed 
to the troops was a reflection of the command's qualities: 
whenever the commanders were bold and aggressive, the troops 
followed them. 19 
Despite this evident disagreement on tactical doctrine, the 
Spanish army seemed to push aside any debate in depth about the 
military teachings of the overseas campaigns. This attitude may 
have been caused by a desire to forget the painful experience of 
defeat in the war against the United States - and, by extension, 
everything related to the wars of 1895-1898. Nonetheless, Major 
Burguete complained that the scorn of irregular warfare and minor 
tactics allegedly felt by some sections of the military had helped 
the army to disregard the experience of these conflicts. 20 
2. Bayonet versus fire power. 
a) The value of cold steel in modern warfare. 
The disagreement on the tactical lessons of the overseas 
campaigns was linked to a more general debate on the ways to cope 
with the new conditions on the battlefield. To be more accurate, 
the issue to be solved was how to carry out the tactical offensive 
when weapon technology made the defensive stronger. An answer was 
to emphasize speed and the psychological effects of the bayonet. 
The foundation of this doctrine was that if defensive fire was 
19 Eduardo Gallego Ramos, `El municionamiento de la infanteria en el combate moderno', RTIC, 
IX, 1 (January-June 1899), pp. 26-7; Luis Fernandez de Cordova, `Täctica del Comandante 
Burguete', RTIC, XII, 1 (January-June 1902), p. 116; Modesto Navarro, `Observaciones sobre la 
täctica de Burguete', EM, XXI, 1 (January-June 1902), pp. 165,259. 
20 Alonso Baquer, `La guerra Hispano-americana', p. 144; Ricardo Burguete Lana, Mi rebeldia 
(Madrid, 1904), pp. 310-4. 
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always more powerful, then the bayonet charge was the only means 
through which the offensive proved its superiority. According to 
this doctrine (which found in Major Ricardo Burguete a very 
outspoken supporter), the best protections against fire were speed 
and mobility. The aim of the offensive was to cover the distance 
quickly, through an advance without interruptions. Thus the enemy 
could not aim its weapons accurately against a fast-moving target. 
The light field fortification and the methodical advance in which 
the soldier took advantage of the roughness of ground must be 
dismissed; otherwise the troops would be too exposed to enemy fire 
whenever they made a halt. 21 
In the eyes of offensive-minded essayists, such as Major 
Burguete and his brother Manuel (who was an infantry officer as 
well), fire in the offensive was seen more as a liability than as 
an asset: it delayed the advance and diminished the will to get 
closer to the enemy. Moreover, since most contemporary armies were 
made up of short-service conscripts, it was not possible to give 
them a good military training. If the tactics of gradual advance 
were used, these troops would end up by staying still behind any 
cover available, and wasting ammunition in a useless, long-range 
firefight. So they must be carried to the final assault line as 
soon as possible. Once there, they would not be able to wait to 
defeat the enemy through fire, but they would feel a compulsion to 
charge and destroy the enemy with the bayonet. More training in 
the use of this weapon would increase the soldiers' offensive 
spirit and self-trust. Ricardo Burguete even argued that the 
colonial campaigns (including the Spanish ones in Cuba and the 
Philippines) had seen the inferiority of the Europeans in close 
combat, faced with peoples used to fight with stabbing weapons, 
21 Burguete, Nuevos metodos, pp. 25-6; Hilario Hernandez Rivera, `Sobre el espiritu que debe 
informar un reglamento täctico', RTIC, XIII, 1 (January-June 1903), pp. 143-4. 
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because the former used to resort to defensive squares. But he 
forgot to add that the European soldiers' alleged softness did not 
prevent them from slaughtering their more robust, offensive 
enemies through the fire power of modern quick-firing rifled 
22 weapons . 
A slightly different approach to this doctrine was taken by 
Captain Dolla, of the cavalry corps. He argued that firearms were 
the more effective the closer they were to the enemy. Therefore, 
in order to increase their effects, they had to be moved forward - 
thus movement became the decisive factor of the combat. Dolla also 
argued that the advance provided moral fortitude as a bonus. The 
more resolute and faster the advance, the greater the morale 
boost. Moreover, according to Dolla, what had happened in the 
performance of modern weapons was an increase in their moral 
effects due to the fear they roused. And this fear increased as 
the distance from the enemy diminished. The firearms' 
effectiveness depended more on how long the troops were exposed to 
their shots than on the volume of their fire per unit of time. So 
the decision of the fighting had to be achieved as soon as 
possible through the advance. 23 This argument was rather 
fallacious, since it underrated the importance of improvements in 
modern weapons' range and rate of fire. Actually the effectiveness 
of the modern quick-firing rifled weapon was based on its ability 
to inflict damage from longer distances sooner. When weapons could 
kill in a few minutes as many men as they did in an hour a hundred 
years before, saying that the longer the troops stood under fire, 
the more they suffered, was just a truism. 
22 Burguete, Nuevos metodos, pp. 15,26; Manuel Burguete, `El choque al arrna Blanca como 
resolvente ünico y decisivo en todo combate moderno', RCM, XXVI (1901), pp. 201-3; Critön, 
pp. 32-5. On the colonial wars, see Daniel R. Headrick, `The Tools of Imperialism: Technology 
and the Expansion of European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century', Journal of Modern 
Histo , 
51,2 (June 1979), pp. 258-61. 
23 Angel Dolla, `Conferencias del Circulo Militar', RTIC, XV, 1 (January-June 1905), pp. 32-5. 
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The arguments of the supporters of the doctrine of outright 
offensive echoed partly the thinking of the French military 
essayist Charles Ardant du Picq. He had stated that the soldiers' 
morale diminishes as they lose confidence in the effectiveness of 
their weapons to beat the enemy from afar. So if the firearms 
became more perfect, the advance under fire would have a greater 
moral effect on the enemy, and victory would go to those who 
marched forward in the most orderly and resolute way. 24 Although 
the Spanish sources surveyed do not allow one to trace a clear, 
direct link back to the work of du Picq, it is plausible to think 
of it. A Spanish translation of du Picq's Etudes sur le combat had 
been published in 1883, so he was not a totally unknown essayist. 
On the other hand, du Picq's ideas could have been known 
secondhand. French tactical thinking after 1870 was partly 
inspired by du Picq (although essayists usually misread his 
writings). And there is some evidence suggesting that French 
military thinking was more likely to be known in Spain due to 
reasons of geographical and cultural closeness. 
25 Therefore, the 
Spanish military men were more likely to be influenced by French 
(and thus by du Picq's) ideas than by other foreign thinking. 
b) Fire power as the foundation of tactics. 
Facing the doctrine of offensive ä outrance, there were those 
who followed ideas more in tune with the official doctrine after 
1881. If the strength of the defence lay in fire power, the 
offensive had to apply even more fire power to overcome the 
former. The attacking troops had to keep firmly in mind the idea 
24 Charles Ardant du Picq, Estudios sobre el combate, 2 vol. (Madrid, 1883), I. 160-1. 
25 A contemporary survey of foreign professional periodicals mentions 
fourteen French journals, 
against seven German ones: X., `La cultura militar en los comienzos 
del siglo XX', RTIC, XIV, 1 
(January-June 1904), pp. 90-6,139-44. On the influence of du Picq's ideas on French military 
thinking, see Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, `Du Picq and Foch: The French School', in 
Edward Mead Earle (ed. ), Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to 
Hitler (Princeton, 1943), pp. 216-7. 
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of marching always forward, but this did not mean that fire was an 
ancillary means which they could do without. Colonel Modesto 
Navarro expressed the idea as follows: 
In the attack one must have the resolution to advance 
constantly until arriving, if necessary, at the assault 
of the enemy lines with the bayonet, but arriving 
quickly at this situation is less important than 
arriving in a good condition, that is, after the 
adversary has been broken physically and morally through 
long range fighting by means of well chosen and duly 
spaced out fire from position to position. 26 
Navarro also argued that if speed were indeed so good a 
protection, the cavalry's role on the battlefield would never have 
diminished (since horse troops are faster than infantry). 27 
According to another supporter of fire power-based tactics, 
Captain Gil Juste, the bayonet enthusiasts overrated the 
psychological effect of cold steel (for example, seasoned Spanish 
troops did not shun hand-to-hand fighting in surprise attacks by 
Philippine insurgents armed with stabbing weapons). On the 
contrary, the fear of a hail of bullets and shells, which killed 
in a impersonal and random way, was as great as that of the 
bayonet. If the defenders overcame the former, they would also 
overcome the latter, and therefore the alleged moral superiority 
of advance per se disappeared. So any assault carried out while 
the defenders stayed in their positions ran the risk of being 
wiped out . 
28 
For advocates of tactics based on fire power such as Captains 
26 `En el ataque hay que tener la resoluciön de avanzar siempre hasta llegar, si se hace menester, al 
asalto y abordaje a 
la bayoneta de las lineas enemigas, pero cuidando no tanto de llegar presto a 
ese caso cuanto de llegar en buenas condiciones, esto es, luego de que el adversario haya quedado 
bien quebrantado material y moralmente mediante el combate a distancia por los fuegos de 
posiciön en posiciön bien elegidas y debidamente espaciadas. ' Navarro, `Observaciones', p. 292. 
27 Navarro, `Observaciones', pp. 225-34. 
28 Germän Gil Juste [or Yuste], `Formaciones y evoluciones de la compania y del batallön', RTIC, 
XI, 1 (January-June 1901), 355-7. Gil Yuste (1866-1948) entered the Infantry Academy in 1882 
and fought in the Philippines, Cuba and Morocco; he later was commandant of the Infantry 
Academy; a major-general on retirement in 1936, he joined the nationalist side and took charge of 
the War Secretariat (the embryonic war ministry) from October 1936 to early 1938. 
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Gallego and Gil Juste, the bayonet had lost its decisive role in 
the combat and assaults with cold steel would have no raison 
d'etre in future battles. The combat would be opened by means of 
fire power, which would also carry out the main attack. Under the 
cover of artillery fire, the attacking troops would be able to 
advance to suitable positions, where they would start a shooting 
duel to achieve the fire superiority deciding the outcome of the 
fighting. 29 Actually Captain Gil Juste, an infantryman, thought 
that new artillery ammunition, such as melinite shells, would be 
able to overcome field fortifications and drive the defenders out 
of them. Thus tactical manoeuvring would be restored and fire 
power would be the means to prepare or impede the clash, the 
combat's supreme act. 30 
However, Gil Juste became less sanguine about the presumed 
effectiveness of such fire three years later and admitted that the 
tactical offensive was inappropriate against an entrenched enemy. 
But this did not mean the impossibility of offensive warfare, as 
stated by the Russian-Polish essayist Ivan Bloch. The offensive 
could still be carried out through strategic manoeuvre, which 
would turn the enemy forces out of their positions and force them 
into encounter battles. In this way, in having to cope with more 
unpredictable battlefields, the commanders' genius would still 
play a fundamental role. On the other hand, battles on unprepared 
ground offered the quick-firing artillery and magazine rifles many 
more chances to break the enemy, whose rout would be achieved by 
the cavalry - the shock arm par excellence - since this was more 
effective for the task than the infantry's bayonet attacks. So 
Captain Gil Juste foretold that cavalry would be the only shock 
29 Gallego, `El municionamiento', p. 25; German Gil Juste, `Como puede obtener la Infanteria 
superioridad de fuego', RTIC, XI, 1 (January-June 1901), pp. 259-62. 
30Germ6n Gil Juste, `Algo sobre la nueva Artilleria de campana y los combates del porvenir', 
RTIC, IX, 1 (January-June 1899), p. 530. 
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arm in the battles of the future. 31 
This argument of an officer who recognized the growing power of 
firearms and the need to adapt tactics to this fact is noteworthy 
because it shows the survival of traditional views about the 
battle (through the attempt to integrate the traditional tactics 
of the cavalry, an arm whose role on the battlefield was eroded by 
technological progress). It illustrates how deeply rooted was the 
idea of the prevalence of the offensive despite the increased 
power of the defence. Nevertheless, the idea of strategic 
manoeuvre evaded rather than solved the concrete tactical problem: 
how to avoid or limit the effects of defensive fire power in the 
age of quick-firing rifled weapons. 
3. The evolution of infantry tactical regulations. 
a) The theoretical debate on tactical regulations, 1899-1913. 
The rapid changes in warfare and the adoption of the Mauser 
magazine rifle forced the Tactics Commission to update the Spanish 
infantry tactical regulations after 1890. But the new regulations 
were not approved until April 1898.32 Thus the Spanish troops 
fought the wars of 1895-1898 following the 1881 infantry tactical 
regulations. These regulations considered fire power as the 
principal means to overcome the growing strength of defence. The 
skirmishing line (called guerrilla in the Spanish military 
vocabulary) had become the main fighting echelon because of 
its 
fire action, dropping its old role as the screen for the assault 
columns. 
33 
The 1898 regulations preserved the essential principles of the 
31 German Gil Juste, `Proyecto de reglamento täctico para la Infanteria', RTIC, XII, 1 (January- 
June 1902), pp. 34-6. 
32 CLE 1898, No. 109. 
33 Verardo Garcia Rey, Estudios acerca de la täctica de infanteria (Madrid, 1907), p. 15. 
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previous ones. 34 Fire was `the main fighting element of the 
infantry' (el principal elemento de combate de la infanteria). 35 
Even more, the regulations were based on the conviction that 
contemporary infantry tactics came down to achieving fire 
superiority. 36 This was a cause of regret for supporters of shock 
action like Major Burguete. According to him, the spirit which had 
inspired the Spanish regulations of the late nineteenth century 
had been influential in the failures of the overseas campaigns in 
the late 1890s . 
37 
Burguete pointed out that, despite the importance given to fire 
power, the official regulations did not specify what sort of fire 
was the most effective, either volleys or individual fire. He 
thought that the regulations overstated the tactical importance of 
the possession of ground. The most unwise were the articles 
recommending a thorough use of ground to get cover during the 
advance: if they were followed, individualism would kill any 
collective action since every soldier would advance his own way. 
It was the task of commanders rather than individuals to decide 
when to go to ground. The exaggerated concern for protection in 
the regulations was harmful for the offensive spirit. 
38 But 
Burguete seems to overstate his case as well. The 1898 regulations 
actually stated that the attacking infantry `must be more worried 
about advancing quickly and in an orderly way without heavy 
losses 
than about delivering fire of a kind which will not achieve real 
effects except in the last stages of combat... ' 
39 
34 Memoria General sobre el proyecto de Reglamento para la instrucciön täctica de las tropas 
de 
Infanteria, pp. 10-1, AGMS 2/8/527. 
35 Reglamento Para la instrucciön täctica de las tropas de infanteria, 3 vol. (1898) (hereafter RTI 
1898), I. paragraph 147. 
36 Memoria General sobre el proyecto de Reglamento para la instrucciön täctica de las tropas de 
Infanteria, p. 11, AGMS 2/8/527. 
37 Burguete, Nuevos metodos, p. 24. 
38 Ibid., pp. 17-9. 
39 ' [D]ebe preocuparse mas de avanzar con rapidez y precision sin grandes perdidas, que de hacer 
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Burguete blamed the official doctrine's ambivalent spirit for 
overcaution. Even when talking about the assault, the regulations 
always bore in mind a possible repulse and the ways to reach 
safety in the rear, rather than emphasizing the decisive character 
which the attack must reveal. The 1898 regulations, in the parts 
dealing with the assault at company and platoon level, certainly 
did not encourage in junior commanders the idea of pushing far 
forward. For instance, after the paragraph describing the way the 
assault had to be carried out, the next one stated that, if the 
assault was successful, the enemy was to be pursued through fire 
alone and the platoon would re-deploy quickly in order to secure 
the conquered position against a counter-attack. And a third 
paragraph - which was longer than the first one - explained how 
the platoon had to retreat in case of failing in the assault. The 
paragraphs about the company assault were quite similar. According 
to another essayist, the regulations' warnings about keeping 
reserves whatever the circumstances were inspired by overcaution, 
as if the prevailing aim was to avoid setbacks. Thus it was 
impossible to achieve any decisive success and destroy the enemy, 
since exploitation would be timid at best. 40 
If Burguete complained of the excessive fear of enemy fire, 
Captain Gil Juste, on the contrary, thought that the tactical 
regulations underrated the effects of defensive fire power during 
the bayonet charge. If the regulations were applied literally, the 
troops would sometimes stand up in close order in the open at 300 
metres from the enemy lines and they were supposed to act in an 
orderly way in this situation. 41 
un fuego que no producirä verdaderos efectos sino en las ültimos periodos del combate... ' RTI 
1898, II. appendix I, article 1. 
40RTI 1898, II. paragraphs 119,120,121,309,310 and 332; Burguete, Nuevos metodos, pp. 20, 
23-4; Un oficial del regimiento "El Rey", `Nuevos metodos de combate', RCM, XXVI (1901), p. 
316. 
41 German Gil Juste, `Los ataques a la bayonets ante el fusil de repeticiön y de pequeflo calibre', 
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The extent of the 1898 regulations was also criticized by 
another essayist. Their seven hundred pages were compared 
unfavourably with the one hundred and fifty-odd ones of the German 
or the French regulations. The only explanation for this was an 
excess of detail on matters of no use on the battlefield. 42 But 
the editors of the regulations argued that the lack of training 
grounds and major manoeuvres deprived the Spanish officers of the 
means to exercise their mastery of tactical procedures. That is, 
it made little sense to replace detailed instructions for tactical 
evolutions on the battlefield with broad guidelines about the 
principles inspiring the official tactical doctrine when the 
officers had few opportunities to put these principles into 
practice. ' 3 
Burguete did not limit himself to criticizing the current 
regulations. He wrote by 1900 an alternative draft of infantry 
tactical regulations and submitted it to the Tactics Commission. 
Burguete's regulations were tested by a full-strength company in 
the 1st Infantry Regiment El Rey. 44 The basic point of the project 
was to divide the infantry platoon into four squads arranged in 
files ten to fifteen men deep each. With the squad leaders ahead, 
the platoon would move in this formation on the battlefield. It 
would overcome obstacles by increasing the distance between 
squads, which would find their own way. Any obstacle which the 
platoon passed through in skirmishing line order could be overcome 
by this deeper formation and with no loss of the advantages of a 
closer order. Once it reached a position to rest or shoot, the 
platoon could deploy in line. The project was inspired by 
RTIC, XI, 2 (July-December 1901), pp. 35-7. 
42 Un oficial, `Nuevos metodos', p. 313. 
43 Memoria General sobre el proyecto de Reglamento para la instruccion täctica de las tropas de 
Infanteria, pp. 9-10, AGMS 2/8/527. 
44 Un official, `Nuevos metodos', p. 311-2. Burguete's regulations were published under the title 
Nuevos metodos de combate, and reprinted in 1903 and 1907. 
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Burguete's ideas of offensive ä outrance and predominance of speed 
and shock over fire action, which have been explained above. The 
commanding officer of El Rey Regiment praised the offensive 
spirit, but he reckoned that the officers had to know its limits 
as well. Anyway, he thought that it was better to avoid any 
reference to caution in the regulations; otherwise the troops' 
morale might be harmed. 45 
Burguete's regulations were criticized at length by Colonel 
Navarro. He argued that they contained an unbalanced approach to 
warfare by placing so much emphasis on the offensive; the defence 
remained an important form of warfare and had to be dealt with in 
the regulations, since it might be forced upon one's own forces. 
There were also contradictions in the project: despite his cult of 
the bayonet, Burguete recognized on several occasions the 
importance of fire, both in the defence and in the attack. So 
Navarro wondered what was the point in persuading the troops that 
cold steel was supreme. He agreed that sometimes the troops had to 
close with the enemy in order to win, but the idea of a clash with 
the bayonet had become a moral concept rather than a material one. 
The trick was to convince the enemy that troops able to advance 
under fire would also be able to kill him with the bayonet, if the 
former waited in his positions for the latter. Fire was the means 
to break the will to resist such advance. If the destruction of 
the enemy was not mainly physical (the percentage of casualties 
had diminished in modern battles), the only tangible proof of 
having achieved moral superiority and victory was therefore the 
seizing of ground. The latter thus had a real tactical importance, 
contrary to what Burguete thought. 
46 
45 Burguete, Nuevos metodos, pp. 6-8,41; Fernandez de Cordova, `Täctica del Comandante 
Burguete', pp. 115-6. 
46 Navarro, `Observaciones', pp. 130-1,168,196,321-3. 
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Navarro pointed out that, despite the talk of uninterrupted 
movement, Burguete actually adopted successive advances from 
position to position; this was unavoidable if the enemy had to be 
broken by fire. Moreover, the extended modern battlefields, the 
limits of the infantryman's stamina, the ruggedness of terrain 
and, of course, the enemy's fire forced troops to make halts 
during the advance; speed alone was no protection. 7 4 
Another criticism was that Burguete's deep formations did not 
offer any substantial improvement when facing modern firearms. 
Although these would be given more difficult frontal targets, 
their ballistics made it easier to hit in depth. Moreover, it got 
soldiers used to seeing the man ahead as a sort of shield, whose 
cover they would be unwilling to leave. Another flaw in Burguete's 
regulations was the excessive exposure of the squad leaders; 
4e morale was harmed when they became casualties. 
The sources consulted do not give any information on the 
official assessment after testing Burguete's regulations. However, 
a disappointed Burguete wrote a decade later that his project led 
`a misleading, ill-fated official life. '49 This suggests that his 
views were too radical to be accepted by the Spanish army at that 
time. 
b) The lessons of the Russo-Japanese War: field fortifications 
and the rise of morale factors. 
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) gave an opportunity to 
observe closely the effects of state-of-the-art firearms in 
regular warfare. Burguete took advantage of this conflict to claim 
the soundness of his own tactical theories, by stating that they 
47 Ibid., pp. 260-5,289-90. 
48 Garcia Rey, Estudios de täctica, pp. 50-1; Navarro, `Observaciones sobre la täctica de 
Burguete', EM, XXII, 1 (January-June 1903), p. 95. 
49 `Mna vida oficial falaz y aciaga. ' Burguete, La guerra y el hombre, p. 220. 
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had been adopted successfully by the Japanese army. 50 He praised 
the aggressive Japanese attitude, while the Russians looked more 
interested in the possession of positions alone. However, Burguete 
himself described how `every inch of conquered ground was a 
victory [for the Japanese] and a support to carry on advancing. 
Every soldier - with a sandbag on his back - turned the bit of 
ground which he conquered into a formidable redoubt... 1 51 This 
does not seem exactly the same thing he suggested when he talked 
in his tactical project about advancing without interruptions and 
the curbing effect of the use of the ground. Indeed Burguete would 
envisage, a few years later, the offensive combat as the action of 
a shooting line, from which squads would move forward in order to 
establish more advanced fire bases. He described this sort of 
advance as methodical and slow, taking advantage of folds in the 
ground. 52 
Burguete's writings are also a token of the interest about the 
use of field fortifications raised by the Russo-Japanese War. 
Actually some Spanish essayists had already displayed a similar 
interest around 1900. Given the predominance of defensive fire 
power, which caused more frequent halts during the advance, 
Captain Gallego thought that resorting to field fortifications was 
- besides dispersed fighting orders - the solution to the problem. 
These fortifications gave a degree of cover against rifle fire and 
shelling by making use of ground. They could also be used as 
rallying points if the assault was repulsed, or as a line of 
resistance against counter-attacks. 
53 Other essayists reckoned 
50 Ricardo Burguete, La Ciencia del Valor. Psicologia de la guerra. Aplicaciön al desarrollo 
episödico de la batalla de Mukden (Madrid, 1907), p. 243. 
51 `[C]ada palmo de terreno conquistado era un triunfo y un apoyo para avanzar. Cada soldado con 
un saco de tierra a cuestas hacia del palmo de tierra que conquistaba un reducto 
formidable... ' 
Ibid., pp. 138-9. 
52 Burguete, La guerra y el hombre, pp. 214-6. 
53 Eduardo Gallego Ramos, `Trabajos de campana y herramientas de las tropas de infanteria', 
RTIC, IX, 2 (July-December 1899), pp. 32-3. 
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that the experiences of the Boer War (1899-1902) endorsed this use 
of field fortifications and showed that the infantryman had to 
fight as much with the shovel as with the rifle and had to be 
trained accordingly. 54 
Based on the experiences of the Russo-Japanese conflict, several 
Spanish essayists discussed the importance of using the ground or, 
more accurately, the light field fortification, in the attack. 
Captains Carreras and Malagön, of the Infantry Academy's teaching 
staff, wrote that the Russo-Japanese War had proved the poor 
effectiveness of field artillery against entrenched infantry by 
contrast to the trials in peacetime. Therefore, the attacking 
infantry had to rely more on their own fire preparation, but they 
could not carry this out uncovered within the effective range of 
artillery. Moreover, once within the range of the enemy's 
musketry, the advance to the assault line would sometimes become 
so difficult as to limit this to the night hours (as actually 
happened in Manchuria). So they concluded the impossibility of any 
advance on open ground, before the ultimate assault, against any 
average fortified defence, and the need in modern campaigns for 
resorting to the old techniques of siege warfare in order to 
approach the enemy strongpoints. 55 
Major Aviles, though recognizing the usefulness of light, fast- 
built trenches in the defence and the attack, did not infer such a 
predominance of the field fortification. This was useful for 
economising on troops in inactive sectors, but excessive reliance 
on it could be demoralizing in the long term. 
56 A few years later, 
Aviles (a lieutenant colonel by that time) was to argue that, 
54 Tomäs Rodriguez de Leon, `La infanteria moderna', RTIC, X, 1 (January-June 1900), pp. 125-6; 
Banüs, Reflexiones, pp. 52-3. 
ss Juan Carreras and Ricardo Malagön, Relaciones entre la fortificaciön y la täctica (Toledo, 1908), 
pp. 4,21-3. 
56 Juan Aviles, `Algenas lecciones de la ültima guerra', RCM, XXX (1905), p. 186. 
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though they must be used as a rule, field fortifications could 
(and had to) be discarded whenever this action improved one's own 
fire: the modern concept of field fortification gave the 
improvement of one's own fire priority over the protection role. 
On the other hand, he also stated that field fortifications did 
not diminish the offensive spirit of well-trained soldiers, who 
saw them as a temporary means to achieve fire superiority. 57 
Aviles' arguments on fortification were inspired by the alleged 
lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, which seemed to endorse the 
idea that the armies displaying the highest morale and the most 
offensive attitude would hold the upper hand in any future war, 
whatever the difficulties they faced on the battlefield. Fire 
power was now important because of the moral support it provided 
to the attacking troops, whereas it was underrated in the defence. 
According to Aviles, the war had taught that the modern rifle did 
not make impossible the frontal attack in open order and had not 
substantially increased the casualty figures. Higher rates of fire 
meant lesser accuracy in practice. The attack could not be 
successful if it had not been prepared through artillery and rifle 
fire. But the purpose of this fire was to tire and unnerve the 
defender, since the latter's fire lost accuracy after two or three 
hours' firefight. 58 Aviles does not explain why the attacking 
troops were apparently immune to this phenomenon, unless it was 
due to their alleged moral superiority. 
Another essayist argued in 1907 that fire superiority only 
became manifest for the attacking side through moral agents: this 
meant in practice a resolute advance scornful of any danger. Thus 
the defender, confident within his positions at the start of 
57 Juan Aviles, `La fortificaciön de campana y su elemento fundamental, las trincheras abrigos', 
RCM, XX)UN (1909), pp. 38-40. 
58 Aviles, `Algenas lecciones', pp. 185-6. 
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fighting, would lose heart when he saw his own losses and his 
inability to stop the attackers; then he would lose fire 
effectiveness, the casualties he inflicted would diminish, and the 
attacking troops' fire superiority would really be obvious. 59 This 
argument, which resembles du Picq's ideas, has a grain of truth 
(in the last analysis, defeated troops flee to avoid the clash 
with the enemy, so attacking troops must move forward sometime in 
order to win), but it portrays fire superiority as the consequence 
of the advance rather than as a requirement, which in an 
offensive-minded environment could not help encouraging premature 
advances. 
The influence of the Russo-Japanese War was so strong that 
praise of morale-related qualities after 1905 spread to those who 
had endorsed fire power tactics before. One of them was Brigadier 
Modesto Navarro, who now expressed ideas which were nearer to the 
doctrine of the offensive ä outrance than to fire-based tactics 
such as those supported by Navarro himself some years before. He 
explained that the battles in Manchuria had lessened the 
expectations about the quick-firing artillery's effectiveness. 
From now on, the artillery's role would be to provide support fire 
to make easier the infantry's advance, through the temporary 
paralysis and neutralization of the enemy forces instead of their 
destruction. This covering fire - despite its diminished material 
effect - was to stop the trend towards more dispersed formations 
in combat. A dispersed formation, though less vulnerable, was also 
more difficult to command, and considerations of the units' inner 
cohesion and command (so important for morale) must prevail over 
those related to vulnerability and one's own weapons 
effectiveness. Facing the danger on the battlefield, the troops 
59 M. Vicente Arcones, `Estudios sobre el combate de la infanteria', RCM, XXXII (1907), pp. 134- 
5. 
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needed an orderly grouping. The combat and its outcome were above 
all human actions of a moral nature. The roots of tactics lay in 
them. 60 
Even Marva (also a general at that time) recognized explicitly 
that, after the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, the bayonet 
attack and the clash remained decisive against a determined, 
entrenched enemy since the cannon and rifle fire did not break the 
latter. Nonetheless, he also carried on arguing about the need to 
use formations adapted to the battle ground and light field 
fortifications. Moreover, General Marv& warned that, although 
moral factors were decisive when the material ones were balanced, 
the latter were becoming more important due to their increasing 
effectiveness. 61 
c) Towards new infantry tactics: the 1908 regulations. 
The transformations of tactics after 1898 led to the creation 
(in early 1907) of a commission under the Spanish army's general 
staff in order to edit new, updated tactical regulations. 62 This 
writer's research has not found evidence related to the activities 
of this commission, so it is not possible now to assess the 
influence of the Spanish army's own experience on the new tactical 
doctrine for the infantry. A contemporary essayist, Lieutenant 
Garcia Rey, reckoned that the Spanish officers had become infected 
with an offensive spirit after the defeat of 1898, which had been 
reinforced by the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. 
63 
There were also Burguete's tactical proposals. Burguete was 
60 Modesto Navarro, `Avance de las tropas de infanteria bajo el fuego de artilleria', RTIC, XXI, 1 
(January-June 1911), pp. 292,329,338,369-70,456. 
61 Jose Marva y Mayer, `La ciencia militar en el Ateneo', RTIC, XVII, 2 (July-December 1907), 
pp. 252-3,492,494. 
62 CLE 1907, No. 30. 
63 V Garcia Rey, `La nueva tdctica', RTIC, XIX, 1 (January-June 1909), pp. 407-8. 
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officially told that some of his ideas had been used for the new 
regulations. He was doubtful about this point, since he had been 
present neither in the discussions nor in the editing. But he was 
sure that only secondary ideas, if any, had been incorporated. 64 
A contemporary source pointed out that the infantry regulations 
of France (1904), Germany (1906), Italy (1905) and Russia (1907) 
provided inspiration for the Spanish doctrine. 65 The writings of 
contemporary essayists suggest that the French regulations were 
the most important influence. For example, Garcia Rey thought that 
the Spanish doctrine on the development of combat was similar to 
the French one: general attacks by subordinate commanders all 
along the front, and exploitation of local success by the high 
command through a major effort (whereas the German doctrine was 
based on a thorough attack by the advanced guard combined with an 
enveloping manoeuvre of the main force). However, the Spanish 
doctrine attached more importance to fire power than the French 
one. 66 The French influence is also emphasized by a Gallic 
essayist, General de Torcy, who stated that the Spanish 
regulations had taken much of the contents of the French ones 
approved in 1904.67 
The new infantry regulations were approved in a provisional way 
in August 1908.68 The 1908 regulations actually ordered the 
advance through a combination of fire and movement by platoons. 
69 
The troops would reach the main firing position, beyond which any 
64Burguete, La guerra y el hombre, p. 220. 
65 Federico de Madariaga, `Instrucciön täctica de las tropas de Infanteria', RTIC, XVIII, 2 (July- 
December 1908), p. 495. 
66 Verardo Garcia Rey, `Doctrinas acerca del combate', RTIC, XXIII, 1 (January-June 1913), pp. 
135,230,232. 
67 Louis Joseph Gilles de Torcy, Les espagnols au Maroc en 1909,2nd edition (Paris and Nancy, 
1911), p. 227. There is a Spanish edition: Los espanoles en Marruecos en 1909 (Madrid, 1911). 
68 CLE 1908, No. 149. 
69 Reglamento provisional Para la instrucciön täctica de las tropas de Infanteria (1908) (hereafter 
RTI 1908), article 291. 
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advance was impossible before achieving fire superiority; the halt 
would be long and heavy fire would be delivered by the 
infantrymen. 70 Once the enemy fire looked like weakening, the 
advance would start again in order to reach the assault line (in 
which the superiority of fire would also be definitively 
achieved) . 
71 The 1908 regulations seemed more offensive-minded 
than those published in 1898. They called for a thorough bayonet 
attack if the enemy showed signs of weakness. But if it was not so 
and the troops were nevertheless very near to the enemy, they must 
charge with the bayonet all the same. 72 The use of light field 
fortifications in the attack had to be very limited. 73 Even the 
defence had an offensive bias: `By means of manoeuvre, and taking 
advantage of mistakes and faults of the enemy, the defence will 
change its role by taking on a energetic and determined offensive 
whenever feasible. ' 74 
The regulations' emphasis on the clash and the offensive was a 
matter for criticism for Major Gil Juste, whose views were 
published in a series of articles in La Correspondencia Militar in 
late 1908. The regulations stated that the clash was the 
infantry's main means of action, but Gil Juste did not believe in 
its absolute necessity. An enveloping movement could also drive 
the enemy out of a position. Actually, he added, many defenders 
already 'beaten' by fire power remained in their positions because 
of the fear of being shot in the flight; the chance of running 
away came when the attacking troops charged with the bayonet. Thus 
the clash was often no more than a confirmation of victory (though 
70 Ibid., article 296. 
't Ibid., articles 298,305 and 306. 
72 Ibid., articles 310 and 311. 
73 Ibid., article 320. 
74 `A favor de la maniobra, y aprovechändose de los descuidos y faltas del contrario, la defensa 
cambiarä su papel, emprendiendo una energica y decidida ofensiva en cuantas ocasiones le sea 
factible. ' Ibid., article 381. 
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it could really be decisive if the enemy was unbroken) . 
75 Gil 
Juste asserted that the excessive emphasis on aggressiveness and 
offensive spirit had been copied from the French regulations. 
According to him, attacking whatever the place and time was as 
harmful as a passive defence, nor did permanent aggression mean 
real courage. The latter, in any case, could not be inculcated 
through tactical regulations. 76 
Gil Juste's remarks prompted a reply in the pages of La 
Correspondencia Militar. According to the unidentified writer, Gil 
Juste was saying the same thing as the regulations: whatever the 
cause, the fact was that the defenders were put to flight once the 
charge was carried out. So the troops had to be ready for the 
offensive in order to conquer (a common idea of all the foreign 
regulations), and this readiness required the strengthening of 
morale-related factors and their guidance in a positive (i. e. 
offensive) direction. This was the regulations' task. " Gil 
Juste's answer to this criticism denied that all the foreign 
regulations resembled each other in emphasizing the offensive. 
They were different in the ways the offensive had to be 
undertaken, and in the factors which had to be given priority. He 
stressed that the Spanish regulations had simply copied the French 
army's doctrine, which had even found opposition in some sections 
of the French military, although the attachment to Napoleonic 
tradition and procedures had prevailed. Gil Juste foretold that 
future experience would prove the French army's mistake . 
78 
The 1908 regulations also found severe criticism from Ricardo 
75 Coronel B. [pseud. of German Gil Yuste], `Sobre el nuevo reglamento täctico de nuestra 
Infanteria', La Correspondencia Militar (hereafter LCM), 28 November 1908. 
76 Coronel B. [pseud. of German Gil Yuste], `Sobre el nuevo reglamento täctico de nuestra 
Infanteria', LCM, 2 December 1908. 
" X., `Sobre el nuevo reglamento täctico de nuestra Infanteria', LCM, 11 and 14 December 1908. 
78 German Gil Yuste, `Sobre el nuevo reglamento täctico de nuestra Infanteria', LCM, 19 
December 1908. 
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Burguete, who seems to have had second thoughts on his work of 
1900 and whose diatribes against the new infantry regulations show 
that he had taken fire power more into account by the early 1910s. 
He criticized the regulations because they forgot the emptiness of 
the modern battlefield, when they ordered troops to fire only 
against enemies in sight: it would be necessary to answer the 
enemy's fire power, but actually there were few chances to see any 
enemy - especially an enemy who had taken up defensive positions. 
On the other hand, once the troops started firing, the regulations 
gave no concrete guideline about fire control and ammunition 
consumption (they ordered troops simply to fire at will 
interrupted by pauses, but with no instructions about the duration 
and rate of the fire periods). The chapter on fire was seen as 
proper for a firing range, but not for infantry tactical 
regulations. 79 
Burguete thought that the regulations also overestimated the 
moral influence of the officer upon the soldier, whose natural 
fear would diminish discipline under fire. The soldier had to be 
told beforehand that the enemy would be invisible. If not, he 
would find it difficult to aim correctly when ordered, control his 
ammunition consumption, and stop firing, because he would see no 
reason to do it and, therefore, to advance. 
80 The regulations gave 
no details about the array of troops on the battlefield beyond 
echeloning in a skirmishing line, supports and reserve. Moreover, 
they were occasionally contradictory: e. g. article 143's burning 
desire which inspired the troops to arrive at the clash did not 
match article 298's guideline about `trying' the advance if the 
enemy looked like weakening. It was supposed that the advance, 
" Ricardo Burguete, Teoria y präctica de la guerra. Evoluciön en el arte (Madrid, 1913), pp. 178- 
82. 
80 Ibid., pp. 184-8. 
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once started, would be carried out thoroughly; `attempts' to 
advance hinted at a not so resolute attitude on the part of the 
attacker, according to Burguete. 81, He also remarked ironically on 
the regulations' lack of clear-cut, practical guidelines; it would 
have been easier to reduce the regulations to a single precept 
ordering commanders to use troops, weapons and ground wisely in 
order to defeat the enemy. 82 This last criticism had already been 
brought forward in 1908 by Major Bermudez de Castro, who 
complained that the highbrow trends within the Spanish military 
had turned the 1908 infantry regulations into a philosophical 
essay. 83 
Besides criticisms, the 1908 infantry regulations faced a 
practical obstacle to their application in the Spanish army. An 
anonymous article in a professional journal wondered how the 
troops could be trained in the right implementation of the 
regulations when the Spanish infantry units were usually so much 
under strength. 84 By 1905, the official peacetime strength of the 
average infantry regiment of two active battalions was 517 
officers and enlisted men (one battalion in wartime was supposed 
to be around 1,000-strong). A fifth of the strength was 
headquarters and specialist staff (clerks, musicians, and so on). 
Therefore, the eight active companies of this undermanned infantry 
regiment only had about fifty troops each. According to Captain 
Gallego, absences due to disease and secondments for ancillary 
duties often reduced the real strength of some companies to two or 
three men. 85 This situation does not seem to have improved three 
years later. 
81 Ibid., pp. 192-4. 
82 Ibid., p. 195. 
83 Luis Bermudez de Castro, `En contra de la nueva täctica', LCM, 31 December 1908. 
84 `La nueva täctica de infanteria', RCM, XXXIII (1908), pp. 354-5. 
85 Gallego, Proyecto de reorganizaciön, p. 32. 
131 
4. The campaign of Melilla (1909) and its doctrinal 
consequences. 
a) The military operations. 
The 1908 provisional infantry regulations were tested in actual 
conflict one year after their approval, in the Melilla campaign of 
1909. This campaign was the first step of the Spanish army's 
involvement in a long, bitter colonial war which was to affect the 
conduct of the military in Spain's politics during the next two 
decades . 
86 
Spain had two enclaves on the northern shore of Morocco in the 
early twentieth century. They were the seaports of Melilla (which 
had been under Spanish sovereignty since 1498) and Ceuta. These 
enclaves had remained as isolated outposts until the early years 
of the twentieth century, when they provided a foothold to expand 
Spanish influence in Morocco. By early 1909, a Spanish mining 
company bought from a self-styled regional overlord the rights to 
exploit iron deposits near Melilla. However, the local Moorish 
natives did not like the agreement, and attacked the workers 
building the railway to the mines in early July. General Marina, 
the military commander of Melilla, reckoned his garrison 
insufficient to undertake punitive operations and protect the 
mining activities, so he asked Madrid for reinforcements. 
The cabinet sent an expeditionary force (including called-up 
reservists) during the summer. The first troops to arrive were 
committed prematurely and suffered setbacks in late July, so the 
military activity was limited to consolidating a defensive 
perimeter and training the newly arrived forces. Offensive 
86 On the origins of the Spanish involvement in Morocco, see Payne, Politics, pp. 102-5; and 
David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif. Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion (Stanford and London, 
1969), pp. 6-9,35-42. The account of the campaign is based on Servicio Histörico Militar, Historia 
de las campanas de Marruecos, 4 vol. (Madrid, 1947-1981), II. 7-299. 
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operations started again in September: in a series of limited, 
cautious advances the Spanish expeditionary army (over 40,000- 
strong) subdued the nearby tribes and set up a ring of defensive 
positions and blockhouses around a slightly expanded area under 
Spanish tutelage. By November, the campaign of Melilla (which was 
also known as the Riff campaign, after the nearby mountainous 
region) was over. According to the official history of the 
campaign, the Spanish casualties amounted to 2,517 killed and 
wounded in action (plus 211 killed by disease); 1,765 Moorish 
corpses were buried. 
The worst defeat suffered by the Spanish army during the 
campaign of Melilla took place in a ravine called the Barranco del 
Lobo (27 July 1909), when General Pintos' brigade was decimated by 
the Moorish natives' musketry. The brigade (six light infantry 
battalions) had to screen the passage of a supply convoy in front 
of the lowest slopes of Mount Gurugü. Although Brigadier Pintos 
needed only to keep the harassing natives at bay, he actually 
committed the whole brigade to an attack up the ravine. Since 
Pintos was killed in the early stages of the fighting, it is not 
clear why he thought this attack necessary. The advance of the 
Spanish brigade turned into a mess as the officers fell under 
enemy fire from the front and the flanks; the mauled Spanish 
battalions came to a halt, endured the fire for a while and 
withdrew in the most orderly way they could, while the artillery 
fire held the pursuing natives off. The Spanish forces lost about 
750 killed and wounded. Official sources put the enemy losses at 
475 killed and 1200 wounded (these figures may well refer to a 
longer time, since they were gathered later from statements of 
natives). 
87 
87 Servicio Histörico Militar, Campanas de Marruecos, II. 104-6. 
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b) Lessons of the campaign. 
The contemporary professional literature admitted that the early 
performance of the Spanish infantry had been disappointing. 
According to Lieutenant-colonel Aviles, besides the Spanish 
expeditionary forces' lack of training and organization, a cause 
of the setbacks had been the recent introduction of the new 
tactical regulations, whose spirit the troops still had not 
familiarized themselves with. 88 General de Torcy wrote that the 
Spanish tactics in 1909 had been an improvised combination of the 
old procedures and the new ones, since only the conscripts who had 
recently joined the colours had been drilled in the 1908 
regulations. 89 
The combat of the Barranco del Lobo was analyzed by Aviles and 
Captain Gallego. According to Aviles, the 1908 infantry 
regulations had a partial responsibility for the defeat: they were 
unclear about the consolidation of seized ground, while they were 
much more explicit about the pursuit. Thus, after the first gains 
of ground, the desire to exploit this initial success could 
prevail over the idea of consolidating the positions. 90 On the 
other hand, Gallego pointed out that the attack formations of 
Pintos' brigade were too dense. They could only be justified if 
General Pintos had thought (as Gallego surmised) of throwing the 
Moors out of their positions by the sheer drive of a bayonet 
charge (which required a closer order than the skirmishing line). 
However, the attack was lacking in preparatory musketry and 
artillery fire. The units did not display a capability for 
manoeuvring and taking advantage of the terrain either: there was 
88 Juan Aviles, `Resumen de la guerra', RCM, XXXV (1910), pp. 6-7. 
89 Torcy, pp. 226-7. Payne states that the Spanish infantry used `extremely old-fashioned' tactics in 
the Melilla campaign; given the contemporary background of tactical doctrine, this statement is 
wrong; a different issue is the tactics' suitability for the Moroccan conflict: Payne, Politics, p. 111. 
90 Juan Aviles, 'Ensefianzas de la guerra del Rif, RCM, XXXV (1910), pp. 51-3. 
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too much confidence in sheer bravado. 91 Aviles remarked that the 
officers tried to encourage their raw troops through a determined, 
thorough attack, and disregarded the stages set by the 
regulations; this did no good for the conduct of the combat. 92 
Discussing the performance of the infantry during the whole 
campaign, Gallego pointed out that the Spanish troops did not 
follow the basic rule of modern tactics about taking advantage of 
terrain and light field fortifications. Despite the example of the 
Russo-Japanese War, the Spanish infantrymen did not know how to 
use the roughness of the ground, nor were the infantry units' 
sapping tools used during the combats. 93 The 1908 regulations must 
have been influential in this behaviour, since an officer praised 
(just before the outbreak of the conflict) how they had prepared 
the units to rank protection behind one's own fire 
effectiveness. 94 
Lieutenant-colonel Aviles put this problems down to the flaws in 
infantry tactical training. This had been based (due to the 
foreign influences and the Spanish army's own colonial experience) 
on offensive tactics: the clash had been given more importance 
than fire power. This state of affairs had been embodied in the 
1908 tactical regulations, in which the officers were told to pay 
much more attention to the troops' morale than to the correct 
manoeuvring of their units. The Melilla campaign also highlighted 
the inadequate place given in the regulations to junior leaders 
within the units. Platoon and squad leaders were to be integrated 
into the skirmishing line, but they were unable in practice to 
control their men's fire during the combat. If they took post 
91 Gallego, Campana del Rif, pp. 152-3. 
92 Aviles, `Ensenanzas', p. 55. 
93 Gallego, Campana del Rif, pp. 302-3. 
94 Bernardino Garcia Conde, `El nuevo reglamento en la präctica', LCM, 2 July 1909. 
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behind the line, they discouraged the troops. They finally 
resorted to standing up and walking along the line (thus offering 
a good target). 95 
Peacetime exercises turned the fire preparation of the attack 
into a few minutes' standstill before the assault. In real war, 
the preparatory fire could last hours. If the troops were not 
prepared for this situation, they could get demoralized by 
thinking that the operation was going badly. The troops did not 
practice the technique of lying down on the ground either 
(allegedly in order not to damage the uniforms! ), so they got 
disheartened the first time they did it in action. 96 
Besides poor training, the nature of the fighting was another 
cause of bewilderment for the Spanish soldiers. They had to fight 
against an irregular enemy able to take the best advantage of the 
rugged ground, both for movement and shooting. In contrast, the 
Spanish army moved as on a drilling ground, according to Martinez 
de Campos (who fought in the campaign as a young artillery 
subaltern). 97 He witnessed how a divisional commander proved to be 
distrustful of the official procedures (or their stereotyped 
implementation, at least). General Tovar, watching a deployment of 
troops by the book, warned his subordinates: `Don't play dirty 
tricks on me. We are no longer in Carabanchel [a training ground 
near Madrid]. ' 98 In the aftermath of the Barranco del Lobo, a 
feature of La Correspondencia Militar complained bitterly about 
the different fighting attitudes of Spaniards and Moors: the 
gallant displays of the Spanish troops were wrong against the 
Moroccan natives. Crawling on the ground was an adequate method 
95 Aviles, 'Ensefianzas', pp. 98-100. 
96 Ibid., p. 100. 
97 Carlos Martinez de Campos y Serrano, Espana belica. El siglo XX. Marruecos (Madrid, 1972), 
p. 96. 
98 4 No hacerme faenas. No estamos ya en Carabanchel. ' Ibid., p. 97. 
136 
for fighting the Moors, imitating their `treacherous' calm. 99 
Lieutenant-colonel Aviles concluded that the idea of the 
offensive had to be understood as an attitude of the commanders' 
mind and will. The offensive required in practice a superiority in 
numbers and morale which was not always achieved at the start of 
the fighting. A temporary defensive posture could be needed in 
order to wear out the enemy forces. However, the training had 
given absolute priority to fast, offensive tactics such as those 
used in the first combats. When these tactics failed at Melilla, 
the soldiers, accustomed to the success of the simulated 
offensive, lost heart and confidence in their own tactics. The 
haste to develop the stages of the attack caused a disorder of the 
tactical echeloning, and was detrimental to any defensive action 
in the heat of the battle. '°° Such haste was sometimes due to the 
commanders' impatience, which made them unwilling to spend time in 
reconnoitring the enemy positions and in preparatory shelling. '0' 
The General Staff's analysis of the campaign revealed weak 
points in the implementation of infantry tactical doctrine. The 
deployments often had not taken advantage of the effectiveness of 
modern firearms, and the small units kept unnecessarily close 
physical contact. This hindered the capability of these units for 
small-scale manoeuvre, so important in modern warfare. The fronts 
covered were too narrow to allow the units to move with ease. 
102 In 
the fighting against the Moroccan native, the aim had to be 
victory through fire superiority and skilful manoeuvre. Although 
the bayonet charge could be essential sometimes, it had to be 
avoided as a rule since the troops ended up scattered and 
99 `Impresiones', LCM, 2 August 1909. 
100 Aviles, `Ensenanzas', pp. 113-6. 
101 Gallego, Campana del Rif, p. 305. 
102 Estado Mayor Central, Ensenanzas del Rif, p. 81. 
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exhausted. 103 Gallego pointed out that bayonet charges were rare 
and carried out in company or platoon strength only; there never 
was an actual clash since this was shunned by the enemy. 104 
The Melilla campaign disclosed the weakness of cooperation 
between the artillery and the infantry. The irregular nature of 
the fighting gave few teachings - if any - about the performance 
of the artillery as an individual arm. The concealment and the 
dispersed fighting order of the enemy did not allow the most 
effective use of the artillery; many shells were wasted to destroy 
almost valueless targets. Moreover, there were seemingly no 
criteria about the operational ratios of artillery to infantry, so 
the columns were often unbalanced in their strength by arms; for 
example, a column could be very strong in infantry but weak in 
artillery. Aviles reckoned that the Spanish commanders' lack of 
experience in the use of combined arms was a reason for this 
problem. '°5 Ricardo Burguete complained that the artillery had been 
moved too far forward on many occasions, when good firing 
positions, suitable for grouping the cannon, were available in the 
rear. He also pointed out that the Spanish troops lacked liaison 
means to coordinate the efforts of artillerymen and infantrymen. ' 06 
Although technical issues were doubtless influential, it was 
also true that the Spanish army's previous experiences had not 
fostered the tactical integration of both arms. This was tried 
during the Third Carlist War, but the outcome was not satisfactory 
because the infantry was very fearful of suffering casualties by 
friendly artillery fire. The colonial wars at the end of the 
nineteenth century saw a piecemeal use of the artillery. One or 
103 Ibid., pp. 82-3. 
104 Gallego, Campafia del Rif, pp. 304-5. 
105 Aviles, `Ensenanzas', pp. 257-9; Gallego, Campana del Rif, pp. 309-10. 
106 Burguete, La guerra y el hombre, pp. 244-5. 
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two pieces were attached to the individual columns and they were 
often used at point-blank range. Thus the Spanish officers lacked 
any chance (or saw no need) to develop a doctrine about combined 
arms. 
107 
c) The aftermath: the 1913 infantry regulations. 
The provisional doctrine of 1908 turned into the official one in 
1913. The 1913 Infantry Tactical Regulations actually emphasized 
the spirit of the offensive with moral factors in the foreground. 
This seems somewhat odd after the experience of 1909. So far, this 
research has not found official evidence to explain the matter. It 
is plausible that the colonial character of the Melilla operations 
justified a reluctance to alter the official doctrine, despite the 
fact that the native musketry had proved - admittedly on a limited 
scale - the effectiveness of rifled small arms. But, on the other 
hand, the campaign could provide arguments to strengthen the role 
of morale and offensive spirit in the infantry regulations as 
well. 
For instance, Lieutenant-colonel Aviles remarked that, in order 
to stiffen their fighting spirit, the troops had been exposed by 
the commanders to the dangers of the firing line with little 
concern about their vulnerability. They also attacked before the 
preparatory fire had broken the enemy. Aviles admitted that such a 
method was dear in casualties during the first weeks, but claimed 
that it was economical in the end. For the Spanish soldier thus 
learnt to fight his enemy and soon obtained a manifest moral 
superiority which contributed to the conclusion of the war. 
'°8 
This last remark is interesting because it shows that Aviles, 
107 Critön, pp. 150,250-1,260. 
tos Aviles, `Ensenanzas', pp. 100-1. 
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whatever his criticisms of the official doctrine (see above), 
shared the image of warfare in terms of morale and psychological 
factors so frequent in the contemporary professional literature. 
This vision has been called the paradigm of `the psychological 
battlefield' by the historian Tim Travers. 109 Within this paradigm, 
any concerns about fire power are secondary to maintaining morale 
and securing a decisive psychological supremacy. Actually Aviles' 
views on the moral strength of the offensive and the need for 
accepting losses resembled the spirit inspiring the 1913 
regulations. 
The new infantry regulations did not offer significant changes 
in tactical procedures, but a heavier emphasis on morale and the 
offensive without regard to casualties could be noticed by any 
reader. The 1908 version of article 4 talked of the need for 
infantrymen to have a `high spirit' tout court. In 1913 the 
infantry regulations stated that the infantry needed `to be 
inspired by a constant offensive and attacking spirit, which 
carries them along to reach the enemy and conquer him whatever the 
cost.. .' 
110 
Fire and movement seemed to be the accepted doctrine in 1908: 
`fire is very important and predominant, but the advancing 
movement, impetuous and overwhelming, is the decisive [means]; the 
latter will only be possible and fruitful when an effective fire 
has prepared and made it possible. '" However, the 1913 
regulations stated that fire just made movement `easier', and 
109 Tim [RE. ] Travers, The Killing Ground. The British Army, the Western Front and the 
Emergence of Modem Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1990), pp. 48-50. 
110 '[E]star animada de un constante espiritu ofensivo y de ataque, que le arrastre a llegar al 
contrario ya vencerle a todo trance... ' Reglamento Täctico de Infanteria (1913) (hereafter RTI 
1913), article 4. 
11 `[E]1 fuego es importantisimo y preponderante, pero el movimiento de avance, impetuoso y 
arrollador, es el decisivo; este solo sera posible y de fructuosos resultados cuando un fuego eficaz 
lo haya preparado y hecho posible. ' RTI 1908, article 260. 
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added: `only through movement will fire get all its development 
and its greatest effectiveness. ' 112 This article suggests that fire 
was a useful, supporting means for movement but was assigned a 
secondary status in relation to the latter, since fire was also 
dependent on movement for its effectiveness and was not deemed a 
decisive element. The underrating of fire power also meant a 
devaluation of tactical defence. The 1913 regulations devoted 
eighty nine articles to offensive combat and only twenty two to 
defensive fighting. 113 
The 1913 regulations also included a new article on the need to 
persist with the attack. 114 This idea was shared by other sections 
of the military. A commentator on the regulations wrote that `the 
determined and forceful offensive is not enough to conquer, if, 
besides, it is not joined by the features of stubbornness and 
endurance in attack. '"5 This persistence involved a will to accept 
great losses, which Captain Gascuena explained this way: `It is 
necessary to fight for the decisive victory, even if we must 
suffer more casualties than the enemy, and one must bear in mind 
for this.. . that the attacker suffers 
during the fight many more 
casualties than the defender, but he wins in the end. ' 
116 This was 
in fact one of the contemporary solutions to the problem of the 
tactical offensive against increased fire power, which Captain 
Dolla had already voiced almost a decade before: `And if we have 
no other alternative, let us march forward, throwing lives 
112 `[A]si Como ünicamente por el movimiento podrä el fuego adquirir todo su desarrollo y su 
maxima eficacia. ' RTI 1913, article 248. 
113 From article 263 to 352, and from article 353 to 375, respectively. 
114 RTI 1913, article 5. 
115 `[L]a ofensiva energica y decidida no es suficiente para lograr el triunfo, si no va acompanada, 
ademäs, de los caracteres de tenacidad y persistencia en el ataque. ' Emilio Gonzalez y 
P. Villamil, 
`El nuevo Reglamento täctico de Infanteria', Memorial de Infanteria (hereafter 
Mj), III, 34 
(October 1914), p. 312. 
116 `Se ha de combatir por la victoria decisiva, aunque para ello tengamos que sufrir mäs bajas que 
el contrario, y para esto hay que tener en cuenta... que el atacante experimenta 
durante la lucha 
muchas mäs bajas que ei defensor, pero al fin vence. ' Epifanio Gascuena, 
`El fuego y la maniobra 
como medios de combate', Mi, III, 34 (October 1914), p. 321. 
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into.. . the hearth of victory: war is not a sensitive matter ... 'h17 
According to Gascuena, there was no other alternative but to face 
up to the modern battlefield: 
Protection must also be conceived within a limit. He 
who thinks that great tactical successes can be achieved in modern warfare without great losses makes a big 
mistake. He needs to admit resolutely that troops which 
are not afraid of losses enjoy a huge superiority over 
all those which look to saving their blood... 118 
Therefore, trenches were only admissible in exceptional cases 
when it was appropriate to guard conquered ground rather than 
advancing. 119 Actually the Spanish infantrymen would have found it 
difficult to dig such trenches on their own, because the Spanish 
army was one of the two armies in Europe (the other was the 
Turkish army) where the infantry still had not got an issue 
individual trenching tool by 1915.120 
This chapter has shown how the Spanish army passed from the fire 
power-based tactical doctrine of the 1890s to a doctrine of 
outright offensive in the early 1910s. The wars of 1895-98 did not 
seem to weigh much in this transformation, since they generated 
debate but no change in the official doctrine. On the contrary, a 
foreign conflict, the Russo-Japanese War, probably did more to 
tilt the balance towards the offensive, which found full 
expression in the 1913 infantry tactical regulations. This 
suggests that Spanish military thinking after 1900 became more 
interested in following foreign doctrines than in assessing and 
117 `Y si no tenemos otro recurso, avancemos, echando vidas... en el hogar de la victoria: la guerra 
no es cosa sensible... ' Dolla, `Conferencias del Circulo Militar', p. 70; T. H. E. Travers, 
`Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 
1900-1914', Journal of Modern History, 51,2 (June 1979), pp. 272-3. 
118 `La protecciön tambien debe concebirse en un cierto limite. El que crea que en la guerra 
moderna se pueden obtener grandes exitos täcticos sin grandes perdidas comete un grande error. 
Precisa admitir resueltamente que una tropa que no teme las perdidas posee una enorme 
superioridad sobre todas las que buscan ahorrar su sangre... ' Epifanio Gascuefia, Empleo de la 
fortificaciön litera en la ofensiva (Madrid, 1915), p. 17. 
"9 Ibid., p. 19. 
120 Ibid., p. 7 fn 1. 
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learning from the Spanish army's own experiences in the colonial 
wars. Insofar as the Spanish military did not have any recent 
significant experience of fighting against a regular army, looking 
for guidance abroad was a logical step. But the lack of interest 
in the experiences of the wars of the 1890s, despite the fact that 
military involvement in Morocco seemed possible, reveals a poor 
professional foresight. Thus the Spanish infantry went into action 
in 1909 with tactical regulations which were hardly adequate for a 
campaign against an irregular enemy. 
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4. - MORALE AND TECHNOLOGY, 1899-1913: THE 
SPANISH MILITARY MIND AND THE MACHINE GUN. 
Technology was transforming warfare by the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Although the military establishment still 
thought in terms of a battlefield where psychological factors 
maintained their importance, it had to cope with technological 
innovation all the same. The machine gun provides a case study of 
such a process. Due to its mechanical production of high volumes 
of fire power, this weapon symbolized the new kind of warfare. The 
study of the debate within the Spanish military about the machine 
gun's importance and tactical role sheds light on the problems of 
implementing technological innovation. 
1. The psychological image of warfare. 
a) Warfare as an exercise of willpower. 
Captain Dolla, in a lecture published in a professional journal 
in early 1903, defined modern war as a natural phenomenon in the 
life of nations; it had a passionate, moral nature, and affected 
all the citizens to the highest degree. Because of this extended 
popular involvement, war disturbed the country's life so much that 
it could not last long. It must be ended quickly through a 
vigorous, decisive action aimed at the moral destruction of the 
enemy (the physical one was an inevitable outcome of the former). 
The goal was to achieve fast, decisive, moral successes through 
the physical exertions of the fighting men, which were `supported 
and encouraged, above all, by great firmness in their hearts and 
absolute contempt for their own lives. '' 
Arguments like this endorsed the idea of war and battle as a 
1 `[S]ostenidas y estimuladas, principalmente, por una gran entereza de su corazön y un absoluto 
desprecio de su vida. ' Angel Dolla, `Concepto e importancia de la Caballeria en abstracto', RTIC, 
XIII, 1 (January-June 1903), pp. 376-7. 
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psychological conflict, a clash of wills, which the material 
factors were subordinated to. Thus Burguete wrote that `war is a 
clash of two wills rather than a clash of weapons: the strongest 
one beats the weakest. '2 The origins of this concept can be traced 
back to the works of essayists of the nineteenth century such as 
Joseph de Maistre, Clausewitz and du Picq, whose thinking was to 
be used as a justification of the doctrine of the offensive at all 
costs. 3 Even essayists who realized the increased importance of 
fire power shared this view: `Battles are lost from moral reasons, 
not material ones... ', wrote Banüs. 4 This idea was also understood 
as a negation of any revolution caused by technological progress, 
which altered the essentials of war (i. e. the moral forces), as 
writers like Ivan Bloch argued. 5 
Something like moral forces were what, according to a 
contemporary critic, the Spanish troops in Santiago de Cuba were 
short of. It was true that they had not collapsed. They made a 
gallant stand against overwhelming odds, while the Americans often 
went to ground under Spanish fire. But the latter advanced boldly 
wherever the danger did not loom large, and did not hesitate to 
send patrols and small columns far ahead. On the contrary, despite 
their fine displays under fire, the Spaniards suffered from 
paralysis outside the firefight. This critic attributed this 
alleged unwillingness to attack to a lack of `moral force'; he 
defined this shortage as a sort of accidental state of mind 
derived from the lack of strong patriotic and military spirit 
2 `[L]a guerra es un choque de dos voluntades antes que un choque de armas: la mds fuerte vence a 
la mds flaca. ' Burguete, Mi rebeldia, pp. 72-3. 
3 Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Tolstoi's View of History (London, 
1988), pp. 51-4; Michael Howard's introductory essay in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976); Possony and Mantoux, pp. 206-17,227-8. 
4 `Las batallas se pierden moral, no materialmente... ' Banüs, Reflexiones, p. 55. Clausewitz (in 
Book IV, Chapter 4 of On War) wrote that `[t]he decision rests chiefly on the state of morale, 
which, in cases where the victor has lost as much as the vanquished, 
has always been the single 
decisive factor. ' Clausewitz, p. 231. 
5 Burguete, Mi rebeldia, pp. 77-80. 
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(this allegedly was a common feature of the contemporary Spanish 
society and institutions) and of will to win (the Spanish troops 
fought just enough to satisfy military honour, thinking that they 
could do nothing to alter the final result of the campaign). 6 
Not that casualties did not matter. The morale breakdown leading 
to defeat was certainly caused by physical losses. But how many 
losses were needed to break an army depended on its state of mind 
or, to use contemporary words, its `moral energy'. An army could 
accept defeat after suffering a few casualties, and the next day 
could keep on fighting and achieve victory despite a heavier loss. 
Lieutenant-colonel Banüs pointed out that modern firearms, despite 
their improved performance, were not deadlier than the older ones, 
as comparative percentages of killed and wounded in battle proved. 
Actually the casualty percentages diminished in more recent wars 
(e. g. the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War). Banüs put down this 
divergence between increasing weapon performance and decreasing 
casualties either to a decline of military spirit in modern 
armies, or to its insufficient growth in parallel to the 
difficulties of modern combat. So the reason for defeat was not 
the power of weapons, but the weakness of troops who could not 
endure the stress of modern warfare and who therefore broke with a 
lesser number of casualties.? 
Actually Banüs was aware that the troops had responded to 
growing fire power by means of dispersion, but he had also thought 
it inmaterial to his point above. The dispersion on the 
battlefield meant that the percentage of casualties suffered by a 
whole army per day of fighting declined. But whenever a commander 
6 Efeele, Desastr, pp. 163-7. Navarro also mentioned reduced morale as a reason of the defensive 
attitude in Santiago de Cuba, in addition to a local inferiority 
in numbers and the shortage of field 
artillery: `Observaciones', p. 166. 
Banüs, Reflexiones, pp. 55-62,65. 
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forgot the lesson and ordered his troops to advance steadily 
across open ground, the latter suffered heavily. The remarkable 
point is that the soldiers' sensible answer to a more lethal 
environment was seen as a sign of moral softness. 8 
What modern weapons had created was the `empty battlefield'. On 
it, the elements which traditionally lessened the effects of fear 
and stress on the troops disappeared. Contemporary military 
essayists like Navarro and Banüs recognized that the soldier could 
no longer see his enemy, could not assess the effects of his own 
fire and did not feel the physical contact of his comrades. If 
battle was a matter of morale, what troops needed in order to keep 
up their will to win under these conditions was, above all, more 
moral training in order to foster their courage, discipline and 
sense of duty. 9 Thus, Captain Gallego concluded, `the soldier, far 
from staying the selfish man of current times, turns into a beint. 
deserving admiration and respect... '10 
b) Social evolution and the problems of military service. 
The military essayists of this period saw in the strengthening 
of fighting morale the answer to the challenge of fire power. 
However, at the same time, these essayists denied or doubted the 
capacity of conscript armies (like the Spanish one) to improve the 
military virtues of their troops. On the one hand, the terms of 
service in the colours were getting shorter; on the other hand, 
there was a belief that the social conditions of civilized, modern 
nations tended to lessen the military spirit of conscripts. Banüs 
complained of the spreading of anti-militarist doctrines in the 
working classes, but he also deplored the `passive' anti- 
8 Creveld, Technology and War, pp. 173-4. 
9 Navarro, To moral', pp. 15-8; Banüs, Reflexiones, p. 65. 
'o `[E]1 soldado, lejos de ser el hombre egoista de los tiempos actuales, se convierte en un ser 
digno de admiraci©n y respeto... ' Gallego Ramos, `El municionamiento', p. 28. 
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militarism of the bourgeois middle class and the well-off, which 
evaded conscription through payment in cash or substitute 
purchase. Nevertheless, he reckoned that the alternatives for 
Spain were not much better (Banüs was writing before the 1912 
military service act). An all-volunteer army was too expensive a 
solution, whereas universal military service would just add 
another group of disgruntled recruits to those already 
conscripted. Only a revival of patriotism in Spain would allow the 
development of a reliable conscript army. " 
A Major Calero also argued about the disintegrating effects of 
class differences for the military units' cohesion if universal 
military service was implemented. The modern, egalitarian society 
would never adapt to the gap between officers and other ranks, who 
had different duties, rights and functions, and therefore were 
totally separate. Class differences would make impossible any 
comradeship among the rank and file; moreover, the educated 
conscripts would bring the external atmosphere of social and 
academic indiscipline into the barracks and transmit a rebellious 
spirit to the uneducated mass. Calero even classified social 
classes according to their warlike aptitudes: the best soldiers 
were peasants, followed at some distance by `craftsmen' 
(presumably industrial workers), while well-off people were the 
very worst . 
12 
This thinking on the problems of universal military service 
reflected distrust and pessimism about the nature of industrial, 
positivist society and its manpower - even in a country like 
Spain, which started her industrial revolution late, and whose 
i*?. Carlos Bands y Comas, El arte de la guerra a principios del siglo XX (Madrid, 1907), pp. 394, 
399-402,407,412,415-6; Bands, Reflexiones, p. 65. 
12 Juan Calero Ortega, `Ideas sobre organizaciön militar', RTIC, XIV, 2 (July-December 1904), 
pp. 452-4. 
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army drafted many, if not most, conscripts from the countryside. 
Civilization seemed to weaken the qualities of man for war. An 
infantry officer and teacher at the Infantry Academy, Lieutenant 
Ruiz-Fornells, had already espoused this idea in 1894. He stated 
that the development of industry and commerce, and the interest in 
other civil activities, plus the prevailing positivist thinking, 
had diminished Spain's military spirit. 13 This line of thought 
also helps to explain the scorn displayed by the Spanish press 
about the military virtues of the more industrialized United 
States before the Spanish-American War. 14 The political-military 
newspaper La Correspondencia Militar echoed these views in the 
months before the outbreak of war, when its articles often 
referred contemptuously to the Americans as a `nation of 
merchants'. One of its contributors even alluded to a lack of 
manliness when he wrote about the ridiculous war scare in the 
United States, a nation which had much more wealth and `more 
people (I hesitate to say men) than Spain. '15 And there was little 
subtlety in an anonymous feature whose writer stated that war was 
also waged by means of `dignity and a sense of self-respect, plus 
a thing which the Yankees have never had, and therefore it has 
been impossible for them to store it in factories or banks, but 
there is more than enough of this thing in Spain. This thing is 
pantalones [trousers, meaning guts]. ' 
16 
The defeat in the Spanish-American War might have changed these 
attitudes about the military virtues of an industrial society's 
soldiers. However, there is no sign of such a change 
in the 
13 Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, La educaciön moral del soldado (Toledo, 1894), p. 50. 
14 Isern, pp. 371-2; Payne, Politics, p. 81. 
15 ' [Mlas persona (no me atrevo a decir hombres) que Espana. ' Claudio, `El miedo yankee', 
LCM, 24 February 1898. 
16 `[D]ignidad y vergüenza y otra cosa que no han tenido jamäs los yankees, por lo cual les ha sido 
imposible almacenarla en fäbricas ni en bancos. Y es precisamente lo que sobra en Espana. 
Pant_ s. ' `Saetas', LCM, 12 March 1898. 
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sources surveyed by this writer. There are a couple of plausible 
reasons for this absence of change. On the one hand, the fighting 
on land was too brief and limited, and the American expeditionary 
armies did not win any clear-cut victory (in Cuba, the American 
troops needed a whole day to expel an enemy one tenth of its size 
from a line of weak field fortifications) . On the other hand, 
according to a contemporary writer mentioned above, the Spanish 
troops suffered from a previous moral decay which offset their 
military virtues. '7 The defeat of 1898 could also be seen within a 
larger context of military decline of the over-civilized European 
nations, whose scions were no longer good soldiers. This was the 
stand of Major Calero, who compared the Spanish overseas defeat to 
European setbacks in other contemporary campaigns against non- 
European enemies. Although he did not mention them explicitly, 
Calero was referring to the setbacks of the British army in the 
Boer War (1899-1902), the Italians in Abyssinia (1896) and the 
Russians in the war against Japan (1904-1905). 18 
c) Ricardo Burguete: searching for industrial age warriors. 
It has been mentioned above that there was a widespread belief 
in Europe, related to social Darwinism, that the modern civilized 
society's soldier was unable to withstand the stress of modern 
warfare and conform to traditional standards of military virtue. 
19 
Examples of this pessimistic thinking are provided by that 
prolific essayist of the first years of the twentieth century, 
Ricardo Burguete. The influence of anti-positivist irrationalism 
is very clear in his book Asi hablaba Zorrapastro, published about 
1903. As the title reveals, this work was inspired by Friedrich 
Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra and praised the way the German 
I' Efeele, Desastre, pp. 163-7. 
18 Calero, `Ideas sobre organizacion', pp. 454-5. 
19 Travers, `Technology, Tactics, and Morale', pp. 266-7. 
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philosopher exalted war and warriors. 20 
According to Burguete, civilization wore out the warlike 
qualities of man so much as to render conscription harmful for 
armies. Civilization also turned war into a business for 
everybody, since technology could turn any man into a mere weapon 
operator. But despite its importance, technology did not always 
transform war into a matter of calculation. Therefore, military 
art sought the solution of conflicts in the manliness, habits and 
morality of peoples; in other words, in what Burguete called the 
warlike education. This education had to be acquired at home 
during the childhood and teenage years. However, civilization 
despised this sort of education: it showed war as something 
horrible and paid homage to progress, not to force. Children were 
punished whenever they displayed willpower, courage and daring, 
and taught to loathe weapons and the use of force. Thus they 
reached the conscription age fully convinced that military service 
was a stage to pass with resignation and - in case of war - by 
taking as few risks as possible. 21 
On the contrary, what had to be emphasized were the virtues 
strengthening the character of man. As Burguete wrote later: `Our 
cult must be the cult of courage and heroism. '22 He praised the 
contribution of the Japanese warrior's code of behaviour (bushido) 
to the Japanese victories in Manchuria in 1904-1905. The bushido 
was, in Burguete's view, a manifestation of the warlike, heroic 
ethos which true soldiers had to assume. 
23 
20 Ricardo Burguete, Asi hablaba Zorrapastro (Valencia, c. 1903). 
21 Ibid., pp. 46,54-62,64. 
22 `Nuestro culto ha de ser el culto del valor y del heroismo. ' Ricardo Burguete, Preparaciön de las 
tropas pars la g_uerra (nuevo Vegecio). Estudios de etica militar (Madrid, 1905), p. 128. 
23 Ibid., p. 128. It is noteworthy that General Millän Astray, founder of the offensive-minded 
Spanish Legion (an elite Uzt of Spanish and foreign volunteers), wrote years later that he had 
been inspired by bushido to shape the unit's fighting spirit: see Millän Astray's introduction in 
Inazo Nitobe, El Bushido (el alma del Japön) (Madrid, 1941), pp. 9-10. 
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Contemporary mass armies neither got reliable, `war-educated' 
short-service conscripts nor could hope to educate them in the 
colours. According to Burguete, discipline would not be enough to 
keep the cohesion of conscript mass armies once in battle. On the 
modern battlefield, without the close leadership of their officers 
and non-commissioned officers, exposed to the play of inconstant 
emotions, the conscripts would need very little stimulus to be 
overtaken by panic and transformed into a crowd in flight. 
Incidentally, this would also make cavalry an important arm on the 
battlefield again: their shock action would cause, or take 
advantage of, the frequent panics in the enemy masses. 24 
Civilization produced smaller numbers of able men for war or 
made necessary a longer time to train real soldiers. On the other 
hand, Burguete argued, progress, by improving weapons, emphasized 
quality rather than quantity. The performance and complexity of 
modern weapons were ever increasing, so the soldier should be more 
robust and skilled as well. 25 However, this was not possible with 
the short terms of conscription (not more than three years). 
Besides, the law made every man a soldier whatever his aptitudes; 
since these were no longer thought to be important, the soldier 
turned into an ancillary element of the rifle, only trained in 
musketry. 26 Burguete proposed a professional standing army, made 
up of volunteers matching the standards for modern warfare; 
compulsory service would be limited to a case of serious threat to 
the country. However, Burguete then contradicted himself, since he 
stated that, as a preparation for this contingency, the population 
would be given a military or warlike education from childhood. 
27 
24 Burguete, Zorrapastro, pp. 48-9; on crowd-like behaviour in battle, see John Keegan, The Face 
of Battle (London, 1976), pp. 172-4. 
25 Burguete, Zorrapastro, pp. 46,49-50. 
26 Burguete, Mi rebeldia, pp. 94-7. 
27 Burguete, Zorrapastro, p. 51. 
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Thus Burguete rejected conscription but he put forward, at the 
same time, a sort of pre-military teaching whose lack was supposed 
to render conscription ineffective. So, if the nation's manpower 
became `educated' for military service, why could not it be 
conscripted then? Perhaps Burguete thought that only an invasion 
of the realm would galvanize his compatriots enough to join the 
colours willingly. If so, this thinking would reflect once again 
his low estimation of the modern man's fighting spirit. 
To sum up, Burguete's ideas embraced two inter-related, 
contemporary solutions to the problem of the tactical offensive 
facing the increased fire power of modern artillery and infantry 
weapons. One of these solutions was the strengthening of the moral 
and psychological qualities necessary for victory in war 
(character, sense of duty, `warlike education', the cult of 
courage); the other sought to produce a new, much better trained 
and highly enthusiastic soldier able to overcome the new weapons' 
effects on morale and move forward on the modern battlefield 
(Burguete's ideal of the professional soldier). 28 Many of 
Burguete's writings displayed views too radical for him to be 
considered representative of the Spanish army's mainstream 
thinking. But the evidence shows that Burguete must be valued 
rather as an extreme point of reference on ideas which were 
discussed in the military at that time. 29 
For example, ideas about the need for increased moral qualities 
were certainly widespread in the Spanish military literature. A 
reason for this might be the influence of the education in the 
28 Dennis E. Showalter, `Army and Society in Imperial Germany: The Pains of Modernization', 
Journal of Contemporary History, 18,4 (October 1983), p. 587; Travers, `Technology, Tactics, 
and Morale', pp. 272-4. 
29 A line of argument standing against the all-volunteer army and for universal military service 
(but with some privileges for well-to-do conscripts) is found, for instance, 
in Pio Suarez Incldn, El 
problema del reclutamiento en Espana 
(Madrid, 1905), pp. 44-57,81-98. 
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Spanish military academies, whose teaching exalted high spiritual 
values, shaped within a nationalist framework - which, in turn, 
was based on the military glories of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. 30 The military also sympathised with the 
idea of the need for `regenerating' morally a decaying Spanish 
society: a need which seemed highlighted by the defeat of 1898 and 
was promoted by contemporary intellectuals and authors such as 
Ramiro de Maeztu (who corresponded with Burguete) or Joaquin 
Costa. 31 
Another influence were contemporary widespread social Darwinist 
ideas, according to which the country whose population had the 
highest moral qualities would be successful in the struggle for 
survival among nations. 32 Burguete was a rather open spokesman of 
such ideas and, in one of his early works, made explicit mention 
of Darwin. Burguete compared war to the struggle for existence due 
to the inequality between the growth of species and the 
availability of resources, when the imperative of one's own 
survival obliged the strongest to eat up the weakest. 
33 Burguete 
wrote a few years later: `A nation cannot live beside other 
vigorous nations without accepting the struggle for life which the 
latter impose on the former. '34 Backward or weaker nations had to 
disappear in order to allow the natural, selective progress of the 
rest of the species. 35 Burguete also compared (in 
interesting 
contrast with the attitudes towards the Americans 
before the 1898 
war) warlike spirit to the spirit of commercial 
initiative, since 
the conquest of markets had become a `physiological' need of 
30 Cardona, p. 23. 
31 Bachoud, p. 140. 
32 Travers, `Technology, Tactics, and Morale', pp. 282-3. 
33 Ricardo Burguete, ; La guerra! Cuba (diario de un testigo) (Barcelona, 1902), pp. 41,111. 
34 'Un pueblo no puede vivir en la vecindad de otros pueblos vigorosos sin aceptar el esfuerzo para 
vivir que los otros pueblos 
le imponen. ' Ricardo Burguete, El problema militar (Espana ante los 
Brandes imperios del porvenir) 
(Palma de Mallorca, 1905), p. 12. 
35 Ricardo Burguete, Morbo nacional. Vida defensiva (Madrid, c. 1905), p. 9. 
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nations. 36 Actually he devoted a whole book (Morbo nacional. Vida 
defensiva) to denouncing the `defensive', protectionist attitudes 
of Spain's economy, which could only lead - as in war - to defeat 
and annihilation. 
Among all this literature stressing the psychological and moral 
factors in warfare, an exception which deserves at least a mention 
in passing were the ideas of Jose Marva, an engineer officer. He 
had no doubts on the increase of destructiveness brought by 
technology. Against this, courage and manliness were of no use. 
The human elements which could decide battles in the past were no 
longer useful unless they were complementary to - and based on - 
the power of modern weapons. 37 A scholar and teacher in issues 
related to ordnance and military engineering, Marva was, according 
to Alonso Baquer, the most prominent figure in advocating the 
technological modernization of the Spanish army in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. However, after the defeat of 
1898, his ideas were the last token of a tradition of reformist 
learned thinking born from a scholarly, analytical approach to the 
military problems. This tradition had virtually disappeared by 
1917, and, indeed, Marvä's concerns turned towards social welfare 
issues from the early years of the twentieth century on. 
38 
2. The Spanish army and the machine gun: early trials 
and organizational debates (1867-1908). 
a) The machine gun in the Spanish army up to 1900. 
The Spanish army first tested a Gatling machine gun in 1867; as 
36 Burguete, El problema militar, p. 10. 
37 Jose Marva y Mayer, Estudio histörico de los medios de ataque y defensa (Madrid, 1903), pp. 
391-2. An engineer officer, Marva (1846-1937) spent many years in teaching and scientific 
research appointments; after 1900, though he still remained 
in active service until the 1910s, his 
career was dominated by civil appointments related to social welfare 
issues. 
38 Miguel Alonso Baquer, `Jose Marva (1846-1937), entre la tecnologia militar y las reformas 
sociales', in Jose Luis Garcia Delgado 
(ed. ), Economia espanola, cultura y sociedad: homenaje a 
Juan Velarde Fuertes, 3 vol. (Madrid, 1992), II. 210-1, II. 219-20. The present writer 
is grateful to 
Miguel Alonso Baquer, who kindly sent a pamphlet version of this paper. 
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a result, the Artillery Board ordered an extension of the trials 
by attaching machine guns to an artillery regiment (one machine 
gun per battery). 39 If the trials were successful, the other 
regiments would be equipped the same way. However, this plan was 
cancelled after the appearance of the Cristophe-Montigny machine 
gun and new trials of this model were carried out. 
A decision to create six batteries (with six Cristophe-Montigny 
machine guns each) was finally made in April 1871. But that 
project was cancelled as well and actually only a single battery 
of four machine guns, attached to an artillery regiment, was 
formed in May 1872. All the same, the military authorities ordered 
up to forty Cristophe-Montigny machine guns, which would be made 
in a Spanish factory (apparently, only fourteen guns were 
completed) . Nevertheless, the Spanish army carried out trials of 
another Gatling machine gun in 1874, and compared it with the 
French model. The Artillery Board judged the machine gun more 
useful in the defence than in the attack and, if larger numbers of 
this weapon were ordered, recommended the Gatling model, which 
offered a higher rate of fire and less encumbrances (actually 
three Gatling machine guns were used in the Cuban colonial war of 
1868-78). 
However, the disappointing role of the French army's machine 
guns in the Franco-Prussian War generated a wave of mistrust and 
scorn towards the new weapon. This wave also reached Spain, whose 
army forgot any idea of field use of the machine gun, and 
the 
Cristophe-Montigny unit was disbanded by 1874.40 The existing 
39 This summary of the history of the machine gun in the Spanish army 
from 1867 to 1898 is based 
on the following works of Luis de la Gdndara Marsella: Ametralladoras 
de campana en el Ejercito 
espafiol (Madrid, 1906), pp. 3-7; Estudios acerca de ametralladoras 
(Madrid, 1908), pp. 247-51; 
and ibid., 2nd edition (Madrid, 1910), pp. 287-9. An infantry officer, 
de la Gdndara (1880-1928) 
taught at the infantry Academy and the Central Firing School and took part 
in the writing of new 
infantry regulations in the 1920s. 
40 Ministerio de la Guerra, Artilleria, Comisiön de Experiencias, Informe sobre `Las experiencias 
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weapons were assigned to fortresses, where they were joined by a 
few Swedish Palkrantz-Nordenfelt machine guns after 1881. Despite 
the appearance of the Maxim model (the first reliable automatic 
machine gun) in 1884, the Spanish lack of interest lasted until 
the outbreak of the last Cuban war. Twelve Maxim-Nordenfelt 
machine guns on wheeled carriages were bought and sent to Cuba in 
1896. However, their performance was poor: the Maxims were not 
adapted to the Spanish issue rifle cartridge and this caused 
frequent jammings. The problem was not solved until the machine 
guns were sent back to Spain after the war against the United 
States. Once they were adapted, eight machine guns were assigned 
to the fortifications of Ceuta and Melilla and the remaining four 
to the Central Firing School. 
The American army had used a few Gatling machine guns against 
the Spaniards in Santiago de Cuba. According to a Spanish source, 
the Gatlings performed reasonably well, though their effectiveness 
was exaggerated by their commanding officer . 
41 The Spanish sources 
did not mention the machine guns as a significant factor in the 
outcome of the fighting. All this suggests that the Spanish army 
was not impressed enough to press forward the procurement of more 
machine guns. 
After 1898 the machine gun seemed to be underrated. A military 
essayist, Luis de la Gändara, commented sadly by 1906: `we neither 
have machine guns nor are there reasons to believe that we will 
own them soon but, on the contrary, there are many reasons to 
presume that there is no atmosphere for the present for the 
organization of those weapons in our army. ' He added that, in his 
view, budget matters were not the only cause of this situation, 
efectuadas con diversos modelos de ametralladoras' (primera parte), 29 
April 1908, AGMS 2/1/9. 
41 Lorenzo Cabrera Mac-Kintosh, Ametralladoras (Madrid, c. 1911), pp. 33-4. 
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but he refrained from mentioning the others. 42 
b) Corporate procrastination, 1900-1907. 
Actually the Spanish army did keep an interest in the machine 
gun. In January 1902, the board of the Central Firing School 
pointed out that the major European armies had carried out 
experiments with machine guns and that, by that time, Germany, 
France, Britain, Switzerland and Russia had organized machine gun 
units. Though there were still doubts about their role on the 
battlefield, machine guns were to be highly valuable weapons due 
to their volume of fire (the board mentioned that, after trials in 
France, one machine gun was reckoned equal to two hundred 
riflemen). The board of the school urged the military authorities 
to pay serious attention to the issue and suggested its study in 
two stages. On the one hand, the Central Firing School would carry 
out the trials concerning the tactical use and firing methods of 
the weapon; on the other hand, the Artillery Experiments 
Commission would carry out the technical trials to decide the 
model to be chosen. 43 The professional board of the artillery 
corps, after studying the proposal, stated several weeks later 
that experimenting with machine guns was its responsibility, 
through the Artillery Experiments Commission. 44 The professional 
board got its way, since the Artillery Experiments Commission 
carried out the trials alone, although these were not undertaken 
seriously until 1904. In this year, several foreign models were 
acquired after a fact-finding journey of the commission abroad 
42 `[N]i contamos con ametralladoras ni aparecen motivos para creer que en breve hemos de 
poseerlas, sino que por lo contrario, hay muchas razones para suponer que no existe ambiente por 
ahora para la organizacion de aquellas arenas en nuestro Ejercito. ' Gändara, Ametralladoras de 
campana, pp. 7-8. 
43 Artileria, Escuela Central de Tiro, Junta Facultativa, Informando sobre la necesidad de 
experimentar ametralladoras y canones automäticos de pequeno calibre, 10 January 1902, AGMS 
2/1/7. 
44 Artilleria, Junta Facultativa, Informe sobre `Necesidad de experimentar ametralladoras y 
canones automäticos de pequenos calibres', 27 February 1902, AGMS 2/1/7. 
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during 1903 and early 1904.45 But the commission displayed a 
rather limited enthusiasm for the machine gun. Though it admitted 
the weapon's effectiveness in some particular cases, the 
commission stated that the usefulness of the machine gun had 
diminished after the widespread adoption of quick-firing artillery 
by all the armies. Indeed, its evaluation of the machine gun 
continued mainly because of foreign armies' acceptance of the 
weapon. 46 This last point suggests that the Spanish artillery 
corps' own assessment of the machine gun might not have justified 
such trials. The professional board of the artillery corps had 
actually proposed in 1902 to delay any decision on the machine 
47 
The over-thoroughness of the experimental trials held back the 
introduction of the machine gun. The Artillery Experiments 
Commission alleged that mechanical unreliability of the models was 
the cause of the slowness in the trials, which therefore delayed 
the definitive adoption of the machine 48 gun by the Spanish army. 
This search for mechanical excellence could be reasonable from a 
technical viewpoint. However, it was also harmful when armies all 
over Europe had already started equipping themselves with the 
models available. Indeed, an artillery officer, Captain Jevenois, 
urged the army to accelerate the studies to adopt machine guns 
after the experience of the Russo-Japanese War. 49 
45 Ministerio de la Guerra, Artilleria, Comisiön de Experiencias, Informe sobre `Las experiencias 
efectuadas con diversos modelos de anletralladoras' (primera parte), 29 April 1908, AGMS 2/1/9. 
46 Resumen de los trabajos realizados por la Comisiän de Experiencias de Artilleria durante el ano 
1905 (Madrid, 1906), pp. 24-5. The copy used by this writer is enclosed in Memoria, Revista de 
Inspecciön del Ministerio de la Guerra, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/15. 
47 Artilleria, Junta Facultativa, Informe sobre `Experiencias con una ametralladora Hotchkiss', 20 
December 1902, AGMS 2/1/7. 
48 Resumen de los trabajos realizados por la Comisiön de Experiencias de Artilleria durante el ano 
1906 (Madrid, 1907), p. 50. The copy used by this writer is enclosed in Memoria, Revista de 
Inspecciön del Ministerio de la Guerra, 1907, SHM-CAD 8/15. 
49 Pedro Jevenois, `Consecuencias täcticas de la guerra ruso-japonesa', EM, ): XVI, 1 (January- 
June 1907), p. 422. Jevenois (1878-1941) was an observer in the Russo-Japanese War (1904); he 
joined the nationalist side in the Civil War and was GOC 24th Division and artillery commander 
of the Army of the South. 
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Another problem was the corporate jealousy within the Spanish 
army. The artillerymen had little enthusiasm for the machine gun, 
but they had taken charge of its trials anyway. The machine gun 
was of secondary importance for the artillery corps, and this 
might explain the leisurely attitude of the commission - though it 
had assumed the sole responsibility for the trials within the army 
as a whole. On the other hand, the artillerymen prided themselves 
on their technical knowledge and their responsibilities in 
ordnance issues. So, in order to preserve their corporate 
prestige, they were unwilling to accept that other corps take part 
in the trials. 
Even after the adoption of an infantry machine gun, the 
artillery corps did not want to give up its hold over other corps' 
weaponry. The Artillery Experiments Commission stated in 1908 that 
the artillery corps had to assume responsibilities within the 
organization of machine gun units, since the performance of these 
weapons depended on their mechanical working, and technical 
ordnance issues were handled by the corps. 50 About the same period 
(sometime from 1908 to the mid-1910s), the Artillery Experiments 
Commission refused to display the newly acquired machine gun model 
during a course in the infantry section of the Central Firing 
School unless an artillery officer was in charge of the 
presentation and explanations. 51 
c) Who should operate the machine gun? 
One reason for the scepticism and the early unsteady policy of 
the army about the machine gun was doubtless the ill-defined 
status of this weapon during the early stages of its development. 
50 Ministerin de la Guerra, Artilleria, Comisiön de Experiencias, Informe sobre `Las experiencias 
efectua. das con diversos modelos de ametralladoras' (segunda parte), 29 April 1908, AGMS 2/1/9. 
51 Equis, II. 116. 
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Due to their technical characteristics, the first models of 
machine guns could not be classified neatly as an infantry, 
cavalry or artillery weapon, or as a new, independent tactical 
arm. An artillery officer, Lieutenant-colonel Brull, summed up the 
hybrid features of the early machine guns: they fired infantry 
rifle ammunition; they were crew-served weapons and organized in 
sections and batteries as were the artillery pieces; and they were 
best suited to a quick and opportune use on the battlefield as the 
cavalry were. This meant that the infantrymen disliked them 
because of their similarity in organization and baggage to the 
artillery and the nuisance they caused for movement. The cavalry 
also thought that they hindered their mobility and dashing spirit, 
whereas the artillery disliked the rifle-like performance of their 
fire and still remembered the French machine guns' fiasco in 1870. 
Moreover, according to Brull, every arm thought that admitting the 
machine gun's support within its ranks was a sign of military 
decline or feebleness. 52 So it is not surprising that, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the teaching on machine guns 
in the Infantry Academy formed part of a heterogeneous subject on 
"Ordnance'. 53 
But Brull's views about the alleged unwillingness of the arms to 
accept the machine gun were not shared by other artillerymen. 
Major Lossada was amazed that the artillery officers of foreign 
armies which had already adopted the machine gun handed it over to 
the other arms, though it was a weapon whose tactics and 
technical 
features made it suitable for the artillery. And Lieutenant 
Jevenois argued that machine guns should be operated 
by 
artillerymen, because if these weapons were assigned 
to infantry 
52 Jose Brull, `Las ametralladoras en los campos de batalla', Memorial de Artilleria (hereafter 
MA), LVIII, 1 (January-June 1903), pp. 556-7. 
53 Gdndara, Ametralladoras de campana, pp. 30-1. 
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and cavalry units, the latter's mobility would be restrained. 54 
The artillery corps was indeed loath to give up its corporate 
interests. The Artillery Central Board censored an article written 
by Major Lossada for the corps journal because he stated that 
machine guns were not artillery weapons only. The board stressed 
that Lossada's article did not represent the corps' views on the 
status of the machine gun. 55 On the other hand, if the artillery 
could not control a new source of fire power which could threaten 
the corps' traditional role, this was an incentive to keep the new 
weapon out of the battlefield. Thus the Artillery professional 
Board concluded in 1902 that the machine gun would never replace 
the horse artillery to support cavalry on independent missions. 
And the board also stated that substituting a machine gun for a 
certain number of infantrymen armed with magazine rifles did not 
provide any significant improvement to the fire power of the 
infantry units, due to the mechanical limitations and cumbersome 
transport of the early models. 56 Nonetheless, this attitude was 
not shared by all the artillerymen. 
57 
Captain Ruiz-Fornells, of the infantry corps, accepted that all 
the tactical arms had machine guns adapted to their own needs. On 
the other hand, since the machine gun was essentially a modified 
infantry rifle, it was only logical that the infantry were able to 
decide on its employment. 58 Major Calero - another infantryman - 
went further by rejecting any idea of the machine gun 
being 
54 Jose de Lossada, `Moderna Artilleria', MA, LV, 2 (July-December 1900), p. 292; Pedro 
Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', MA, LVIII, 1 (January-June 1903), p. 177. 
55 This account of the incident is based on Vigön, Artilleria espanola, 
III. 240, and `Crönica 
interior', MA, LVIII, 2 (July-December 1903), pp. 65-6. Some details on this incident given 
in 
Vigön did not coincide with those provided by the journal, but no other sign 
has been found to 
think that Vigön was writing about a different case. Both sources display the artillery's corporate 
attitude anyway. 
56 Adleria, Junta Facultativa, Informe sobre `Necesidad de experimentar ametralladoras y 
canones automäticos de pequefios calibres', 27 February 1902, 
AGMS 2/1/7. 
57 Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', pp. 30-1; Lossada, `Moderna Artilleria', p. 292. 
58 Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, `Fuegos de la Infanteria', EM, XXIII, 1 (January-June 1904), pp. 
23-4. 
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considered an artillery piece. The infantry had to take charge of 
its study. Since it fired the infantry rifle cartridge and 
followed the infantry's manoeuvres, the machine gun could not be 
anything but an infantry weapon. Therefore, it must be used in the 
exclusive service of the infantry, and maybe the cavalry as 
well. 
59 
Calero's last point had been anticipated - at least partially - 
by Lieutenant-colonel Banüs a couple of years before. He concluded 
from the experience of the Boer War that machine guns did not 
replace artillery. Their real role was to increase the fire power 
of the cavalry and the mounted infantry. 60 Such an increase was 
badly needed on the modern battlefield. The cavalry remained the 
weapon of opportunity, but they could not create the opportunity 
by weakening the enemy infantry unless they were supported by 
horse artillery or their own cavalry machine guns. 
61 However, 
Lieutenant de la Gändara thought the machine gun so closely 
integrated within the infantry that no other corps should use it: 
there must not be machine guns in the cavalry because they could 
limit the latter's action by forcing the cavalrymen to look for 
firing positions. 62 Nevertheless, de la Gändara softened his 
radical view some pages later and reckoned a ratio of one machine 
gun company per cavalry division enough. A larger scale would 
cause the underemployment of the weapons, since they would 
find 
few opportunities for their use and `opportunity is a sine qua non 
for them..., 
63 
Perhaps surprisingly, the cavalry showed interest in the new 
59 Calero, `Ideas sobre organizaciän', p. 451. 
60 Banüs, Reflexiones, pp. 70-1. 
61 Eduardo Gallego y Ramos, `Misiön de la Caballeria en las guerras antiguas y modernas', 
EM, 
XX, 1 (January-June 1901), p. 164; see also Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', pp. 
30-1. 
62 Gandara, Ametralladoras de campana, pp. 20-5. 
63 '[L]a oportunidad es en ellas condicion sine qua non... ', Ibid., p. 89. 
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weapon as well. Despite the fact that the increasing fire power of 
modern weapons was eroding the cavalry's traditional tactical 
role, at least a section of the cavalrymen seemed eager to adopt 
the machine gun. The reason was that they saw it as the remedy 
which would allow them to recover their old status on the 
battlefield. Since a few machine guns could replace the fire power 
of many carbines, there would be less need for dismounted 
fighting. The traditional spirit and tactics of cavalry would be 
preserved and the arme blanche would remain the horseman's main 
weapon. 64 
A alternative solution to the problem of which tactical arm the 
machine gun had to be assigned to was the creation of a brand new 
machine gun corps. An artillery officer, Major Lossada, had 
already weighed up an independent machine gun corps in 1903. He 
ruled it out because the machine gun lacked enough shock action, 
fire power and mobility (the main attributes of infantry, 
artillery and cavalry, respectively) and had no other feature 
overcoming those of the traditional tactical arms. 65 But the idea 
of independence still found supporting voices in the Spanish 
military, such as Colonel Modesto Navarro, of the infantry corps. 
Though admitting their resemblance to the rifle, and therefore 
their closeness to infantry, Colonel Navarro thought that machine 
guns must become a fourth tactical arm; the combination of several 
tactical arms was much better than the mixture of different 
weapons in the same arm, so attaching a machine gun section to 
every infantry battalion or regiment would go against the 
prevailing foundations of warfare. 
66 
64Eliseo Sanz Balza, La ametralladora en caballeria (Madrid, 1906), pp. 6,11-2. 
65 Jose de Lossada Canterac, Ametralladoras (Segovia, 1903), p. viii. Commissioned in the 
artillery corps in 1879, Lossada taught at the Artillery Academy 
(1896-1911); promoted to 
brigadier in 1919, he was head of the artillery section at the War Ministry (1920-1921). 
66 Modesto Navarro Garcia, `Prölogo' in Gändara, Estudios [ 1908 edition], pp. xiii-xviii. 
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c) Who should command the machine gun units? 
Despite their differences on organization, both Lossada and 
Navarro agreed in opposing the integration of machine guns into 
the basic tactical units (regiment and battalion), a view also 
shared by Jevenois, who thought that machine guns should be 
grouped in battalions of three or four batteries under the 
divisional artillery commander. 67 Navarro reckoned the division 
the right level to integrate a machine gun unit, whose commanding 
officer must not have more initiative than the commander of 
divisional artillery. 68 Lossada thought that machine guns would 
always be a strange element within an infantry or cavalry unit, 
even if commanded by officers of these arms, so they had to be a 
temporary attachment only and return under the general officer 
commanding the major unit afterwards. At any rate, the machine 
guns had to be used in separate sections. 69 In fact, the Artillery 
Experiments Commission reached a similar conclusion by 1908, and 
it argued that attaching machine gun sections permanently would 
hinder the mobility of infantry and cavalry units. 70 
A Lieutenant Pelayo expressed disagreement with these views. A 
divisional or army corps commander was not in a position to 
realize the fleeting opportunities for a successful use of the 
machine gun. Therefore this weapon had to be integrated into the 
basic tactical units of infantry and cavalry, whose commanding 
officers had a closer knowledge of the events on the 
battlefield. 7' Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean a better 
67 Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', p. 177. 
68 Navarro, `Prölogo' in Gändara, Estudios [1908 edition], pp. xix-xxii. 
69 Lossada, Ametralladoras, pp. viii, 84,177. 
70 Ministerio de la Guerra, Artilleria, Comisiön de Experiencias, Informe sobre `Las experiencias 
efectuadas con diversos modelos de ametralladoras' (segunda parte), 
29 April 1908, AGMS 2/1/9. 
See also `Ametralladoras Hotchkiss 1907', MA, LXIII, 1 (January-June 
1908), pp. 33-4. 
71 A. G. Pelayo, `Las ametralladoras en campana', RTIC, XV, 1 (January-June 1905), pp. 431-2, 
472-4. 
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understanding of the machine gun and its tactics, and the way 
weapons were organized within tactical outfits was not 
unimportant. A subaltern commanding a battalion machine gun 
section had less chance to influence tactical issues than the 
commander of a regimental company of machine guns. 72 
3. The machine gun and tactics (1900-1913). 
a) The problem of controlling infant ry fire power. 
The discussions about the machine gun took place within a more 
general debate on the effectiveness of infantry fire. Captain 
Jevenois had small confidence in the infantry's individual 
musketry: the conscripts' short terms in the ranks, the isolation 
in dispersed skirmishing lines, and fear, led the riflemen to 
shoot quickly and inaccurately, wasting their ammunition. 
73 A 
proposed solution was collective rifle fire (that is, fire in 
which the officers announced to their men the targets, sight 
adjustment and number of rounds to be shot). However, there was 
disagreement about the effectiveness, especially at medium and 
long range, of this kind of fire in fighting conditions. 
Jevenois stated in 1907 that the Russo-Japanese War had shown 
the increased importance of collective fire over individual 
fire. 74 On the contrary, Captain Rodriguez Tarduchy - an 
infantryman - was sceptical about the effectiveness of the 
collective fire proposed by the regulations. He thought that it 
was based on firing range experiences, far from the real 
conditions of the battlefield. He also remarked on the great 
difficulties which officers would find in directing their units' 
fire: they would be too busy in leading and keeping their men 
72 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power. British Army Weapons and Theories of 
War, 1904-1945 (London, 1985), pp. 22-3,55. 
73 Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', pp. 23-4. 
74 Jevenois, `Consecuencias täcticas', p. 423. 
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steady, their units would be too dispersed and the transmission of 
orders would be too difficult to allow accurate fire direction. 
Most times fire direction and tactical command of the troops would 
be the same thing. Collective fire was really individual fire at 
the same time and the riflemen must be trained accordingly. 75 
It seems plausible that he had taken into account the experience 
of the early years of the Moroccan campaigns. General Rodriguez 
del Barrio recalled that he never saw the use of collective fire 
during the years (1909-1917) he served in Morocco. Many officers 
seemed to be ignorant about that kind of fire, although it was 
included in the firing regulations. 76 But rather than ignorance, 
perhaps the reason for these officers' conduct was that they 
thought that collective fire made little sense on the African 
battlefields. According to Colonel Bermudez de Castro, the 
contemporary doctrines of collective fire were useless against the 
natives. These fought scattered on a wide front without forming a 
regular skirmishing line. Therefore, the riflemen had to rely on 
their individual accuracy, since the officers could no longer 
direct their units' collective fire against clear targets. " 
However, it seemed difficult to improve the individual musketry 
training of conscripts when there was a trend to reduce the terms 
of military service. A solution, proposed by Captain Ruiz-Fornells 
in 1904, was to increase the numbers of machine guns - which would 
allow the army to exploit to the full the qualities of accuracy 
and range of the modern small rifled weapons. 78 A contributor to 
75 Emilio R[odriguez]. Tarduchy, El tiro de la Infanteria. Ensayo critico independiente (Burgos, 
1913), pp. 22-3. 
76 Angel Rodriguez del Barrio, `El Regimiento de Infanteria. El Pelotön de combate. El Batallön 
de ametralladoras', LGP, XI, 7 (July 1926), pp. 4-5. 
7' Luis Bermudez de Castro, `Täctica para el combate en Marruecos', MI, III, 25 (January 1914), 
p. 29-30. 
78 Ruiz-Fornells, `Fuegos', p. 24. The German army had drawn at that time the conclusion that it 
was easier to teach conscripts to produce huge volumes of fire with a machine gun than to turn 
them into marksmen: Bidwell and Graham, p. 22. 
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a professional journal pointed out the greater effectiveness of 
the machine gun over the riflemen to sweep the range from 600 to 
1,500/2,000 metres. 79 Some essayists expressed the view that 
machine gun fire was less adequate than rifle musketry to sweep 
extended targets. They did not take into account the fact that a 
machine gun was less vulnerable and easier to control than a line 
of riflemen, and that the former's capability to hit targets 
successively through accurate concentrations of bullets made up 
amply for the `narrowness' of its field of fire. 8° 
b) The machine gun as a weapon of opportunity. 
Although Ruiz-Fornells had envisaged an intensive use of the 
machine gun as a way to deliver controlled infantry fire power, 
mainstream thinking did not favour such use by the infantry (nor 
indeed by any arm). The machine gun was seen as a weapon of 
opportunity whose use on the battlefield was limited to infrequent 
favourable moments of the fighting. Even an essayist asserting the 
machine gun's role in all the stages of battle recommended only 
careful, occasional use. 81 
There were objective reasons for such a view. In the early years 
of the twentieth century, the machine gun certainly was not a 
handy weapon to use in the attack. A machine gun in movement - 
with its crew, its transport horse or mule and assorted 
baggage - 
offered a clearer target than a small group of riflemen taking 
advantage of the folds of the terrain. 
82 The machine gun also 
generated distrust about its performance because 
it was exposed 
7 Juan Laverön Agut, `Conferencia sobre ametralladoras', EM, XXVII, 1 (January-June 1908), 
pp. 101-2. 
80 Eladio Rodriguez, Pascual Torras and Jose Munoz, Conferencias sobre ametralladoras (n. p., 
1908), p. 32; Bidwell and Graham, pp. 28-9. 
81 Laverön, `Conferencia', pp. 100,105-6. 
82 However, Lossada and Jevenois thought that the size of contemporary machine guns allowed 
them to go unnoticed and reach easily the most advanced points of the 
firing line: Lossada, 
`Moderna Artilleria', p. 292; Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', pp. 29-30. 
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to over-heating and mechanical breakdowns, and consumed huge 
amounts of ammunition which was difficult to carry to the firing 
line. 83 Therefore, it was a logical step to conclude that its 
effectiveness was only guaranteed for short periods of time (this 
also meant that its effects were understood as temporary) . Thus 
the machine gun was `the weapon of the moment' (i. e. a weapon of 
opportunity). According to this concept, the machine gun could not 
be used continuously in all the stages of the combat; otherwise 
the machine gun's tactical role would lose its essence and be 
exposed to failure. 84 
It is noteworthy that the expenditure of ammunition was of such 
concern that it led de la Gändara to disapprove of any tactical 
use of the machine gun (i. e. just like any other accepted weapon 
on the battlefield), unless it could produce a significant enough 
outcome. 85 The historian T. H. E. Travers has shown a similar 
concern in the British army to save ammunition when the essence of 
the machine gun is precisely to produce high volumes of fire power 
(which logically consumes a lot of ammunition). 86 This suggests 
that contemporary armies were unwilling to exploit the full 
capabilities of the machine gun by devoting more effort to solving 
the problem of the supply of ammunition. In other words, the 
machine gun - in order to be an effective weapon - needed large 
amounts of ammunition (which admittedly was not always easy to 
supply), but instead of seeking ways to overcome such 
difficulties, the military rather preferred to solve the problem 
by restraining the tactical role of this new weapon on the 
battlefield. 
83 Niemand, `Crönica general', RCM, XXV (1900), p. 98; Rodriguez, Torras, and Munoz, p. 33. 
84 Lossada, Ametralladoras, p. 176; Rodriguez, Torras, and Munoz, pp. 32-3. 
85 Gändara, Estudios [1908 edition], p. 255. 
86 T. H. E. Travers, `The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought, 
1870-1915', Journal of Contemporary History, 13,4 (October 1978), p. 536. 
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c) The operational role of the machine gun. 
Besides the issues mentioned above, the increasing emphasis of 
the Spanish army on offensive doctrines was a significant factor 
in underrating the military value of the machine gun. Fire power 
technology had shifted the balance to the side of defence, but, as 
the first part of this chapter has shown, the Spanish military's 
mind set was dominated by a psychological image of warfare. 
Despite the increased power of firearms (or precisely because of 
this), the human factors - morale, discipline, and so on - were 
still exalted as the decisive ones. And within this frame of 
thought, offensive tactics were the surest way to achieve victory, 
since they required the highest display of these factors. Machine 
guns, the latest piece of fire power technology, could not help 
running into trouble in this atmosphere. The army's initial 
reaction was the adaptation of the weapon and its qualities to the 
predominant frame of tactical thinking rather than the other way 
round. 87 
Captain Herrera de la Rosa, who was an observer attached to the 
Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War, reported that the use 
of the machine gun demanded a certain degree of passivity in the 
conduct of operations. This plus the mechanical requirements and 
the high ammunition consumption forced the armies to keep the 
machine gun for the right moment only. 
88 So de la Gändara 
concluded that the machine gun's role `is reduced to reinforcing 
[cannon and rifle] fire [and therefore lacks] enough 
distinctiveness to introduce variations in current general 
tactics. 
89 
87 Tim Travers' comments about the British army are applicable to the Spanish case for the most 
part: Travers, Killing Ground, pp. 68-71. 
88 Capitän Herrera de la Rosa, Impresiones recogidas de la campana ruso-japonesa con el ejercito 
del general baron Nogui, p. 88,30 November 1905, AGMS 2/8/152. 
89 `[S]e reduce a reforzar los fuegos... personalidad suficiente para introducir variaciones en la 
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Lossada acknowledged that machine guns could be effective in the 
advanced guard (where there were more chances for sudden clashes). 
But they must be removed from the firing line once the main force 
of the army went into action, either for offence or defence 
(Lossada was more interested in the former). 90 The machine gun was 
seen as a fire power reserve, which had to be used by surprise in 
order to achieve the greatest effect in a short time (that is, as 
a weapon of opportunity). In practice, this meant relegating the 
machine gun to secondary operations on the fringes of the battle 
(to deliver fire power when there were not enough troops) and in 
special kinds of combat (such as mountain and irregular 
warfare). 9' 
Besides keeping the machine gun out of the major clashes on the 
battlefield, the military underrated its defensive capabilities. 
Contemporary tactical thinking seemed indeed to be reluctant to 
envisage the deployment of many machine guns for defence in the 
firing line. De la Gdndara only justified such a deployment if the 
defensive front was very long, but he also warned about the huge 
consumption of ammunition it involved. 92 
d) The effects of the machine gun on morale. 
With hindsight, restraints on the use of the machine gun appear 
surprising at a time when the military essayists were worried by 
the double-edged effects of contemporary fire power. The increase 
in individual effectiveness of small firearms after the mid- 
nineteenth century had been counterbalanced by the dispersal of 
their operators. This had reduced the officers' control over their 
actual täctica general. ' Gändara, Estudios [ 1908 edition], p. 255. 
90 Lossada, Ametralladoras, pp. 86-95. 
91 Victor Martin Garcia and Francisco Gomez Souza, Estudios de arte militar, 3 vol. (Madrid, 
1910), 11.299-301; Navarro, `Prologo' in Endara, Estudios [1908 edition], p. xviii. 
92 Gändara, Estudios [1908 edition], pp. 254-5. 
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men and, in a sense, the collective effectiveness of units (it was 
more difficult to maintain fire discipline). But the machine gun 
put back in the commanders' hands the means to produce fire power 
in a highly disciplined way. Since it was a machine, such a weapon 
removed the frailties of the human being from the act of 
shooting. 93 
Captain Ruiz-Fornells acknowledged this fact. He was a rare 
supporter of the use of the machine gun during all the stages of 
combat. Ruiz-Fornells stated that it was impossible to exploit 
fully the effectiveness of rifle fire - even if the riflemen were 
all marksmen - since the soldiers were too shaken by the ordeal of 
battle to make the best use of their weapons. On the contrary, the 
machine gun was essentially a multiple automatic rifle and a 
nerveless weapon, which substituted a stable mounting for the 
staggering man as its firing platform. And it needed very few men 
to produce more effective fire power than a large number of troops 
armed with rifles. 94 
But these two features of the weapon (its mechanical nature and 
the reduction of troop numbers it involved) were fated to cause 
rejection on the part of contemporary military minds, which were 
attached to an image of warfare based on psychological, human 
factors. Technological innovation was accepted insofar as it 
bolstered those elements; those sides of innovation implying an 
essential change in the established image of warfare were 
overlooked or underrated. It was admitted, as early as 
1900, that 
the machine gun was `concentrated infantry' whose 
fire was more 
accurate than the `real' infantry's. However, 
it lacked the 
infantrymen's morale. So the machine gun could be superior to any 
93 Keegan, Face of Battle, pp. 228-30. 
91 Ruiz-Fornells, `Fuegos', p. 20; a similar argument is found in Jevenois, `Ametralladoras', p. 34. 
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infantry of low morale and poor training in musketry, but it could 
never be a match for infantrymen who were highly trained and 
motivated individuals. 95 
On the other hand, the machine gun represented a kind of fire 
power which was seen as threatening for the foundations of the 
contemporary offensive tactics. T. H. E. Travers has pointed out the 
strong concern of the British military establishment with the 
`weight' of the attack and, therefore, with numbers and manpower. 
The `energy' or drive of an attack was supposed to derive from the 
latter's `weight' (i. e. the strength of the attacking troops). 96 
Thus it was logical to see a weapon which implied a reduction of 
manpower on the firing line as a weakening of the offensive. 
The professional literature shows quite similar worries in the 
Spanish army. Captain Dolla pointed out the importance of the 
advance in mass, even in exaggerated numbers. The troops, by 
pushing each other physically within close-knit masses, would get 
the advantages of comradeship and discipline. 97 Major Ricardo 
Burguete saw in sheer numbers the way to get closer to the enemy 
on the fire-swept battlefield. `Against the huge volume of bullets 
with which the enemy will sweep our infantry's front.. . it 
is 
necessary to throw men, and sometimes "human masses"..., 98 Writing 
after the Russo-Japanese War, Lieutenant-colonel Banüs concluded 
that decisive success was only achieved, in moral and material 
terms, through mass. 99 Martinez de Campos' memoirs offer an 
example of this tendency to see fighting value in sheer numbers 
during the Melilla campaign. He described how, during the night 
95 Niemand, `Cronica general', p. 98. 
96 Travers, `The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation', pp. 541-3. 
97 Dolla, `Conferencias del Circulo Militar', p. 38. 
98 `Contra la enorme masa de proyectiles con que el enemigo cubrirä... el frente de nuestra 
infanteria, hay que Tanzar hombres, ya veces "masas humanas"... ' Burguete, Nuevos metodos, p. 
26. 
99 Banüs, Arte de la guerra, p. 46. 
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hours, lots of rifles were placed on the stone wall of a Spanish 
position, ready to fire without warning: `Nobody thought of 
replacing them with a few machine guns enfilading the barbed wire. 
Numbers - doubtless - gave an impression of greater strength; they 
gave it to ourselves, at least. ''°° 
As regards the machine gun, this thinking meant a failure to 
understand that the effectiveness of its fire was what gave real 
fighting value to an infantry unit, and that technology had 
changed the quantitative relationship between strength and volume 
of fire power. The authors of a work published in 1908 offer an 
example of such a lack of understanding: `[S]ome authors define 
the machine gun as condensed infantry; but this can only refer to 
the intensity of its fire, that is, to the material part, since 
concentration disappears in terms of personnel and actually very 
few infantry turn out. 'lol These words suggested that, for example, 
an infantry battalion with a reduced strength and equipped with 
several machine guns was deemed `less infantry' than a traditional 
battalion armed only with rifles. But modern firearms allowed a 
greater fire power to be produced with the same strength, or 
permitted a modern unit to deliver the same volume of fire power 
despite having reduced in strength, a fact already recognized by 
Captain Ruiz-Fornells in 1904.102 Nonetheless, in 1908, the 
Artillery Experiments Commission did not hesitate to call the idea 
of condensed infantry a falsehood. 
'03 
The issue of numbers had a direct influence on tactics. For it 
100 'Nadie piensa en reemplazarlos por unas cuantas mäquinas que enfilen la alambrada. El nümero 
-sin duda- da impresiön de mayor 
fuerza; nos lo da a nosotros mismos, por lo menos. ' Martinez de 
Campos y Serrano, Ayer, I. 60-1. 
101 `[A]lgunos autores definen la ametralladora como infanteria condensada; pero esto solo puede 
referirse a la intensidad de su fuego, es decir, a la parte material, pues en 
la personal desaparece la 
concentraciön, y resulta muy poca infanteria. ' Rodriguez, Torras, and 
Munoz, p. 32. 
102 Ruiz-Fornells, `Fuegos', p. 20. 
103 Ministeno de la Guerra, Artilleria, Comisiön de Experiencias, Informe sobre `Las experiencias 
efectuadas con diversos modelos 
de ametralladoras' (segunda parte), 29 April 1908, AGMS 2/1/9. 
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linked the thickening of the skirmishing line to the necessary 
superiority of fire before the assault. That is, in order to win, 
the attacking side had to achieve moral superiority, which derived 
in turn from the superiority of fire. The problem was that there 
was not a clear way to know when this superiority had been 
achieved. '04 As a contemporary essayist put it: 
Achieving fire superiority is an issue which almost 
has to do more with the troops' morale than with the 
material effects caused by fire. The thing which decides 
when fire superiority has been achieved is the fact of 
advancing under fire. If the attacking side makes 
progress despite the defender's fire, this means that, 
in practice, the former has achieved that superiority. '05 
The solution which best fitted the psychological image of 
warfare was to think (as Lieutenant-colonel Banüs did) that 
accumulating the largest number of riflemen for the firefight 
translated into a superiority of fire - and, therefore, of morale. 
The fact that the machine gun was very effective against thick 
lines or groups of riflemen at short range - as de la Gändara 
admitted - was overlooked, as was the idea of using machine fire 
power to replace riflemen. '06 Incidentally, Banüs reckoned the 
density of lines necessary for the defence as well, whereas de la 
Gändara thought that machine guns could save manpower, at least in 
passive defensive sectors . 
107 
4. The machine gun in the Spanish army: procurement 
and performance in the campaign of Melilla (1907- 
1909). 
a) Procurement. 
The push for the acquisition at last of the first batch of 
1°4 Travers, Killing Ground, pp. 70-1. 
105 'Obtener la superioridad de fuego es cuestiön que afecta casi mds a la moral de las tropas que a 
los efectos materiales que el tiro produce. Lo que determina cudndo se ha alcanzado dicha 
superioridad es el hecho del avance bajo el fuego. Si el atacante progresa pese al fuego del 
defensor, significa que, a efectos präcticos, ha alcanzado dicha superioridad. ' Francisco Sigüenza, 
`La artilleria en relaciön con la infanteria', MA, LXV, 2 (July-December 1910), p. 263. 
106 Banüs, Arte de la gu. erra, pp. 45-6; Gdndara, Estudios [1908 edition], p. 263. 
107 Banüs, Arte de la guerra, p. 46; Gändara, Estudios [1908 edition], p. 262. 
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machine guns for operational purposes after the Cuban campaigns 
was due to the commercial initiative of the representative in 
Spain of the French arms manufacturer Hotchkiss, Esteban Marin, 
who wrote on 14 August 1907 to War Minister General Fernando Primo 
de Rivera (uncle of the future dictator of the 1920s). Marin 
explained that the events in Morocco led him to suppose that the 
Spanish army would urgently need to acquire machine guns for use 
in a likely intervention in northern Africa. He offered the 
opportunity to get twenty Hotchkiss machine guns in the Spanish 
rifle calibre, which would be delivered within four weeks after 
being ordered. This could be achieved if the Spanish government 
made its order within ten days. Marin stated that the proposed 
figure was his own guess, but the manufacturer could accept a 
larger order, if regarded. He also remembered that the Spanish 
army had already tested a Hotchkiss machine gun in 1902 and 
concluded that it had performed better than the Maxim model. '°8 
The urgency of the Spanish government was seemingly real, since 
a document of the War Ministry (of unidentified origin, but which 
surely stemmed from the Artillery Section), dated 21 August 1907, 
records that the war minister gave an order this same day to start 
the procedures for the direct purchase of twenty Hotchkiss machine 
guns. Nevertheless, the document's content was a warning against a 
rash purchase, and advised waiting until comparative trials with 
other models were carried out. If this was not possible, it 
recommended that a number of officers be sent to test the machine 
gun in the manufacturer's factory. 109 Urgency prevailed and, on 22 
August 1907, the Artillery Section informed the captain-general of 
the First Military Region that two officers of the Artillery 
108 Ma. mn to Ministro de la Guerra, 14 August 1907, AGMS 2/ 1 /73 . 
109 Ministerio de la Guerra [Secciön de Artilleria? ], memorandum on the acquisition of twenty 
Hotchkiss machine guns, 21 August 1907, AGMS 2/1/73. 
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Experiments Commission were to be sent to France in order to 
examine the machine guns on offer and arrange the purchase. "" 
The commission's officers, Colonel de Santiago and Major 
Esparza, travelled to France to check the mechanical performance 
of the Hotchkiss machine guns, but they also met army officers to 
collect information on the French military's ideas about the role 
of machine guns. The Spanish commissioners' conclusions on the 
subject (the machine gun was essentially a defensive weapon; it 
was not condensed infantry; it must be under control of major unit 
commanders) inspired the Artillery Experiments Commission report 
of April 1908, and probably much of the Spanish thought after 1908 
as well. "' 
The contract of purchase for the first Hotchkiss machine guns 
was signed on 31 October 1907.112 During the next few years, more 
Hotchkiss weapons were bought by the Spanish army. But the overall 
numbers of machine guns were not excessive. In September 1908 
there were twelve sections (two machine guns each) for six 
brigades (including those equipped with the old Maxims). Thus the 
ratio was one section to three infantry battalions. By early 1910, 
after the Melilla campaign, there were twenty two sections. 113 
Besides the issues about machine guns and tactical doctrine 
discussed above, the financial factor must also be taken into 
account. Even if the Spanish army had developed a more favourable 
attitude towards the machine gun, the continual restraints on 
ordnance procurement would probably have slowed down any ambitious 
'lo Ministerio de la Guerra, Secciön de Artilleria to Capitän General de la la Region, 22 August 
1907, AGMS 2/l/73. 
111 Artilleria, Comisiön de Experiencias, Memoria redactada por el Coronel D. Luis de Santiago y 
Comte. D. Luis Esparza como resultado de la Comisiön que les the conferida por R. O. de 22 de 
Agosto p°. p°" y que trata de la ametralladora Hotchkiss en particular y de las apreciaciones 
de los 
mismos acerca del empleo esta clase 
de armas en general, 20 September 1907, AGMS 2/1/73. 
112 Documents concerning the purchase are filed in AGMS 2/1/73. 
113 Gandara, Estudios [ 1910 edition], pp. 290-3. 
177 
policy about the machine gun. In 1909, the Spanish army had a 
ratio of 3.9 artillery pieces to every one thousand men; even the 
armies of countries like Greece (6.9), Portugal (5) or Bulgaria 
(4.6) had higher ratios. 114 If this happened with a traditional 
weapon, the slow introduction of a new weapon whose value was 
still uncertain is not surprising. 
b) The lessons of the campaign of Melilla (1909). 
The brand new machine gun units of the Spanish army underwent 
their baptism of fire in 1909, during the campaign of Melilla. 
Contemporary judgements about their performance in that conflict 
were positive as a whole. The only exception this writer has found 
are Lieutenant-colonel Aviles' remarks. Aviles stated that the 
machine gun was not useful against an enemy like the Moroccan 
irregular fighting man. After an initial period of frequent use, 
restraint prevailed, according to Aviles, who concluded that the 
machine gun had to be kept for the defence of special places. 115 
On the contrary, Lieutenant-colonel Lossada praised the accuracy 
and rate of fire of the machine gun. These qualities were very 
helpful against the scattered Moorish fighting array, since the 
artillery had little effectiveness without clear-cut targets and 
the musketry of the infantry was poor due to the conscripts's 
limited training. 116 
Lossada indicated that the machine guns had often fired without 
interruption during the combats. This went against the Central 
Firing School's doctrine, which based machine gun tactics on 
surprise. 
117 Actually the first regulations for machine gun units, 
114 Vigön, Artilleria espanola, 11.299 n 215. 
115 Aviles, `Ensenanzas', pp. 289-90. 
116 Conde de Casa-Canterac [Jose de Lossada Canterac], `Ametralladoras', EM, XXIX, 2 (July- 
December 1910), p. 402. 
117 Ibid., pp. 402-6,414. 
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put into effect in July 1909, stipulated occasional use and 
surprise. But in practice things were rather different. Captain 
Medialdea - an instructor of the Central Firing School sent to 
observe and report on the machine guns' performance - pointed out 
that the weapons used to go into action in the early stages of 
offensive combats and stayed in their fire positions until the 
end, sometimes firing without any interruption. "8 
The official doctrine about use as a weapon of opportunity was 
not followed in the defence either. Medialdea stated that the 
machine guns' performance was excellent despite their constant 
use. 119 And according to Lossada, riflemen usually did not open 
fire when there were machine guns available . 
120 
The field commanders sometimes had ordered the machine guns to 
intervene even if the latter lacked suitable targets, because 
their moral effect made up for their small material effectiveness 
in such cases. The Spanish soldiers got used to the rhythmic 
shooting of the machine gun and highly valued its covering fire. 
Medialdea witnessed once how the riflemen, advancing under heavy 
enemy fire, looked back from time to time and wondered why the 
machine guns did not open fire. Such behaviour had a logical 
foundation. Whenever the machine guns swept the positions whose 
fire was more dangerous, the enemy's shooting diminished in a 
perceptible way. Then the Spanish skirmishing line could advance 
with a greater resolution, though the soldiers still did not see 
their adversaries. 
121 
118 Federico Medialdea Munoz, Las ametralladoras en la campafla del Rif (1909) (Madrid, 1910), 
pp. 54,56; for an operational account of the machine gun units in the campaign, see 
ibid., pp. 91- 
108. Medialdea (1880-1926) was an instructor at the Central Firing School (1908-1914) and the 
Infantry Academy (1915-1920); he served in the Moroccan campaigns (1924-1926), where he died 
from heart disease. 
119 Ibid., p. 61. 
120 Casa-Canterac, `Ametralladoras' p. 402. 
121 Medialdea, pp. 56-7. This behaviour resembles British Major McMahon's `tabloid' fire power 
tactics, based on the distinctiveness to the ear of machine gun fire: Bidwell and Graham, p. 52. 
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In its post-mortem about the campaign, the General Staff 
discarded any use of the machine gun units as an independent arm, 
different from the other fighting arms. Their employment according 
to the tactical rules of the artillery was rejected as well. But 
other conclusions were rather contradictory. The General Staff 
still supported the idea of using surprise as the base for machine 
gun tactics. But, at the same time, it concluded that the machine 
gun had to be used frequently, since it had turned out to be a 
powerful support of musketry. 122 Frequency and surprise are 
requirements difficult to match on the battlefield, and this 
contradiction probably reveals hesitant thinking about the 
tactical role of the machine gun. However, the experience of 
Melilla did not seem to alter in a significant way the prevailing 
views about the machine gun. Proof of this is the almost total 
neglect of it in the 1913 infantry regulations: there were only 
five articles, and these were dedicated to fighting against 
machine guns . 
123 
In his survey of the machine guns in the Melilla campaign, 
Captain Medialdea made a point which is useful to understand 
contemporary attitudes towards the machine gun. He advised against 
the general use of sweeping fire on the enemy positions due to 
the huge expenditure of ammunition it involved, even though it was 
of benefit to morale. 124 This looks like a odd conclusion when the 
military were so eager to sustain the offensive spirit of the 
troops. For it was contradictory to dispense with the machine gun 
when this actually bolstered the morale of the attacking troops. 
But it was not contradictory within the terms of the psychological 
image of warfare ('the psychological battlefield'), which weighed 
122 Estado Mayor Central, Ensefianzas, pp. 113-4. 
123 RTI 1913, articles 457 to 461. 
124 Medialdea, p. 57. 
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too heavily the human-centred factors to the detriment of fire 
power (a more mechanical factor). 
The machine gun was a kind of fire power which, in being 
produced by machines, stressed the quantitative side of warfare, 
based on non-human and tangible factors (e. g. technology), 
susceptible of being measured and treated as physical, mechanical 
processes unaltered by human emotions. While the crewmen executed 
the mechanical movements needed to fire and supply the weapon with 
ammunition, their emotions would not change the accuracy and the 
number of rounds fired per minute by the machine gun on a fixed 
beaten zone. Thus it is possible to develop mathematical models 
and statistical tables about events on the battlefield (how many 
men crossing the zone will be hit, how many machine guns are 
needed to seal off a certain stretch of the front line). For the 
military establishment of the early twentieth century, accepting 
the increasing importance of mechanized fire power meant accepting 
a relative decline of the qualitative, traditional military 
virtues (discipline, self-sacrifice and so on) which had been 
valued until then as the decisive factors in war and in which 
professional officers had grown up. 
125 For many officers, if not 
all of them, this was a difficult change of mind, a change which 
could only be stimulated by the actual experience of combat. 
125 Travers, Killing Ground, p. 77. It is noteworthy, in contrast, that many Spanish military 
essayists of the sixteenth century 
(especially its second half) saw no conflict between soldierly 
virtues and the use of new technology 
(firearms); on the contrary, such a transformation of warfare 
demanded the best qualities from contemporary soldiers: Jose Antonio Maravall, Anti os y 
modert'1oS Vision 
de la historia e idea de progreso hasta el Renacimiento, 2nd edition (Madrid, 
1986), pp" 542-50. 
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5. -THE OFFICER CORPS AND THE MILITARY REFORMS, 
1916-1936. 
This chapter surveys the most relevant events in relation to the 
army and its reform during the political-military crisis of 1917- 
1923 (unleashed by the officer corps' will to safeguard its vested 
interests), during General Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (whose 
final failure dragged the monarchy down), and during the Second 
Republic (which failed to implement a solid liberal democracy and 
heal the fractures the Spanish society had developed). The reforms 
of military education in 1927 and 1932 are analysed in detail and 
assessed as illustrative of the tangle of politics and 
professional issues which affected Spain's military policy during 
this period. 
1. The rise of peninsular corporatism: the juntas de 
defensa. 
a) Morocco and the growth of professional dissatisfaction. 
The Spanish army had developed, in addition to the corporatism 
of its branches, another source of internal division by the mid- 
1910s: the disagreement within the officer corps about promotion. 
As was shown in Chapter 1, promotion in the infantry and cavalry 
was linked to seniority in peacetime only. Therefore, the military 
operations in Morocco from the campaign of Melilla on opened the 
doors to promotions by war merit. The creation of the Spanish 
army's Moroccan regular troops (regulares) in 1911 - which were to 
carry the burden of fighting after that year - improved the 
prospects of those officers who hoped to speed up their careers 
through courage and skill on the African battlefields. These 
officers were known under the name of `africanists', and 
their 
ambition became conspicuous. Social issues probably were not 
foreign to their eager pursuit of promotion, as in the French 
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colonial army, where, according to Douglas Porch, `officers wore 
their ambition on their sleeves. ' Unlike their British colleagues 
in colonial garrisons, the French and Spanish officers' careerist 
bent was not restrained by a code of gentlemanly social behaviour, 
which prevented the individual pursuit of professional promotion 
from getting out of hand. ' 
Even though the military supported the Spanish involvement in 
Morocco, few officers volunteered to fight there. Instead of 
looking for action, as Stanley G. Payne puts it, `the great 
majority of officers dragged out their boring and unremarkable 
careers amid the sloth of peninsular garrisons, carping about low 
pay, slow promotion and favouritism. '2 Nonetheless, the army in 
Morocco offered a number of administrative or bureaucratic posts 
which provided substantial additional incomes to the holders. Due 
to the nature of the appointment system, such posts were the 
preserve of officers with good contacts in the military hierarchy. 
The privileges and financial benefits of the proteges of the 
ministerial authorities (and even the crown), and the prestige and 
fast promotions of the africanists, brought about the jealousy of 
the officers of the peninsular garrisons. 
The officers at home complained especially of the promotion by 
war merit, which they reckoned an encouragement of patronage and 
favouritism (they even accused the africanists of provoking armed 
clashes to get promotions). The Spanish army was prodigal in war 
rewards, which many times were not really justified (Vigön records 
a figure of 236,718 war merit promotions and decorations conceded 
1 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 40; Payne, Politics, pp. 114-5; Douglas Porch, March to the Marne, 
p. 161. Neither the French nor the Spanish armies had modelled their officers' career pattern on a 
regimental system; it is noteworthy that the unfavourable effect on the officer corps' morale of 
the 
colonial soldiers' careerism bears some resemblance to that of the purchase of commissions 
in the 
British army before the Cardwell reforms: John Keegan, `Regimental ideology', 
in Geoffrey Best 
and Andrew Wheatcroft 
(eds. ), War, Economy, and the Military Mind (London, 1976), pp. 9-10. 
2 Payne, Politic , P. 
126. 
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from 1909 to 1917). The attachment to strict seniority was also 
unfair insofar it made no distinction between mediocre officers 
and those of outstanding ability, but this lack of selection 
procedures was advantageous for the large numbers of officers 
whose professionalism was poor. 3 
Nonetheless, the critics of war merit promotion had a point. The 
Spanish army had developed by the early years of the twentieth 
century a penchant for valuing merit promotion in wartime more as 
a reward for campaign risks and hardships than as a recognition of 
proven command ability and a means to pick an elite of senior 
commanders. Thus an officer could be promoted in the Moroccan 
campaigns of 1909 and 1911 because he had been slightly wounded in 
an arm or a leg. The General Staff's analysis of the 1909 campaign 
admitted that combats were assessed according to the blood toll 
for one's own side rather than by the casualties inflicted on, or 
the military advantages obtained over, the enemy. Rules for a 
better control of war merit promotions were introduced after 1912 
and seem to have been partially successful, but the previous 
experiences had also made the peninsular officers so sensitive 
that even a smaller number of cases of favouritism could still 
produce a lot of resentment .4 
The average Spanish officer had also developed a strong sense of 
bureaucratic property status, which actually had a legal base. The 
1878 army act had defined an officer's commissioned rank as his 
personal property and he was supposed to be entitled to legal 
protection whenever he reckoned his professional rights under 
threat. 5 To be fair, this point in the 1878 act was certainly a 
3 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 40-2; Vigön, `Breves notas', p. 6. 
4 Estado Mayor Central, Ensenanzas del Rif, p. 84; Puell, `Fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 111; 
Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida, p. 31. 
5 CLE 1878, No. 367 (article 30); Payne, Politics, p. 124. 
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step forward in the process of professionalization of the Spanish 
officer corps. 6 
Besides the problems caused by the Moroccan conflict, the 
First World War worsened the officers' financial situation after 
1914 because it unleashed inflation in Spain. Within four years, 
prices rose twofold, so the 1914 salaries lost half of their 
buying power in this period.? By 1916, the financial problems had 
increased the discontent of many officers of middle and junior 
rank towards the ruling political elite, while the policy of war 
merit promotions had estranged them from the higher military 
hierarchy. 8 
b) The juntas de defensa and De la Cierva's reform, 1916-1923. 
The political-military crisis unleashed by the juntas de defensa 
(de fence committees) originated in the need for military reforms 
highlighted by the conflict in Europe. 9 The major problem for any 
reformist intention was that a serious reform of the Spanish 
military required cuts in the size of the officer corps, and no 
officer was ready to sacrifice his career in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the army. War Minister General Luque did prepare 
a moderate reformist plan which was a cautious step forward. 
However, it failed to pass the parliamentary procedures in 1916. 
Luque also introduced in 1916 physical tests as a means of 
selection for promotion. These tests were the first step 
leading 
to the political-military crisis of 1917. The way (trials 
in 
public) in which General Alfau, captain-general of the 
Fourth 
Military Region, applied the tests to several infantry field 
6 Olmeda, p. 98. 
Puell, `Fuerzas armadas en la crisis', V. 90. 
8 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, p. 44. 
9 This account of the emmiuee is based on Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 44-229; 
Payne, 
Politics, pp. 122-51,173-6,182-3; Seco, pp. 257-300; and Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 96-105. 
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officers of the Barcelona garrison annoyed the corps' officers in 
the Catalonian capital. Then the infantry officers in Barcelona, 
inspired by the example of the specialist corps'COmmittees, started 
organizing the Infantry Defence committee (Junta de Defensa de 
Infanteria) after mid-1916, in order to defend what they 
considered their legitimate professional interests. By early 1917, 
their example had spread to the rest of the army, although the 
Barcelona infantry committee (chaired by Colonel Benito Marquez) was 
to play a leading role. The defence committees' main purpose was the 
preservation of the interests of the peninsular officers, who 
would not hesitate to defy the authority of the military hierarchy 
and the cabinet. 
In order not to upset further the dissatisfied officer corps, 
the military hierarchy actually did not interfere with this 
process (promoted by middle and junior rank officers) until May 
1917. In this month, a new prime minister, Garcia Prieto, and his 
war minister, General Aguilera, attempted to stem a movement which 
threatened the discipline of the army. Aguilera ordered the 
Barcelona infantrýcommitteeto disband itself. When thecommitteerefused 
to do this, its members were arrested. At once, a newcommitteewas 
organized by the Barcelona officers, and the other existing juntas 
demonstrated their support all over Spain. The government finally 
gave up in early June and released the arrested officers, because 
it did not want to take the risk of losing the army's loyalty 
during a time of social unrest (the example of the Russian 
Revolution in early 1917 was fresh). 
On 1 June 1917, the Barcelona infant rycommitteehad also submitted 
a document (which was called thereafter the Cö itteesManifesto') 
which contained, wrapped in vague demands for political reform, 
the basic claims of the insubordinate officers: an improvement of 
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the moral and professional conditions in the military career, 
better financial terms, and, above all, fairness in the promotion 
system (i. e. promotion by seniority alone). The manifesto got 
unexpected support from political groups which, though highly 
critical of the army so far, thought that the military now offered 
the opportunity to bring the rusty political order of the 
Restoration down. However, they failed to see that the officers' 
opposition to the government only sought to satisfy corporate 
interests. Thus an extra-official assembly of members of 
parliament convened to force a constitutional change in July 1917 
was not backed by the military, which, moreover, helped the 
government to crack down on a revolutionary general strike next 
month. 
Garcia Prieto became prime minister again in late October 1917. 
His new cabinet included a civilian war minister, Juan de la 
Cierva, a conservative politician whose authoritarian bent had won 
the trust of the juntas. De la Cierva intended to calm down the 
defence0ommitteesand promised the satisfaction of their professional 
demands. In exchange, the committees had to abandon any sort of 
reformist political program of their own. The ready approval of 
the juntas proved that corporate interests were the military's 
main reason to defy the civil authority. This also frustrated the 
political ambitions of Colonel Marquez, who resigned in December 
1917 as chairman of the Infantry Highelco, nittee, he was dismissed 
from the army in March 1918 (due to de la Cierva's plots) and soon 
disappeared from the limelight. 
De la Cierva's policy took shape in the 1918 army reform act. 
With regard to the officer corps, the act satisfied the main 
demand of the defencEcommittees: the suppression of promotions by war 
merit. Thereafter, in order to put an end to 
favouritism, all the 
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promotions would be conceded using strict seniority as a rule. In 
exceptional cases, promotion by war merit would be conceded after 
a thorough inquiry and parliamentary approval. This new system of 
promotion was demoralizing for the officers fighting in Morocco. '0 
The reform also provided more active appointments through an 
enlargement of the army force structure. The act set up a first 
line(regular) army, a second line army (formed by the youngest 
classes of reservists), and a territorial (older reservists) army. 
The regular peninsular army was increased to sixteen infantry 
divisions (two per military region) and three cavalry divisions, 
and the overall strength established at 180,000 troops. 
Nevertheless, the reform was only a patch which did not really 
improve the army's effectiveness. Actually the army strength had 
to be reduced in July 1918 due to financial shortages, and several 
thousand conscripts were discharged. The 1918 act was accompanied 
by a substantial increase in salaries. Depending on rank, officer 
pay was raised by 11 to 50 per cent (the average pay per hour of a 
Spanish skilled worker rose 86 per cent in the period 1914- 
1920) . 
11 
Nonetheless, the zeal of the military to preserve its vested 
interests did not disappear after de la Cierva's reform. The new 
organization of the army still left many officers unassigned. When 
de la Cierva's successor, General Marina, tried to implement a 
policy of amortization of vacancies in the officer lists (in order 
to adjust the numbers of promotions to the appointments provided 
by the 1918 organization), the committees refused to accept it. But, 
as time passed, the strength of the -juntas wore out 
because they 
were unable to bridge the traditional internal 
divisions of the 
to Lieutenant-colonel Nünez de Prado, a commander of regulares, articulated this dissatisfaction to 
the commission of inquiry on the disaster of Annual: Expediente Picasso, pp. 
71-2. 
11 Data on salary rises taken from Fernandez Bastarreche, `El Ejercito', XVI-1.665. 
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officer corps. Moreover, the escalation of military operations in 
Morocco after 1918 increased the hostility between peninsular 
officers supporting the committees (j unteros) and africanists, who, 
moreover, enjoyed an increasing popular appeal thanks to the 
successes in the Moroccan campaigns from 1919 to early 1921. On 
the other hand, Franco Salgado-Araujo stated in his memoirs that 
most infantry lieutenants stood for the `open list' system. If 
this is true, it indicates that a part of the peninsular officers 
also stood against the defence committees and their excessively 
bureaucratic character. 12 
The position of the defence committees started crumbling after the 
defeat of the Spanish army in the eastern district of the Moroccan 
Protectorate (the so-called `disaster of Annual') in the summer of 
1921. The africanists blamed the juntas for the decreasing 
fighting spirit of the officer corps, which had allegedly been 
influential in the Spanish misfortunes in Morocco. Unable to 
answer this charge convincingly, the already weakened junteros 
fell into discredit and lost their power to face up to the 
government. Thus Prime Minister Jose Sanchez Guerra was finally 
able to dissolve the defence committees on 14 November 1922. 
Previously, the parliament passed a reform of the 1918 act which 
allowed a percentage of promotions by war merit if they satisfied 
several bureaucratic requirements. 
This compromise and the disappearance of the juntas allowed a 
partial recovery of the officer corps' unity. But the army still 
fell short of completely overcoming its main inner 
division (merit 
or seniority promotion), which caused resentments 
that could not 
be healed in the short term. Nevertheless, this lack of unity had 
not been detrimental for the vested interests of 
the army as a 
12 Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida, p. 31. 
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whole while the latter was the only support of (and therefore 
could influence) the dynastic politicians in the late 1910s and 
early 1920s. When the turmoil caused by the inquiry about the 
political responsibilities for the Moroccan disaster of 1921 
brought about an opportunity to restore the supremacy of civil 
power (by starting a regeneration of the parliamentary regime), 
the officer corps could not help seeing this as a threat to its 
corporate interests. Therefore, the government found no support in 
the military to face up to the bloodless coup d'etat (though it 
took the form of a nineteenth century ronunciamiento) of 
Lieutenant-general Miguel Primo de Rivera, captain-general of the 
Fourth Military Region (Barcelona), which imposed an alternative 
solution - an authoritarian regime - to replace the decaying 
13 Restoration political system in September 1923. 
2. Primo de Rivera and the Second Republic (1923- 
1936). 
a) Primo de Rivera: the fight against corporatism (1923-1930). 
General Primo de Rivera's government was a military 
authoritarian regime, and many officers were seconded to 
bureaucratic posts to oversee the civil service. But it remains a 
matter of debate among scholars how much Primo de Rivera's 
dictatorship was a fully militarist regime, if it ever was. The 
army initially agreed with a regime which seemed to bring 
political stability and social order back to the country and kept 
military corporate affairs out of the hands of the civil 
authority. However, Primo de Rivera was not a watchdog of 
traditional corporate interests, and his military policy 
led him 
to a clash with sections of the officer corps. 
14 
13 Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 236-73. 
14 The following overview of Primo de Rivera's policy is based on Carlos Navajas Zubeldia, 
Eiercito, estado y sociedad en Espana (1923-1930) (Logrono, 1991), pp. 117-56,163-4,168,282- 
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An important outcome of Primo de Rivera's policy was the rise of 
the africanist elite within the army hierarchy, since this group 
of officers played a conspicuous role in the subsequent political 
and military history of Spain. 15 Although Primo de Rivera was 
inclined to stop any further advance in the Moroccan protectorate 
at the beginning of his dictatorship, he changed his mind after 
personal meetings with the africanists and embarked on a resolute 
war effort which finished the Moroccan conflict in 1927. This 
brought a shower of promotions which fell on the most outstanding 
officers of these campaigns. 
Such promotions were possible because Primo de Rivera abolished 
the bureaucratic control procedures for promotions by war merit 
(1925). Later on, he reformed the promotion system to introduce 
the selective promotion of proficient officers both in wartime and 
peacetime (1926). At the same time, he changed the membership of 
the board in charge of promotions: the old members, retired 
lieutenant-generals, were replaced by Primo de Rivera's men. These 
measures were meant to speed up the careers of the ablest 
officers. Nevertheless, there was a risk of favouritism and 
unfairness (which increased under an authoritarian regime). The 
mistrust which the dictator's promotion policies revived in large 
sections of the army was a major cause of the military opposition 
to Primo de Rivera's regime. 
Primo de Rivera also tried to cut the surplus of officers 
through the amortization of vacancies after a reorganization of 
the regular army. However, his efforts were far 
from successful. 
Worse, he linked cuts in personnel to political loyalty. Thus the 
infantry and the cavalry - the most loyal corps - 
did not lose 
5; Boyd, Politica pretoriana, pp. 324-60; Payne, Politics, pp. 208-55; Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 
105-15; and Seco, pp. 303-364. 
15 Payne, Politics, p. 223. For more information on the africanists, see Mas Chao, pp. 56-62. 
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many command appointments for their officers in the new army 
organization, unlike the artillery and engineer corps. 
The dictator's desire to keep the army and military policy under 
his control was also behind the decision to abolish the General 
Staff on 14 December 1925. The official reason was the difficulty 
in adapting this body to the Spanish military administrative 
framework. The oddly named Direcciön General de Preparaciön de 
Campana (General Directorate for Preparation of Field Operations), 
integrated within the War Ministry and whose head was a direct 
subordinate to the minister, took charge of the General Staff's 
functions. 16 The reform was essentially limited to cutting the 
General Staff's autonomy, which supports the contemporary view 
that Primo de Rivera's real aim was to get rid of his last chief 
of general staff, Captain-General Weyler, who had allegedly used 
the post to hinder the dictator's policy. 17 
The artillery corps was the most conspicuous opponent of Primo 
de Rivera, who wanted to reduce the artillery's prickly esprit de 
corps. Although the artillerymen were zealous supporters of 
promotion by seniority alone, Primo de Rivera ordered in 1926 that 
artillery officers could no longer exchange war merit promotions 
for the Maria Cristina Cross and had to accept those conceded 
after 1925. The result was a strong protest by all the artillery 
officers, but the dictator did not give up and ordered their 
dismissal from the service in September 1926. The artillerymen 
came back to the army in November after signing a humiliating 
document of obedience to the government. In early 1929, the 
artillery corps was the military backbone of a failed plot against 
Primo de Rivera and the dictator decided to expel the artillery 
16 CLE 1925, No. 427. 
17 Nazario Cebreiros, Las reformas militares. Estudio critico (Santander, 1931), p. 134. 
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officers from the service once again. They were admitted back 
after signing a declaration in which they swore loyalty to Primo 
de Rivera's current government. 
But the struggle against the artillerymen and the way Primo de 
Rivera had handled it harmed the position of the regime, which 
also had to face the opposition of other sections of the military 
which disagreed with the dictator's authoritarian manner. The 
resignation of Primo de Rivera in early 1930 (after the dictator 
found out that he had lost the confidence of his fellow generals 
and King Alfonso XIII) weakened the position of the monarchy, 
which in accepting the suppression of the constitutional regime in 
1923 had linked its destiny to the dictatorship. A cabinet chaired 
by General Dämaso Berenguer (a former high commissioner in 
Morocco) tried unsuccessfully to restore the constitutional regime 
and save the monarchy. Alfonso XIII, acknowledging the lack of 
significant political support after the local elections in the 
spring of 1931, left the country to allow the formation of a 
republican government. After the political failure of Primo de 
Rivera, the military (though most officers had no republican 
feelings) adopted a passive attitude and did not stand either for 
or against the change of regime. 18 
b) Azana: remodelling the officer corps (1931-1933). 
The Second Republic was proclaimed on 14 April 1931. The first 
republican war minister was Manuel Azana, a left-of-centre 
politician. A student and admirer of the political-military policy 
of the French Third Republic, he sought to safeguard the supremacy 
of civil power over the military. Besides trying to put civil- 
military relations on a basis suitable for a contemporary 
18 Cardona, pp. 103-15. 
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democratic state (for instance, the 1906 Law of Jurisdictions was 
revoked), Azana took on the professional problems and undertook a 
deep reorganization of the army. '9 
Azana did not hesitate in tackling the root problem which had 
hindered military reform for five decades: the excessive numbers 
of officers. In order to cut the size of the officer corps, Azana 
brought out a decree of voluntary retirement in 1931; within a set 
time, officers could leave the service prematurely without losing 
the full salaries corresponding to their rank. About 8,000 out of 
20,500 officers (almost 40 per cent) took advantage of the decree, 
which meant a substantial cut in personnel at last. Three decades 
later, Generalissimo Franco said to his cousin and military 
secretary, Franco Salgado-Araujo, that Azana's decree `was not 
badly planned nor so faulty as was said at that time; it had the 
sectarian purpose of desiring to remove from the army's ranks the 
officers with monarchist ideas; but this was not achieved 
because.. . most of us stayed on. '20 
The promotion system would be based on a combination of 
seniority and merit. Captains had to pass a compulsory course as a 
requirement for promotion to major. The course qualifications 
would change the order of seniority for promotion; thus the best 
officers in the course would be at the top of their academy class 
segment within the field grade ranks. Colonels would also be 
required to pass another course before being proposed for 
promotion to general officer rank. 
19 Azafia's thinking and reforms are surveyed and analysed in Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 
18-60, 
133-247,262-84,327-34; Ramon Salas Larrazäbal, `Las reformas de Azana', in Hernandez 
Sanchez-Barba and Alonso Baquer, VI. 20-69, VI. 77-81; Carolyn P. Boyd, 
`Las reformas 
militares', in Historia General de Espana, XVII. 144-55; and 
Cardona, pp. 116-44,163-6. 
20 `[N]o estaba mal proyectada ni era tan mala como se decia en aquella 
epoca; tenia el sectarismo 
de querer apartar de las filas del Ejercito a la oficialidad 
de ideales monärquicos; pero esto no se 
realiz6, pues... nos quedamos 
la mayoria. ' Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones 
privadas con Franco (Barcelona, 
1976), p. 397. 
194 
The reserve list was integrated in the active list; but officer 
candidates from the non-commissioned ranks would have to pass more 
demanding trials than hitherto (including a period of study in the 
military academies) in order to get a commission. Nevertheless, in 
order to improve the professional and social status of the career 
non-commissioned officers who lacked the ability or educational 
requirements for a commission, Azana created a regular non- 
commissioned officer corps. Prior to this, the career of the non- 
commissioned officer was subject to his commanding officer's 
approval of successive fixed-term enlistments; therefore he could 
actually be discharged without any compensation before reaching an 
age entitling him to retirement benefits. 21 
Azana also restored the General Staff, which was organized in 
four sections (organization, intelligence, operations and supply). 
The force structure was adapted to the strength available: after 
the reform, the army had eight infantry divisions, one cavalry 
division and two brand new mountain brigades, which would be 
supervised by three new army general inspectorates. Azana's reform 
also suppressed the territorial organization in military regions, 
the appointment of captain-general and the rank of lieutenant- 
general. 22 
Azana also looked for fresh military leaders, in order to move 
beyond the hierarchy bequeathed by the monarchy. Alonso Baquer has 
classified the Spanish military elite of 1931 in groups based on 
Morris Janowitz's categories: heroic leaders (which featured 
conspicuous africanists), managers (including staff corps officers 
with proven ability as field commanders) and technicians (linked 
to military aviation or with extended service in the army 
21 Cardona, p. 63. 
22 CLE 1931, No. 282, No. 288, No. 337, No. 339, No. 401 and No. 444. 
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industrial establishments). Alonso Baquer also introduces a fourth 
group of his own: the `humanist' officers. These were either 
colonial soldiers with experience as native affairs officers (thus 
combining military ability with a good understanding of the 
political and administrative problems in Morocco), or reformist- 
minded members of the military academies' teaching staff. 23 
In 1917, the career models leading to the high places in the 
hierarchy had been the heroic and the managerial ones. But Primo 
de Rivera's dictatorship had granted all the advantages to the 
heroic model by 1930. Azana sought to change the situation in 
order to favour technicians and humanists, but they were too small 
a pool to choose from. 24 A result of this was that the republican 
regime lacked a reliable army leadership able to cope with the 
military conservatives' dissatisfaction with the reformist 
policies of the period 1931-1933. 
The soundness of the reforms was damaged by the arrogant and 
abrasive character of Azafia, who proved to be rather insensitive 
to issues (e. g. ceremonial, corporate traditions) which shape the 
emotional conditioning of military men. Moreover, his own 
rhetorical fluency played a dirty trick on Azana. In June 1931, 
during a political meeting in Valencia, Azana spoke of the need 
for grinding down the dominance of the traditional Spanish 
oligarchy, as he had ground down other obstacles to Spain's 
progress. There was no mention of the military, but, since he had 
carried out a major military reform as war minister, it was easy 
for his adversaries to present Azana's policy as a deliberate, 
23 Miguel Alonso Baquer, `La selecciön de la elite militar espanola', in Hernandez Sanchez-Barba 
and Alonso Baquer, V. 49-59; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political 
Portrait (New York, 1971), pp. 74-8. 
24 Miguel Alonso Baquer, `La reforma de la ensenanza militar durante la Segunda Republica', in 
Jean-Pierre Etienvre (ed. ), Les armees espagnoles et francaises. Modernisation et reforme entre les 
deux guerres mondiales (Madrid, 1989), p. 11. 
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9 
sinister plan to destroy the army. Certainly Azana was not wise in 
his choice of words in Valencia, but only hostile political 
partisanship can present his actual achievement as a whole as 
destructive for the army. 25 
Despite the contemporary criticism voiced by some conservative 
sections of the army, Azana's reforms were sound from a 
professional point of view and were not changed in their 
essentials by the later right-wing cabinets (1933-1935). The 
reforms were the foundations for an improvement of the army's 
effectiveness in the long term, once the natural wastage of the 
retired personnel made available financial resources for 
equipment. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936 
wrecked these prospects. 
c) From reform to civil war (1933-1936). 
Other scholars have already dealt in detail with the political- 
military evolution of the Second Republic, so pointing out a few 
relevant events will suffice for this section. 26 The early life of 
the republic had not aroused the military's enthusiasm for the new 
regime. The cabinet's feebleness in restraining the social unrest 
fostered by the radical left, and the concession of home rule to 
Catalonia, could not help nourishing the distrust of many 
officers, whose instincts were conservative. The results of the 
parliamentary elections of November 1933 gave a majority to the 
right-wing parties, which included a coalition named Confederaciön 
Espanola de Derechas Autönomas (Spanish Confederation of 
Autonomous Rightist Groups) or CEDA. When CEDA members were 
25 Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 21-2,293-7. 
26 For civil-military relations from 1931 to 1936 and Gil Robles' policy, see 
Stanley G. Payne, 
Eiercito y sociedad en la Espana liberal (1808-1936) (Madrid, 
1977), pp. 395-479; Alpert, 
Reforma militar, pp. 250-2,307-8,320-1; Cardona, pp. 174-247; Salas 
Larrazäbal, `Reformas de 
Azana', VI. 73-77, VI. 81-95; and Boyd, `Las reformas militares', pp. 156-72. 
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appointed to the cabinet, about one year later, the radical left 
started a general revolutionary strike. However, the strike 
quickly failed all over Spain, except in Asturias, where it took 
the form of an armed uprising (6-19 October 1934). The 
revolutionaries were defeated after the intervention of 15,000 
troops - including crack units of the Army of Africa - and 3,000 
members of the police forces under the overall command of Major- 
General Franco. The government forces lost about 300 killed and 
900 wounded, whereas the toll for the rebels was 900 killed and 
15,000 imprisoned. 
The leader of CEDA, Jose Maria Gil Robles, was appointed war 
minister in May 1935. Gil Robles tried to turn the army into an 
instrument to prevent the left from coming back to power, so he 
undertook a policy oriented to win over the support of the 
military for his partisan purposes. Gil Robles made some minor 
changes in the force structure, promoted all the army subtenientes 
(the highest non-commissioned rank, which was abolished at the 
same time) to second-lieutenants, and prepared an ambitious plan 
of re-armament which satisfied the professional desires of the 
officer corps (but was also justified by an increasingly tense 
international environment in the Mediterranean). 
This project could not be carried out because of the political 
crisis in the second half of 1935, after a part of the cabinet got 
involved in corruption scandals. President Alcalä-Zamora (a 
centrist politician) opted rashly for calling new elections in 
early 1936. On the verge of leaving office in December 1935, Gil 
Robles played for a while with the idea of staging a military- 
backed coup d'etat. However, he finally discarded it because the 
army's conservative leadership - despite its political sympathy - 
still refused to join any action out-side the republican legality. 
198 
The parliamentary elections of February 1936 were won by the 
Popular Front, a wide left-wing coalition headed by Azana. Despite 
winning with a narrow margin in the numbers of votes, the 
electoral rules allocated the coalition an ample majority of 
parliamentary seats, which was used to replace Alcalä-Zamora with 
Azana in April. Azana and the moderate sections of the Front were 
unable to hold in check the revolutionary bent of the more radical 
left. In turn, the right adopted more extreme attitudes as well, 
since the heated leftist rhetoric was seen as the announcement of 
an impending revolution. The result was a polarization of 
political life, which generated an escalation of political 
violence on the streets and finally led a section of the officer 
corps to think of overthrowing the government through a military 
putsch. 
Only a relatively small number of officers (perhaps no more than 
one thousand), whose main organizer was Brigadier Mola, were 
actively engaged in the 1936 conspiracy. Nevertheless, many, if 
not most, officers were ready to join the uprising if their 
commanding officers rebelled or the plotters could get rid of the 
commanders loyal to the government. The murder of the conservative 
political leader Jose Calvo Sotelo by leftist policemen acting on 
their own on 12 July 1936 spurred the conspirators to carry out 
their plans within a few days. The coup d'etat started on 17 July 
1936 in Melilla, after a police detachment tried unsuccessfully to 
arrest a group of conspirators on the eve of the military 
uprising. Since the secrecy was broken, the rebel officers of the 
Army of Africa immediately got their units out of the barracks to 
arrest the government's civil and military authorities. Next 
day, 
the plotters at the home garrisons joined the rebellion, 
but they 
were only half-successful. The Spanish Civil War 
had begun. 
199 
The preceding narrative is a summary of the most significant 
events which formed the political-military background for the 
Spanish army's professional developments from the late 1910s to 
1936. Some of those developments (e. g. the introduction of armour) 
were not essentially affected by the political-military turmoil, 
but the latter did influence the reform of military education. The 
following sections of this chapter deal with the evolution of this 
issue under Primo de Rivera and the Second Republic. 
3. The restoration of the General Military Academy 
(1927-1931). 
a) The origins of the second General Military Academy. 
The idea of training all the army officers in a single academy 
remained alive in the late 1910s. In 1917, Comandante Beta - the 
pseudonym of a graduate of the Toledo general academy and engineer 
officer, Jose Garcia Benitez - stood for the restoration of a 
general academy as the best way to solve the problem of the lack 
of real professional relationships among the corps of the army. 
Against the argument that a single academy could limit the 
students' choice of arm, he stated that a common military spirit 
must be the foundation of any career in the army. Thus an engineer 
officer candidate would have to prove his ability and will to 
become an officer before thinking of being a military engineer. 
27 
Actually a commission headed by General Villalba worked in 1918 to 
set up a single military academy again but, once more, the plan 
was not implemented. 28 
Despite this new miscarried attempt, a contributor to the 
cavalry corps journal (Memorial de Caballeria) urged the military 
authorities, a couple of years later, to set up a general 
27 Beta, pp. 136-43. 
28 Carlos Blanco Escolä, La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza (1928-1931) (Barcelona, 
1989), pp. 50-1. 
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academy, by arguing that the European war of 1914-1918 had shown 
the need for cooperation among the fighting arms. Such cooperation 
would be made easier if all the officers knew the essentials of 
the other arms' tactics through training in a single academy. The 
officer corps would also benefit from the comradeship fostered by 
a general military academy, as happened with the first one in 
Toledo. 29 The military authorities had certainly given little 
regard, if any, to practical combined arms training in the 
academies: indeed, infantry and artillery officer candidates did 
not carry out joint exercises until May 1923.30 
General Primo de Rivera graduated from the Toledo general 
academy and was convinced of the benefits of common training for 
officers. He had made no secret of his views: during a celebration 
of his promotion to general officer rank in 1912, he expressed his 
purpose of encouraging the restoration of the centre. 31 The 
professional ideology of Primo de Rivera was based on a concept of 
the military as a whole, instead of the narrow corporate 
attachment to the branch of the service which had prevailed so 
far, especially among the artillerymen. 32 
Once he became Spain's ruler, it is hardly surprising that Primo 
de Rivera used his position to put his 
Although he was not acting in a vacuum, 
coincidence that an essay prize offered b 
on officer recruitment was won by a paper, 
(that is, a few months after Primo de 
proposing the restoration of a general 
desires into practice. 
it maybe was not sheer 
y Memorial de Caballeria 
published in early 1924 
Rivera's coup d'etat), 
academy. The author, a 
29 Luis Rivero, `Union es fuerza', Memorial de Caballeria (hereafter MC), VI, 
55 (January 1921), 
pp. 175-6. 
30 `Prdcticas de conjunto de las academias de Infanteria y Artilleria en el Campamento 
de Abades 
(Segovia)', LGP, VIII, 7 (July 1923), p. 14. 
31 Blanco, p. 60. 
32 Navajas, p. 40. 
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Captain Durango, put forward the secondary education diploma and 
the passing of an examination as the admission requirements. The 
entrance examination would not be very severe, since the actual 
selection would be carried out during the two years of training in 
the general academy. Those officer candidates who passed this 
stage would choose their arm of service, after being awarded their 
place in the order of merit. Then they would go to the schools of 
application with the rank of second-lieutenant. After three or 
four years at the arm school and as probationary officers, they 
would finally be commissioned as lieutenants. A result of this 
system was that no officer would be younger than twenty one, and 
all the graduates would join the regiments with some practical 
experience. 
33 
In their essentials, Durango's views were rather similar to the 
schedule outlined in the decree, dated 20 February 1927, ordering 
the creation of the General Military Academy in Saragossa. The 
candidates coming straight from civil life had to be seventeen 
years old at the start of the year of admission and not older than 
twenty one (the senior age limit was extended for candidates 
coming from the ranks). A junior secondary education diploma was 
the minimum requirement to take the entrance examination. The 
studies at the academy lasted two years. The choice of arm would 
be based on the officer candidate's place in the graduation list 
(if the officer candidate was not satisfied, he could read some 
subjects for another year to improve his place in the following 
class list). The training in the arm academy would last three 
years (including probationary periods); after passing the first 
year, the officer candidates would be commissioned as student 
second-lieutenants. Once their training was finished, 
they would 
33 Jose Durango Y Pardini, `Reclutamiento de la oficialidad del Ejercito, en sus diversas escalas, y 
ascensos en las mismas', MC, IX, 93 (March 1924), pp. 141-3. 
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be given their regular commission as lieutenants. 34 
This last point is noteworthy because it was a change in 
relation to the previous system, which commissioned infantry and 
cavalry students as second-lieutenants after finishing officer 
training. According to the decree, the change had the purpose of 
`raising, through equalizing, the [officers'] class prestige..., 35 
One cannot help thinking that the infantry and the cavalry perhaps 
had settled a score with the specialist corps, whose graduates 
previously left their academies promoted one rank above those of 
the general corps. 
Nonetheless, the new academy had a primary purpose, clearly 
expressed at the start of the decree, more important than the 
organizational detail of professional training. The officer 
candidates would learn in the General Military Academy `the basic 
[professional] education and, above all, the military spirit which 
must be common to all the branches of the service. '36 This 
emphasis on the development of a common military ethos was to be 
the guideline for the teaching in the academy, and its distinctive 
trademark. 
b) Franco and the new academy. 
Given his backing for africanist officers, it is no surprise 
that Primo de Rivera chose one of them as the first commandant of 
the academy. It seems that General Millän Astray, founder of the 
Tercio de Extranjeros (a volunteer outfit, which recruited 
foreigners and Spaniards and was later named the Spanish Legion), 
was the first candidate; he had actually visited French military 
34 CLE 1927, No. 94 (articles 3 to 13). 
35 `[E]levar, igualdndolo, el prestigio de clase... ' Ibid. (Introduction). 
36 `[L]a cultura bäsica y, sobre todo, el espiritu militar que ha de ser comün a todas 
las 
especialidades. ' Ibid. (Introduction). 
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schools in 1924. But his ardent, outspoken personality had aroused 
many enmities within the army. The scholar Blanco Escolä suggests 
that, once his candidature was discarded, Millän Astray himself 
nominated his old collaborator in the organization of the Tercio, 
Brigadier Francisco Franco, to the post. 37 
Franco, who at thirty three had become the youngest general 
officer in Europe, was a rising star on the Spanish military 
landscape thanks to his achievements on the Moroccan battlefields, 
but he had no special qualifications to direct an educational 
centre. However, this was not an obstacle for the dictator, who 
wanted battle-hardened instructors to indoctrinate the officer 
candidates in the tough-minded military spirit which should 
characterize the officer corps. 38 From this point of view, Franco 
was certainly a good choice as commandant to play an exemplary 
role. In the important formative years of the future officers, 
Franco - who had reached general officer rank before being forty - 
was a living example of the heroic leader's professionalism so 
cherished by the dictator. 
Franco assembled in the academy staff a select group of fellow- 
africanists, whose careers had been (and were to be later on) 
closely associated to Franco's, such as Alonso Vega, 
Franco 
Salgado-Araujo or Sueiro. Another remarkable member of 
the 
directing staff was the head of studies, Colonel 
Campins. He had 
fought with distinction in Morocco and developed an association 
with Franco after the early 1920s. But 
he also graduated at the 
war college and displayed a genuine 
interest in the academic 
prowess of the officer candidates. 
According to Blanco, this 
academic bent set Campins apart 
from many an africanist officer. 
37 Blanco, pp. 99-100. On the creation of the Spanish Legion, see 
Payne, Politics, pp. 155-7. 
38 Payne, Politics, p. 242. 
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Unfortunately for Campins, his acquaintanceship with Franco was of 
no use after the rebel leadership dismissed him from the command 
of the Granada garrison because of his hesitations in joining the 
1936 uprising. Campins was court-martialed and shot a few weeks 
later. 39 
The style of the new teaching staff was to be different from 
that of the former corps academies. The reformist literature had 
often poured much criticism on the teachers' perfunctory ways and 
their preference for bookish theory, a sign of their poor quality. 
This was a fault stemming from the nineteenth century. General 
Bermudez de Castro, who was an infantry officer candidate in the 
late 1870s, defined the typical academy instructor of the second 
half of the nineteenth century as unimaginative and easy-going, 
and this state of affairs seemed to continue after 1900. He 
compared the easy life of his teachers at the Toledo academy with 
that of the city cathedral's canons. Bermudez never saw an 
instructor on horseback and attributed this fact, as well as the 
cancellation on rainy days of the single weekly session of 
practical training, to the poor professionalism of the teaching 
staff. 4° Franco himself agreed that the quality of their 
instructors at the Toledo academy (in the 1907-1910 period) was 
poor. However, some of them were redeemed by displaying their war 
wounds and medals for gallantry, which, according to Franco, 
taught the essentials about the military profession. 
41 He put this 
idea into practice in Saragossa: the ninety teaching officers 
had 
collected a dozen Military Medals (the second 
highest award to 
military prowess and gallantry) and over 
fifty promotions through 
39 Blanco, pp. 127-30. Some information about Campins' conduct 
in the military uprising of July 
1936 can be found in Manuel Rubio Cabeza, Diccionario 
de la guerra civil, 2 vol. (Barcelona, 
1987), I. 154-5,1.397. 
40 Luis Bermudez de Castro y Tomas, Mosaico militar. Historias, 
historietas, anecdotas, episodios, 
1-- t inn-, v costumbres 
de la vida militar de antano (Madrid, 1951), pp. 205-6. 
Blanco, p. 175. 
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war merit or selection, and half of them had been wounded in 
action. 
42 
The historian Stanley G. Payne states that Franco was respected 
as an efficient commandant, although the officer candidates could 
not help feeling a degree of apprehension due to his 
disciplinarian ways. 43 This last point is contradictory to the 
testimony, admittedly partisan, of Franco Salgado-Araujo, who 
writes in his memoirs that his cousin imposed arrests only 
occasionally . 
44 There is almost no evidence coming from the 
officer candidates, but the only memoir published so far leaves no 
doubt that Franco won high prestige among them. General Gutierrez 
Mellado - who cannot be accused of nostalgic Franco-worship - 
remembered him as `a superb commandant'. The officer candidates 
did not charge the unpleasant sides of their life in the academy 
to Franco, but to other members of the staff. 45 
Gutierrez Mellado's testimony suggests that Franco, given his 
role as chief organizer and first commandant, took a very personal 
interest in the functioning of the academy. He had in the end the 
opportunity to mould the future members of the officer corps, and 
this is a privileged position for any officer committed to his 
profession. Moreover, after the end of the Moroccan campaigns, his 
was probably the most attractive post in the Spanish army for an 
ambitious officer, and a good performance in this appointment 
would be of much benefit to Franco's career. Due to these reasons, 
42 Julio Ferrer Siquera, La Academia General Militar. Apuntes pars su historia, 2 vol. (Barcelona, 
1985), I. 243. 
43 Payne, Politics, pp. 242-3,243 fn. 
as Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida, p. 82. 
as ' [Un magnifico Director. ' Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, Un soldado de Espana (Barcelona, 1983), 
p. 52. Gutierrez Mellado (1912-1995) entered the General Military Academy in 1929 and was 
commissioned in the artillery corps (1933); he ran a nationalist spying and escape network in the 
republican rear during the Civil War; he became lieutenant-general and chief of army general staff 
in 1976; as deputy prime minister for defence affairs (1976-1'981), he took charge of making the 
armed forces accept the democratic regime after Franco's death. 
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it is understandable that Franco felt such sorrow when the 
republican government decided to close the Saragossa academy in 
1931. According to Franco Salgado-Araujo, the commandant was 
'deeply depressed, making no effort to conceal his great grief and 
worry. ' 46 It is plausible that the sudden closure of the academy, 
joined to the shocking transition from the monarchy to the 
republican regime, accentuated, as Stanley G. Payne suggests, 
47 Franco's introverted bent. Actually Franco lost no time in 
trying to bring the academy back to life. After being appointed 
chief of general staff in 1935, he urged War Minister Gil Robles 
to restore the General Military Academy, and indeed the CEDA 
minister announced to the parliament on 2 July 1935 his intention 
to open the academy again. 48 
c) A different style of education. 
Primo de Rivera gave much significance, reflected in the 1927 
decree, to the military spirit which the officer candidates should 
develop. He had a political-military reason for this (his wish to 
combat the corporate rivalries within the military) and a personal 
one (his preference of the officer role as heroic leader). Thus 
the Saragossa academy was to perform a role which, according to 
Primo de Rivera, the corps academies had seemingly failed to do 
well enough: the vocational testing of the officer candidates. In 
this sense, the new academy would work, as has been written of the 
French military academy of St Cyr, as `a sort of novitiate, to 
which postulant officers came to try out their vocations and to be 
initiated into the rule of the order. '49 Franco Salgado-Araujo 
provides evidence on the importance given in the academy to the 
46 ' [M]uy abatido, sin tratar de disimular su gran dolor y emociön. ' Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi 
vida, p. 104. 
47 Stanley G. Payne, Franco. El perfil de la Historia (Madrid, 1992), p. 21. 
48 Jose Maria Gil Robles, No fue posible la paz (Barcelona, 1978), p. 247; Ferrer Siquera, I. 295. 
49 Keegan, `Regimental ideology', p. 3. 
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officer candidates' military ethos. When the time for selecting 
candidates for entrance arrived, Franco ordered the selection 
board to assess in a benevolent way the sons of military men 
killed in action. According to Franco Salgado-Araujo, though most 
of them were hardly prepared to satisfy the academic standards for 
admission, they became fine officers due to their moral 
background: `Their great spirit made good the [educational] 
limitations'. 50 
Since Spain's army was inspired in many respects by the French 
one and both armies depended on conscription, it may seem 
surprising that, during the organizational period of the academy, 
Franco chose Germany (whose army was all-volunteer) to observe her 
army's officer training procedures. In April 1928, Franco asked 
General Losada, responsible for training issues in the War 
Ministry, for expense allowances for a trip to the German officer 
school in Dresden. He argued the usefulness of the visit on the 
basis of the German centre's resemblance to the projected General 
Military Academy. Moreover, Franco thought it interesting to look 
at the way the German army overcame the restraints of the 
Versailles Treaty in training its officers (this is, by the way, 
an implicit acknowledgement of the limitations of the Spanish army 
in terms of availability of modern ordnance) . 
51 The visit to the 
German centre (the Infantry School) was approved and carried out, 
after a delay, in late June. 52 
The German army's officer candidates needed to prove an 
education entitling them to admission into an university, and were 
50 'Su gran espiritu supliö las deficiencias. ' Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida, pp. 80-1. 
51 Franco to Director General de Instrucciön y Administraciön, 18 April 1928, AGMS 2/3/55. 
52 Direccion General de Preparaciön de Campana to General Director, Academia General Militar, 
11 May 1928, AGMS 2/3/55; Ministerio de la Guerra, Direcciön General de Preparaciön de 
Campafia, Secciön de E. M., 2°Negociado to Teniente Coronel Agregado Militar a la Embajada de 
Espana en Berlin, 2 June 1928, AGMS 2/3/55. 
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thoroughly assessed on their psychological features. Those who 
were admitted served for two years in the ranks and had to prove 
their proficiency as junior non-commissioned officers. Then they 
took one year's basic officer training, in a common course for all 
the candidates, followed by one year's training for their chosen 
arm. Although cultural and scientific issues were not neglected 
and private study was encouraged, character (i. e. willpower and a 
sense of responsibility) rather than intellectual excellence per 
se was what the selection and training procedures looked for. 53 
Franco submitted to the War Ministry a memorandum on his trip, but 
no copy was found in the files consulted by this writer, so it has 
not been possible to assess its contents . 
54 
It is doubtful that Franco got much practical knowledge from his 
trip, given the huge differences in organization between the 
German officer training schedule and the Spanish one. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that the visit confirmed Franco in 
his views about officer training - which were to be put into 
practice within a few months. For, although the formal educational 
standards for admission were lower than in Germany, the General 
Military Academy seems to have shared a rather similar background 
conception of training, and thus its syllabus seems to have been 
oriented more to moulding adequate features of character in the 
future officers than to pursuing intellectual prowess. For 
example, horsemanship was given great attention because, besides 
its physical training role, it was reckoned of benefit 
for the 
55 
officer cadets' willpower and quick decision-making. 
53 For a contemporary survey of German officer training in the mid-1920s, see 
Luis de la Gdndara 
Marsella, El moderno eiercito alemän (Madrid, 1925), pp. 81-9; for an assessment of this 
training, 
see Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and 
U. S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 
(London, 1983), pp. 133-9. 
54 The memorandum is mentioned in Direcciön General 
de Instrucciön y Administraciön, 
Negociado Central to Direcciön General de Preparaciön de Campafia, 14 August 
1928, AGMS 
2/3/55. 
55 Ferrer. Siquera, I. 236; Blanco, p. 158. 
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The academy's annual report for the academic year 1929-1930 
displayed the priorities of its syllabus (which was also a 
criticism of the older ones). It stated that the Saragossa academy 
avoided `the long-standing mistake of considering pure mathematics 
as the sinew of all military education, to the detriment. 
. . of the 
preponderance which must be given to teachings which are 
essentially tactical and military... '56 Moreover, the demanding 
fitness trials for entrance made possible that `military drill and 
exercises were not halted by the lack of readiness or stamina in 
the trainees, as happened in previous times. '57 This is a 
significant difference from the corps academies (or at least the 
specialist corps' ones), where there was much emphasis on 
academic achievement. 
However, some sections of the officer corps had doubts about the 
achievements of the General Military Academy. Jesus Perez Salas, a 
future commander in the republican army, wrote (after the Civil 
War) that the staff of the corps academies were appalled by the 
ignorance of the officer candidates coming from the Saragossa 
academy, where scientific and technical matters had been so 
neglected that their essentials had to be taught again. 58 On the 
contrary, the conservative military essayist Nazario Cebreiros 
thought that the five years' officer training was still too long 
and that the syllabus of the Saragossa academy still included too 
much academic content, in order to make up for the limited general 
56 `[E]1 error mantenido durante tantos afios de considerar las matemäticas puras como el nervio de 
Coda la ensenanza militar, con menoscabo... del predominio que deberän tener las ensefianzas 
eminentemente täcticas y militares... ' Academia General Militar, Memoria del curso de 1929-30 
(Saragossa, 1931), p. 50. 
S7 '[L]a instrucciön y los ejercicios militares no se viesen cortadas por la falta de preparaciön o de 
fortaleza fisica de los educandos, como en epocas anteriores sucedia. ' Ibid., p. 51. 
58 Jesüs Perez Salas, Guerra en Espana (1936 a 1939). Bosguejo del problema militar espanol; de 
las causas de la guerra y del desarrollo de la misma (Mexico D. F., 1947), p. 86. Perez Salas was an 
infantry officer who conspired against Primo de Rivera and later became a member of Azafia's 
military private office at the War Ministry; during the Civil War, he joined the republican side, 
rose to colonel and became divisional and army corps commander; still, his thoroughgoing 
professionalism disapproved of the revolutionary tinges of the republican army. 
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education of the officer candidates and because this centre 
allegedly could not help obliging the specialist corps' 
demands. 59 
It is difficult to asses the fairness of these judgements. Perez 
Salas and Cebreiros fail to explain what they meant by `poor' or 
`excessive' scientific content in the education of officers, so 
there is no way to contrast their statements with the academy's 
syllabus. This, according to Gutierrez Mellado (a future artillery 
officer), was well balanced in theoretical content and outdoor 
training. 60 Moreover, he makes no mention of educational deficiencies 
when arriving at his arm academy. Nonetheless, it can be argued 
that his testimony has limited value, since the kind of 
indoctrination imbued at the Saragossa academy was perhaps so 
effective as to prevent him from developing any critical 
assessment of his own training. 
Was this indoctrination oriented to non-professional, political 
goals? It is again hard to give a straight answer. The Spanish 
officers' accounts and memoirs are often so biased by ideological 
partisanship that it is difficult to separate pure professional 
assessment from political criticism. Franco Salgado-Araujo, a 
close associate of the commandant, could write nothing but praise 
of the academy's ethos and achievements. 
61 
On the contary, officers who in the 1920s and during the Civil 
War were hostile to Primo de Rivera and Franco expressed negative 
judgements on the General Military Academy. Cordon, a communist 
from the early 1930s on, described the academy as a reactionary 
centre which inculcated in the officer candidates a caste 
spirit 
59 Cebreiros, pp. 217-9. 
60 Gutierrez Mellado, p. 52. 
61 His service in the academy is recalled in Franco Salgado-Araujo, 
M vida, pp. 77-104. 
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and a fascist sense of discipline and loyalty to the leader. 62 
Perez Salas, exiled after 1939, shared this view: the academy 
produced `complete horsemen, fine players in several sport 
games ... and, above all, [officers with] a frightening africanist 
spirit. ' This kind of training, according to Perez Salas, made the 
officer candidates very receptive to the ideas of fascist-like 
organizations like Falange (a political party founded in 1933 by 
Primo de Rivera's eldest son Jose Antonio). 63 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to think that General Franco, as 
organizer and first commandant, stamped to some degree features of 
his own weltanschauunq on the academy's ethos. 64 This would help 
to explain the large number of Saragossa graduates who joined the 
military rebellion of 1936 - about 90-95 per cent, against 60-80 
per cent (these last figures vary according to the scholars) of 
the officer corps as a whole. 65 
4. Military education under the Second Republic, 1931- 
1936. 
a) Azana' s reform and military education. 
On 30 June 1931, the republican government ordered the closing 
of the General Military Academy. The arguments used were the 
illegality of its creation (since Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, 
in breaking with the constitutional regime, had no legitimacy), 
and the squandering of personnel and financial resources caused by 
the existing officer training system (which maintained five major 
academies and was disproportionate to the real needs of the 
army) 66 However, Cebreiros attributed the decision to the alleged 
62 Cordon, p. 193. 
63 '[ J]inetes consumados, excelentes jugadores en diversos deportes... y, sobre todo, con un espiritu 
africano que aterraba. ' Perez Salas, p. 86. 
64 Carlos Blanco reckons Franco's highly conservative ideas as the main source of the Saragossa 
academy's indoctrination: Blanco, pp. 100-2,126-7,181-2. 
65 Busquets, pp. 120-1. 
66 CLE 1931, No. 410. 
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anti-military thinking of Azana and the pressure of those 
interested in the disappearance of the Saragossa academy: the 
interest group of the old academies (formed by teaching staff, 
textbook writers and preparatory school teachers) and the 
artillery officers, who wished a return to the system of separate 
education. 67 Cordon thought that the General Military Academy's 
alleged reactionary indoctrination justified the government's 
decision. However, he acknowledged (something quite unusual for an 
artilleryman) that the idea of a single academy was good, because 
this strengthened the unity of the officer corps, and he suggested 
that it would have been wiser to substitute a commandant and a 
teaching staff more sympathetic to the republican regime for 
Franco' s team. 68 
Military education was reorganized by a decree dated 30 June 
1931 as well. Officer training would be divided into two centres: 
the Infantry, Cavalry and Quartermaster Academy (Toledo), and the 
Artillery and Engineer Academy (Segovia). Their syllabi would last 
four semesters; the officer candidates would be commissioned as 
second-lieutenants after finishing the third semester, and they 
would graduate as lieutenants. 
69 Although this was a step 
backwards in relation to the benefits of common basic training for 
the officer corps' professionalism, it was not a return to the 
1893 system. Actually the new organization resembled that of 
France and Britain, where general and technical corps were trained 
separately in two major academies (St Cyr and the 
Ecole 
70 
Polytechnique; Sandhurst and Woolwich) . 
The requirements for entrance into the military academies were 
67 Cebreiros, pp. 212-3,221. 
68 Cordön, p. 193-4. 
69 CLE 1931, No. 412 (articles 1 and 2). 
70 Alpert, Reforma militar, p. 255. 
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detailed by the 1932 act on officer recruitment and promotion. 71 
Officer candidates coming straight from civil life should be 
eighteen years old at least, have the senior secondary education 
diploma and have passed a number of subjects in a university. They 
also had to fulfil six months' regimental service in their arm of 
choice; after this service, their commanding officers would give 
them a certificate as proof of their military aptitude. During the 
academy years, officer candidates would be trained in the duties 
of company officers up to the rank of captain. 72 
In the annual intakes of the academies, 60 per cent of the posts 
would be reserved for non-commissioned officers. These would 
belong to two groups: i) senior and middle-ranking non- 
commissioned officers who voluntarily sat the admission 
examinations; and ii) senior non-commissioned officers who, after 
a number of years of service, had to sit an entrance examination 
compulsorily. Those of the first group who passed the examinations 
would follow the same syllabus as the officer candidates of 
civilian background, while those of the second group would only 
take one year's training. The students of the three groups would 
attend a common course of application and joint exercises. 73 
b) Continuity and innovation in the recruitment of officers. 
Although the 1932 act introduced significant changes in relation 
to the previous ways of recruiting officers, the purpose of this 
section will be to prove, through evidence coming from Spanish 
professional and military-related literature, that major points of 
the reform had been put forward during the three previous decades. 
Therefore, the reform of military education under Azana was not 
71 CLE 1932, No. 506. 
72 Ibid. (articles 3,4 and 5). 
73 Ibid. (articles 3 and 5). 
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radical in its foundations, since it limited itself to 
implementing proposals advanced by other essayists. 
The requirement for raising the recruitment age of officers was 
an old desire of reformists. In 1902, an article in Revista 
Cientifico - Militar argued that candidates should be seventeen 
years old at least since their personality would have matured at a 
natural pace, instead of imposing maturity artificially on 
teenagers at the military academies; whatever the short-term 
benefits, demanding excessive responsibility during these early 
years might be harmful for the officers' personality in the long 
term. 74 Almost two decades later, the dynastic liberal politician 
the Count of Romanones recommended, in an essay on military 
reform, that the minimum age for officer candidates should be 
eighteen. 75 The same year (1920), a regular contributor to the 
cavalry's official journal proposed not to commission any officer 
candidate until he came of age. 76 And in an officer training 
schedule proposed by a Captain Garcia Miranda and published in the 
infantry corps journal in 1925, no officer candidate should be 
taken into an academy before being seventeen years old. 
77 It is 
evident that the decision taken in 1932 had found support in the 
military literature before. 
It is true that the minimum age for entrance had also been 
raised in the General Military Academy, but this was not 
accompanied by its educational equivalent, a full secondary 
education. Although Romanones did not mention explicitly a 
full 
74 `Academias militares', RCM, XXVII (1902), p. 10. 
75 Conde de Romanones [Alvaro de Figueroa], El ejercito y la politica. Apuntes sobre la 
organizaciön military el presupuesto de la guerra 
(Madrid, 1920), p. 170-1. Romanones was a 
conspicuous politician of Alfonso XIII's reign, who 
held office several times as minister and prime 
minister, although he never got the war portfolio. 
76 A., `La oficialidad de nuestros dias', MC, V, 49 (July 1920), p. 9. 
77 Jose Garcia Miranda, `Proyecto de reformas en el Reclutamiento de la oficialidad 
de nuestro 
Ejercito', M1 XIV, 158 (March 1925), p. 166. 
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secondary education, this requirement is rather obvious when he 
wrote that officer candidates should prove an adequate level of 
general education, in order not to waste time during the first 
years at the academy by reading non-professional subjects. 78 The 
same requirement can be deduced when, about the same time as 
Romanones, the previously mentioned contributor to the cavalry 
journal wrote that officer candidates should get an education 
similar to that entitling them to university entrance. 79 
Indeed, the 1932 act went a step beyond the preceding proposals 
by demanding a certain level of university education. Although the 
decree gave no detail on which subjects should be taken, it seems 
that the actual practice was that candidates passed the first 
year's courses in a faculty of science . 
80 Romanones had actually 
suggested that some non-military matters could be read in civilian 
educational institutions and thus the academies' teaching could be 
focused on military subjects. 81 Nevertheless, the 1932 act was 
timid by comparison with the proposal made by a Major Belda in 
1924. He suggested that officer candidates should first take a 
degree in science. This requirement would provide candidates who 
were more mature physically and psychologically, whose decision to 
follow the military career would be more thoughtful and no longer 
conditioned by the need to earn a living (since they could look 
for civil jobs thanks to their university education). Moreover, 
sharing higher education would bring the officer corps nearer to 
the civilian society. 82 
Belda's proposal shows that the idea of giving university 
78 Romanones, pp. 169-70. 
79 A., `La oficialidad', MC, V, 49, p. 9. 
80 Cardona, p. 149 fn 10. 
81 Romanones, pp. 172-3. 
82 Luis Belda, `Ideas sobre el reclutamiento, escalas y preparaciön profesional del Oficial de 
Infanteria', MI, XIII, 150 (July 1924), pp. 17-8. 
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education to officer candidates was not reckoned alien to the 
military spirit (at least by a number of officers). It is 
interesting to contrast such a proposal with General Mola's views. 
Mola thought that the requirement of university education was an 
anti-military device, an exposure to the indiscipline and the 
corrosive ideas which, according to Mola, prevailed among the 
students. Thus the military values which made up the basis of the 
officer corps would never take root. 83 
Another significant break with past military education was the 
introduction of compulsory service in the ranks before admission 
into the military academies. In 1905, Captain Herrera de la Rosa 
had already praised the Japanese practice (taken in turn from the 
German army) of demanding one year's service in the ranks, as a 
good way to judge if officer candidates had the endurance and the 
sense of discipline needed for military life. 84 During the early 
1920s, this requirement of preliminary service in the ranks was a 
common recommendation of the reformist essayists on officer 
training. But, by contrast with the six months of the 1932 reform, 
they proposed a longer term (one year) . 
85 Another difference was 
that they often demanded that candidates achieve promotion to non- 
commissioned rank. 86 Major Belda went further to propose that 
candidates should get a commission as officers of the 
complementary list (which provided the reservist officers) before 
83 Mola, p. 1072. 
84 Capitän Herrera de la Rosa, Impresiones recogidas de la campana ruso japonesa con el ejercito 
del general baron Nogui, pp. 18-9,30 November 1905, AGMS 2/8/152. The 
Japanese army had 
been organized on the German model in the 1880s: Enciclopedia Espasa sv 
`Japön', XXVIII-ii. 
2497. 
85 A., `La oficialidad', MC, V, 49, p. 9; Garcia Miranda, `Proyecto 
de reformas', p. 166; Belda, 
`Ideas', p. 18; Miguel Ponte y Manso de Zuniga, `Reclutamiento 
de la oficialidad del Ejercito, en 
sus diversas escalas, y ascensos en las mismas', MC, IX, 96 
(June 1924), p. 374. Ponte (1882- 
1952) was commissioned in the cavalry (1897) and reached general officer rank 
in Morocco; he 
left the service in 1931 and turned into a monarchist conspirator; 
during the Civil War, Ponte held 
senior commands on the nationalist Aragonese and central 
fronts; he signed the letter sent in 1943 
by a group of generals asking Franco for the restoration of the monarchy. 
86 Romanones, p. 169; Ponte, `Reclutamiento', pp. 375-6; Garcia Miranda, 
`Proyecto de reformas', 
p. 16. 
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sitting the examinations for entrance into a military academy. 87 
General Mola saw preliminary training in the ranks as a positive 
step, in contrast with the studies in the university where officer 
candidates would supposedly be exposed to the harmful influence of 
their civil classmates. 88 But could not this training be a 
disturbing experience for the future officers as well? Compulsory 
military service, as implemented in Spain, was unpopular, and the 
poorly motivated conscripts could be receptive, via anti- 
militarist propaganda, to leftist doctrines. In fact, the army (or 
the conservative section of the military at least) seems to have 
rated poorly the political reliability of conscripts at that time. 
Primo de Rivera's dictatorship undertook a program of `moral 
education' for the rank and file, which was actually a program of 
ideological indoctrination for conscripts, especially for those 
coming from a urban working-class background. 89 Once such 
indoctrination disappeared under the republican regime, officer 
candidates would probably have been exposed to the kind of 
`subversive' ideas loathed by Nola. Although their influence is 
impossible to assess for sure, and was probably exaggerated by the 
conservative-minded officers, left-wing organizations certainly 
worked to set up underground networks within the barracks and win 
over the conscripts in the early 1930s. 
9° Perhaps the desire to 
remove future officers from this exposure was one of the reasons 
behind Gil Robles' unsuccessful bill to restore the General 
Military Academy, which included the abolition of the six 
months' term in the ranks (July 1935). 
91 
87 Belda, `Ideas', p. 18. 
88 Mola, pp. 1069-70. 
89Navajas, pp. 242-59. 
90 Payne, Politics, pp. 304-5. 
91 Gil Robles presented a bill to parliament in July 1935 in order to restore the 
General Military 
Academy. The bill suppressed the requirement for university studies (which allegedly 
deterred 
many candidates) and previous military service (which was reckoned 
ineffective), and it extended 
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It is noteworthy that the requirement of service in the ranks 
was a distinctive feature of the German army and has been reckoned 
by some historians as one of the reasons behind the German 
officers' fine performance in the First and Second World Wars. 92 
However, this preliminary training in the ranks was also 
introduced by the French army before the Great War, and the result 
was unsuccessful. 13 Therefore any claim that previous contact with 
the rank and file would have improved the quality of the Spanish 
junior officers cannot be accepted at face value. But the 
republican officer training system was too short-lived to reach 
any conclusion on this issue (and, indeed, on the effectiveness of 
the 1932 reform as a whole). 
Reformist essayists had also pointed out before 1932 the need 
for limiting training in the academies to the essential subjects 
required by a junior officer's duties. 94 The reform satisfied such 
a view, and even Cebreiros, one of the harshest critics of Azana, 
acknowledged this as a wise move. He wrote that this reform was an 
official acceptance at last that officer candidates had to be 
trained only as subalterns - not as generals as well - in the 
military academies. 95 
The 1932 reform also included the creation of compulsory 
promotion courses, which forced officers to keep their 
professional expertise up to date. The neglect of professional 
education after the academy period had already been denounced many 
the training to five years (two in the general academy and three in the corps academy). 
However, 
the bill did not get parliamentary support. In November 1935, Gil Robles got approval 
for another 
bill which extended officer training to three years: DOMG, 6 July 1935,3 November 
1935 and 26 
November 1935; Ferrer Siquera, I. 295; Salas Larrazäbal, `Reformas de Azafia', VI. 75, VI. 329 n 
215. 
92 Barnett, pp. 25-26; Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 129. 
94 Barnett, pp. 26ý 315" A. F. B. P. de A., Rufino Gines, Reclutamiento de oficiales', MI, X, 112 (May 1921), p. y 
p. 55. 
95 Cebreiros, pp. 224-5,228-9. 
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years before by Captain Gallego. 96 Cordon admitted that as the 
average officer advanced in his career, his professional knowledge 
diminished, instead of increasing. Cordon wrote in an outspoken 
way that `most of us [the junior officers] reckoned each 
promotion, from the rank of captain upwards, as a step forward to 
professional ignorance... '. 97 In order to correct this situation, 
besides avoiding the worst effects of the closed list, the 1932 
act required captains to pass a proficiency course in the arm 
academy before promotion to the rank of major. 98 This solution had 
been put forward several years before in the pages of Memorial de 
Caballeria and in a reformist essay. 99 However, this part of the 
1932 act was not implemented in practice, according to Salas 
Larrazäbal. Even if the proficiency course had been implemented, 
it would soon have lost much - if not all - of its value as a 
means of selection for priority promotion, since the re-ordering 
of seniority in the list after the course was abolished by Gil 
Robles. 100 
Promotion to higher command was influenced by the new 
organization of military education as well. Under the 1932 act, 
colonels had to pass a course - one year long - in a brand new 
Centre of Higher Military Studies as a requirement for promotion 
to general officer rank. '°' And, once more, at least one case of 
demand for a centre which would train the future generals of the 
Spanish army can be found in a professional journal, a decade 
before. 102 
96 Gallego, Proyecto de reorganizacion, p. 18. 
97 `[C]ada ascenso, a partir del de capitän, lo consideräsemos la mayoria 
de nosotros como un paso 
mäs hacia la incultura profesional... '. Cordon, p. 71. 
98 CLE 1932, No. 506 (article 14). 
99 A., `La oficialidad de nuestros dias', MC, V, 50 (August 1920), pp. 97-8; 
A. F. B. y P. de A., p. 
55. 
100 Salas Larrazäbal, `Reformas de Azana', VI. 66, VI. 76, VI. 329 n 217 
'o' CLE 1932, No. 506 (article 16). 
102 A., `El problems del generalato', MC, VI, 58 (April 1921), pp. 228-30. 
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c) The democratization of the officer corps. 
Azana wanted to open the officer corps to candidates from a 
wider social background in order to get a 'democratic' military in 
tune with the new regime's spirit. A way to achieve such a purpose 
was the reservation of a large number of academy vacancies for 
non-commissioned officers. As was the case with the other points 
of the reform, there had already been proposals to increase the 
numbers of officers coming from the ranks. In 1920, a contributor 
to Memorial de Caballeria argued that half of the regular officer 
corps should be made up of former non-commissioned officers . 
103 A 
Major Gines complained of the uselessness in wartime of the 
reserve list and of the disagreements this list caused within the 
officer corps. As a better way to get officers from the non- 
commissioned ranks, he suggested preserving up to two thirds of 
the student posts in the academies for non-commissioned officers 
with adequate educational qualifications. '04 
Cebreiros admitted that a larger number of officers coming from 
the ranks was beneficial, but not because he agreed with the 
democratic goals of Azana. According to Cebreiros, the officers 
coming straight from civil life would pursue much better careers 
than before. Though a half of the company grade appointments could 
be held by former non-commissioned officers, the older age of 
these would limit their chances of promotion to senior rank. 
105 
That is, since these officers were often older than those who had 
entered the academies straight from civil life, the former were 
more likely now to reach the retirement age with a relatively 
low 
rank (this had been less likely in the separate - 
but less packed 
- reserve list). 
103 A., `La oficialidad', MC, V, 50, p. 97. 
114 Gines, `Reclutamiento', p. 313-5. 
105 Cebreiros, pp. 269-70. 
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However, Azana's plan had a serious weakness. As the 
conservative member of parliament Tomas Peire - formerly one of 
Azana's military assistants in the ministry before leaving the 
army - pointed out, the minister's goals were hardly achievable 
due to the low educational level of the Spanish non-commissioned 
officers. It seemed disproportionate to reserve 60 per cent of 
academy posts for candidates of non-commissioned rank, when, on 
average, they had made up only 5 per cent of the academy graduates 
by 1930.106 Peire had a point: unless the educational standards for 
admission were lowered, few non-commissioned officers would be 
able to enter the military academies in the short term under the 
conditions set by Azana. 
The figures for the intake of officer candidates who entered the 
military academies after the 1932 reform prove beyond doubt the 
gap between the theory and the reality, but the potential of the 
non-commissioned ranks cannot be underrated either, although it 
did not satisfy the act's sanguine expectations. The first summons 
for the new military academies (September 1933) offered 280 
vacancies (of which 168 were reserved for non-commissioned 
officers). Only eight non-commissioned officers passed the 
entrance examinations. 107 In the second summons (March 1935), there 
were 190 vacancies; this time at least 40 per cent of them were 
reserved for non-commissioned officers. The list of 139 candidates 
who passed the entrance examinations (released in January 
1936) 
included 42 non-commissioned officers and 30 second-lieutenants; 
the latter were surely subtenientes who had sat the compulsory 
examinations set in the 1932 act for senior non-commissioned 
officers but had been promoted to second-lieutenants 
after the 
106 Tomas Peire, Una politica militar expuesta ante las Cortes Constituyentes 
(Madrid, 1933), p. 
23; for other critical views during the parliamentary discussion, see 
Alpert, Reforma militar, p. 
249. 
107 Salas Larrazäbal, `Reformas de Azana', VI. 80. 
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abolition of their rank under Gil Robles (nonetheless, these new 
second-lieutenants would have to pass through a military academy 
to be promoted to lieutenants), 108 
The second summons' figures were a substantial improvement: 
probably more non-commissioned officers took more interest in or 
had a longer time for their preparatory studies. Nonetheless, the 
percentage (37.8 per cent) still fell short of the 1932 act's 
original goal, which could only be fully achieved by raising the 
educational level and by encouraging study among the non- 
commissioned ranks. The 1932 act was removed from Spain's social 
reality (Alpert suggests that Azana perhaps was not too involved 
in the drafting of the bill). Therefore, the republican reform 
could not attract overnight social groups different from those 
which traditionally had produced candidates for a career in the 
officer corps. log 
5. The reform of higher military education (1927- 
1932). 
The reformist efforts of Primo de Rivera and the Second Republic 
also reached the training of staff officers. The same decree which 
restored the General Military Academy also included the essential 
features of a new organization of higher military education. The 
ESG would turn into the Escuela de Estudios Superiores Militares 
(Higher Military Studies College) or EESM. The students would be 
captains who had at least two years' experience as unit 
commanders, and field officers. 
"° The EESM was made up of two 
sections: military and industrial. 
"' This reorganization meant a 
triumph of the view of the military as a corporate unity over the 
108 DOMG, 11 December 1935; Salas Larrazdbal, `Reformas de Azana', VI. 80, VI. 330 n 239; 
Alpert, Reforma militar, p. 251. 
109 Alpert, Reforma militar, p. 250. 
110 CLE 1927, No. 94 (article 17). 
111 Ibid. (article 18). 
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more parochial esprit de corps of the branches of the service 
which had prevailed before. 
The industrial section would provide teaching in three 
specialities: chemistry and metallurgy, military construction, and 
electricity and mechanics. The studies would last two years plus a 
period of practice, and their goal was to train specialist 
engineers in the manufacture of ordnance and in industrial 
management and mobilization. 112 In other words, this meant that the 
technical and industrial responsibilities which justified the 
heavy scientific content in the training of artillery and engineer 
officers were snatched away from the specialist corps. Such a 
policy had been put forward before. A Captain Moreno had proposed 
in 1911 the creation of a military industrial corps, which would 
assume the technical and manufacturing functions of the artillery 
and engineers corps. A decade later, a Major de Pazos repeated the 
same proposal. 113 Both essayists were infantry officers, and it 
seems plausible that their views were shared by large sections of 
the general corps. Limiting professional training and duties to 
tactical and unit command issues meant that all the corps would be 
on an equal footing, without special responsibilities justifying 
different corporate educational levels within the military. Such 
an egalitarian status was a requirement to foster a common 
military spirit within the officer corps, and it 
is no surprise 
that Primo de Rivera picked the idea as a part of his policy to 
promote the corporate unity of the military. 
Primo de Rivera and the general corps were not the only ones 
standing for a separate branch of military 
industrial engineers. 
The Count of Romanones also echoed this desire 
in suggesting that 
112 Ibid. (articles 18 and 20). 
113 Moreno y Alvarez, `Instrucciön y reclutamiento', p. 261; 
M. de Pazos y Zamora, `Las 
especialidades', MI, X, 112 
(May 1921), pp. 317-8. 
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a number of artillery and engineer officer candidates should get 
additional technical training in their academies and, after 
graduation, 
factories. 114 
should be appointed permanently to military 
The military section of the EESM would train officers to perform 
staff duties. After two years' training plus a period of practice, 
the students would graduate as diplomados. Since article 20 of the 
decree stated that graduates would never leave their corps of 
origin after taking the staff diploma, the 1927 reorganization was 
also a death sentence for the staff corps, which would disappear 
by natural wastage. 115 
The fact that Primo de Rivera decided to suppress the staff 
corps at that time seems somewhat paradoxical. According to Mola, 
senior officers of the corps, far from being absorbed in 
bureaucratic paperwork, were ready and able to perform as column 
commanders in the Moroccan campaigns of 1924-1927, unlike those of 
the facultative corps. Mola wrote of the latter: `Not to get out 
of the headquarters area was more comfortable for the colonels and 
lieutenant-colonels of the artillery and engineers corps - and 
perhaps they reckoned this more scientific. ' 
116 Actually Primo de 
Rivera did not harm the corps before 1927. And two outstanding 
staff corps officers, Fanjul and Goded, were promoted to general 
rank in 1926 because of their prowess in the field. These 
officers' performance in the Moroccan campaigns proved that the 
preparation and conduct of military operations had replaced the 
corps' old scientific-oriented functions. 
117 But it is clear that 
Primo de Rivera, although acknowledging and rewarding individual 
114 Romanones, pp. 171-2. 
115 CLE 1927, No. 94 (articles 18 and 20). 
116 `A los coroneles y tenientes coroneles de Artilleria e Ingenieros les era mäs cömodo -y tal vez 
lo juzgaran mäs cientifico- no salirse del area de los cuarteles generales. ' Mola, pp. 1025-6. 
117 Alonso Baquer, Ejercito en la sociedad, pp. 287-8. 
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merit, was determined to erase the sources of discord within the 
military, such as the existence of a separate corps of staff 
officers. 
Azana closed the EESM and restored the War College through a 
decree dated 21 July 1931.118 According to Cebreiros, the 
industrial section was abolished to satisfy the artillerymen; 
scientific and technical teaching was thus returned to the Segovia 
academy, preventing the infantry and the cavalry from having their 
own ordnance engineering specialists. ' 19 But Azana's legislation 
did not mean a full restoration of the old corporatism. In 1932, 
the officer recruitment and promotion act ordered that, 
thenceforward, staff duties would be performed by captains and 
field officers with the staff diploma and it declared the staff 
corps would be `wasted away' (a extinguir); that is, no more 
officers would join the corps, which would disappear through 
natural wastage. This was the end of a corporate struggle which 12° 
had lasted from General Cassola's time as war minister. 
But this did not necessarily mean an definitive end of the 
quarrels affecting the staff officers as a whole. Mola wrote about 
the existence within the military of a faction which rejected the 
idea that staff college graduates were entitled to priority in 
appointments near the high command. The destruction of the staff 
corps was not enough for this faction, which would then turn on 
the diplomados, according to Mola. 121 
Mola did not speculate on this issue. Cebreiros did not hide his 
hostility to the alleged privileges of the diplomados. After Azana 
became war minister, the staff diploma was required 
for 
118 CLE 1931, No. 513. 
119 Cebreiros, pp. 225-6. 
120 CLE 1932, No. 506 (article 6 and transitory arrangement No. 3). 
121 Mola, pp. 971-2. 
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appointments in the General Staff. However, Cebreiros rejected the 
idea that staff graduates deserved to monopolize these 
appointments, because, according to him, the former's professional 
expertise was not (indeed never had been) worthy of such a 
right. 122 Rejecting an officer of proven ability for a general 
staff post because he had not taken formal staff training for it 
would perhaps be unfair. But such possible unfairness is hardly 
the best argument to lambast - as Cebreiros does - the 
professional quality of the staff graduates as a whole. 
The soundness of the reforms of 1927-1932 is proved by the fact 
that most of them were adopted after 1939. Officer candidates 
would take basic officer training in the restored General Military 
Academy and specialist training in the arm academy; the diplomados 
would graduate in the Staff College (Escuela de Estado Mayor); 
specialist engineers of ordnance and construction (who formed a 
separate corps thenceforth) would be trained in a military 
technical college (Escuela Politecnica Superior del Ejercito); 
passing a course of proficiency for field grade would be necessary 
before promotion to the rank of major; and attendance at a new war 
college (Escuela Superior del Ejercito) became a requirement for 
promotion to general officer rank. 123 
The reform of military education was an issue directly affecting 
corporate interests within the officer corps, and since the 
defence of these interests was one of the main reasons for the 
involvement of the military in politics, it was inevitable that, 
in turn, political factors weighed on the decisions about military 
education. Primo de Rivera's organization of military education 
was essentially sound. Common training in the same academy 
122 Cebreiros, pp. 150-2. 
123 Historia fuerzas armadas, IV. 257-8, IV. 260-5, IV. 276-9, V. 61-2. 
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provided to the future officers much of the mutual trust and 
understanding needed for inter-arms cooperation. On the other 
hand, since training factory managers and ordnance specialists is 
not the primary role of a military academy, it was a sensible 
arrangement to set up a separate centre to satisfy those officers 
with a technical bent. 
Unfortunately, Primo de Rivera's opponents tended to see only 
political partisanship behind the 1927 reform (and, to the extent 
that the dictator used military policy as a way to bolster his 
regime, they had a point). Therefore, when Primo de Rivera fell, 
his reform soon followed him, because politics prevailed over 
professional usefulness. An exception of sorts was the ; abolition 
of the staff corps: a step implied in the creation of the EESM 
which was formally taken by the republican government. 
Azana's reform was certainly a step back in relation to basic 
officer training, but it at least avoided the fragmentation 
existing before 1927. On the other hand, it took practical 
measures to raise the educational level of the officer corps from 
entrance into the academies to promotion to general officer rank. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the republican reform cannot be 
assessed since no officer candidate who entered the military 
academies after 1932 had joined the officer corps when the Civil 
War broke out. The officers who were commissioned under the 
Second 
Republic came from the General Military Academy, 
belonged to 
ancillary corps (e. g. legal and medical officers) or were 
subtenientes promoted by Gil Robles. This 
last group also was 
mainly responsible for the increase in size of 
the officer corps 
from 1932 to 1936 (the 1936 army yearbook recorded 2,997 officers 
more than in the 1932 issue). 
124 Finally, as happened to Primo de 
124 Salas Larrazäbal, `Reformas de Azafia', VI. 80-1. 
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Rivera, Azana was often criticized on the basis of political 
assessments (the alleged anti-military purposes behind his reform) 
rather than as a result of sober professional analysis. 
229 
6. - DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION, 
1916-1936. 
The First World War (1914-1918) brought about significant 
changes in warfare, which forced all the armies involved to work 
out new military doctrines. The Spanish army was a spectator of 
that major conflict and had to cope with the new professional 
developments after 1918.1 After looking at the Spanish army's 
reactions to the First World War and to its own experience in 
Morocco in the 1910s, this chapter will survey two significant 
issues of the 1918-1936 period: the development of a new 
operational doctrine (embodied in the 1925 field service 
regulations) and the introduction of a new model major unit (the 
composite brigade). 
1. The debate on the lessons of the First World War. 
a) The new face of battle in Spanish professional literature. 
Unlike the armies of the major European powers, the Spanish army 
did not follow the evolution of warfare through actual fighting 
experience in the First World War. 2 Nevertheless, the War Ministry 
made an effort to gather information on the professional aspects 
of the war. One way to do this was through military observers, a 
role played by the Spanish military attaches in the belligerent 
countries and commissioners sent for this purpose. Several 
commissions of Spanish observers visited the fighting armies at 
the invitation of their respective governments. Some renowned 
1 Scholarship on the evolution of warfare from 1914 to the late 1930s has focused on the 
developments in the First World War and on mechanization after 1918. For an overview of the 
1914-1918 period, see Strachan, pp. 130-49; and G. D. Sheffield, `Blitzkrieg and Attrition: 
Land 
Operations in Europe 1919-45', in Colin McInnes and G. D. Sheffield (eds. ), Warfare in the 
Twentieth Century. Theory and Practice (London, 1988), pp. 51-64. The discussion of some 
contemporary professional issues in the Spanish military has been surveyed 
briefly in Alpert, 
Reforma militar, pp. 68-71,74-81. 
2 Although Spain was a neutral country, most officers were germanöf los (Germanophile) because 
they admired the German military prowess and sympathised with the authoritarian 
tinges of 
Wilhelmine Germany: Boyd, Praetorian Politics, pp. 45-6. 
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essayists (e. g. General Burguete, Captain de la Gändara) were 
among the officers chosen for these appointments. In 1917, two 
commissions of observers visited the German army and another one 
was sent to the Austro-Hungarian army, whereas a permanent 
commission was set up in France after November 1914 and three 
commissions visited the British army (one in 1916 and two in 
1917) .3 
These investigations were reflected in the professional 
literature. The War Ministry created a journal (La Guerra y su 
preparaciön) in 1916, to be edited and published by the General 
Staff. Its main sources were the military attaches' reports from 
the belligerent countries and, to a lesser extent, abridged 
versions of memoranda written by the observers sent to the war 
fronts. 4 Since this writer has found almost no other records on 
this subject in the military archives he had access to, La Guerra 
y su preparaciön and other professional journals provide most 
evidence on the reactions within the Spanish military with regard 
to the changes in warfare in the period 1914-1918. 
Luis Fernandez Espana, an infantry colonel and editor of 
Estudios Militares, recognized in early 1915 the increase in the 
use of field fortifications and in infantry and artillery fire 
power as outstanding features of the conflict. However, 
he saw the 
stagnation of operations on the Western Front as a 
temporary 
pause, mainly due to the exhaustion of the armies. 
Thus, according 
to Fernandez Espana, the absence of mobile warfare was a result of 
the belligerents' desire to rest, not of an inability to undertake 
offensives. 5 Although the shape of military operations 
had changed 
3 Fernando Redondo Diaz, `Los observadores militares espanoles en la Primera 
Guerra Mundial', 
RHM, XXIX, 59 (July-December 1985), pp. 199-208. 
4 Ibid., pp. 198-9. 
5 Luis Fernandez Espana, `Orientaciones alrededor de la guerra de hoy', EM, 
XXXIV, 1 (January- 
June 1915), pp. 70-1,131-3. 
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much from the pre-war expectations, many Spanish military 
essayists kept interpreting the former according to the accepted 
terms of the latter. Thus, Colonel Bands wrote in 1916: `[WJe have 
never doubted that in the current [war] there would be a 
confirmation of the eternal principles which have ruled all the 
campaigns and given victory to the great captains. '6 
A sector of the military was unwilling to accept the changes 
that technology (i. e. the material, non-human factor) had caused 
in the face of battle. A student at the War College, Captain 
Anaya, recognized by 1916 that fire power, in forcing armies to 
dig successive lines of trenches, had brought about a halt to 
manoeuvre warfare. But he also maintained that men remained the 
basic factor due to the increase of the armies' numerical 
strength, which was necessary to break through the enemy front. ' 
Even the counter-measures forced by the increased fire power were 
explained as the triumph of human initiative: `[E]xperience has 
told us that man has beaten materiel ... and he has beaten it 
because, in putting the means of his intelligence and will to work 
in the service of his self-preservation, he has deduced the 
absolute need of underground warfare... '8 
But such an attitude, although widespread, did not apply to all 
the military essayists. Major-General Marva made very lucid 
remarks about the increased dehumanization and material nature of 
war by early 1916: 
[The current war is] on the technical side the rule of 
6 `[N]unca hemos dudado de que en la actual se verian confirmados los etemos principios que han 
regido en todas las campanas, y que han dado e1 triunfo a los Grandes Capitanes. ' Carlos Banüs, 
`La estrategia en la guerra moderna', MI, V, Special issue (January 1916), p. 183. 
Francisco Anaya Ruiz, `De la guerra mundial. Impresiones hispanofilas', RTIC, XXVI, 1 
(January-June 1916), pp. 412-4,457. 
8 `[L]a experiencia nos ha dicho que el hombre ha vencido al material... y lo ha vencido, porque, 
poniendo en funcion los resortes de su inteligencia y voluntad al servicio 
de su propia 
conservacic n, dedujo la necesidad de la guerra subterranea... ' Enrique Albert, `La Infanterfa en 
la 
Gran Guerra', MI, VII, 75 (April 1918), pp. 288. 
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the machine; on the side of art, the drowning of inspiration; on the tactical side, the diminished 
importance of manoeuvre; on the strategic side, the 
enlargement of the stage to encompass the entire planet. 
The drama is earning in magnitude what it loses in 
gallantry; the sense of destruction grows sharper and 
victory comes through the mechanical accumulation of battalions and devices. Success does not surrender to the bayonet but to the missile; not to the most skillful formation but to the highest explosive; rather than man, it is due to industry and money. 9 
Nonetheless, shrewd contemporary minds understood that this 
change in the features of battle had not affected all the levels 
of warfare. Major Goded, one of the ablest officers of the staff 
corps, pointed out in early 1918 the need to study all the 
theatres of operations, instead of focusing on the Western Front. 
There had been no simultaneous and prolonged stagnation over all 
the fronts, except for short periods; the defensive was chosen on 
one front to move the mass of manoeuvre to the other and wage a 
more mobile war there; the battles of the Eastern Front and the 
Isonzo (Caporetto) proved that breakthroughs were still possible. 
Therefore tactical doctrine and the means of warfare were what had 
changed after 1914.10 
b) Bayonet diehards, Morocco and the need for new tactics. 
For those fond of the traditional, morale-based, pre-war values, 
9 `[E]n lo tecnico, la soberania de la maquina; en lo artistico, el ahogo de la inspiraciön; en lo 
täctico, amenguada la importancia de la maniobra; en lo estrategico, el agigantamiento del 
escenario sobre toda la faz del planeta. 
El drama va ganando en magnitud to que pierde en gallardia; el sentido de la destrucciön se 
agudiza y se vence, no tanto por las felices combinaciones del genio, como por el mecänico 
amontonamiento de batallones y artefactos. El exito no se rinde a la bayoneta, sino al proyectil; no 
a la mäs häbil formaciön, sino al mas alto explosivo; mäs que al hombre, debese a la industria y al 
dinero. ' Jose Marva y Mayer, `Algo sobre la guerra actual', MI, V, Special issue (January 1916), 
pp. 457-8. 
i*o Manuel Goded y Llopis, `Campania de invasion de Servia en 1915', LGP, III, 4 (April 1918), pp. 
368-72. Searching for lessons in the Eastern Front was also proposed in Francisco del Rosal, `La 
trinchera en la actual guerra', MI, VI, 71 (December 1917), pp. 492-3. Commissioned in the 
infantry, Goded (1882-1936) joined the staff corps in 1905; he pursued an outstanding career in 
Morocco, where he became chief of staff of the Army of Africa; he was army general inspector 
under the right-wing republican cabinets; he joined his command of the Balearic Islands to the 
1936 military uprising and flew to Barcelona, where he was captured, court-martialed and shot 
after the rebel defeat there. 
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the essence of infantry fighting remained allegedly the same: a 
vigorous bayonet attack. The bayonet certainly had produced 
psychological effects on the battlefield before the First World 
War, and the British army lectured their troops on the Western 
Front on this weapon's virtues for the sake of morale . 
11 But many 
in the Spanish military seem to have interpreted the rhetoric on 
this weapon in too literal a way. For instance, the military 
attache in Vienna, Major Fernandez de Villa-Abrile, summed up his 
report on the Austrian-Hungarian infantry assault procedures this 
way in April 1916: '[Q]uick and resolute leaps, small volume of 
fire and a lot of heart, the ultimate argument is the bayonet; the 
latter, as usual, is what writes the last word on the breast of 
the conquered! '12 
The battle was conceived as a clash of fighting spirits, in 
which technology had no place. Worse, it could be a negative 
factor for the fighting man's morale. Even an essayist encouraging 
a higher number of machine guns in the infantry units concluded 
that infantry had `proven that, despite the progress of firearms, 
the bayonet... still is what settles the fiercest fighting and 
preserves unharmed... their renown as queen of battles. '13 Another 
critic of the increasing role of ordnance in tactics was Brigadier 
Burguete, who wrote in 1917 that `the main weapon is the heart and 
[the latter] is proven by marching forward; instinct must drag 
11 V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815-1960 (London, 1982), p. 35; 
for a mocking view of the British army's lectures on the bayonet, see the remembrances of 
Siegfried Sassoon, quoted in John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (London, 1987), 
pp. 126-7. 
12 `[S]altos räpidos y decididos, poco fuego y macho corazön, la razön suprema es la bayoneta; 
fella, coma siempre, es la que escribe la ültima palabra en el pecho del vencido! ' Respuestas a las 
14 preguntas de la circular del E. M. C. de 19 febrero ultimo, 18 April 1916, AGMS 2/4/153. 
Fernandez de Villa-Abrile (1878-1946) was GOC 2nd Division (Seville) in July 1936; arrested by 
the rebel officers because of his loyalty to the government, he was discharged from the service in 
late 1936; a court-martial sentenced him later to six years' imprisonment. 
13 `[D]emostrado que, a despecho del progreso de las armas de fuego, la bayoneta... sigue siendo la 
que resuelve los combates mäs encarnizados y conservando incölume, por lo tanto, el renombre de 
reina de las batallas. ' Juan Genova, `Las armas automäticas modernas', MI, V, Special issue 
(January 1916), p. 350. 
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[the soldier] to thrust the bayonet in the enemy's breast. '14 
Since the machine could not beat the spirit, there was no reason 
for the introduction of new weaponry. Quite the contrary: 
[P]oisoned in spirit and stunned in 
wrong idea that `the machine is all 
nothing', [some people] look to the m, 
remedy and turn the infantry into a 
coolies carrying... a thousand devices, of 
[whose only effect is] the disappearance 
creating another [false infantry] which 
the name of this arm... 15 
mind with the 
and the man, 
achine for the 
collection of 
occasional use 
of infantry by 
only preserves 
This view seems to have been widespread within the army, and 
quite probably even survived the war. Despite the experiences of 
the previous three years, an officer still lamented by 1918 that 
the infantryman had to carry equipment such as gas masks, hand 
grenades and so on, because `victory lies in the point of the 
bayonet. ' 16 
It is noteworthy that, by contrast with these views which 
opposed specialization within the infantry, the cavalry seemed to 
consider specialization as a solution for their survival. The 
cavalry, deprived by the new features of warfare of its 
traditional role, tried to remain an independent arm through a 
transformation into a sort of maid of all work combining the 
fighting procedures of the infantry and the cavalry. According to 
Major Dolla, this new model cavalry had to include machine guns, 
cyclists, motorized riflemen, and sappers. 
'? Another essayist 
proposed the organization of a `heavy' cavalry trained and 
equipped for foot and trench fighting; although 
fighting beside 
14 `[E]1 arma principal es el corazön y... se prueba avanzando; el 
instinto ha de arrastrarle a clavar 
la bayoneta en el pecho del enemigo. ' Ricardo Burguete, La ciencia militar ante 
la guerra europea. 
Su evoluciön y transformacion hasta el presente y el porvenir 
(Barcelona, 1917), p. 503. 
15 `[E]nvenenado el espiritu y aturdida la mente con la erronea idea 
de que "la mäquina lo es todo 
y ei hombre nada"... buscan en la mäquina el remedio, y convierten a 
la infanteria en un conjunto 
de companias de colies portadoras de... mil ingenios, de use ocasional.... 
la desapariciön de la 
infanteria, creando otra, que solo tiene de tal el nombre... ' ibid., pp. 
473-4. 
16 `[L]a victoria estä en la punts de la bayoneta. ' Antonio Vera 
Salas, `Impresiones de un curso de 
tiro en Valdemoro', MI, VII, 83 (December 1918), p. 442. 
17 Angel Dolla, `La caballeria en la guerra actual', MI, V, Special issue 
(January 1916), p. 222-3. 
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the infantry most of the time, they would not become mounted 
infantry because they would allegedly be able to ride and fight 
with the traditional cavalry elan when the opportunity arose. '8 
However, this essayist gave no details about how this cavalry's 
mounts were supposed to follow their riders closely enough on the 
battlefield to allow them to charge in time. 
In contrast with the views mentioned above, a number of officers 
did understand the changing nature of the battlefield, in a 
partial way at least. Captain Epifanio Gascuena, who had 
elaborated on the willingness to accept great losses in the 
offensive by the time the war broke out, admitted in May 1915 that 
fire power had reduced fighting to the two arms (infantry and 
artillery) whose tactics depended on it; even more, victory could 
be achieved with less blood lost by relying on artillery fire. 
Thus fighting was to depend on the close liaison and cooperation 
of both arms. 19 Another essayist reckoned that extended periods of 
static fighting along fortified fronts had become a feature of 
regular warfare. Since fire power was the essential factor in this 
kind of warfare, the automatic rifle would be a necessary weapon 
for infantry besides the machine gun. 20 
The Spanish military experience in Morocco during the 
1910s 
displayed to the most thoughtful minds of the army the need to 
adapt tactics to the increased fire power, even in a colonial war 
against an irregular enemy. Captain Gascuena deplored 
the careless 
procedures used by the Spanish forces. Commanders were 
too eager 
to go into action and move forward. This meant sometimes 
that the 
18 Pedro Pablo Corral, `Estudio sobre el empleo de la Caballeria en la guerra moderna', 
LGP, III, 
12 (December 1918), p. 651. 
19 Epifanio Gascuena, `La Artilleria es hoy el Arma hermana de la Infanteria', 
MI, IV, 41 (May 
1915), pp. 424-8. 
20 Enrique Iniesta, `Ideas sobre la influencia de la actual guerra europea en el moderno arte 
de 
combate', MI, V, 51 (April 1916), pp. 207,210. 
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selection of emplacements for the artillery was neglected, and 
that the artillery were not given enough time to provide effective 
fire support. 21 The artillery corps historian Vigön, moreover, 
points out that artillery fire during an operation was not 
coordinated by a single command: the artillery units were divided 
into penny packets and scattered among the field columns, thus 
losing much of their effectiveness. 22 Gascuena urged his 
colleagues, either fighting in Morocco or training at home, to 
take more account of the time needed by the artillery to go into 
action and provide effective fire support. And the officers at the 
headquarters should also restrain their impulses to ride to the 
firing line to the detriment of their main duties in the 
23 coordination of operations. 
General Berenguer, the ablest colonial soldier of the Spanish 
army at that time, emphasized the need for tactical changes in a 
book based on his Moroccan experiences and published in 1918. 
Berenguer stated that the Spanish infantry had to replace the 
thick skirmishing line used hitherto with a thinner one. Front 
line stretches of small tactical value could even be left 
unoccupied whenever they could be covered by fire from the 
neighbouring ones. Thus the number of troops used in the front 
line (and therefore exposed to becoming casualties) would be 
24 smaller . 
Machine guns played a conspicuous role in the new tactics 
21 Epifanio Gascuena, `El enlace de las armas con aplicaciön al estudio täctico de una campana 
moderna', EM, XXXV, 2 (July-December 1916), p. 119. 
22 Vigön, Artilleria espanola, III. 183. 
23 Gascuefla, `El enlace de las armas', p. 119. 
24 Dämaso Berenguer, La guerra en Marruecos (ensayo de una ada taciön täctica) 
(Madrid, 1918), 
pp. 100-1. Graduated at the General Military Academy and commissioned 
in the cavalry, 
Berenguer (1871-1947) fought in Cuba; service in Morocco (1909-1915) speeded up his career 
(he 
rose from lieutenant-colonel to major-general in nine years); 
he organized the first unit of 
regulares in 1911; high commissioner in Morocco (1919-1922), 
he was later court-martialed under 
charges of negligence leading to the disaster of Annual but Primo 
de Rivera pardoned him in 1924. 
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envisaged by Berenguer, since they were well suited to cover a 
discontinuous front line with a smaller strength. Moreover, the 
machine gun delivered effective infantry fire power at ranges at 
which the riflemen's fire did not, and therefore it made tangible 
the Spanish army's technological superiority over the Moroccan 
bands. Machine guns should be under the control of basic fighting 
units, and only in exceptional cases should their command be 
assumed by higher headquarters. 25 Indeed there was an official 
awareness of the importance of the machine gun, since the scale of 
machine guns in the units fighting in Morocco was increased in 
1919: a machine gun company (four machine guns) was created within 
every infantry battalion, as well as in every regimental group of 
regulares; the cavalry regiments received a six-machine gun 
squadron, and each district command was allocated a heavy machine 
2 gun company (twelve machine guns) .6 
Nonetheless, Berenguer, in his own account of his campaigns, 
admitted that the Spanish army's official tactical doctrines were 
outdated by 1919 due to the evolution of warfare during the First 
World War. There were no official regulations for the use of 
automatic firearms in the front line, of large masses of artillery 
under a single command, or of aircraft as an offensive weapon and 
a tool for intelligence gathering. 27 
2. The search for a new Spanish military doctrine, 
1919-1936_ 
a) Coping with a new way of warfare. 
After the guns fell silent in Europe, military essayists started 
to assess how far warfare had been transformed 
during the 
conflict. A section of the Spanish military saw the 
increased 
25 Ibid., pp. 101-2,107-8. 
26 Servicio Histörico Militar, Campanas de Marruecos, III. 55 fn 28. 
27 Dämaso Berenguer, Campanas en el Rif y Yebala, 2 vol. (Madrid, 1948), I. 250-1. 
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reliance on materiel as a form of decay of the military art; such 
a reliance, coupled with the massive use of manpower, would 
allegedly lead to a stagnation similar to the Western Front. For 
instance, a regular contributor to the cavalry corps journal 
criticized the mass armies which had led to an unnecessary 
prolongation of war and its subsequent social disturbances; 
moreover, small nations had been wrong in aping the `nation in 
arms' doctrine, since this would never make good their imbalance 
in relation to the major powers. 28 
However, the French army, which became the model to be imitated 
due to its final victory in 1918, was to found its post-war 
doctrine on the predominance of fire power over manoeuvre. 29 A 
consequence, which was not unnoticed in Spain, was that the French 
tactical regulations were virtually to take for granted that a 
future war would again see fortified fronts. 3° In 1921, Captain 
Maquieira, who was against the slavish imitation of the French 
doctrine, deplored such thinking. It fostered a defensive 
mentality (such as that which got hold of the French by 1917, 
according to Maquieira) which could not be dispelled by envisaging 
limited counter-offensives. Moreover, carrying out these counter- 
offensives required substantial superiority of military means. 
31 
Maquieira seems to suggest in this last point that the Spanish 
army's poverty of material resources was another reason not to 
follow the French doctrine too closely. 
Curiously, the military attache in France, Colonel Garcia 
Benitez, interpreted the French army's first post-war regulations 
28 A., `La posiciön del Ejercito freute a las ensenanzas de la guerra mundial', 
MC, IV, 31 (January 
1919), pp. 50-1. 
29 Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 74-5; Robert Allan Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster. 
The 
Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, 1985), pp. 
74-5,91-3. 
30 A., `La doctrina francesa acerca de la Caballerla', MC, V, 51 (September 1920), p. 
175. 
31 Enrique Maquieira, `Ideas francesas sobre la ofensiva', MI, X, 113 (June 
1921), pp. 402-6. 
239 
as a return to the principles prevailing on the eve of the First 
World War. The stalemate of the Western Front had only been due to 
a massive accumulation of material resources by the belligerents. 
No material factor alone but the arrival of the American troops 
finally broke the balance of strength. As a result, Garcia Benitez 
stated, the French army was discarding principles such as `the 
artillery conquers, the infantry occupy' and returning to those of 
the pre-war period. 32 Scholarship on the French post-war doctrine 
shows that the views of Colonel Garcia Benitez were wishful 
thinking, which reflected discomfort about the new realities of 
33 warfare . 
Though, as will be shown later, the French army doctrine was the 
main guideline, some professional articles leave no doubt that 
ideas on the predominance of human-related factors in warfare 
still had force in sections of the Spanish military, though they 
were not so publicised as before. In the period 1919-1920, the 
cavalry corps journal echoed them through one of its most regular 
contributors. This essayist asserted the value of the 
`psychological' principles of warfare, unaffected by technological 
change, and argued that tactical doctrine could not depend on the 
number and quality of new weapons: `[W]e shall ask once more if it 
is appropriate to build a whole system on so fragile a foundation 
as that of the semi-portable weapons. '34 He considered machine 
guns, mortars and hand grenades as weapons of occasional use, and 
deplored the creation of sub-units of specialist troops in the 
fighting arms. 35 
32 Juan Garcia Benitez, `Regresiön hacia los principios anteriores a la guerra, en el Ejercito 
frances', LGP, VI, 2 (February 1921), pp. 124-5. 
33 Doughty, pp. 73-5,79-81,84-5. 
34 '[P]reguntaremos una vez mäs si es pertinente el edificar todo un sistema sobre un cimiento tan 
deleznable como es el de las armas semiportatiles. ' A., `LPotencia 
de fuego o potencia de 
maniobra? ', MC, V, 48 (June 1920), p. 42. 
35A 
, 
To ocasional y lo permanente. La aviaci6n y la disimulaci6n', 
MC, IV, 32 (February 1919), 
p. 102; and `Contra las tendencias modemistas', MC, IV, 
35 (May 1919), p. 363. 
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Such thinking met a forceful reply in an article by Major de la 
Gändara in 1921. He criticized the attitudes of that section of 
the military which deplored the adoption of new weaponry for the 
infantry by alleging that this step would restrain mobility and 
would lead to the death of manoeuvre warfare. De la Gändara 
thought that these views were retrogressive and based on armchair 
theoretical reflection, which reasoned as if the clock should be 
put back half a century. On the contrary, the empirical experience 
of warfare had forced the armies to adopt new weapons in order to 
cope with innovations unknown twenty-five years before, such as 
the automatic machine gun. If the progress of technology and 
industry had brought obstacles to mobility in warfare, this same 
progress was providing the means to overcome the obstacles through 
the automobile transport and, maybe, in the not too distant 
future, the aircraft. 36 De la Gändara admitted that these 
retrograde essayists had a point in arguing that a repetition of 
the Western Front's conditions would be scarcely possible. But 
even if future conflicts did not create long fortified fronts, the 
weaker armies would resort to the advantages of the ground and to 
the tactical use of field fortifications to compensate for their 
numerical or material inferiority. 37 
The present writer's survey of the Spanish professional 
literature has not found significant evidence of anti-machine 
thinking after the early 1920s. Probably the fact 
that French- 
inspired doctrine was officially adopted by the 
Spanish army 
inhibited the essayists from expressing their views openly, 
when 
the latter were not totally in tune, so to speak, with 
official 
thinking. Moreover, there was the undeniable fact 
that the French 
36 Luis de la Gändara, `El material y el armamento de la infanteria en 
la guerra mondial', MI, X, 
115 (August 1921), pp. 106-9. 
37 Luis de la Gändara, `El material y el armamento de la infanteria en 
la guerra mondial', MI, X, 
116 (September 1921), pp. 177-8. 
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army had won the war. But the idea of the importance of morale 
certainly remained alive. In the early 1930s, a Major Rodriguez 
Urbano emphasized the importance of morale in terms echoing the 
literature before 1914: `The combat is nothing but a struggle 
between two wills. Above. . . all the armaments, always shines that 
intense, purifying flame, where selfishness and ambitions are 
melted down, which is called military morale and which decides 
victory. '38 It would be an interesting subject for further 
research (which is beyond this thesis' scope) to find out to what 
extent this kind of thinking became linked to non-democratic )< 
political ideologies by that date (1933). Rodriguez Urbano 
complained that, notwithstanding the value of the spirit, `the 
power of numbers triumphs in the elections, and this same power 
prevails, or tries to prevail, in the social struggles which turn 
more virulent every day... '. In his eyes, almost every social 
class seemed to be dominated by a materialistic attitude to 
life. 39 
Finally, mention must be made of the issue, brought out by 
Alpert, of the Spanish military's alleged interest in German army 
organization and doctrine in the 1928-1931 period. 40 This writer 
thinks that there is not enough evidence to reach such a 
conclusion, since Alpert's argument is based on the contributions 
to professional journals of Lieutenant-colonel Juan Beigbeder, the 
military attache in Berlin. Certainly Beigbeder took a keen 
interest in increasing the contacts with the German army. 
41 The 
38 `El combate no es sino una luchs entre dos voluntades. Por encima... 
de todos los armamentos, 
luce siempre esa llama intensa, purificadora, donde se funden egoismos y ambiciones, que se 
llama 
moral military que es la que determina el triunfo. ' [Francisco] Rodriguez Urbano, 
Polemica sobre 
el combate (ensayo de una or anizaciön military (Barcelona, 1933), p. 
156. 
39 ' [T)riunfa la fuerza del numero en los comicios, y esta misma fuerza se impone, o pretende 
imponerse, en las luchas sociales que cada dia adquieren mayor virulencia... ' Ibid., p. 
83. 
40 Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 69-71. 
41 See the correspondence between Beigbeder and the War Ministry 
filed in AGMS 2/3/55. Juan 
Beigbeder (1888-1957) was commissioned as an engineer officer and 
later entered the staff corps; 
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letter which Beigbeder sent on 19 March 1928 to General Gutierrez 
Chaume (head of the general staff section of the General 
Directorate for Preparation of Field Operations) is very clear 
about the former's views. Beigbeder encouraged the Spanish 
military authorities to send hand-picked officers to Germany, 
where they would get first hand knowledge and experience of German 
doctrine in artillery, infantry, and gas warfare and technology 
(several months later Beigbeder also thought it possible to send 
one officer to the clandestine staff course). Beigbeder thought 
that the German practice was interesting because the German 
military had to work under conditions of under-equipment. The 
Versailles Treaty prevented Germany from having several kinds of 
ordnance (heavy artillery, tanks, aircraft), but these restraints 
were overcome by efforts of imagination, hard work and study. The 
Spanish army, with its traditional shortage of resources, could 
learn from the German ways in order to improve its professional 
proficiency. 42 Beigbeder's correspondence is interesting, but it 
only shows an individual effort. There is no further evidence 
available which points to a widespread desire for closer 
cooperation with the German military. 
b) The making of the 1925 regulations. 
The Spanish army renewed its operations in Morocco after 
1918 
with an outdated tactical doctrine which took 
little account of 
the fire power of modern weapons. On the other 
hand, the Moroccan 
natives learnt to use field fortifications and, after 
1921, they 
had the artillery captured in the Spanish 
defeat in Annual. Thus 
the Spanish artillery had to improvise 
in this theatre of 
after long service in Morocco, he was military attache 
in Paris and Berlin; a lieutenant-colonel in 
1936, Beigbeder joined the nationalist side when the Civil War 
broke out and became high 
commissar in Spanish Morocco (1936-1939); he was 
foreign affairs minister (1939-40) and retired 
with general officer rank and devoted himself to scholarship and 
business. 
42 Beigbeder to Gutierrez Chaume, 19 March 1928 and 6 July 1928, 
AGMS 2/3/55. 
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operations a new doctrine for the use of their fire power. The 
Spanish artillery was now required to destroy enemy field 
fortifications and deliver counter-battery fire, in addition to 
the previous missions of support to the columns and punitive 
shelling. This enlarged role led to the creation of artillery 
groups under a single artillery commander, separate from the 
batteries attached to the field columns. The artillery group, 
called masa de artilleria (artillery mass), would carry out 
overall fire plans for each operation (and, when needed, would 
deliver additional artillery fire power to individual field 
columns). 43 This was one of the few practical lessons the Spanish 
army learnt from its Moroccan campaigns, which, according to the 
introduction of the General Staff's new guidelines on tactical 
doctrine (Doctrina para el empleo täctico de las Armas y los 
Servicios), published in 1924, had not provided many useful 
4 lessons .4 
The Spanish army took the French army as its major source of 
military doctrine in the 1920s. This writer's research has only 
found one piece of official documentary evidence on this issue, 
but it goes far to prove that the French post-war doctrine weighed 
heavily on the Spanish one. This piece of evidence is a report on 
a paper written by the head of the General Staff's Sixth Section 
(military doctrine) for the working group on the reform of the 
field service regulations. 
45 The report is undated, but it was 
written after February 1923, when the General 
Staff was 
reorganized and the 6th Section took charge of 
doctrinal 
affairs. 46 
43 Berenguer, Campanas, pp. 251-2; Vigön, Artilleria espanola, III. 188. 
44Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Doctrina Para el empleo täctico de las Armas y 
los Servicios 
(1924), p. 3. 
as Doctrina Täctica. Informe del Cor de EM Jefe de la 2a [sic] Secciön que llevarä a 
la Ponencia 
designada por la Junta de Jefes del Centro, n. d., AGMS 2/8/535. 
46 The General Staff was reorganized on 21 February 1923: CIE 
1923, No. 67. 
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The General Staff had set up a working group (ponencia) which 
had to survey the main features of modern warfare, and the role, 
equipment and organization of the fighting arms. The group, in 
turn, asked the head of the Sixth Section, Colonel Enrique Ruiz- 
Fornells, for guidelines on which it could base its work. Ruiz- 
Fornells submitted a paper which actually outlined a draft of 
regulations for the employment of major units, that is, an outline 
of new field service regulations. The report of the working group 
on Ruiz-Fornells' paper praised the soundness of its doctrinal 
foundations and pointed out that this soundness was backed by its 
coincidence with the doctrine of the French army, the highest 
contemporary authority in warfare matters, according to the 
working group. Such a doctrine had been set forth, among other 
French regulations, in the 1921 instructions on the employment of 
major units. 47 Nonetheless, as will be shown later, the working 
group made some remarks on whether certain aspects were applicable 
in the Spanish case. 
The Spanish doctrine for military operations finally took shape 
in the Reglamento para el empleo täctico de las Grandes Unidades 
(Regulations for the Tactical Employment of Major Units) of 1925. 
Although this writer has not found any evidence on this point, it 
is rather plausible that the regulations' contents were influenced 
by those of Ruiz-Fornells's paper. The contemporary essayists 
certainly had small doubt about the Gallic influence. Major Roman 
Lopez Muniz went so far as to state that the Spanish regulations 
were essentially a copy of the French ones of 1921.48 Major 
Ungria, a staff corps officer and one of the editors of the 1925 
regulations, felt no shame about copying foreign models: 
'[The 
4' Doctrina Tactica. Infornne del Cor de EM Jefe de la 2a [sic] Secciön que llevard a la Ponencia 
designada por la Junta de Jefes del Centro, n. d., pp. i-ü, AGMS 
2/8/535. 
48 R[oman] Lopez Muniz, Los procedimientos täcticos vigentes en la actualidad (ensayo de tdctica 
com arada (Toledo, 1929), p. 6. 
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regulations] are copies because they must be a copy; are we to 
fall into the naive aim of inventing tactics of our own alone? ' 
Ungria based his assertion on Spain's dependence on foreign 
military technology and on the fact that the Spanish army's 
professional experience during the last hundred years had been 
limited to colonial and civil wars. 44 
c) Fire power and manoeuvre in the 1925 regulations. 
The 1925 regulations stated that modern weapons had radically 
increased the importance of fire power: `Fire plays a prevailing 
role in combat. . . Fire superiority is the best protection against 
the enemy's elements of destruction. ' 50 Although tactics were 
based on the combination of fire and movement, movement seemed 
implicitly subordinated to fire. The regulations stated that the 
effect of fire made movement easier, and the latter should be 
carried out by echelons; every echelon would move forward covered 
by the fire of the others until reaching the objective. 51 The aim 
of manoeuvre would be to achieve a material advantage over the 
enemy forces by inflicting physical damage in order to weaken 
their morale until they gave up. Moral superiority was a 
consequence of the material superiority, and it must not be 
reckoned as a direct effect of a manoeuvre which had just 
started. 
52 
49 'Copias son, porque copias deben ser; Les que vamos a caer en la inocente aspiraciön de inventar 
una täctica exclusivamente nuestra? ' Jose Ungria, `Los estudios täcticos en la Escuela de Guerra 
de Paris', LGP, X, 5 (May 1925), p. 518. Commissioned in the infantry, Ungria (1890-1968) 
joined the staff corps in 1915; he studied at the French war college and was liaison officer in the 
French-Spanish campaign in Morocco; he served as military attache in France, Belgium, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands; a lieutenant-colonel in 1936, he escaped from the republican 
territory and was appointed head of the nationalist army's intelligence and security service 
from 
late 1937 to the end of the war. 
50 'El fuego desempefia en el combate un papel preponderante... La superioridad de fuego es la 
mejor proteccion contra los elementos de destrucciön del enemigo. ' Estado 
Mayor Central del 
Ejercito, Reglamento Para el empleo täctico de las Grandes Unidades (1925) (hereafter quoted as 
RGU 1925), article 111. 
s' Ibid., article 111. 
52 Ibid., article 136. 
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As a result, the superiority of the offensive was no longer 
asserted as an axiom and, as an essayist remarked, the Spanish 
doctrine was rather impartial on this point. 53 The emphasis was 
put now on the goal of the battle, and the ways to achieve it 
would depend on the circumstances. The purpose of battle, 
according to the 1925 regulations, was `the moral and physical 
destruction of the enemy; if [the battle] is offensive, by driving 
him out of his positions, by breaking his lines, and by pursuing 
him...; if it is defensive, by driving his attacks back and by 
thwarting his advance. '54 
The prevalence of fire was echoed in minor tactics, most 
significantly in those of the infantry. Lopez Muniz pointed out 
how the firing regulations for small arms gave a pre-eminent role 
in combat to fire power. In order to neutralize the enemy fire 
during the attack, the advancing infantry had to achieve fire 
superiority. No attack would be successful without being prepared 
and accompanied by fire supremacy over the enemy. This key idea of 
supremacy had to be applied in the offensive (fire power which 
moves forward) and in the defence (fire power which holds UP) . 
55 
Since fire supremacy should always accompany the infantry's 
advance, it was logical that the infantry units had increased 
after the First World War the scale of means to deliver fire power 
of their own, from heavy machine guns to mortars and rifle 
grenades. 56 
However, this last development was not liked in the late 1910s 
53 Emilio Pardo, `La doctrina militar espafiola despues de la guerra de 1914-1918', MI, XXV, 3 
(March 1936), p. 96. 
54 ' [L]a destrucciön moral y material del adversario; si es offensiva, arrojändole de sus posiciones, 
rompiendo sus lineas y persiguiendole...; si es defensiva, rechazando sus ataques e impidiendo su 
avance. ' RGU 1925, article 106. 
55 Lopez Muniz, Procedimientos täcticos, pp. 11-2. 
56 Emilio Pardo, `La doctrina militar espafiola despues de la guerra de 1914-1918', Ml, XXV, 1 
(January 1936), p. 26. 
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and the early 1920s by some sections of the military, as has been 
shown above. The working group surveying the lessons of 
contemporary warfare sided with these sections. Ruiz-Fornells' 
paper had proposed the inclusion of infantry guns and mortars at 
battalion level and a specialist platoon of assault sappers 
(equipped with flame-throwers, demolition charges and smoke 
grenades) in the infantry regiment's establishment. The working 
group expressed its disagreement because it reckoned that all this 
ordnance would limit the mobility of the infantry regiment in so 
hilly a country as Spain. The working group actually thought that 
infantry guns could not stay for long in very advanced 
emplacements without being exposed to enemy fire. Moreover, all 
that infantry support weaponry would be operated better by 
artillerymen and engineers (and even so, artillery pieces in an 
accompanying role would find difficulties in supporting the 
5 infantry from the most advanced echelon). 7 For different reasons, 
the artillery, the fire power arm par excellence, was also 
displeased by this development. An editorial review in the 
artillery journal of the French regulations of 1921 (which 
influenced the Spanish ones of 1925) pointed out that these 
regulations, although giving great preponderance to the artillery, 
stressed too much the importance of the aircraft, infantry heavy 
weapons, and the tank. In view of the Spanish military's 58 
background of corporate rivalries, the displeasure of the 
artillerymen is not surprising. 
d) The cooperation of infantry and artillery. 
With hindsight, the artillery's early dissatisfaction with the 
57 Doctrina Täctica. Informe del Cor de EM Jefe de la 2a [sic] Secciön que llevarä a la Ponencia 
designada por la Junta de Jefes del Centro, n. d., pp. xiv, xviii-xix, AGMS 2/8/535. 
58 `L'Instruction provisoire sur l'emploie tactique des grandes unites', MA, LXXVII, 2 
(July- 
December 1922), p. 511. 
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French regulations turns out to be paradoxical, for the 1925 
regulations were to put the Spanish army in contact with the 
concept of `the methodical battle', which was the foundation of 
French military doctrine after 1918. The conduct of the methodical 
battle was characterized by the overall subordination of 
operations to the action of the artillery. This, in turn, required 
a specific style of command and control. 59 As the 1925 regulations 
put it, the artillery `will have all the more facility to 
concentrate their fire the more centralized is their command. '60 
How did the Spanish army cope with the problems of the methodical 
battle? 
The idea that modern combat after the First World War was to 
turn into a slow and methodical affair, due to the extended use of 
strong field fortifications and massive fire power (especially 
artillery fire) had already been set forth by a Captain Garcia 
61 Nieto in the infantry journal in early 1921. The 1925 
regulations exalted the status of the infantry as the queen of the 
battlefield, `the arm whose success all the other ones must work 
for. '62 However, the regulations later made a more sober 
assessment of the capacities of this arm; its capacity to hold 
ground unsupported was recognized, but `its limited offensive 
capacity requires the support.. . of the artillery, with which 
it 
has to keep so close a liaison that both actually form a whole. '63 
In practice, the division's infantry commanders had no authority 
over the artillery, which was controlled by the divisional 
commander; centralization was the rule for the tactical employment 
59 Doughty, pp. 74-5,81-3,99-100. 
60 `[T]endril tanta mäs facilidad para concentrar sus fuegos cuanto mäs centralizado este su 
mando. ' RGU 1925, article 48. 
61 Carlos Garcia Nieto, `Comentarios tacticos', MI, X, 110 (March 1921), pp. 146-7. 
62 `[E]1 arma en provecho de la cual deben actuar todas las demäs. ' RGU 
1925, art 29. 
63 '[S]u limitada capacidad ofensiva exige el apoyo... de la Artilleria, con la que ha de enlazar de 
modo tan intimo que en realidad, formen un todo ünico. ' RGU 1925, article 
32. 
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of the artillery. 64 Only in exceptional cases would artillery 
troops be attached temporarily to an infantry unit and 
subordinated to the latter' s commander. 65 
General Ruiz-Fornells justified the need for such centralization 
in 1935. If the divisional artillery was divided among the 
infantry units, the latter would be embarrassed in their 
movements, according to Ruiz-Fornells. There would be no unity in 
the division's manoeuvre because every subordinate commander would 
carry out the plan according to his personal judgement; thus 
targets of tactical importance for the division as a whole could 
be left unshelled. And the divisional commander would be unable to 
shift fire power all around the division's operational area. 66 
On the other hand, Major Lopez Muniz reckoned that the result of 
this procedure was inflexibility in the divisional tactics, which 
were hardly suitable for mobile warfare. Moreover, centralization 
of tactical command and artillery support at the divisional 
headquarters made it difficult to organize and use combined arms 
task forces at brigade and regimental level. 67 He summed up the 
official doctrine and his own judgement on it this way: 
Centralization, artillery support not under the 
infantry's command, narrow combat fronts, systematic 
deployment of units, stereotyped procedures, absence of 
manoeuvre, overall rigidity and too detailed orders are 
the features [of] our current tactical rules. 
68 
The working of a centralized procedure of command such as that 
adopted by the French army after 1918 also put a heavy burden on 
64 Lopez Muniz, Procedimientos täcticos, pp. 53-8. 
65 RGU 1925, article 48. 
66 Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, `Datos para la decision', MI, XXIV, 6 (June 1935), p. 180. 
67 R[oman] Lopez Muniz, Comentarios sobre doctrina, organizaciön y procedimientos täcticos. 
(Notas orientadas al estudio del problema en nuestro Ejercito) (Toledo, 1934), pp. 
140-2,155-6. 
68 `Centraliza. ciön, artilleria de apoyo pero no bajo el mando de la infanteria, frentes estrechos de 
combate, encuadramiento sistemätico de las unidades, procedimientos metodizados, carencia 
de 
maniobra, rigidez del conjunto y ordenes excesivamente minuciosas son 
las caracteristicas [... ] 
nuestras normas täcticas vigentes. ' Ibid., p. 146. 
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the staff officers at headquarters. 69 The reluctance to delegate 
authority to lower command levels meant long, excessively detailed 
processes for the preparation of operational orders. The Spanish 
1925 regulations suffered from this malady, as was eloquently 
revealed by General Rodriguez del Barrio. He was the director of 
the manoeuvres carried out in the autumn of 1932 in the Pisuerga 
River area, which simulated operations at army corps level. In his 
report on the manoeuvres, Rodriguez del Barrio wrote that the 
strict application of the 1925 regulations caused insoluble 
situations; as he pointed out, this was not surprising because the 
regulations were based on the French ones and these had been born 
from a kind of warfare where time and material means were 
70 plentiful . 
Article 164 of the 1925 regulations, which dealt with the 
functions of the army corps commander, described the preparation 
of orders for offensive operations. The orders had to include a 
detailed study of the terrain (incorporating maps); then copies of 
the orders had to be made and delivered to the subordinate 
commanders. The experience of the manoeuvres had shown that the 
drafting of orders required eight hours at least; the copying 
process required a roughly similar time, and the delivery added 
several hours more. The total time consumed in the procedure was a 
full day. Since the commander could not make decisions before 
knowing all the events of the day and being informed by his 
intelligence officer, the work could not start until late 
afternoon. This meant that the orders could not be issued to the 
divisions and the brigades early next morning (and even when they 
69 Doughty, p. 110. 
70 [Angel Rodriguez del Barrio], Grandes Maniobras del Pisuerga. Otono de 1932. Memoria 
(Madrid, 1932), p. 8. Rodriguez del Barrio was one of the general inspectors of the army under the 
Second Republic; involved in the early stages of the military conspiracy of 1936, he became 
estranged later because of illness and died before the uprising. 
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were issued, the headquarters of these units then had to prepare 
their own orders). Therefore, Rodriguez del Barrio wrote that new 
procedures (faster, more realistic and better adapted to mobile 
warfare) should replace those in force in the regulations. 71 
A point to consider is why the Spanish military were not aware 
of the flaws of the regulations until 1932, about six years after 
their official sanction. The only plausible explanation is the 
absence of large-scale manoeuvres or headquarters exercises to 
test the new doctrine. Shortage of resources is only a partial 
reason for this; professional neglect emerges as a stronger 
reason, if the reader bears in mind the German case (in which 
professional commitment and ingenuity mitigated material 
shortcomings). 
3. Towards a new model of major unit. 
a) The infantry division in the Spanish army, 1914-1931. 
According to the Spanish army doctrine, a major unit was a. 
formation whose organization included troops of all arms and service 
corps . 
72 The standing major unit of the Spanish army in the early 
twentieth century was the infantry division. By 1914, its 
theoretical organization was roughly similar in combat troops to 
that of the French infantry division. Both had four infantry 
regiments (of three battalions each), grouped into two brigades, 
as well as one field artillery regiment, one or two engineer 
companies, and service support units. The main differences were 
that the Spanish division had one cavalry regiment (the French 
unit had only one squadron) and it was also stronger in engineers 
and service support units than the French division. This was 
due 
to the fact that the army corps was the major operational unit in 
71 Ibid., pp. 106-7. 
72 RGU 1925, article 92. 
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France, whereas in the Spanish army the division was considered as 
a self-contained unit with a capacity to operate on its own. 73 
The developments of the First World war led the belligerent 
European armies to reduce the number of infantry units and 
increase the artillery strength within the division. By 1918, the 
standard infantry division had nine infantry battalions (divided 
into three regiments or brigades) and a larger scale of cannon. 74 
This organization, called triangular (ternaria in the Spanish 
military vocabulary), was to be the norm after the conflict was 
over. 
The 1918 army reform act introduced a new organization of the 
Spanish infantry division. This major unit, the main one in 
peacetime and whose organization would remain intact in case of 
war, was called division orgänica (organized or standing 
division). Its organization included two infantry brigades (of two 
regiments each) and a field artillery brigade (one light regiment 
and one heavy regiment). The divisional organization also included 
a sapper battalion, a signals (telegraph) company, a lighting 
platoon, and service units of undetermined strength; when 
necessary, the standing division would receive cavalry troops 
detached from the cavalry divisions. Sixteen standing divisions 
were to be be formed. 75 It is clear that the Spanish army only 
partly followed the foreign experience. The strength of the 
divisional artillery was hugely increased, but there was no cut in 
infantry troops. 
Moreover, its organization in brigades and regiments remained 
7' Emilio Pardo, `La doctrina militar espanola despues de la guerra de 1914-1918', MI, XXV, 2 
(February 1936), p. 58. 
74 Pardo, `La doctrina militar espafiola' (February 1936), pp. 58-9; G[regorio] Lopez Muniz (ed. ), 
Diccionario enciclopedico de la guerra, 13 vol. (Madrid, 1958), V. 709-11; Bidwell and Graham, 
pp. 139,303 n 134. 
75 CLE 1918, No 169 (annexe 1,3rd basis, items a] and b]). 
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binary (binaria), that is, based on sub-groupings of two combat 
units. This kind of organization has the disadvantage of limiting 
the commanding officer's capacity to intervene in the conduct of 
an operation through the employment of a third (or reserve) 
manoeuvre force. Such forces at the disposal of a commander either 
do not exist if both sub-groupings are employed, or must be 
improvised with troops detached from the standing sub-groupings 
(thus weakening the parent units). 76 
An issue discussed in the professional literature was whether 
the 1918 divisional organization was too cumbersome and inflexible 
for the conditions of warfare in Spanish territory. Considering 
the experience of the First World War, a regular contributor to 
the cavalry journal stated in 1919 that the weaker army in a 
conflict had to combine the use of fortified zones fixing the 
enemy with the manoeuvres of the field forces in order not to be 
enticed into an early decisive battle. Given her limited military 
power, Spain had to set up fortified zones along her borders 
(after the French model) to channel enemy offensives, and organize 
her army in small, very mobile, strategic units (not larger than a 
77 
division). 
These points were in line with the views set forth a few years 
later by the working group on the reform of the field service 
regulations. The group reckoned that Spain, unless she went to war 
beside powerful allies, could only fight to defend her own 
territory. Such a defence would be based on Spain's mountainous 
land border. Given the features of the ground, which made the 
maintenance of extended fortified fronts impossible, a repetition 
of the trenches of the Western Front was impractical; on 
the 
76 G. Lopez Muniz, III. 17. 




contrary, there was a need for a mobile army, capable of driving 
back the enemy advance, which would proceed from a limited number 
of mountain passes. Within this context, the working group's 
report noted that the scale of animal transport for the 1918 
division was set at more than 6,000 horses and mules; such a 
figure was revealing, according to the working group, of the large 
amounts of divisional equipment and of the difficulties that the 
latter presented to the division's mobility. 78 
Despite this view, the official policy did not introduce major 
changes in the infantry division's organization during the 1920s. 
The 1925 regulations defined the standing division as the major 
tactical unit and the basis of the organization of the field 
forces. It was the only major unit organized in peacetime, since 
forces above the divisional level would be organized, in general, 
at the start of the conflict. 79 The 1925 regulations also followed 
in essence the model of 1918. The organization of the 1925 
division oradnica was as follows: 
-Two infantry brigades (two regiments each). 
-Cavalry squadron (detached from an army corps cavalry 
regiment in wartime). 




-Signals group (including a wireless platoon). 
-Aerostatic platoon (one balloon). 
-Air observation flight. 
80 
The French influence certainly weighed to some extent on the 
divisional organization. But the French infantry divisions, 
though 
they were strong in artillery, were leaner units 
due to the 
triangular organization of their infantry. Nonetheless, 
the French 
non-motorized infantry division of 1929-1930 was not 
very supple 
78 Doctrina Tdctica. Informe del Cor de EM Jefe de la 2a [sic] Secciön que llevarä a 
la Ponencia 
designada por la Junta de Jefes del Centro, n. d., pp. iv-vii, AGMS 2/8/535. 
79 RGU 1925, article 94. 
80 Ibid., article 95. 
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and not very mobile. 81 Therefore, the Spanish 1925 division, a 
heavier unit . with a dozen infantry battalions and six artillery 
grupos (battalions), was even less adequate for manoeuvre warfare. 
Thus there was a paradoxical situation. The Spanish military, 
which disliked doctrines envisaging continuous fronts to be 
overcome through fire power-based procedures, kept a divisional 
organization which fitted better with that kind of warfare. 
The present writer's research has not found evidence on the 
reasons for keeping the binary organization, but an official 
source suggests that those responsible for developing new military 
doctrine disliked the idea of cutting the infantry strength within 
the division. 82 Perhaps another reason could be a desire to 
provide the division with strong reserves of its own. 83 
b) A Spanish organizational innovation: the composite brigade. 
The reforms of Azana, so far-reaching in other matters, left 
the divisional organization of 1925 intact. This reflected the 
fact that Azana's interest in military policy lay essentially in 
the political aspects, not the professional ones. 
84 But the lack 
of reforms in 1931 does not mean that there was uncritical 
acceptance of the current model of division. The organization of 
the infantry division after the 1925 regulations was reckoned 
unsuitable for the Spanish theatres of operations by a number of 
essayists, who stood for more flexible models of major unit. There 
were two lines of thinking on this issue. 
One of these lines advocated the introduction of the triangular 
division. Major Martinez de Campos proposed divisions of nine 
81 Doughty, p. 104. 
82 Doctrina Täctica. Informe del Cor de EM Jefe de la 2a [sic] Secciön que llevarä a la Ponencia 
designada por la Junta de Jefes del Centro, n. d., p. xxiii, AGMS 2/8/535. 
83 Pardo, `La doctrina militar espafiola' (February 1936), p. 59. 
84CLE 1931, No. 282. See also Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 300-8. 
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infantry battalions and a proportionate scale of artillery; these 
smaller divisions would give the army corps more operational 
flexibility. 85 But the triangular division had other advantages, 
besides the operational ones. Cebreiros expressed his amazement 
because Azana, who liked imitating French military models, had not 
substituted the triangular division for the Spanish binary 
organization. He argued that a triangular organization of the 
infantry, based on smaller peacetime battalions (three active 
companies), would allow Spain to keep sixteen standing divisions 
(432 companies or 144 battalions) with only a slight increase on 
the actual strength of the eight divisions and the mountain troops 
(360 companies making 64 line and 8 mountain battalions) envisaged 
by Azana's reform. Thus it would not have been necessary to bring 
about the premature retirement of many infantry officers. For 
Cebreiros, all this was explained by Azana's desire to expel 
politically unreliable personnel. 86 
Most essayists, however, advocated the so-called `composite 
brigade' (brigada mixta) as the basic major unit of the Spanish 
army. The composite brigade bore some resemblance to the German 
army's contemporary concept of kampfgruppen. The kampfgruppe was a 
combined arms task force organized within the division in order to 
carry out a specific mission. The kampfgruppen were the 
organizational expression of the German doctrine, which imbued 
commanders at all levels with the need for de-centralization and 
initiative on the battlefield. This also meant that the manoeuvre 
forces should be accompanied by their own support artillery, which 
would be able to attend immediately to the infantry's calls. 
87 The 
Spanish composite brigade provided full combat support to a group 
85 Carlos Martinez de Campos, `Reflexiones practicables sobre asuntos artilleros', MA, LXXXIV, 
2 (July-December 1929), pp. 223-4. 
86 Cebreiros, pp. 43-7. 
87 Lopez Muniz, Procedimientos täcticos, p. 58; Doughty, pp. 105,109-10. 
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of infantry battalions (the manoeuvre force) as well; the 
difference lay in the fact that support and manoeuvre troops were 
grouped in a standing unit, whereas the kampfgruppen were formed 
ad hoc with divisional assets. 
In the same year that the regulations for the employment of 
major units were published (1925), Lieutenant-colonel Rodriguez 
Carril, of the artillery corps, wrote on the disadvantages of 
keeping single-arm brigades within the division. The infantry 
brigades introduced a rather unnecessary partition of the 
divisional front, which complicated the liaison between artillery 
and infantry, while the artillery brigade fostered in this arm a 
sense of separation to the detriment of the infantry's needs. The 
solution was to create self-sufficient composite brigades as 
divisional combined arms sub-units. 8e 
A staff corps officer, Lieutenant-colonel Norena, pointed out in 
1933 that the composite brigade gave a greater flexibility to the 
binary division. This was very useful in a country like Spain, 
whose rugged territory was unfavourable for the movement of large 
major units; thus the smaller ones should keep a certain capacity 
to operate with autonomy. The composite brigade also made training 
in liaison and cooperation between arms easier. Finally, the 
composite brigade allowed the division to assume the functions of 
the army corps as an operational manoeuvre unit (capable of 
undertaking actions of some amplitude in time and space with 
homogeneous units), an arrangement which fitted better with the 
conditions of the Spanish army. 89 
88 Vicente Rodriguez Carril, `Empleo täctico de la Artilleria Divisionaria', MA, LXXX, 2 (July- 
December 1925), pp. 255-6. 
89 Carlos Norena, `Nuestra Division como unidad de maniobra', Revista de Estudios Militares 
(hereafter REM), II, 1 (January-June 1933), pp. 331-4. Norena (1889-1936) had studied in the 
French war college; unassigned when the war broke out, the government ordered him to rejoin the 
service; he refused to obey and professed his moral support for the rebel cause, though he had not 
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According to Ramon Salas Larrazäbal (who sadly does not mention 
his source), one of the army's general inspectorates proposed the 
theoretical organization for a composite brigade in 1934. It had 
two infantry regiments, a artillery regiment, a group of cavalry 
squadrons, a group of engineers, a signals company, and service 
units; the brigade's strength was about 12,500 troops. 90 If 
compared with the contemporary models outside Spain, this unit can 
be classified rather as a light division. 91 
On the other hand, the concept of the composite brigade was not 
alien to the Spanish army's military experience. Major Martinez de 
Campos, in a lecture at the staff college in May 1933, remarked 
that the composite brigade was no more than the formal 
organization of the traditional combined arms column; this had 
become the main operational unit of the Spanish army during its 
recent campaigns, which saw at their start the dismemberment of 
larger and heavier units, such as the standing divisions. 92 
Actually the Spanish army created the first composite brigade 
(under the form of a specialist unit) with the reorganization of 
1931. A decree of 25 May 1931 included the organization of two 
brand new mountain infantry brigades. Every brigade was made up of 
two half brigades (two mountain infantry battalions each), a 
mountain artillery regiment (two howitzer battalions), a sapper 
been involved in the conspiracy; he was court-martialed and shot despite the French government's 
pleas for mercy; after the war, his name would be permanently at the top of the list of lieutenant- 
colonels of the staff corps. 
9° Ramon Salas Larrazäbal, Historia del Eiercito Popular de la Rep_üblica, 4 vol. (Madrid, 1973), I. 
556-7 n 36. 
91 Actually the Italian infantry division on the eve of the Second World War was reduced to two 
infantry regiments as well; however this smaller size did not bring any improvement in practice: 
G. Lopez Muniz, V. 715-7. 
92 Carlos Martinez de Campos, El problema orgdnico de las glandes unidades desde el punto de 
vista täctico-terrestre (Madrid, 1933), p. 10. Other articles standing for the composite 
brigade: 
Secundino Serrano, `La Brigada, unidad de combinaciön de acciones de Infanteria y Artilleria', 
REM, II, 2 (July-December 1933), pp. 97-109; Jose Luis Soraluce, `La maniobra en las distintas 
unidades de la Division', REM, II, 2 (July-December 1933), pp. 191-6; Jose 
Garcia Colomo, `Las 
Brigadas con capacidad de combate autönomo', REM, H, 2 (July-December 1933), pp. 259-69. 
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company and a signals group. 93 
The idea that major units smaller than the division were 
suitable for many of the foreseeable theatres of operations in 
Spanish territory gained strength by the mid-1930s, and was 
embodied in the expansion of outfits for mountain warfare. Under 
Gil Robles' term of office as war minister, a new composite 
mountain brigade was created in September 1935; the brigade 
included two infantry half brigades (two battalions each), at 
least one mountain artillery group, and a composite sapper and 
signals company. 94 At the same time, two of the standing divisions 
were to be fully transformed into mountain units (so it seems 
logical that their brigades became composite brigades); another 
two divisions would turn one of their infantry brigades, one 
howitzer battalion and a corresponding slice of service troops 
into mountain units. 95 
It is clear, after the evidence shown above, that the Spanish 
army was shaping by the mid-1930s a force structure in which new 
self-contained major units smaller than the divisiones orgänicas 
loomed large. If the reorganizations of 1935 had been implemented, 
almost half of the standing infantry brigades would have been 
based on the composite model by the late 1930s. Such a development 
went against the 1925 regulations, which did not contemplate 
combined arms tactics below the divisional level. Actually they 
stated that the divisional artillery commander was also the 
commanding officer of the division's artillery units. 
96 This was 
at odds with the organization of composite 
brigades, which 
93 CLE 1931, No. 282. 
94 The first official reference to the brigade in June 1935 mentioned a single artillery 
battalion, 
while the official announcement of creation spoke of an artillery regiment: 
DOMG, 30 June 1935 
and 27 September 1935. 
9s Ibid., 27 September 1935. 
96 RGU 1925, article 25. 
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required de-centralizing the command of divisional artillery in 
order to allow the brigades to operate with a degree of 
independence. 
The conclusion is that there was a gap between the official 
doctrine and a strong current of professional thinking which 
envisaged Spain's future conflicts in terms of mobile warfare. The 
former was more suitable for methodical operations along fortified 
fronts and for armies in which the division was the smallest 
standing combined arms unit. The latter encouraged the 
organization of self-contained units below the divisional level 
because they fitted better with the Spanish army's operational 
experience and the theatres of operations in Spanish territory. 
Overall, there was an uneasy relationship at this period between 
the tradition of imitation of the French model, which seems to 
have weighed much on official decision-making circles, and the 
thinking of a part (at least) of the military. Thus a stream of 
essayists urged the army to develop a military doctrine and 
organization of its own, better adapted to the features of the 
Spanish territory, while the official spheres displayed a penchant 




7. - THE SPANISH 
1918-1936. 
MILITARY AND MECHANIZATION, 
This chapter sums up and discusses the attitudes of the Spanish 
military towards armour and mechanized warfare from the end of the 
First World War to the eve of the Spanish Civil War. After an 
account of the beginnings of the armoured force, this chapter will 
assess the weight of foreign doctrines (especially those of 
British theorists), and the organizational evolution of the 
Spanish armour and the doctrinal debate on mechanization in the 
decade before the Civil War. ' 
Before going on, it may be useful to point out the difference 
between two terms - motorization and mechanization - which, though 
often used indistinctly by the contemporary literature, had a 
different meaning. Motorization was defined as the substitution of 
the combustion engine for muscular effort in 
Mechanization was the use of armoured vehicles 
transport. 
(wheeled or 
tracked) for carrying troops and for fighting on the battlefield, 
to the detriment of foot and mounted units; moreover, mechanized 
units used motorization for their logistics and long range 
movements. Therefore, mechanization implied motorization, but 
motorization did not necessarily lead to mechanization. 2 
1. Mechanization in the Spanish army until 1926. 
a) The beginnings of Spanish armour, 1909-1922. 
The first tanks went into action in 1916, but before the First 
World War some authors had already speculated about the idea of a 
self-propelled armoured fighting device and the form this vehicle 
1 There is an extended literature dealing with mechanization and armoured warfare, and just a 
couple of titles will be mentioned here: Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg 
(London, 1976), 
and John Wheldon, Machine Age Armies (London, 1968). 
2 Enrique Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön y mecanizaciön del Ejercito (Toledo, 1935), pp. 7-8. Garcia 
Albors was appointed in the 2nd Infantry Tank Regiment in 1931-1934. 
2 62 
could adopt. 
3 The Spanish military can display a contribution to 
this pioneering thinking about armoured vehicles. Around 1912 a 
Lieutenant-colonel Emilio Gil Alvaro thought up an armoured device 
moving on helicoidal rollers, which he called `war chariot' . His 
design did not arouse interest and only a passing reference in a 
professional journal a few years later rescued it from oblivion. 4 
Nonetheless, about the same time, the Spanish army recognized the 
convenience of using armoured vehicles for some kinds of 
operations. The General Staff, in its conclusions about the 
Melilla campaign, recommended transforming motor vehicles for 
movement in hostile zones by equipping them with light armour and 
5 one machine gun. 
This writer's research has not found any evidence about how the 
Spanish army made the decision to acquire tanks. It is certain 
that such a decision was made before the end of the First World 
War, because the General Staff communicated to the War Ministry 
undersecretary on 22 October 1918 that the military attache in 
Paris, Colonel Garcia Benitez, had reported that the French 
government would give permission for handing over one Renault 
tank. 6 A few days later the head of the Artillery Section, General 
Sanz, informed Foreign Minister Dato that the Spanish ambassador in 
Paris must ask the French government for such permission; 
Sanz 
pointed out that King Alfonso XIII had stressed 
the urgency of 
carrying out the operation. 
7 
The French government gave its permission 
in early January 
3 For example, see T. H. E. Travers, `Future Warfare: 
H. G. Wells and British Military Theory, 
1895-1916', in Brian Bond and Ian Roy (eds. ), War and Society. 
A Yearbook of Military History 
(London, 1975), pp. 72-4. 
4 Ricardo Caballe, `El carro de asalto 6 tanque', MI, VII, 83 (December 
1918), p. 465. 
Estado Mayor Central, Ensenanzas del Rif, p. 196. 
6 Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Sexta Secciön to Subsecretaria 
del M° de la Guerra, 22 
October 1918, AGMS 2/1/67. 
Ministerio de la Guerra, Secciön de Artilleria to Ministro de 
Estado, 28 October 1918, AGMS 
2/l/67. 
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1919.8 The Spanish cabinet approved the purchase of the Renault 
tank in March 1919. The tank was delivered in May 1919, but there 
was a bureaucratic muddle which delayed the payment (the French 
embassy in Spain still demanded it in May 1923). 9 
The Renault tank underwent trials on the training grounds of 
Carabanchel in late June 1919. 
satisfactory by the Spanish 
commission, which recommended st 
tanks. 1° A decree authorized the 
purchase on 13 August 1919.11 
Its performance was reckoned 
army's ordnance experiences 
arting dealings to purchase ten 
War Ministry to carry out the 
While it tried to get French tanks, the Spanish army also looked 
for other suppliers. The military attache in London, Colonel Rich, 
reported in early October 1919 that his inquiry (ordered by the 
General Staff) about the British authorities' reaction to a 
request to acquire a light tank had not provided positive results. 
Nonetheless, Rich met with Winston Churchill (then British war 
minister) during a meal and the subject of tanks emerged during 
their conversation. Rich told him about the negative answer to his 
inquiry. Churchill said that he was ready to meet again with Rich 
and give support if the Spanish government retained its interest 
in British tanks. 12 
However, the Spanish efforts suffered a setback when Colonel 
Garcia Benitez reported in November 1919 that the Allies had 
8 Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Sexta Secci6n to Subsecretaria del M° de la Guerra, 15 
January 1919, AGMS 2/ 1 /67. 
9 Secciön de Artilleria, 2° Negociado, Nota para el Senor General, n. d., AGMS 2/1/67; [State 
Minister] Alba to [War Minister] Alcalä Zamora, 23 February 1923, AGMS 2/1/67; M. Barrail 
[French financial attache in Madrid] to General Hernando [head of the Artillery 
Section], ,9 May 
1923, AGMS 2/ 1 /67. 
10 Ministerio de la Guerra, Artilleria, Comisiön de experiencias, proyectos y comprobaciön del 
material de Guerra, Adquisiciön de 8 carros-ametralladora tipo Renault y 
dos carros-canön de 37, 
2 July 1919, AGMS 2/l/67. 
11 DOMG, 14 August 1919. 
12 Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Sexta Secciön to Subsecretaria, 7 November 1919, AGMS 
2/1/67. 
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decided not to supply some kinds of ordnance, such as tanks. '3 The 
Spanish army did not give up and, in late November 1919, the War 
Ministry ordered Lieutenant-colonel Perez Vidal, military attache 
in Washington, to gather information in order to purchase tanks 
and artillery tractors made in America. Perez Vidal contacted the 
American army and local manufacturers, but he had no success in 
his efforts . 
14 
Despite the obstacles, the Spanish army carried on looking for a 
supplier of armour, and its efforts were finally rewarded when it 
could at last buy tanks in France. A contract to purchase six 
Schneider tanks (armed with one 75 mm gun) was signed on 12 
September 1921, and was followed two days later by another 
contract concerning eleven Renault tanks. Both purchases were 
approved by the Spanish cabinet on 16 September 1921.15 
It was not clear for the Spanish military which corps armour 
should be assigned to. Given the Spanish army's background of 
corporate rivalries, it is not surprising that armour became 
another area of professional responsibility to fight for. For 
instance, Major Jevenois (an artilleryman) stated in 1921 that 
tanks were essentially accompanying artillery for the assault and, 
therefore, the artillery corps should take charge of 
their 
organization (as had been the case in France . 
16 
13 Ministerio de la Guerra, Subsecretaria, 5° Negociado to Secciön de Artilleria, 25 November 
1919, AGMS 2/l/67. 
14 Embajada de Espana en Washington, Agregado Militar to General 
Jefe de la Secciön de 
Artilleria, 29 December 1919, AGMS 2/1/39; Ministerio de Estado to Ministerio 
de la Guerra, 8 
January 1920, AGMS 2/l/39. 
15 The documents about these purchases are filed in AGMS 2/1/67. 
Technical data about both 
tanks was as follows: 
Model Weight Speed Armament Max. armour 
Crew 
(tonnes) (kmph) (mm) 
Renault FT- 17 6,7 7,7 1 37 mm gun or 16 
2 
1 machine gun 
Schneider M-16 13,5 6,7 1 75 mm gun and 11,4 
7 
2 machine guns 
Source: Javier de Mazarrasa, Los carros de combate en Espan (Madrid, 
1977), pp. 25-9. 
16 Pedro Jevenois, `Artilleria de acompanamiento. Nuevos materiales que 
la integran', MA, 
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A paper of the General Staff of early 1922 provides some 
information about this issue. 17 The paper assessed the idea of 
creating a separate tank service, which would get specialist 
personnel seconded from the corps of the army (this was the 
arrangement for the military air service). The artillery would 
provide gunners, machine gunners would come from the infantry, and 
the tanks would be driven by engineer corps' personnel. The 
command of armoured units would be performed by officers of these 
branches of the army and the staff corps. However, the paper gave 
an unfavourable opinion about this arrangement. The heavier tanks, 
armed with cannon, based much of their performance on fire power. 
Although the fire direction of these tanks' main armament was 
simple, it was logical that artillery officers were the most 
proficient for this task. In turn, the lighter tanks, which had to 
cooperate closely with the infantry, would be much better 
commanded by officers of this arm, since they had the best 
knowledge of infantry tactics. Moreover, the machine gun had 
become a weapon of common use for all arms, and all the corps had 
personnel qualified to become tank drivers. 
Therefore, the paper discarded the grouping of all the armour 
under a single service in order to avoid the troubles of mixing 
personnel from different corps. It stood instead for sharing 
the 
responsibilities for tanks depending on the 
latter's 
characteristics and tactical missions. The heavy or 
breakthrough 
(ruptura) tanks should be under the command of 
the artillery 
corps, whereas the light tanks should be assigned 
to the infantry. 
Nonetheless, such a division of the tank 
force also made little 
sense. The paper stated that the light 
tanks' mission was the 
LXXVI, 1 (January-June 1921), pp. 104-5,245. 
17 Estado Mayor Central, la Secciön, Carros de asalto. Informe en expediente sobre el empleo 
de 
dichas armas de combate en nuestro ejercito, 2 February 1922, 
AGMS 2/1/67. 
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protection of the infantry from enemy fire during the assault, and 
the destruction of the passive and active means of resistance. The 
heavy tanks opened the way for the attacking forces through all 
kinds of ground, and were to destroy the strongest points of enemy 
resistance. This formulation of missions does not articulate any 
significant difference between the missions for both types of 
tanks. The only difference which can be deduced after reading the 
paper lies in each tank's main armament (the infantry tank was 
armed with machine guns or a small calibre gun, whereas the 
breakthrough tank carried a more powerful gun - up to 75mm 
calibre). 
The solution put forward by the General Staff's paper was the 
one adopted: the Spanish armour was divided into infantry and 
artillery tanks. It would have been more rational to put the 
tanks, given their similar missions in practice, under a single 
authority (either a new corps or one of the traditional ones) 
which would provide common training in tank weapons and mechanical 
matters. But corporate jealousies still weighed much in the early 
1920s, and a plausible explanation is that, for instance, 
artillery officers found it unpleasant to give up some of their 
technical responsibilities, to leave their corps for a new one, or 
even to be integrated temporarily with personnel of other corps in 
a same unit .. This last case had actually worked 
for Spanish 
military aviation, but then the aircraft was not seen as a 
threat 
to the corporate status of any of the branches of the army. 
b) Some early reactions. 
For some sections of the Spanish military the 
First World War 
seemed to stress the need, in future conflicts, 
for a mobile arm 
cooperating with motorized and cyclist 
infantry, artillery and 
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sappers. 18 The question was the nature of this mobile arm: should 
machines or horseflesh be its embodiment? 
Those who stood for the horse did not lack proofs endorsing the 
value of cavalry in contemporary warfare. Even on the Western 
Front, the British cavalry could show their mettle after the 
return of mobile warfare operations in 1918.19 The fact that the 
victors of 1918 used large numbers of tanks seemed not to be 
significant for those who were sceptical about armoured forces. 
Two officers attending a course at the French Ecole Euperieure de 
Guerre, Majors Segui and Martin, reached the conclusion that the 
tank was a very limited weapon whose usefulness for the Spanish 
army was almost nil. 20 
Others displayed a more positive - if conventional - attitude in 
relation to armour. The 1923 edition of a textbook widely used in 
the military academies defined tanks as armoured automobile 
machine guns or cannon which replaced artillery to suppress 
resistance after breaking into the enemy's positions; moreover, 
they could reduce or eliminate the need for a prolonged artillery 
preparation, thus favouring surprise. The text emphasized that 
tanks were an infantry weapon and as such had to be employed 
21 
according to infantry tactics. 
Major Jevenois saw no usefulness in tanks armed with machine 
guns only, since they had to be capable of destroying machine 
gun 
pillboxes and bunkers. According to Jevenois, 
light machine gun 
teams (which were more mobile on broken ground) or cavalry 
machine 
18 A., `Orientaciones de la Caballeria', MC, IV, 38 (August 1919), pp. 91-100. 
19 John Singleton, `Britain's Military Use of Horses 1914-1918', Past and 
Present, No. 139 (May 
1993), p. 192. 
20 Juan Segui and Jose Martin Prat, `Evoluciön del armamento 
de la infanterla francesa durante la 
gran guerra', LGP VI, 4 (April 1921), p. 253. 
21 J[ose] Villalba, Täctica de las tres Armas (Aviaciön y carros de asalto), 
3 vol. (Toledo, 1923), I. 
485-92. 
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gun sections carried on motorbikes with sidecar (which were faster 
on open, level ground) could substitute for the machine gun 
tank. 22 
It is noteworthy that a way to scorn the tank (as happened to 
early machine guns) was to deem it unsuitable for mobile war (the 
war par excellence) and more adequate for colonial operations 
only. 23 As late as 1927, a regular contributor to the cavalry 
journal still wrote: `It is possible that they [tanks] are useful 
sometimes, mainly in colonial wars, but battering rams and 
catapults can be useful as well and nobody thinks of unearthing 
these artefacts out of the pantheon in which they deservedly 
rest. ' 24 
c) First blood: Morocco, 1922-1926. 
The Renault and Schneider tanks were certainly bought for 
training purposes, since they were assigned to the Central Firing 
School (Madrid). But the War Ministry later changed its mind and 
decided to dispatch the newly born armoured force to the Spanish 
protectorate in Morocco in early 1922. On 6 March 1922, the War 
Ministry ordered the urgent dispatch of five Renault tanks from 
the ECT to Melilla, in addition to the six Renaults sent the day >( 
before . 
25 
The armour sent to Morocco was not an impressive force. 
26 The 
22 Jevenois, `Artilleria de acompanamiento... ', pp. 104-5. 
23 A., To ocasional y lo permanente... ', p. 102; `Los carros de asalto', MC, V, 43 (January 1920), 
pp. 3-12; and `Los carros de asalto', MC, V, 44 (February 1920), pp. 91-9. 
24 `Posible es que alguna vez sear ütiles, principalmente en guerras coloniales, pero tambien 
pueden serlo los arietes, catapultas... sin que a nadie se le ocurra desenterrar esos artefactos del 
panteon en que merecidamente reposan. ' A., `La guerra en el porvenir', MC, XII, 130 (April 
1927), p. 226. 
25 Ministerio de la Guerra to Capitän General [Madrid], 6 March 1922, AGMS 2/1/67. 
26 Brief accounts of their intervention can be found in Francisco Fernandez 
Mateos, Carros de 
combate y vehiculos acorazados en la historia de Espana (Madrid, 1986), pp. 
9-12,17; Francisco 
Marin, `Los carros de asalto espanoles en la campana de Marruecos', Defensa, 
XIII, 144 (April 
1990), pp. 62-7; and Francisco Marin, `La bateria de carros de asalto 
de artilleria (Espana, 1922)', 
Defensa, XIV, 156 (April 1991), pp. 60-4. 
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Spanish army fielded an infantry tank unit with eleven Renault FT- 
17s (Spain later purchased another six Renaults to replace lost 
tanks), and a battery of artillery tanks with six Schneider CA-1s. 
An article strongly recommending the use of armour in Morocco and 
published in the infantry journal a couple of months before the 
arrival of the tanks is noteworthy. Its author saw the tank as an 
impregnable mobile pillbox, capable of moving forward even through 
somewhat broken ground and overcoming points of concentrated 
resistance. The tanks would demoralize the Moors for sure. 27 
However, the reality was to dispel such hopes about the 
effectiveness of the tank in Morocco. 
The initial performance of the Spanish tanks was rather 
disappointing: in their first action two Renault tanks had to be 
abandoned because of damage by enemy fire and mechanical 
breakdowns. The lessons of the first combats were used by the 
Spanish army to develop a more careful use of its armour, whose 
performance was generally effective - though unspectacular - 
during the rest of the campaign. Actually this improvement 
encouraged the Spanish command to conceive a comparatively bold 
use of tanks during the landings in the bay of Alhucemas 
(September 1925) . The 
infantry tank unit, embarked on modified 
landing craft, would precede the assault troops in the first wave. 
However, tide conditions prevented the armour from landing on the 
28 first day. 
The colonial experience of armour does not seem to 
have been an 
outstanding success. Captain Guarner, who was 
to serve in the 
infantry tank unit for several months in 1925-1926, enumerated 
the 
mistakes made in the early period: using 
tanks in isolation as 
27 Luis Berenguer, `Facetas de la campana marroqui', MI, IX, 120 (January 
1920), pp. 76-7. 
28 Francisco Castrillo Mazeres, La aportacion de Espana al arte militar 
(Madrid, 1959), p. 52; 
Marin, `Carros de asalto espanoles... ', p. 64. 
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mobile blockhouses, too long periods in action (exceeding their 
nine hours' autonomy), inadequate reconnaissance, and losing 
contact with the infantry during the advance. Lack of experience 
doubtless contributed to these faults, which, on the other hand, 
were quite similar to those made by the French in their Moroccan 
protectorate, which points to an unsuitable doctrine. 29 The French 
army's experience in the Riff strengthened its tendency to use 
armour piecemeal. During the heyday of the campaign against Abd 
el-Krim the French used two tank battalions which were divided 
into independent companies and platoons to operate with the 
operations column s. 3o 
Therefore, it is not surprising that an essayist concluded that 
the Moroccan experience proved the need for a greater 
subordination of tanks to infantry, by using them as fire support 
for the lines of riflemen and under the cover of the latter. 31 An 
analyst of the campaign, Major Diaz de Villegas, also pointed out 
that, besides the tactical limitations, the poor road network in 
Morocco reduced the tank's strategic readiness; and, moreover, 
armoured trucks armed with machine guns were more effective for 
road patrol missions than tanks. Diaz de Villegas was reassured in 
his judgements by the similar views of French military 
essayists . 
32 
However, Guarner thought that armour could be employed in 
colonial warfare in more imaginative ways: it could be used for 
29 Vicente Guarner, `Carros de combate', Mii, XIII, 145 (February 1924), p. 101; Fernandez 
Mateos, p. 17. Guarner (1894-1981) was commissioned in the infantry and a staff diplomate; he 
served several months in the infantry tank unit of Morocco (1925-1926) and taught at the Infantry 
Academy; Guarner left the service in early 1936 and became senior police official in the 
Catalonian regional government; during the Civil War, he held senior staff appointments in the 
republican army on the Catalonian-Aragonese front. 
30 Doughty, pp. 87-8. 
31 Manuel de Pazos, `El ejercito colonial. Lo que dicta la experiencia', MI, XII, 142 (November 
1923), p. 326. 
32 Jose Diaz de Villegas, Lecciones de la experiencia. (Ensenanzas de las campanas de Marruecos) 
(Toledo, 1930), pp. 72-4. 
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assaults even in rough ground (if the enemy had no anti-tank 
weapons), long-range offensive reconnaissance (with supporting 
infantry), and line of communication protection (though it had to 
be used in numbers for this role) . 
33 An essayist of the 1930s, 
Lieutenant Garcia Albors, thought that irregular campaigns such as 
the last Spanish operations in Morocco (1926-1927) proved the 
benefits of increasing the level of motorization in the army. This 
required the building of roads and tracks, a costly task 
sometimes, but they made supply easier and allowed continual, 
methodical operations . 
39 
2. The influence of foreign thinking on mechanization. 
Beside its own experience in Morocco, foreign military thinking 
and experiences were another source of doctrine on mechanization 
for the Spanish army. Part of the knowledge came through the 
professional journals, of which the most interesting is La Guerra 
y su preparaciön. The articles in this journal on foreign 
experiences displayed at best a sceptical view on the future of 
mechanization. 35 
For instance, in an article about the manoeuvres of the British 
army in 1925, the editorial staff of La Guerra V su preparaciön 
acknowledged the technical improvement of the new Vickers 
tanks 
over those used in the First World War; therefore their main role 
could not be to support infantry, since they would 
lose the 
advantage of their greater mobility. The 
journal's staff deduced 
that they were to perform a reserve role first, and 
then they were 
to advance quickly to attack points of resistance 
or support 
mobile field forces. 
36 This article reveals signs of the 
`weapon 
33 Guarner, `Carros de combate', pp. 101-2. 
34 Garcia Albors, Motorizacion, pp. 117-24. 
35 Alpert, Reforma militar, pp. 72-4. 
36 `Las maniobras del Ejercito britanico', LGP, X, 4 (April 
1926), pp. 366. 
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of opportunity' concept. Despite' their technical improvement, 
which made easier their integration in manoeuvre warfare, tanks 
were not to intervene until a culminating point of fighting was 
reached by the traditional arms. Therefore this hints that the 
journal's editorial staff did not consider armour an integral part 
of the mobile field forces yet, though mobility was recognized as 
a major feature of the new tanks. 
Then there were the writings of the foreign essayists, though 
knowledge of them was limited. The British theorists Swinton, 
Fuller, Liddell Hart, Croft and Collins, and the American Edmunds, 
were deemed the leading supporters of mechanization, whereas the 
best known representatives of motorization were Generals Carron and 
Allehaut of the French army. The so-called motorization school was 
less radical and nearer to the thinking prevailing in most armies, 
which broadly followed the lessons deduced from operations on the 
Western Front during the First World War. But both schools agreed 
that future warfare would see motor mobile units able to strike 
precise, disabling blows which would end conflicts in the shortest 
time . 
31 
a) British thinking. 
Knowledge of British mechanization pioneers was very 
limited. 
Only J. F. C. Fuller raised enough interest to prompt the 
translation of some of his works (Training Soldiers 
for War, On 
Future Warfare, and Lectures on FSR III) 
before 1936.38 In 
general, their views were reckoned 
too radical. For example, 
Captain Ruiz de Toledo (who designed the 
first Spanish tank) was 
particularly sceptical about Fuller's 
theories of armoured forces 
forming `land fleets'. These modified 
too radically the 
37 Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, pp. 14-5. 
38 Alpert, Re -ma militar, pp. 71-2. 
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traditional features of battle consolidated during the First World 
War. According to Ruiz de Toledo, Fuller underrated the value of 
ground, which channels movement and provides protection and 
vantage points to observe and attack the enemy. The conquest and 
defence of these positions was what made the difference between 
sea and land warfare; armoured forces could conquer ground but 
were unable to hold it. Nonetheless, Ruiz de Toledo was no 
retrogressive thinker: on the contrary, he thought that infantry 
had to become as mobile as tanks to reach full effectiveness. 39 
Even Lieutenant Garcia Albors, who accepted a gradual increase 
of the mechanical factor in battle, warned against too radical 
mechanization because of the dangers of overconfidence in 
machines, which harmed morale by making it too dependent on the 
quality and/or quantity of ordnance. In other words, the theorists 
of mechanization were subject to the charge of leaving 
deliberately aside the human, morale-related factors. 40 
Only one essayist, a Major Montojo, displayed a relative 
sympathy towards the British theorists before 1936; his book's 
bibliography included the works of Fuller (On Future Warfare) and 
Liddell Hart (The Remaking of Modern Armies). Montojo argued that 
the enthusiasts of traditional cavalry, in stressing the few 
missions which seemed to be the raison d'etre of the contemporary 
regiments on horseback, actually underlined the latter's limited 
use in modern warfare. The problem was that cavalry officers 
thought as horsemen, instead of thinking of the mission of cavalry 
as the mobile fighting arm. If cavalrymen did the 
latter, they 
would seek to implement mechanization at any cost. For 
tanks were, 
according to Montojo, the modern version of 
heavy cavalry, to be 
39 Carlos Ruiz de Toledo, `El problema del carro de combate', MA, LX: XXIV, 1 (July-December 
1929), pp. 182-4,197. 
40 Garcia Albors, Motorizaci6n, pp. 169-71. 
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used en masse against weak points and lines of communication of 
the enemy, while the latter was pinned by infantry and artillery 
41 action. 
Fuller's and Liddell Hart's ideas on the role of infantry in 
mechanized warfare were criticised by Lieutenant Garcia Albors, 
who was an infantryman. Fuller envisaged `heavy' infantry on 
armoured carriers advancing with the tanks, and `light' infantry 
for security and garrison duties and fighting in rough ground; 
Liddell Hart reduced the infantry to a defensive role or offensive 
skirmishing missions. According to Garcia Albors, these theories 
led to an overspecialization, which deprived the infantry of their 
ability to fight whatever the ground and the situation. He 
accepted that the infantrymen had to be equipped with means which 
reduced their impedimenta and increased their mobility, but 
without introducing new categories. Garcia Albors reckoned light 
tracked armoured vehicles useful for carrying infantry support 
42 
weapons on the battlefield. 
To be fair with contemporary critics, and to see that they were 
not led by sheer conservatism, it is necessary to bear 
in mind 
that the doctrine of mechanization could not be totally 
implemented in Spain at that time. Even if the financial and 
industrial resources had been available, a mechanization of 
the 
Spanish army on a large scale would have been unlikely 
because of 
the geographical factor. J. F. C. Fuller 
himself recognized this in 
his prologue to the Spanish edition of Lectures on 
FSR III: 
If I had written this book for the Spanish army, 
I 
would have done it in a different way, 
because Spain's 
topography is different from that which we usually 
found 
in the British empire. From a topographical point of 
view, Spain is an unique country, 
divided, as it is, by 
41 Vicente Montojo, Ejercito modemo (Madrid, 1930), pp. 148-50. 
42 Enrique Garcia Albbors, Carros de Combate, 3 vol. (Toledo, 1932-1933), 
III. 560; Garcia Albors, 
Motorizacion, pp. 185-6. 
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a series of almost parallel mountain chains from west to east. In my view, such a country is ideal to combine the 
methods of muscular and mechanized warfare; for the 
older weapons can occupy the mountains, while the newer ones can go over the plains. 93 
Only published sources until 1936 have been surveyed for this 
research on the issue of foreign influence. However, a later 
source makes very plausible that Fuller's ideas raised the 
interest of Vicente Rojo (an infantry officer and co-publisher of 
the Spanish edition of Lectures on FSR III), who became the 
republican army's chief of general staff in the Civil War. In late 
May 1938 the republican army undertook an offensive on the 
Catalonian front. Since he was the operational mastermind in the 
republican general staff, Rojo was almost surely in charge of the 
offensive's planning. 44 According to the plan, an army corps 
should exploit the initial breakthrough on motor transport. This 
army corps' commander, Lieutenant-colonel Tagüena, wrote in his 
memoirs that he and his army corps' senior officers were given 
before the operation copies of one of Fuller's works in order to 
get the essentials of that kind of warfare. 45 Tagüena does not 
mention the title of the book, but given Rojo's involvement in the 
43 'Si hubiese escrito este libro para el Ejercito espanol, le hubiera escrito de diferente manera, 
porque la topografia de Espana es diferente de la que generalmente encontramos en el Imperio 
britänico. Desde el punto de vista topogräfico, Espana es un pais ünico, compartimentado, como se 
encuentra, de oeste a este por una serie de cadenas montanosas casi paralelas. Semejante pals, a mi 
juicio, resulta ideal para una combinaciön de los procedimientos de guerra muscular y de guerra 
mecanizada; porque mientras las armas mäs antiguas pueden ocupar las montanas, las mäs nuevas 
pueden recorrer los Llanos. ' J. F. C. Fuller, Qperaciones entre fuerzas mecanizadas. Comentarios al 
F. S. R. III (Toledo, 1933), p. 11. 
44 Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La batalla del Ebro (Madrid, 1978), p. 28. Vicente Rojo (1894- 
1966) was commissioned in the infantry (1914), served in Morocco in the late 1910s, taught in the 
Infantry Academy in the 1920s, got the staff diploma in the early 1930s, and was a co-publisher of 
a successful series of professional literature (1928-1936); despite being conservative-minded, he 
served the republican government during the Civil War. As chief of staff in the defence of Madrid 
in late 1936 and chief of army general staff after May 1937, Rojo planned the main republican 
offensives; exiled after 1939, he taught at the Bolivian staff college from 1943 to the mid-1950s. 
45 Manuel Tagüena Lacorte, Testimonio de dos guerras (Barcelona, 1978), p. 133. Tagüena (1913- 
1971) was a reservist non-commissioned officer, a graduate in physics and mathematics and a 
communist militant in 1936; when the Civil War broke out, he joined the militias and had risen to 
divisional commander one year later; his good performance won him the command of an army 
corps from April 1938 to the end of the war; after a period in the Soviet army in the 1940s, 
Tagüena broke with the Communist Party and, in 1955, left for Mexico, where he devoted himself 
to science-related studies and jobs. 
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preparation of the offensive, it seems very possible that this 
book was Lectures on FSR III. And it would be very strange that 
Rojo recommended such reading if he had not been fond of Fuller's 
ideas, at least in a partial way. 
b) French thinking. 
Although the research for this thesis has not found evidence 
about this issue, it is plausible to think that the knowledge of 
French thought was rather more widespread, as a part of the 
overall Gallic military influence on the Spanish army after 1918. 
Though the French had used tanks in large numbers in their 
successful offensives of 1918 and made some efforts to develop a 
doctrine of mechanized warfare in the 1920s, they failed to 
implement far-sighted thinking on the use of armour. 46 
Actually the French experience was used to endorse negative 
views on armour in the Spanish army in the early post-war years. 
One year after the end of the war the infantry journal mentioned 
as an example to follow the French policy - inspired by General 
Petain - of keeping tanks confined to infantry support missions, 
instead of paying attention to premature innovations such as 
General Malleterre's project to turn armour into the backbone of 
the infantry arm. 47 
It did no good for the progress of mechanization in the Spanish 
army that a part of the early 1920s' published reporting on 
the 
French army's mechanization was carried out by Majors Segui and 
Martin, who were studying at the Ecole Superieure 
de Guerre and 
displayed an open dislike for armour. They reported 
in 1921 that 
46 Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, `Liddell Hart and De 
Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited 
Liability and Mobile Defense', in Peter Paret (ed. ), Makers of 
Modern Strategy from Machiavelli 
to the Nuclear Age (Oxford, 1986), pp. 602-4; Wheldon, pp. 
43,48-9,55-6. 
47 `La Infanteria y los tanques', MI, VIII, 95 (December 1919), pp. 463-6. 
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the tank played a very secondary role in the French military 
exercises. '8 Segui and Martin even used a paper on the employment 
of air power in colonial warfare to show their negative views on 
tanks. 49 Several years later, Segul, then a lieutenant-colonel and 
military attache in France, expressed his unfavourable views again 
in La Guerra y su pre aracion after observing the French 
manoeuvres of July 1929, where he became reassured about the 
limitations suffered in using tanks. Moreover, he added that the 
improvement and the increased employment of anti-tank weapons were 
`to make precarious the achievements made by this expensive 
equipment. ' 50 
The French school of motorization (represented by Generals 
Allehaut and Camon) was less radical than the mechanization 
theorists, and easier for the Spanish military to accept since it 
was nearer to the contemporary official doctrine. Even the 51 
Spanish military's conservative sections were willing to see some 
advantages in an increased use of motor vehicles in the army. In 
fact, the use of motor vehicles was seen as a way to prevent 
cavalry from turning into mounted infantry, since mobile infantry 
forces could be created through motorization - with the additional 
advantage of the better cost-effectiveness of the mechanical 
transport's. 52 Another advantage of motorization was that motor 
vehicles were faster, less fatiguing for the troops and less 
expensive in manpower than horse-drawn transport, since their 
maintenance was minimal when inactive (whereas horses need 
constant care) . 
53 
48 Segui and Martin, `Evoluciön del armamento de la infanteria francesa... ', p. 
250. 
49 Juan Segul and Jose Martin Prat, `Utilizacion de la aviaciön en las campanas coloniales', 
LGP, 
VI, 1 (January 1921), p. 36. 
so '[H]ate precarios los resultados conseguidos por ese costoso material. 
' [Juan] Segui, 
`Maniobras del Ejercito frances en el Campo de Mailly', LGP, XV, 1 (January 1930), p. 53. 
51 Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, pp. 14-5. 
52 A., `La doctrina francesa acerca de la Caballeria', MC, V, 51 (September 1920), p. 177. 
53 Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, pp. 23-30. 
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3. Organizational and doctrinal consolidation, 1927- 
1935. 
a) Reorganization and attempts at development. 
After the defeat of Abd el-Krim in the spring of 1926, the 
infantry tank unit was repatriated and attached to the Third 
Section of the Central Firing School, where it was used as a 
`school-unit' in courses for officers. The artillery tank battery 
was also sent to the Central Firing School by 1930.54 
While the small Spanish armoured force was still fighting in 
Morocco, the army thought of producing a tank of national 
manufacture. An artillery officer, Captain Ruiz de Toledo, was 
sent abroad to study foreign tanks in 1925. With the knowledge 
acquired, he designed a new model and supervised the making of the 
prototypes by the artillery factory in Trubia (six prototypes were 
made from 1926 to 1934) . The official name of the model was 
`fast 
tank', but it became generally known as `Trubia tank'. The first 
prototypes were finished in the summer of 1926 and sent to the ECT 
(Third Section) for trials. 55 
The 4A version of the Trubia also underwent trials at the 
Central Firing School in 1928. According to the official records 
on those trials, the performance of the Trubia was highly 
satisfactory. It had good cross-country mobility and was fast (32 
kmph on road) and well-protected (up to 15 mm armour) despite 
being a tank of moderate weight (9 tons); the armament 
it was 
supposed to carry (one 40 mm gun and two machine guns, or 
three 
machine guns) provided enough fire power. The conclusion was 
that 
the Trubia tanks satisfied the requirements for a modern 
light 
tank and even outmatched other contemporary 
foreign models in many 
sa Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 527; Marin, `La bateria... ', p. 64. 




The positive judgement of the official report mentioned above 
was not totally shared by Lieutenant-colonel Urena, of the 
engineer corps, although this writer has been unable to find out 
if this officer was well grounded enough in the issue to be 
considered a reliable source. According to Urena, the Trubia had a 
relatively high speed, good vision capacity and acceptable ability 
to surpass obstacles; but its armour was poor, the tracks were too 
fragile, and it was too bulky in relation to its performance. 57 
Whatever the Spanish military's assessment of the Trubia, the 
fact is that its mass production never started. Although 
dissatisfaction with the Trubia's performance perhaps should not 
be totally discarded, financial reasons probably were the main 
cause of this inaction. The army budgets left too small a margin 
for ordnance procurement and, since there were more immediate 
needs for basic equipment, it would have been rather odd to devote 
many resources to such a piece of state-of-the-art technology as 
the tank. 58 It must also be remembered that Spain had no major 
motor industry at the time, so producing a large series of tanks 
was possibly beyond the country's capabilities. 59 
In late November 1926 the military authorities ordered the 
creation of an armoured group, attached to the Third Section of 
the ECT. The organization of the unit was detailed on 12 January 
1927. The group was formed with two companies. One of these would 
56 Negociado de estudios, proyectos, experiencias y fabricaciön de material de guerra, Acta n° 10, 
23 May 1928, AGMS 2/1/39; Ministerio de la Guerra, Secciön de Industrias y Construcciones 
Militares, l er Negociado, Expediente relativo a informe sobre pruebas realizadas con el carro 
ligero de combate Trubia de 75 HP serie 4A, 8 June 1928, AGMS 2/1/39. 
57 Ladislao Urefia, `Motorizacion, mecanizaciön', Memorial de Ingenieros, LXXXVIII, 12 
(December 1933), pp. 523-4. 
58 For instance, the Spanish soldiers were not provided with an issue steel helmet until 1935: 
Payne, Politics, p. 305. 
s9 Fernandez Mateos, p. 17. 
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be equipped with the existing Renaults and would have a 
headquarters (one signals tank), two combat platoons (five tanks 
each) and a supply and service platoon (four tanks). The other 
would receive the first Trubia tanks and would have a similar 
organization (excepting the service platoon, with two tanks only). 
The total strength was 28 tanks (13 Trubias and 15 Renaults). 
However, according to Garcia Albors, the unit never 
60 materialized o 
b) Official doctrine on armour in the 1920s. 
The early guidance for the Spanish tankmen were the ECT 
provisional instructions for the Renault tank company and the 1922 
provisional regulations for `assault artillery' (i. e. the 
artillery tanks) 61 Later there were also some short references to 
62 armour in the 1924 Doctrina and the 1925 major unit regulations. 
However, it is necessary to mention an article of Captain Guarner, 
published in Memorial de Infanteria in February 1924, which 
advanced some of the principles for the employment of tanks which 
were sanctioned later by the official regulations. Guarner 
stressed the role of the tank as an offensive weapon. Tanks had to 
be used massively and simultaneously (in order to saturate the 
enemy's defences); if they could not be deployed along all the 
front, they must be concentrated on the decisive point. The 
fighting order of tanks had to be organized in depth, thus 
allowing tanks in the rear ranks to suppress points of resistance 
which had been passed by the advanced ones, and to relieve the 
63 latter in time. 
60 CLE 1926, No. 408; CLE 1927, No. 14; Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 527-8; Marin, `Carros de 
asalto espanoles... ', p. 67. 
61 Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 530-1. This writer could not find any copy of the instructions 
mentioned. 
62 Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 531. 
63 Gute., 'C os de combate', pp. 92-6. 
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The 1924 Doctrina, in relation to which the 1925 regulations did 
not offer any new development, defined tanks as weapons which were 
essentially offensive. 64 Besides pointing out that armour must be 
used massively, it also went some way to clarify the tactical 
roles of the infantry and artillery tanks, since it explained that 
the breakthrough (artillery) tanks were those which first broke 
into the enemy lines, followed by the infantry tanks. 65 The 
Doctrina asserted that the employment of tanks could only be 
occasional. Armour must be organized in separate units, which 
would detach their elements to support the infantry with the 
strength required for each mission; the number of armoured units 
recommended was one regiment (two battalions) for two standing 
infantry divisions. 66 
The army's first official detailed doctrine on armour was 
finally issued in 1928 as a supplement to the 1926 Infantry 
Tactical Regulations. This doctrine fixed the tank's subordinate 
status as an infantry weapon. 67 Therefore, all the tank personnel 
had to belong to the infantry corps. 68 To dispel categorically any 
doubt on the tank's role, the use of tanks was banned in any 
mission other than those in direct relation to the infantry 
ones. 69 It must also be remembered that the regulations were 
suited to the features of the Renault FT-17 tank or similar 
models. 
The basic tank unit was the platoon. The so-called 'first 
echelon' (i. e. fighting) platoon had five tanks (three armed with 
64Estado Mayor Central, Doctrina Armas y Servicios, Title I, Chapter II, article 4. 
65 Ibid., Title I, Chapter 11, article 3. 
66 Ibid., Title II, Chapter Il, article 4. 
6' Direcciön General de Preparaciön de Campana, Instrucciön y empleo täctico de los carros de 
combate ligeros o de acompafiamiento. Anexo III al Reglamento Täctico de Infanteria (1928), 
article 1. 
68 Ibid., article 2. 
69 Ibid., article 128. 
282 
a 37 mm gun, two with a machine gun). The `second echelon' platoon 
was a service unit which included another five tanks, whose role 
was to carry forward supplies to the tanks in the firing line and 
replace those which were lost because of enemy action or 
mechanical breakdown. Three first echelon and one second echelon 
platoons plus a headquarters (with one command and one signals 
tank) and a tank-transporter platoon formed a first echelon 
company. Two tank and one tank-transporter platoons formed a 
second echelon company. The battalion was organized in three first 
echelon and one second echelon companies plus a headquarters (with 
two command and one signals tanks); total battalion strength was 
79 tanks. Two battalions formed a regiment, whose strength (after 
adding the regimental signals tank) was 159 tanks. 7° 
The regulations recognized that the tank had features (tactical 
mobility, firepower, protection against light infantry weapons and 
shrapnel) which were suitable for offensive action. On the other 
hand, they also enumerated the weak points of the tanks: 
vulnerability to shelling; insufficient logistic (i. e. non- 
tactical) mobility; limited observation means; quick wearing out 
of crews and mechanics; a noisy motor; mechanical unreliability; 
and a high fuel consumption. 71 
The tactical employment of tanks had to be ruled by the 
following principles: 
-use en masse on wide fronts, to reduce vulnerability 
to the 
enemy's artillery fire and avoid exposed 
flanks; 
-use in depth through successive echelons; 
-maintenance of a reserve; 
'0 Ibid., articles 47,66,76,77 and 80. This organization 
had already been outlined (with a lesser 
attention to second echelon units) in 1924: Estado 
Mayor Central, Doctrina Armas y Servicios, 
Title I, Chapter II, article 4. 
71 Direcciön General de Preparaciön de Campafia, Instrucciön y empleo 
de carros de combate, 
article 82. 
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-full cooperation with the infantry, whose command had to 
indicate the tanks' targets; 
-surprise. 
This last point also stated that the intervention of tanks was 
momentary, so they must be used in the last phase of combat (the 
assault); they were in great danger in case of premature 
deployment or if they were not withdrawn in time from the battle 
ground. 72 This was another display of the view of tanks as 
`weapons of opportunity'. Captain Ruiz de Toledo echoed it in an 
article for the artillery corps journal in 1929. He stated that 
tanks tended to become a special arm for quick and violent 
interventions in the decisive moments of combat. 73 
Despite the point about a massive use of tanks, there was no 
idea of large tank forces under the operational control of a 
single commander (as was proposed by the leading British and 
German theorists of armoured warfare). Fragmentation, instead of 
concentration, was the rule. Actually, as Garcia Albors pointed 
out, there was a contradiction in the Spanish doctrine on tank 
operations, because it recommended attacks on wide fronts (i. e. 
dispersal) and, at the same time, concentration of effort (that 
is, concentration of tanks) at the decisive point of the attack. 
Such a contradiction was confusing and dangerous for an army with 
a limited tank strength (Garcia Albors thought that, in case of 
conflicting needs, concentration of effort must prevail over 
attacks on wide fronts) . 
74 
The regulations did not conceive that a tank regiment or 
battalion could operate concentrated under its commanding 
72 Ibid., article 86. 
73 Ruiz de Toledo, `El problema del carro... ', p. 197. 
74 Enrique Garcia Albors, `Ligero parangön y comentario de los Reglamentos de carros franceses y 
espanoles', MI, XXV, 3 (March 1936), p. 101. 
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officer. 75 The regiment was deemed an administrative unit. 76 The 
battalion commanders were reduced to an advisory and liaison role 
near the divisional or higher headquarters. " As regards the 
tank/infantry ratio in tactical operations, the regulations 
reckoned that a tank platoon attached to each infantry battalion 
was usually enough - though the armoured component could be 
augmented to a company if the enemy defence was very strong. 78 
These regulations dealing with the infantry (light) tanks were 
virtually all the existing doctrine on armour, because, so far as 
this writer is aware, the artillery corps did not develop any 
regulations for its heavy tanks, besides the 1922 provisional 
ones. Nevertheless, the 1924 Doctrina outlined the organization of 
the artillery tanks. The basic unit was the battery, with the 
combat echelon (one command and four combat tanks), and the first 
(supply and liaison) and second (road transport) logistical 
echelons. Three batteries and a headquarters formed a reu o 
(battalion) . 
79 
Compared with the French regulations (which usually attached one 
tank company to an infantry battalion), the Spanish ones provided 
for smaller tank support per infantry battalion (the Spanish 
regulations reckoned one tank platoon per infantry battalion as 
the standard ratio). On the other hand, the Spanish organization 
gave greater autonomy to tank companies and battalions, since they 
had more signals tanks and tank-transporters. But this advantage 
was limited by the fact that signals tanks were supposed to 
complete the divisional signals network, instead of being used for 
75 Direcciön General de Preparaciön de Campana, Instrucciön y empleo de carros de combate, 
article 122. 
76 Ibid., article 124. 
" Ibid., article 79. 
78 Direcciön General de Preparaciön de Campafia, Reglamento Täctico de Infanteria, 2 vol. 
(1926), II. article 726. 
79 Estado Mayor Central, Doctrina Armas y Servicios, Title II, Chapter IV, article 3. 
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liaison between tank units and between these and the infantry 
(which seems the more logical role) . 
80 However, this did not seem 
very important because the official doctrine did not contemplate 
tank operations beyond the company level, for which coloured flags 
were reckoned enough at that time. 
c) Mechanization under the Second Republic (1931-1936). 
The reorganization of the Spanish army after the coming of the 
Second Republic also affected the armoured forces, though, 
according to Payne, War Minister Azana `had scant interest in 
tanks. .. '81 Nevertheless, the republican government created two 
infantry tank regiments and a cavalry armoured car grupo (group of 
squadrons) on 23 June 1931; the tank regiments were based in 
Madrid (1st) and Saragossa (2nd) while the armoured car group was 
integrated into the cavalry division and located after September 
1931 in Aranjuez, near Madrid. 82 Such an expansion of the armoured 
force did not fail to meet criticism. Cebreiros thought that two 
tank regiments were too much armour, when the line infantry had 
been reduced to the thirty two regiments of the standing 
divisions. 83 
The organization established in the 1928 regulations was not 
applied to the tank regiments set up in 1931. These were formed 
according to tables of organization and equipment established on 
5 
June 1931 (which contain no data on the armoured car group). Two 
first echelon and one second echelon platoons (five tanks each) 
formed a first echelon company; two first echelon companies 
formed 
a battalion; and each regiment included two 
battalions. The 
80 Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 531-3, III. 537; and'Ligero parangon y comentario... 
', p. 102. 
81 Payne, Politics, p. 274. 
82 CLE 1931 No. 384, No. 385 and No. 729. The cavalry armoured car group was not equipped 
until 1935, when it received the same model of armoured car 
(made in Spain and armed with one 
machine-gun) used by the police forces: Fernandez 
Mateos, p. 16. 
83 Cebreiros, p. 61. 
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regiment's total tank strength (after adding one signals and 
command tank for every company, battalion and regimental 
headquarters) was 67 tanks . 
84 
This establishment seems to contradict the decree of 25 May 1931 
on the reorganization of the army, which stated that the 
organization of the basic tactical units would be in perfect 
agreement with the regulations. 5 There is no explanation of the ß 
new organization in the sources consulted, though this question 
becomes purely academic when talking about units which were 
armoured regiments on paper only: in practice there were just five 
Renault tanks available for each regiment. 86 On the other hand, 
since the platoon remained the basic tank unit, such a 
contradiction had no real tactical consequences. Perhaps the 
answer is related to Azana's personnel policy. Since the war 
minister wanted to reduce the size of the officer corps (and there 
were no prospects in the near future to procure more tanks), he 
was probably satisfied with a reduced organization which saved a 
number of useless appointments. 
Lieutenant Garcia Albors thought that the 1931 organization 
could look after the equipment issues sufficiently well through 
the War Ministry's Ordnance Section and the ECT (for trials of new 
equipment). But he pointed out the need for an inspectorate of 
tank units with responsibilities for doctrine and training. As 
it 
was, the tank regiments were subordinate in these matters 
to the 
army general inspectors. Garcia Albors proposed as a 
temporary 
remedy that training rules be given to the general 
inspectors or 
the tank units directly by the General Staff. 
87 
84 CLE 1931, No. 314. 
85 CLE 1931, No. 282. 
86 Fernandez Mateos, p. 22. 
8' Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 536. 
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After 1930 the Spanish army seemed to develop a greater interest 
in the increase of motorized transport, but with no real 
consequence in practice. 88 The lack of efforts to pursue a clear- 
cut policy of motorization - even on a small scale - led to an 
appalling state of affairs: in 1933 the Spanish army used a motor 
fleet of 2,655 vehicles of 92 different models. Moreover, the 
civil motor fleet would not be a great help in wartime. 
Lieutenant-colonel Urena reckoned that just 20-30 per cent of 
requisitionable vehicles would be of any use because of the 
diversity of models and spare parts. 89 
Under the right-wing cabinets of the 1933-1935 period there were 
two attempts to increase the Spanish army's motorization, but they 
did not become more than projects before the outbreak of the Civil 
War. In late 1934, Prime Minister Lerroux thought of organizing a 
new motorized division. It would be an all-volunteer unit and a 
general reserve unit for the army, ready to operate in home 
territory or northern Africa. The second attempt was planned in 
June 1935, when it was decided to motorize one of the existing 
divisions, as a first step towards a gradual motorization of the 
army. 90 
The interest in developing a tank made in Spain did not 
disappear in the 1930s either, since the Trubia factory designed 
in 1934 a medium tank based on the Landesa commercial tractor 
(which gave the tank its name) and whose external shape resembled 
the Schneider model. 91 Another issue affecting armoured warfare 
was anti-tank defence. This matter was also neglected 
in the 
Spanish army. There were no regulations on 
the subject nor 
88 Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, p. 221. 
89 Urena, `Motorizaciön... ', pp. 522-3. 
9' Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, pp. 221-2; Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, 
El ejercito espanol durante 
la Segunda Republica (claves de su actuaciön posterior) (Madrid, 1986), p. 
406. 
91 Mazarrasa, Carros en Espana, p. 5. 
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specialized weapons. Actually the Spanish army was supposed to be 
equipped with an anti-tank gun designed in 1926, the Ramirez 
Arellano gun (named after its designer, an army officer), which 
was theoretically able to pierce the Renault tank's armour at 
2,000 metres. A series of about a dozen guns was made in the 
artillery factory of Trubia, but they remained untested by 1931. 
These weapons were still stored in the factory when, during the 
leftist revolution of Asturias in October 1934, the insurgents 
took and used them against military forces, which included - 
ironically - the gun's designer. 92 
Writing by late 1935, Lieutenant Garcia Albors offered a view 
about how motorization and mechanization could be tackled by the 
Spanish army in the near future. He considered a total 
motorization unfeasible, since the Spanish territory was too 
varied and there was not enough motor industry nor raw materials. 
Therefore, although it was possible to substitute motor transport 
for horse-drawn transport, the latter would remain important; this 
seemed confirmed by the trend of the General Staff to increase the 
proportion of mountain troops in the army's force structure. 
93 
Instead of creating new kinds of divisions, completing and 
improving the existing ones was a better policy. 
94 Garcia Albors 
also urged the procurement of more infantry tanks (at least the 
minimum number needed for training purposes). Nonetheless, 
mechanization in Spain should be set aside for the moment, but 
without neglecting its theoretical study. At best, mechanization 
should be initially implemented on a small scale, following 
contemporary orthodox thinking and discarding bold, unproven 
theories. 95 
92 Garcia Albors, Carros, III. 541-3; Cardona, p. 168. 
93 Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, pp. 223-5. 
94 Ibid., pp. 225-8. 
95 Ibid., pp. 228-30. 
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4. Some views on mechanization, 1920-1936: for and 
against. 
a) Restraints (i) : Spain's industry and terrain. 
The making of a Spanish armoured force in the 1920s and 1930s 
faced objective obstacles which the contemporary professional 
literature did not fail to highlight. One of them was the 
underdevelopment of the Spanish industry. In the early 1920s, 
Villalba's textbook pointed out Spain's lack of an industrial base 
solid enough to produce and maintain this kind of ordnance. 96 
Major Federico Beigbeder of the engineer corps wrote in 1928 that 
any attempt to implement mechanization would end in failure 
because Spain was not an industrial country capable of affording 
such a luxury, not to mention the problems of getting a supply of 
fuel . 
97 
Beigbdeder also mentioned the other major factor limiting the 
development of armoured forces in Spain: the ground. He stated 
that mechanization could certainly be discussed and supported on 
paper, but he also said of its supporters that they often 
disregarded the rugged Spanish terrain. Beigbeder was sure that if 
mechanized forces had to operate on the latter, their supporters' 
enthusiasm would turn into `the bitterness brought by reality, 
which cannot be discussed. '98 
The restraints of the ground were used as an argument to keep 
any armoured force created in the Spanish army small. Segui and 
Martin had already recommended in 1921 to set up only one unit for 
occasional operations and experimental purposes. 
99 Cebreiros wrote 
a decade later that the two tank regiments created 
by the 
96 Villalba, I. 485 fa 1. 
97 Federico Beigbeder, `Los transportes militares en la guerra', LGP, XIII, 2 (August 1928), pp. 
103,116-8. 
98 `[L]a amargura que da la realidad, contra la cual no se puede discutir. ' Ibid., p. 
103. 
99 Segui and Martin, `Evolucion del armamento de la infanteria francesa... ', p. 
253. 
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republican government were a disproportionate force, since their 
employment on the rugged Spanish territory had not yet been 
tried. 100 However, Cebreiros contradicted himself because he had 
stated several pages before that the cavalry still had a prime 
role in Spain's large plains. 101 
b) Restraints (ii): mechanization versus morale. 
Another source of criticism of mechanization lay in the latter's 
alleged unfavourable effects on morale. Segui and Martin pointed 
out in 1921 that tank crews must be hand-picked. Both officers 
argued then that few soldiers had the highest military virtues. 
They had to extend these virtues to the mass of troops through 
their exemplary role on the battlefield. According to Segui and 
Martin, heroic behaviour is most effective when it can be seen by 
the soldier's comrades. But how could this be achieved, Segui and 
Martin asked, when the fighting men became confined within 
armoured shells with minimal external communication? 102 
Major Beigbeder also wrote with regret in 1928 about the 
`madness' (locura) which had got hold of some foreign armies which 
pursued mechanization theories. These, according to Beigbeder, 
aimed to suppress the human factor in warfare. The new armies 
would make mechanics their god. 
103 
Cebreiros, a harsh critic of Azana's work, admitted the need not 
to lose track of a new military development such as 
tanks. But 
they must not be given too much importance, 
because these 
cacharros (pieces of junk) - as he called 
them - were not 
essential for the effectiveness of the army. 
On the contrary, the 
100 Cebreiros, p. 61. 
101 Ibid., p. 39. 
102 Segui and Martin, `Evolucion del armamento de 
la infanteria francesa... ', p. 253. 
103 Federico Beigbeder, `Los transportes militares... ', p. 103. 
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essentials of the army were morale, discipline, training, and so 
on. Whithout them, any material improvement was of no avail. 104 
Thus Cebreiros scorned the military value of armour if it was not 
accompanied by the army's moral values, and hinted that the latter 
were allegedly under threat by the 1931 reforms. General Mola 
quite probably shared this idea of mechanization threatening the 
traditional military virtues, since he saw as `suspicious' 
(sospechosa) the persistent talk about mechanization and 
motorization-' 05 
c) Backing mechanization. 
Despite the arguments against mechanized forces discussed above, 
it cannot be said that the environment was totally hostile or 
retrogressive. Although they probably voiced the views of a 
minority within the officer corps, a few essayists recognized that 
mechanization was to bring a major transformation to warfare 
sooner than was expected. Nonetheless, except for Garcia Albors, 
they merely expressed in vague terms their awareness of the 
changes brought by mechanization, but did not display thorough 
thinking about it. 
For instance, Lieutenant-colonel Monasterio, a cavalry officer, 
made an outspoken acknowledgement of the future of mechanized 
forces. Although he refused to accept that cavalry were currently 
in decline, he thought wrong the idea that mechanization would 
never substitute for that arm. Quite the contrary, 
it would be 
very probable that technology would provide 
a mechanical 
replacement for the horse, capable of carrying 
out the cavalry's 
missions in a more effective way. 
Perhaps, Monasterio thought, 
mechanization would solve the problem 
of mobility in the 
104 Cebreiros, pp. 55-6. 
105 Mola, p. 1160. 
292 
offensive, thus preventing armies from engaging in trench warfare 
again. 
106 
A retired general, Cändido Pardo, was also aware in 1934 of how 
mechanization was to transform warfare. In future wars, the 
mobility of troops would be more important than their numerical 
strength alone. Armies would seek to carry out their strategic 
manoeuvres quickly through the use of motor transport. Although 
the increase of fire power on the battlefield forced the adoption 
of more dispersed fighting orders, the offensive would not lose 
strength since it would use cross-country fighting vehicles 
invulnerable to small arms fire. 107 
Lieutenant Garcia Albors, the most thoughtful Spanish essayist 
on the issue, can also be included among those standing for 
mechanizing the army. Nevertheless, he was not too enthusiastic in 
considering the feasibility of mechanization in Spain. Garcia 
Albors thought that motorization was a commendable ideal which 
must be pursued as much as capacities and needs allowed, though he 
admitted that the cavalry and horse-drawn transport still had to 
be preserved in the army. Garcia Albors recognized that 
motorization, which also needed a supporting industrial base, was 
expensive in its initial stage, so it had to be implemented with 
moderation and completed in wartime through requisition. Despite 
these difficulties, he thought that most units of the army could 
be motorized to a great extent and their needs for armoured 
support on the battlefield could be satisfied with an adequate 
number of armoured fighting vehicles. 
108 
He was rather less optimistic in relation to mechanization. 
This 
106 J[ose] Monasterio, El momento de la Caballeria (Toledo, 1930), pp. 
93-4. 
107 Cändido Pardo Gonzalez, El problema militar de Espana; su resoluciön 
as racional, 
econömica y nacional (Madrid, 1934), p. 246. 
108 Garcia Albors, Motorizaciön, pp. 174,218-9. 
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had to be implemented gradually and required great national 
economic resources. Despite its promise, mechanization could not 
assure the quick end of a war; an army of armoured fighting 
machines could not decide the result of a campaign, since the 
infantry would always be necessary to protect the conquered 
ground. Only non-mechanized units could operate in all terrain and 
combat situations. Therefore, total mechanization had to be 
limited to units carrying out specialized missions, such as raids 
or attacks against the enemy's lines of communication and 
headquarters. The mechanized forces would be comparatively small, 
since it was not normal that the enemy army gave up fighting 
simply because a major unit or headquarters had been surprised or 
enveloped. The clash with the enemy's main force had to be the 
basic aim for a field army, and raids were only supporting efforts 
in this endeavour. '09 
d) An intermediate alternative. 
One question was still to be answered. If horse and motorized 
troops were to live together (at least for a while), how would 
this co-existence be organized? Would they lead separate lives or 
could they be grouped in composite units? 
Lieutenant-colonel Juan Beigbeder (Federico's brother), who had 
seen manoeuvres of the German army with cavalry, concluded 
that 
the future lay in combining motor and horse, instead of opting 
for 
motor or horse, since both means complemented 
each other. The 
motor vehicle extended the range of the cavalry 
by easing their 
logistics, and armoured cars and motorized 
infantry units 
increased the fighting capacity of that arm. 
In turn, the horse 
110 
provided greater tactical mobility. 
109 Ibid., pp. 173-4,219-20. 
11° [Juan] Beigbeder, `Las maniobras del Oder', REM, I, 2 (July-December 
1932), pp. 427-8. 
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Major Gascuena recognized that the motorized division had more 
strategic mobility than the cavalry division, but this superiority 
was only significant in long distance marches and behind a screen 
of other units. When a motorized division had to provide its own 
protection, its speed would diminish and its mobility would also 
be restricted by its dependence on roads. Moreover, the logistic 
support of a motorized force would be more complicated. Thus 
Gascuena concluded that composite units combining motor and horse 
were superior to the fully motorized ones. At the tactical level, 
he took the superiority of the mounted forces for granted. 
However, Gascuena inadvertently undermined his arguments by 
writing that the cavalry would have to demand fast tracked 
armoured vehicles for fighting and logistic support missions. "' If 
it was accepted that these vehicles were able (or would be able in 
the near future) to carry out tactical (i. e. fighting) missions, 
there was not much point in justifying the survival of major 
mounted units for long. 
Moreover, Gascuena admitted that units on horseback were quite 
fragile (the horse needs a lot of care and training and wears out 
quickly without them) and were vulnerable to modern weapons. 
112 So 
the cavalry had to adapt their doctrine to technical progress. 
However, he insisted that this evolution had to be prudent and the 
cavalry division must remain a composite unit due to the motor 
industry's actual level of development. Gascuena proposed a series 
of improvements for the division: the motorization of the units' 
transport trains, the substitution of cross-country armoured cars 
for the current models, the building of a fast cavalry 
tank able 
11' Epifanio Gascuefla, La moderna division de Caballeria Sus misiones; su organizaciön; 
aplicaciön de esta a nuestro ejercito (Toledo, 1931), pp. 23-6. 
112 During the Civil War, the nationalist army's general headquarters reminded 
that more attention 
should be paid to the care of cavalry mounts; many of them 
had been requisitioned and were of 
medium quality and poorly trained: Instrucciones para el empleo 
de la Caballeria, 24 March 1938, 
Archivo General Militar de Avila: Zona Nacional 14/24/13. 
V 
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to follow the movements of mounted units, and the increase of the 
artillery component. 113 Actually all this implied an increased 
mechanization of the division. 
These arguments also reflected a trend, which started receiving 
notice in the Spanish professional literature after the late 
1920s, in support of motorizing the cavalry (at least partially) 
and equipping this arm with armoured vehicles (initially armoured 
cars). For instance, against the argument that the armoured car 
limited the cavalry's mobility due to its dependence on roads, it 
was alleged that armies tended to fight - because of economic and 
geographical reasons - in areas with extended road networks. On 
the other hand, mobility also meant being able to advance quickly 
with one's own means against enemy resistance, which armoured cars 
could help to overcome. Moreover, armoured cars allowed a more 
economical use of horses. '14 
Major Gascuena stated that the cavalry division could not be 
engaged in prolonged attacks because of its limited fighting 
means. Its offensive operations had to be based on surprise and 
directed against the flanks, looking for short and intense 
clashes. '15 Under these circumstances, Gascuena pointed out the 
usefulness of adding some tank units to the cavalry division; the 
tanks, armed with field guns, would be able to follow the mounted 
troops. Thus the cavalry attacks - though carried out on foot - 
would have enough power to be really sudden, strong and 
116 
.6 
113 Gascuena, Moderna division, pp. 26-9. 
114 Juan Camps, `ýCuändo sera un hecho la creaciön de las Unidades de Auto-ametralladoras en 
Caballeria? ', MC, XIII, 143 (September-November 1928), pp. 292-4. 
115 Both sides in the Civil War issued instructions stressing these points: 
Inspecciön General de 
Caballeria, Directivas para la instrucciön de las Brigadas de Caballeria, 
Directiva n° 1,10 July 
1937, Archivo General Militar de Avila: Zona Republicana 55/540/2; and Instrucciones para el 
empleo de la Caballeria, 24 March 1938, Archivo 
General Militar de Avila: Zona Nacional 
14/24/13. 
116 Gascuena, Moderna division, pp. 143. 
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Captain Izquierdo, an infantryman who had passed the tank 
course, considered that the cavalry needed, occasionally at least, 
an increase in speed that horses could not give, but that the 
armoured car could give - with the advantage of a degree of 
protection against fire; so the armoured car was suitable for 
short missions to be carried out quickly, such as road 
reconnaissance, raids, harassing pursuit, and screening 
withdrawal. Izquierdo proposed the use of a modified version of 
the Trubia tank as a way to overcome the limitations of the 
armoured car (road dependence, limited vision and excessive 
size). 117 In another article, Izquierdo suggested that, if the 
enemy had not consolidated a resistance line yet, tanks could be 
temporarily attached to an attacking cavalry unit in order to act 
as close support artillery. "" 
If Gascuena thought that the actual fighting of cavalry would 
usually be on foot, others were more sanguine about actions on 
horseback. A proposed role for horsemen was the support of tanks 
in the attack. After all, if the infantry could advance under the 
cover of smoke screens, why not the faster cavalry? "9 This 
proposal was answered by Captain Izquierdo, who stated that 
mounted troops would be destroyed in any attack against an 
organized front. The tank needed the support of foot troops to 
fight against the anti-tank defences. Of course, the cavalry could 
dismount to do this, but this action turned the cavalry into 
second class infantry, instead of remaining the `fast' arm. Using 
as an example for his arguments the battle of Cambrai (November 
1917), Izquierdo concluded that only infantry and tanks could 
117 Joaquin Izquierdo Jimenez, `Necesidad de auto-ametralladoras-canones y carros de combate en 
cooperaciön con la Caballeria', , XVI, 
156 (January-February 1931), pp. 12-5. 
118 Joaquin Izquierdo Jimenez, `Carros de combate en cooperaciön con la Caballeria', MC, XVI, 
158 (May-June 1931), pp. 22-5. 
119 Julian Gomez Seco, `La Caballeria en las campanas modernas. Nuevas modalidades de su 
empleo eficaz', MC, XVI, 160 (September-October 1931), pp. 
19-23. 
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attack organized defensive lines; therefore, the idea of using 
cavalry as a replacement for infantry had to be discarded. Once a 
breach had been opened, the cavalry would exploit the success 
(supported by tanks, if possible), but not before a complete 
breakthrough. 120 
This possible modus vivendi of the cavalry with motor vehicles 
was not seen as a happy compromise by other essayists. Major 
Hernandez Ballester rejected the mixture of small horse and motor 
units to carry out tactical missions. Mechanization provided 
operational means and procedures which were very different to 
those of the forces relying on horses. Horse units were adequate 
as mobile tactical reserves, and for liaison and rear security 
missions. Motorized troops, in turn, could achieve strategic 
surprise and move quickly to threatened sectors of the front, but 
they would have to give up exploiting their speed in order to keep 
contact with the slower elements. 121 
In a similar vein, Lieutenant Garcia Albors, who believed that 
talking of the end of the cavalry was premature, also thought that 
mixing mounted and motorized troops in a cavalry division could 
damage its effectiveness, since its components tended to act in a 
dissociated way. 122 It is worth noting that, in this period, the 
French army organized composite divisions of armour, cavalry and 
motor troops, which in practice failed to operate as 
integrated 
fighting outfitS. 123 
Hernandez Ballester went further and proposed the creation of 
fully motorized major outfits in order to make an effective use of 
120 Joaquin Izquierdo Gimenez, `Colaboraciön de los carros de combate. Infanteria con 
la 
Caballeria', MC, XVII, 162 (January-February 1932), pp. 15-23. 
121 Antonio Hernandez Ballester, `La combinaciön de las Armas', MI, 
XXII, 262 (November 
1933), pp. 377-8. 
122 Garcia Albors, Motorizacion, pp. 96-102. 
123 Wheldon, pp. 63-4. 
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their capacity for strategic mobility, instead of spreading motor 
assets in small batches in every major unit. Moreover, by having 
to operate beside strong motorized units, generals would learn to 
assess the latter's real capacity and combine these forces with 
traditional, non-motorized troops. 124 
This chapter has shown that the Spanish army had an interest in 
the tank before the First World War was over, but its efforts to 
purchase a first batch were unsuccessful until 1921. However, this 
initial interest did not turn into realistic plans for building up 
a sizeable armoured force and the Spanish military remained 
satisfied by adopting a conventional doctrine in which tanks 
operated only to support infantry. All the same, the evidence 
discussed in this chapter shows that by the early 1930s 
motorization was a concept gaining ground within the Spanish 
military environment, although its implementation was slowed by 
financial constraints. More doubts were expressed about 
mechanization. The use of tanks was accepted only in the role of 
supporting the infantry. Although a small section of the 
contemporary essayists shared the ideas on future warfare 
envisaged by the mechanization pioneers, the rest openly disagreed 
or saw mechanized armies as unsuitable for a country like Spain. 
Industrial backwardness and rugged ground were certainly tangible 
obstacles to the development of a mechanized force. More 
questionable were the criticisms based on the alleged 
harmful 
influence of armour on morale. 
Nevertheless, in this writer's view, the professional literature 
assessing the future of cavalry by the early 
1930s perhaps offered 
a promising and unperceived way to make mechanization more 
acceptable. Such literature shows an 
incipient acceptance of 
124 Hernandez Ballester, `La combinaciön de las Armas', pp. 376-7. 
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mechanization to support cavalry missions; initially, by 
encouraging the use of armoured cars; then, by recommending the 
integration of some kind of fast tank in cavalry major units. This 
was probably a logical conclusion for an arm which had to fight 
like infantry and whose last claim to a distinctive status - 
mobility on horseback - was challenged with increasing success by 
motor transport. 
However, it is also true that effective mechanization could not 
be implemented overnight. In situations like this, innovation - 
even if recognized as desirable - must be pursued without 
damaging the morale of the existing forces which have to carry on 
operating for the immediate future. Thus, in the case of cavalry, 
these had to be reassured about the usefulness of the horse in 
contemporary warfare. As an essayist in military technology has 
written, a military organization cannot help finding it `difficult 
to function in that somewhat schizophrenic mode... '. 125 This does 
not seem to be an unusual situation for branches of the armed 
services in a period of technological transition, and the Spanish 
cavalry was indeed moving towards such a transitional stage in the 
1930s. Therefore it is no surprise that the contemporary 
professional literature still displayed defences of the horse 
beside acknowledgements of the rise of the machine. Indeed, the 
arguments for keeping strong mounted forces were still widespread 
126 
in the Spanish military environment after 1939. 
125 R. James Woolsey, `The Sources of Technological Innovation', 
in Shai Feldman (ed. ), 
Technology and Strategy: Future Trends (Tel Aviv, 
1989), p. 21. 
126 Juan Carlos Losada Malvärez, Ideologia del ejercito franguista 
(1939-1959) (Madrid, 1990), 
pp. 59-66. Losada states that these views were 
due to the stress on the morale-related factors in 
warfare in Franco's army: ibid., pp. 48-59. 
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8. - OFFICER TRAINING, MAJOR UNITS AND ARMOUR AT 
WAR, 1936-1939. 
Political, social and ideological subjects have dominated 
academic historians' interest in the Spanish Civil War, to the 
detriment of the study of military issues. This has happened even 
though the war, which broke out as a half-successful coup d'etat, 
turned into a struggle between two large regular armies after late 
1936. And, in the last analysis, defeat on the battlefield sealed 
the fate of the republican side. 
This chapter's purpose is not to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the conduct of the war, but to survey and discuss how 
both armies faced during the war three issues tackled in Chapters 
5,6 and 7. The first section looks at the ways the nationalist 
and republican armies trained and promoted their officers. The 
second section surveys factors which weighed on the organization 
and command of major units on both sides, and how successful they 
were. The third section examines the reaction (or the lack of it) 
on both sides to the actual operational experience with armour. It 
is hoped that this survey will go some way to casting light on 
these issues neglected by academic scholarship. 
1. The officer corps and the shadows of its past. 
a) The pre-war officer corps after the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War. 
Corporate factionalism must be borne in mind when studying the 
organization and performance of the officer corps of 
the Spanish 
Civil War. The following section illustrates how corporatism and 
its related issues left traces in both sides' officer corps, 
from 
basic officer training to senior command. 
The Spanish army had slightly over 15,000 regular officers 
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(including those of the para-military police forces) in July 1936. 
But the outbreak of the Civil War thinned the ranks of the officer 
corps. Many officers were killed or shot after being captured in 
the initial clashes of the military uprising. Others, who were 
considered out of sympathy with the side which had prevailed in 
their garrison, were murdered, sentenced to imprisonment or jailed 
under suspicion. Finally, there were those who went into hiding 
because they were in the wrong zone for their political leanings. 
The republican side got the worst of the split of the Spanish 
officer corps into two unequal parts. Including those who came 
back from retirement (due to age or Azana's decree of 1931), the 
republican side could resort to a pool of 5,500 professional 
officers at best, against about 8,000 who served in the 
nationalist army during the war. ' 
There was also the complementary list, which had 6,100 reservist 
officers in 1936. According to Gärate, 2,000 of them joined or 
were called up by the nationalists, whereas 1,100 or 1,200 served 
in the republican army. The rest did not join either side. 2 These 
figures of regular and reservist officers were insufficient for 
the mass armies which both sides built up during the war, and 
republicans and nationalists had to look for other ways of 
officering their armies. 
b) Junior officers. 
On 4 September 1936, the nationalist army created the rank of 
alferez provisional (temporary second-lieutenant). After a period 
1 The republican side's figure (which includes perhaps up to 2,000 retired officers) is taken from 
Salas Larrazäbal, E'ýc1 ito Popular, I. 186-7; the nationalist army's figure is taken from Jesüs Maria 
Salas Larrazabal and Ramon Salas Larrazdbal, `La Guerra', in Historia General de Espana, XVII. 
316, XV'IL 318. This last figure probably includes 1,500 to 2,000 retired officers: Jose Maria 
Gärate Cordoba, Alfereces provisionales La improvisaciön de oficiales en la guerra del 36 
(Madrid, 1976), pp. 28,31. 
2 Gdrate, Alfereces provisionales, pp. 31-3. 
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of improvisation, temporary officer training was organized in 
separate arm schools by General Orgaz (head of the nationalist 
command for manpower and training) by late April 1937. Although 
career non-commissioned officers could enter these schools, most 
candidates came from a civilian background. They needed to be at 
least eighteen years old and not older than thirty, to have passed 
the senior secondary education, and to have at least two months' 
experience at the front. They would take a platoon leader course 
for one month (two after early 1938) and be given a temporary 
commission with the rank of second-lieutenant. The nationalist 
army commissioned 29,000 temporary second-lieutenants, although 
7,000 got their commissions too late in the war to go into 
action. 
3 
A few days after the nationalist side (15 September 1936), the 
republican army also organized the training of temporary officers 
(oficiales en campana) in the brand new People's War Schools 
(Escuelas Populares de Guerra). The requirements for entrance were 
roughly similar to those of the nationalist side, and the training 
courses lasted from one to three months; in general the republican 
courses tended to be longer than the nationalist ones. There were 
also divisional basic officer schools which ran courses for 
company officers and trained non-commissioned officers as platoon 
leaders. The republican army commissioned between 10,500 and 
11,200 officers in the war schools and 15,000 in the divisional 
and army corps schools. The political militias provided another 
10,000 officers during the first months of the war 
(this figure 
included promoted militiamen and regular military men who 
joined 
the militias on their own) .4 
3 Ibid., pp. 39-63,115-6,135-65,331. 
4 Jose Maria Gärate Cordoba, Tenientes en camp ana La improvisaciön de oficiales en la guerra 
del 36 (Madrid, 1976), pp. 23-33,49-80,101-79,239-40; Michael Alpert, El ejercito republicano 
en la guerra civil, 2nd edition (Madrid, 1989), pp. 139-46. 
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According to Alpert, the republican war schools suffered from 
several internal problems which reduced their effectiveness in 
training officer candidates. There certainly was a shortage of 
adequate teaching staff, but the syllabi also were excessively 
theoretical and the instructors were too fond of perfunctory, 
conservative teaching methods. The republican war schools also 
initially overemphasized the educational requirements; until 
August 1937 fighting experience, character and political 
commitment (features often found in militia officers) were not 
valued as much as the ability to pass examinations. 5 
Alpert's criticisms remind one of those applied to Spanish 
military education after 1893 and its fondness for syllabi of 
bookish content and for testing the intellectual powers of officer 
candidates rather than their psychological suitability. This 
similarity suggests that corporate inertia weighed much on the 
reorganization of the republican army. In view of the results, the 
legacy of Spanish military education in the 1893-1927 period was a 
dead weight for the republican efforts at building up an effective 
regular army. 
Corporate factionalism seems to have influenced republican 
officer training in another way as well. In his report on the 
republican army's performance in the battle of Teruel, a 
Lieutenant-colonel Morales (of the artillery corps) complained 
that the officer training organization lacked enough unity, 
because the branches of the service still considered themselves as 
watertight compartments. Morales thought it urgent to put all the 
professional matters of officer training under a single authority 
in order to impose uniform syllabi for temporary officers. 
6 
5 Alpert, Ejercito republicano, p. 166-70. 
6 Las operaciones de Teruel, 25 February 1938, Archivo 
General Militar de Avila: Zona 
Republicana (hereafter AMA-ZR) 65/787/6. 
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Although assessing the validity of Morales' views is beyond this 
thesis' scope, there are reasons to think that his assertions were 
not totally unfounded if the reader bears in mind the inter-corps 
frictions around officer training surveyed in Chapters 2 and 5. 
By contrast with the republican side, the nationalist army 
focused on a clear-cut goal: building up a cadre of junior 
commanders (the alfereces provisionales), who were officers of the 
`heroic leader' pattern. This pattern was often found among the 
`africanists' and became a role model for the Saragossa military 
academy's officer candidates. For performing such a role, 
intellectual performance did not count as much as morale. 
Nevertheless, the nationalist army was fortunate in having - 
unlike the republican side -a large enough pool of would-be 
temporary officers satisfying both requirements. The alfereces 
rovisionales were usually educated youths of conservative middle- 
class background, who, moreover, had a strong sense of commitment 
to the nationalist cause (even if they lacked any concrete 
political affiliation). ' 
Strong commitment certainly facilitated the mission of these 
officers, who had the primary task of 'pulling' the troops through 
resolute, exemplary leadership in combat. This kind of leadership 
was indeed necessary for troops who, at least sometimes, seemed to 
have no taste for the fighting. An indication of this last point 
is, for example, a paper of early January 1938 written by Martinez 
de Campos (then a senior artillery commander). Among other issues, 
he commented on the nationalist infantry's unwillingness 
to 
advance under enemy fire and fight at close quarters 
in the last 
stage of the assault. Too many infantry units were 
inclined to 
expect the artillery to crush the enemy resistance. 
And if they 
Busquets, pp. 109-11. 
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failed to take advantage of the artillery support, these units did 
not even come near the republican positions. 8 
The republican army, in contrast, did not manage to create an 
effective counterpart of the alfereces provisionales. The best- 
educated officer candidates were not always ardent republican 
supporters, or they were unwilling to get involved too much in a 
highly politicized army. And, on the contrary, the most spirited 
temporary officers often were ill-educated. Lots of republican 
non-professional officers were of peasant or working-class 
background and poorly educated. It must be no surprise that they 
were hard put to apply professional skills requiring literacy 
(e. g. map-reading). 9 
c) Wartime promotion. 
Both sides followed different policies in relation to promotions 
and appointments of commanders for the increasing number of major 
units in their armies. The republican government carried out many 
selective promotions in the regular list. Given the situation of 
the republican side, political loyalty weighed heavily in the 
selection. After all, quite a few republican regular officers were 
`geographical loyalists' (i. e. they limited themselves to serving 
the side which had prevailed in the place where the outbreak of 
war found them). 10 
According to Salas Larrazäbal, most officers reckoned to be 
supporters of the republican cause in August 1936 were promoted 
8 Ejercito del Norte, Comandancia General de Artilleria to Comandante General de Artilleria de 
los Ejercitos Nacionales, 8 January 1938, Archivo General Militar de Avila: Zona Nacional 
(hereafter AMA-ZN) 15/2/ 1. 
9 Alpert, Eiercito republicano, p. 168; Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1509-10; Gärate, 
Tenientes en campana, pp. 234-5. After one year of war, training 
instructions for the republican 
crack manoeuvre army corps issued in October 1937 emphasized map-reading as a skill which 
officers had to learn: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 
Estado Mayor Central, Plan para los cuerpos 
de ejercito de maniobra, 17 October 1937, AMA-ZR 53/463/1. 
10 Alpert, Ejercito republicano, pp. 105,118-25. 
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twice during the war, and many were awarded a third promotion. The 
backing of a political party (the Spanish Communist Party was 
rather active in this matter) or a trade-union could also speed up 
the career of a regular officer. But an unfortunate outcome of 
this political selection was that able professional officers 
without partisan commitments were left unassigned, especially in 
the early months of the conflict (after mid-1937, under Minister 
of Defence Prieto, political commitment was somewhat less decisive 
in the choice of professional officers for senior commands). " 
In contrast, seniority was the rule for most wartime promotions 
on the nationalist side, and promotions by war merit were conceded 
sparingly. 12 Moreover, after 4 September 1936, the nationalist 
army filled many vacancies at middle and higher command levels 
through the entitlement (habilitaciön) of regular officers up to 
the rank of colonel. This was a temporary promotion for holding 
command appointments assigned to a higher rank. The officer 
assumed the privileges and responsibilities (though not the pay) 
of the temporary rank until his services were no longer required. 
In practice, most entitlements were confirmed as promotions in the 
army list by 1940.13 
The quality of the nationalist company and battalion commanders 
deteriorated as the war proceeded. Due to the number of 
casualties, the ablest regular officers at this level 
(such as 
those serving or with fresh experience in the Army of Africa when 
the war broke out) became reserved for the crack outfits. 
The rest 
of the nationalist units often had to get along 
with 
unenthusiastic officers of limited professional proficiency, 
who 
11 Garate, Tenientes en campana, pp. 229-31; Alpert, Ejercito republicano, pp. 130-1,175; 
Salas 
Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 492,11.1507-9; Tagüena, p. 103. 
12 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1506-7. 
13 Garate, Alfereces provisionales, pp. 35-7. 
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had developed their pre-war careers in the undemanding routine of 
the peninsular provincial garrisons. 14 
Although these professional shortcomings did not go unnoticed, 
the nationalist army maintained undeserving officers in their 
posts. According to Salas Larrazäbal, the cause of this policy was 
the disproportionate prestige which surrounded the military on the 
nationalist side. The dismissal of incompetent regular officers 
could harm the public image of the officer corps, and it must not 
be forgotten that this prestige, deserved or not, was also a 
source of the military's undisputed authority in nationalist 
Spain. 15 
Comparing promotion policies on the two sides, it is clear that 
the republican government, pressed by necessity, chose an option 
which was bound to reproduce the problems of an oversized officer 
corps which had been so damaging for the Spanish army since the 
mid-nineteenth century. The massive republican promotions were 
permanent and, as Alpert notes, such prodigality would likely have 
posed a source of problems for the republican government if the 
latter had won the war. 16 
Perhaps that kind of promotion was the most powerful incentive 
for a regular officer corps whose sympathy with the republican 
cause was lukewarm, but it still preserved a careerist bent. 
Nevertheless, even this incentive was not enough for some 
officers. In September 1937, most professional military men who 
had risen in the militias to a rank higher than their regular one 
14 Kindeldn to Franco, 16 August 1938, Fundaciön Nacional Francisco Franco, Documentos 
ineditos Para la historia del Generallsirno Franco (tomo 1) (Madrid, 1992), pp. 194-5; Salas 
Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1507, II. 1509. There were promotion courses for temporary 
officers; 8,000 passed the lieutenant (company commander) courses, and 500 passed the captain 
courses (battalion commander), but no source gives figures about how many held the command 
they were qualified for: Gärate, Alfereces provisionales, pp. 233-61,279-93,331,335. 
15 Salas Larrazdbal, Ejercito Popular, 11.1507, I1.1510. 
16 Alpert, Reforma militar, p. 234. 
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chose to leave the regular list and keep the militia rank with its 
temporary status, rather than coming back to the regular list with 
their army rank. '7 It seems as if the affected officers thought 
that the republican government would accept their non-regular 
promotions as a fait accompli; so the higher the rank, the better 
their professional future. 
On the contrary, the nationalist army's policy of entitlements 
and seniority certainly was a sensible way to avoid the 
controversies about promotion by war merit which had characterized 
the Spanish military in the preceding decades. Unfortunately for 
the future Spanish professional officers, the soundness of this 
wartime policy was spoilt after the conflict by the decision to 
commission in the regular list those temporary officers who, after 
passing an abridged syllabus, wanted to pursue a military career. 
Almost 10,000 subalterns entered the regular officer corps at a 
stroke. This decision certainly strengthened the officer corps' 
loyalty to Franco's regime, but it also condemned the Spanish army 
to put up again with the consequences of having oversized officer 
lists. 18 
d) Senior officers. 
Another legacy of the Spanish military academies of the early 
twentieth century can be seen in the performance of nationalist 
commanders at the level of brigade, division and army corps. 
These 
officers had passed through the military academies 
in the 1900s 
and 1910s, and in Chapter 2 it was pointed out 
that the teaching 
methods of these establishments did not encourage 
the development 
of individual initiative. On the contrary, 
officer candidates got 
used to unthinking obedience. 
17 Salas Larrazäbal, Elercito Popular, If. 1549. 
18 on the temporary officers in the post-war army, see Busquets, pp. 
106-13. 
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Such behaviour was described by General Kindelän (the commander- 
in-chief of the nationalist air force) in a letter sent to 
Generalissimo Franco during the battle of Teruel (December 1937- 
February 1938). 19 Kindelän attributed the field commanders' poor 
performance to the lack of willing obedience: if the orders they 
were given could not be carried out easily at the first attempt, 
the commanders did not make any further effort to overcome the 
difficulties and did not even look for excuses. No initiative on 
the battlefield could be expected from such commanders. Kindelän 
reported how on 5 January 1938 nationalist aircraft had bombed and 
strafed the enemy positions for half an hour in front of a 
nationalist division, but instead of taking advantage of the air 
attack (in which one aircraft was shot down), the nationalist 
troops limited themselves to watching the action and eating their 
midday meal. When the divisional commander was asked about this 
inaction, he answered that he had only been ordered to protect the 
advance of the division operating on his right flank. 
In view of cases like the one described above, it is not 
surprising that senior commanders became annoyed. Thus Kindelän 
also pointed out that General Davila (GOC Army of the 
North) 
reckoned his divisional commanders as bad, and that General 
Vigön 
(Dävila's chief of staff) had the same opinion about most 
divisional commanders operating in Teruel, but the 
latter was even 
more dissatified with the army corps commanders, who 
did not know 
`the matter they have in hand' (1o que traen entre manos). 
These command problems in the nationalist army 
probably stemmed 
to a large extent from limited communications 
networks together 
with poor command and control arrangements, 
which could not assure 
19 Kindelän to Franco, 6 January 193 8, Fundaciön Nacional 
Francisco Franco Documentos 
ineditos para la historia del Generalisimo Franco (tomo 
I) (Madrid, 1992), pp. 174-6. 
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contact between field commanders and their staffs. Kindelän 
pointed out in the same letter that there were always staff 
officers in Dävila's headquarters but, if asked about the 
situation at the front, they did not know what was going on. The 
situation at the army corps headquarters was worse: during the 
day, they had only a subaltern, who often was ignorant even of the 
whereabouts of the army corps commander and his staff. 
The limitations of the nationalist command at divisional and 
brigade level can also be seen in evidence some months later 
during the campaign of the Levant. On 24 May, General Aranda (GOC 
Galicia Army Corps) reported to Davila that the commander of the 
4th Division (one of the best nationalist divisions) was running 
into command difficulties because he had no able brigade 
commander; this forced him to intervene personally in the 
operations of smaller units and meant that he could not delegate 
the division's command to any subordinate. If this was the 
situation in an elite division, one cannot help wondering what 
happened in the others. 20 And about the same time, the Castile 
army corps progressed too slowly because of bad weather and 
terrain, but also because the divisional commanders neglected to 
fulfil keenly the army corps' operations plan; they were so 
concerned with their commands' individual endeavours that they 
were unable to carry out concerted actions in an effective way. 
21 
If these things happened on the nationalist side, it is easy to 
understand the underperformance of the republican army. 
Alpert's 
20 Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La ofensiva sobre Valencia (Madrid, 1977), p. 82 
fn 70. On the 
nationalist crack divisions, see Payne, Politics, pp. 389-90. 
21 Observaciones entregadas en `Terminus' [codename for the nationalist general 
headquarters' 
field command post] por el Comandante Beltran, a su regreso 
de enlace con el Cuerpo de Ejercito 
de Castilla, 21 May 1938, Archivo General Militar de Avila: Cuartel 
General del Generalisimo 
(hereafter AMA-CGG) 7/375/103; Resumen de las observaciones hechas por el 
Jefe que suscribe 
en relaciön con las operaciones realizadas por el 
C. de E. de Castilla durante los dias 22 a 28 de 
Mayo, ambos inclusive, 30 May 1938, AMA-CGG 7/375/103. 
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analysis of the background of the field commanders of both armies 
about mid-war (by the time of the battle of Teruel) shows that, 
when the war broke out in 1936, the republican regular officers 
commanding major units had on average a lower rank (and therefore 
were theoretically less trained for senior command) than their 
counterparts in the nationalist army. Surveying the nationalist 
side's major unit commands in January 1938, Alpert points out that 
the three army commanders were already general officers when the 
war broke out in 1936; the army corps commanders were colonels at 
least, and most infantry division commanders (besides being 
infantry officers) had also reached the rank of lieutenant- 
22 colonel . 
On the other side of the hill, the republican army commanders in 
December 1937 were (in terms of their positions in 1936) two 
brigadiers, an artillery lieutenant-colonel, an infantry major who 
had been seconded to the police before the war, and a retired 
infantry major. Most army corps were commanded by professional 
officers, but they had reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel at 
best. A similar situation existed among the division commanders; 
even so, 17 out of 59 divisional commander appointments (28 per 
cent) had been given to militia officers. The existing 188 
brigades had only 49 regular commanders or chiefs of staff, and 
most of them had been captains with little, if any, operational 
experience. Moreover, many regular officers held appointments 
during the conflict which did not fit their professional 
training 
and pre-war experience: e. g. artillery officers were appointed as 
commanders of infantry divisions or brigades, or subalterns 
as 
chiefs of staff. Headquarters down to army corps 
level had enough 
trained staff officers, but these were very scarce 
in the 
22 Alpert, Eidreito republicano, p. 100. An exception in the army corps commanders was 
Yagüe, 
who was an infantry lieutenant-colonel: AME 
1936. 
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divisions and virtually unknown in the brigades. 23 
The politicized environment of the republican side also weighed 
on the performance of many a regular officer, whose situation was 
similar to that described by the social scientist Teitler as 
affecting the professional officer involved in an armed conflict 
between antagonistic ideologies: `As an ideologically neutral 
expert he will be unable to inspire this [his side's fighting] 
mass, and he will have to compete with military leaders whose 
training and performance is measured according to non-professional 
standards. '24 Certainly many non-professional officers (often 
political and trade-union activists turned militiamen) rose and 
took the place of regular ones in the command of combat units. 
Some of the militia officers, despite a limited professional 
expertise, displayed a natural ability for military command. 
Indeed, the most spirited republican units were commanded by 
militia officers. 25 
However, the republican senior commanders were wanting in one of 
the most valuable assets in war: experience. Whether they were 
fast-risen regular officers or outstanding militia leaders, the 
republican army's brand new, green major unit commanders and 
staffs needed time to learn to command their troops effectively. 
They went a long way in learning to do this (for instance, the 
assault crossing of the Ebro river, in the summer of 1938, was 
quite well prepared and executed), but in the meantime their army 
got too worn out to withstand the nationalist onslaughts and turn 
23 Alpert, Ejercito republicano, pp. 100-2,126. In an effort to overcome the 
handicap in the middle 
and higher levels of command, republican divisions, army corps and armies ran courses on 
battalion and brigade command (for captains and majors) and divisional and 
higher command (for 
senior officers); in May 1937, the republican army also set up a staff college, whose 
two/three- 
month courses were passed by 198 students (out of 320 course vacancies offered): 
Alpert, Ejercito 
republicano, p. 167; Gärate, Tenientes en campana, pp. 181-94,248. 
24 Gerke Teitler, The genesis of the professional officers' corps (Beverly Hills and London, 1977), 
p. 19. 
25 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 525-6, II. 1507, II. 1509. 
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the tide of the war. 
2. The organization of major units. 
a) The republican new model army and the co osite brigade. 
The many defeats of the militia columns which, after the 
breaking up of many loyal army units , made up the bulk of the 
government forces in the summer of 1936, convinced the republican 
cabinet to organize a new regular army. This army was to be 
innovative in its organization by choosing the composite brigade 
as the basic major unit. 
Precedents of the composite brigade in the Spanish army before 
the war have already been surveyed in Chapter 6. The composite 
brigade was a model of unit extensively discussed by the Spanish 
military essayists and partly adopted for the army force structure 
before July 1936. Therefore, the Spanish republican officers in 
charge of the organization of the new army needed little, if any, 
encouragement and guidance from foreign advisers to choose this 
major unit model. 26 Moreover, it is plausible that the republican 
command thought that combined arms brigades could be ready for 
combat sooner than conventional divisions, at a time when the 
nationalist columns of the Army of Africa were heading 
fast 
towards Madrid. 
Thus the composite brigade became the fundamental major unit of 
the republican army's organization. 
27 The composite brigade was 
officially set up in the early days of October 
1936. It had a 
headquarters, four infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, a 
field artillery battalion, a composite group of engineers 
and 
26 See also Alpert, Elercito republicano, pp. 76-7. 
27 These paragraphs about the organization of the republican army are 
based on the scholarship 
provided by Ramon Salas Larrazäbal: `Los efectivos 
del Ejercito Republicano', Historia y Vida, 
VI, 66 (September 1973), pp. 15-9; the first two volumes of 
ji rcito Popular; and `El Ejercito 
popular de la Republica', in Hernandez Sanchez-Barba and 
Alonso Baquer, VII. 81-155. 
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signals, and service units; its original strength was about 3,800 
troops. This establishment underwent several changes during the 
war. The most significant one came in June 1937, when there was a 
cut in the strength of the brigade's artillery (reduced to a 
single battery of three pieces) and service troops. The cause of 
this cut lay in the insufficient capacity of the republican side 
to satisfy the equipment needs of its fast-grown army. On the 
other hand, the strength of the infantry battalion increased 
steadily (from 633 to 828 officers and men). The official overall 
strength of the brigade fluctuated between 3,500 and 4,200 troops. 
The course of the conflict made it necessary to expand the 
republican army's force structure to include divisions, army 
corps, field armies and army groups. The republican division was 
born on 31 December 1936 and included an artillery battalion, an 
engineer company (later abolished), a few service units and 
(later in the war) a machine gun battalion; each division usually 
grouped three brigades, and it became officially over 14,000- 
strong. The structure of army corps and field armies was 
implemented from March 1937 on, and, by October 1938, the 
republican order of battle included 2 army groups, 6 armies, 23 
army corps, 70 divisions and 200 brigades. 
Salas Larrazäbal has argued that the republican armies were 
usually much stronger than the republicans' memoirs and accounts, 
and many histories of the war, admit. 
28 His point is not 
unfounded, although, in this writer's view, 
Salas sometimes goes 
too far and overestimates the actual fighting strength 
of the 
republican army. For instance, he resorts 
to the official 
establishment of the republican division and points 
out that this 
was stronger in manpower than the nationalist 
one after late 1937. 
28 See, e. g., Salas Larrazäbal, `Los efectivos', pp. 19-27. 
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Thus whenever both sides deployed the same number of divisions on 
the eve of a campaign or battle the republicans should in theory 
have had an advantage in strength. And Salas Larrazäbal also seems 
to assume that the republicans were able to field fully equipped 
units. 29 However, this argument is contradicted by his own 
criticism (also shared by Alpert) of the republican high command's 
penchant for organizing large numbers of units in a hurry, in 
which he states that the nationalist units in the field were 
30 usually stronger in manpower and equipment. 
The shortages in weaponry were perhaps more significant than 
those in manpower. The original composite brigade had a 
theoretical equipment of 108 light and 36 heavy machine guns. In 
late 1937, the scale of automatic weapons was reduced to 98 light 
and 32 heavy machine guns. And the figures became just 24 light 
and 24 heavy machine guns by the summer of 1938.31 This last scale 
seems like a way of making a virtue of necessity, because it comes 
near some brigades' actual overall figures. For instance, on the 
eve of the battle of the Ebro, after a period of refitting, the 
brigades of the 35th Division (a seasoned unit which was to 
spearhead the republican offensive) did not have more than 40-odd 
light machine guns and a dozen heavy machine guns at best. 32 In 
short, the composite brigades lost much machine gun fire power (if 
they ever had the original scales) as the war went on. 
Something rather similar can be said about rifles. The original 
rifle scale for the republican composite brigade was 2,897 rifles; 
29 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1617,11.2171-3. 
30 Alpert, Ejercito republicano, p. 259; Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 575-6. 
31 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 718 n 15, U. 1865. 
32 The exact figures for the 35th Division are as follows: 
Brigade Strength Light machine guns Heavy machine guns 
XI 3,372 45 12 
XIII 3,046 49 4 
XIV 3,233 49 7 
Source: Martinez Bande, Ebro, p. 84 fn 103. 
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the figure was later cut to 2,413 (June 1937) and then increased 
to 2,969 (late 1937). Finally, the scale of the summer of 1938 was 
1,860 rifles. 33 The increase in late 1937 may reflect an increase 
in the republican rifle stocks, but this must obviously have been 
a temporary situation, given the sharp fall in the 1938 scale 
(whose numbers come interestingly near those of the 35th 
Division's brigades on the eve of the battle of the Ebro). 34 
Another source states that the theoretical scale of rifles for the 
composite brigade was 2,200 rifles (the figure seems to refer to 
those allocated to the infantry battalions), but in practice the 
usual numbers available in many republican brigades were from 
1,600 to 1,800.35 If this ratio was typical, this would mean that 
the average republican brigade often could not field more than 
four fifths of its theoretical scale of rifles. Therefore, it 
seems plausible to guess that the republican army's composite 
brigades (probably excepting those which were reckoned as crack 
units) would often be under strength, at least in terms of fire 
power. 
The limitations of the republican officer corps affected the 
performance of the composite brigade. This was based on a sound, 
self-contained organization, but it also required a large 
establishment of trained staff personnel for its headquarters, 
which should take charge of issues previously managed at 
the 
divisional level. As Alpert points out, the mistake of the 
republican organizers was that they had created sophisticated 
units without realizing that the republican army 
lacked enough 
33 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 718 n 15, H. 1865. 
34 The exact figures for the 35th Division are as follows: 
Brigade Strength Rifles 
XI 3,372 1,764 
XIII 3,046 1,822 
XV 3,233 1,782 
Source: Martinez Bande, Ebro, p. 84 fn 103. 
35 Enciclopedia Espasa, 1936-1939 supplements sv `Espana', II. 
1462. 
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officers able to command them effectively. 36 
This flaw did not go unnoticed, nor was it the only one. A 
report of June 1937 concluded that the brigade should not have 
integrated field batteries with the standard field cannon, and 
that grouping the artillery in divisional battalions was a better 
arrangement. 37 The report of Lieutenant-colonel Morales after the 
battle of Teruel also criticized the existence of the brigade 
artillery, which, by dispersing the cannon available, went against 
the guiding principle of using the artillery arm in large 
concentrations (the only way to achieve effective outcomes). 
Morales reckoned the performance of the composite brigade 
unsatisfactory and proposed a return to the conventional three- 
battalion infantry regiment, without other arms' support units. 38 
Nonetheless, in order to put the criticisms about the brigade 
artillery in perspective, the reader must bear in mind that many 
brigades - probably most - never had any field cannon at all. 
39 
The introduction of the composite brigade also had effects on 
the doctrine for the tactical use of the division. As was shown in 
Chapter 6, Lieutenant-colonel Norma had pointed out before the 
war that the composite brigade meant that the division commander 
would conduct the operations of homogeneous sub-units, instead of 
combining the efforts of separate arm outfits. The republican army 
indeed pursued this guiding principle. Its instructions (undated 
but surely issued after early 1937) on the organization and combat 
of a division defined the latter as a major unit which grouped 
36 Alpert, Eiercito republicano, pp. 75,77. For a first-hand account of the war experiences of a 
republican non-professional officer who became a composite 
brigade, division and army corps 
commander, see Tagüena, pp. 101-98. 
37 Observaciones al empleo de la artilleria en el ataque a Huesca del dia 16 
de Junio de 1937,17 
June 1937, AMA-ZR 55154518. 
38 Las operaciones de Teruel, 25 February 1938, AMA-ZR 65/787/6. 
See also Alpert, Ejercito 
republicano, pp. 259-60. 
39 Enciclopedia Espasa, 1936-1939 supplements sv `Espana', II. 1462. 
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several brigades and coordinated their combat. In order to focus 
the divisional command on this operational role, the division was 
devoid of logistical units of its own (excepting the medical 
services), since motor transport made it possible to supply the 
brigades from army corps or army magazines. Therefore the 
republican new model division only had the headquarters, two or 
three brigades, the medical echelon and attached artillery . 
40 
This organization made the republican divisions into highly 
flexible units, which could exchange, detach or be given composite 
brigades according to the tactical situation without overloading 
the divisional command with logistical issues. This flexibility 
was used much during the defensive campaign of the Levant (April- 
July 1938), when the divisions became in practice mere 
headquarters units. 41 Nonetheless, given the republican problems 
in getting able senior commanders and staffs (surveyed above), it 
is not surprising that this capacity to modify the divisional 
orders of battle took a toll of the overall effectiveness. 
Martinez Bande, after noting that quite a lot of composite 
brigades were transferred from one division to another, were 
fielded separately within the republican orders of battle, or 
simply disappeared during the same campaign of the Levant, 
concludes that such organizational flexibility brought confusion 
and disorganization as well. 
42 
b) Organizational pragmatism in the nationalist army. 
By contrast with the rational-minded model developed 
by the 
ao Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Ejercito de Tierra, Instrucciön nümero dos sobre la 
organizaciön y el combate de una division (n. d. [1937? ]), p. 1. 
The copy used is filed in AMA-ZR 
55/524/1. 
41 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1861-2. 
42 Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, Valencia, p. 59. The pre-war regulations advised against too 
frequent reorganizations of major units, since they damaged the 
Tatter's esprit de corps: RGU 
1925, article 120. 
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republican side, the evolution of the nationalist force structure 
was a rough-and-ready process. 43 Since describing the many changes 
in the organization of the nationalist army until late 1937 would 
be a long-winded task, it will suffice to say that the nationalist 
order of battle in the first half of the war was broadly an 
assortment of territorial and field units. The strength of these 
commands depended on the local situation or their operational 
responsibilities. The nationalist armies were the highest 
territorial units, each one embracing several fronts. In turn, 
the fronts covered by the army corps and the territorial divisions 
and brigades resembled more those of conventional armies, army 
corps and divisions respectively, whereas several major field 
units were stronger than their name suggested . 
44 The nationalist 
army was finally organized in field (i. e. non-territorial) army 
corps and standard divisions in late 1937. In December 1938, it 
fielded 4 armies, 12 army corps (plus 2 army corps-level 
commands), and 56 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions. 95 
The standard nationalist infantry division was initially based 
on the pre-war model, but it was weaker in artillery and support 
troops. According to the establishment of late 1937 the 
nationalist division had twelve infantry battalions, grouped into 
four tactical `regiments' (they were not self-administering 
43 Thee is no comprehensive study on the development of the nationalist army's force structure, 
but a useful chronological account is found in `El esfuerzo de guerra en ambas zonas durante la 
Cruzada', RHM, VIII, 17 (September-December 1964), pp. 90-2,96-101,106-17. 
44 For instance, on the Aragonese front by mid-1937, the 51st Division (22,000-strong) had 17 
infantry battalions and 2 more attached, and a separate brigade (7,700-strong) had 9 battalions 
(plus some minor units attached): Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La gran ofensiva sobre Zaragoza 
(Madrid, 1973), p. 89. By June 1937, the VII Army Corps, on the northern Madrid front, had only 
two divisions but it was over 50,000-strong: Jesus Maria Salas and Ramon Salas, XVII. 504. The 
six `Navarrese Brigades', which operated as field units, were grouped 
in the 61st Division (a 
territorial command) in May 1937; they bore no resemblance to the pre-war 
brigades, since they 
were born as task forces (whose initial establishment was around 
4,000 rifles and 6 to 8 artillery 
batteries); the first four Navarrese brigades grouped overall 32 infantry battalions in late March 
1937 and two of them had reached divisional size by early July 
1937: Enciclopedia Espas a, 1936- 
1939 supplements sv `Espana', II. 1491; `El esfuerzo de guerra', p. 
97; Jesus Maria Salas and 
Ramon Salas, XVII. 461, XVII. 509. 
45 'El esfuerzo de guerra', pp. 106-7,109-12. 
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units) which in turn formed two brigades, and two (sometimes 
three) field artillery battalions plus small numbers of engineers 
and service troops. Its strength was between 10,500 and 12,000 
troops. 46 The division was the basic self-contained operational 
unit in the nationalist army; brigades and regiments functioned 
only as tactical headquarters for the infantry battalions. Later 
in 1938, the nationalist divisions started organizing their 
infantry in three regiments or regimental groups (agrupaciones) of 
47 four battalions each. This writer has not found in the sources 
consulted any explanation for this last change in the nationalist 
division's organization, which suppressed half of the sub- 
divisional commands (two brigade and one regimental headquarters). 
Perhaps operational experience convinced the nationalist army's 
command to adopt a leaner and more flexible divisional command 
structure, by simply increasing the infantry regiment's strength 
by one battalion. 
c) Command and performance of major units. 
Theoretically, the republican organization, based on the 
composite brigade (a model of unit set forth in the Spanish 
military literature and organization before the war), was a sound 
structure allegedly more suitable for manoeuvre warfare on 
extended fronts like those of the Spanish Civil War. On the 
contrary, the nationalist army operated with ad hoc formations for 
the first half of the war, and, once it set up a standard force 
structure, it initially followed the 1925 divisional organization, 
which was more suitable for methodical fighting on 
fortified 
fronts. 
46 G. Lopez Mufliz, V. 712; Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1617; Jesüs Maria Salas and 
Ramon Salas, XVII. 630. 
47 G. Lopez Muniz, V. 712. Indeed, the 4th and 5th (Navarrese) Divisions went into action with 
this organization in January 1938: Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, 
La batalla de Teruel, revised 
edition (Madrid, 1990), p. 126 fn 158. 
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Nonetheless, the nationalists carried out manoeuvre warfare 
operations more successfully than the republicans. An explanation 
for this paradox is found in the quality of the command: no 
organizational arrangement could make up for the professional 
limitations of the republican officer corps. 48 The republican army 
lacked trained cadres to staff the huge number of senior 
headquarters required by its expansion. 
Moreover, the 1925 regulations were still the official doctrine 
(as seen at the end of the republican instructions on the 
organization and combat of a division). 49 The regulations' 
guidelines, with their methodical approach, matched badly with the 
would-be flexibility allowed by the composite brigade and the 
actual conditions of the Spanish Civil War (with extended fronts 
often allowing manoeuvre warfare). Experienced, well-trained 
officers perhaps would have been capable of overcoming the 
frictions between the official doctrine and front-line realities. 
Unfortunately, the republican army had to resort to officers who 
lacked either the proficiency or an appropriate environment (or 
both) to tackle such frictions. 
The nationalist army, in turn, certainly did not display 
innovative organizational thinking with its attachment to the 
division as its basic operational major unit, but on this occasion 
conservatism paid off. After all, Spanish officers were already 
familiar with the 1925 regulations and had only to put into 
practice their contents as far as the situation made feasible. 
48 For instance, a report on the Huesca attacks of June 1937 stated that brigade commanders (who 
very often were not professional officers) had to be thoroughly taught to 
distinguish between the 
artillery's preparatory fire and support fire (the latter was 
delivered when the infantry moved 
forward): Observaciones al empleo de la artilleria en e1 ataque a Huesca del dia 16 de Junio de 
1937,17 June 1937, AMA-ZR 55/545/8. 
49 Ministeno de Defensa Nacional, Ejercito de Tierra, Instrucciön nümero dos sobre la 
organizaciön y el combate de una division, (n. d. [1937? ]), p. 
8. The copy used is filed in AMA-ZR 
55/524/1. 
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Although centralization of command at the divisional headquarters 
meant a loss of tactical flexibility, it did not scatter 
professional officers amongst lots of low-level headquarters, and 
allowed the nationalists a more efficient use of the limited 
amount of artillery available, since the divisional commander 
could concentrate all the artillery assets of his unit for 
supporting any part of it. 50 Centralization of staff work at 
higher headquarters also prevented the dispersal of the limited 
numbers of trained staff officers serving on the nationalist side 
(106 out of 245 captains and field officers of the pre-war staff 
corps, plus 31 who came back from the reserve or retirement, were 
serving on the nationalist side by April 1937). 51 
3. The Spanish military and armour in the war. 
a) The armour at the outbreak of war and sources of supply. 
There is no agreement in the published sources about the exact 
numbers of tanks available on the eve of the Spanish Civil War. 
Nonetheless, it can be reckoned that seventeen tanks at least were 
in operational condition: five Renaults in each tank regiment, 
four Schneiders in the Central Firing School, and three Trubia 
prototypes attached to the Oviedo garrison. 
52 The 1st Tank 
Regiment (Madrid) remained loyal to the government, which also got 
at least two Schneiders - captured after loyal units and leftist 
militias prevented the troops of the Central Firing School from 
joining the military uprising (the other Schneiders were allegedly 
50 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, 1.1168n64. 
51 AME 1936; Situaciön del Cuerpo de Estado Mayor del Ejercito en 25 de abril de 1937 (1937). A 
school for ancillary staff officers was also created in July 
1937; military experience was not 
necessary, but the candidates had to be thirty years old at 
least and university graduates. After a 
course of 30-40 days, they were commissioned as temporary 
lieutenants and performed 
bureaucratic tasks at headquarters, thus freeing regular staff officers for operational matters. 
Nonetheless, only 417 out of 1,170 course vacancies (35.6 per cent) offered 
during the war were 
filled: Gdrate, Alfereces provisionales, pp. 170-4. 
52 Fernandez Mateos, pp. 22; Javier de Mazarrasa, 'Carros de combate durante el conflicto 1936- 
39', Soldiers-Raids, 10 (July 1996), pp. 26-7. 
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knocked out) . 
53 The 2nd Tank Regiment (Saragossa) and the Oviedo 
garrison joined the rebellion. 54 
Both sides were later supplied from foreign sources. The 
republican side got a number of Renaults from France and Poland. 55 
But the republican forces were mainly equipped with Soviet armour: 
320-400 T -26s and around 50 BT-5s. The nationalist army was 
supplied with light tanks from Germany (around 140 
Panzerkampfwagen Is) and Italy (150 Fiat-Ansaldo L-3/35s), and 
also used captured republican armour. 56 
b) Republican armour. 
The republican armoured force was really born in mid-October 
1936 after the arrival of Soviet tanks (around 50 T-26s) and 
armoured cars. The shortage of time and the Soviet tankmen's 
eagerness to get combat experience meant that only one company 
53 Servicio Histörico Militar, Herdldica e historiales del Eiercito. Tomo VI: Infanteria (Madrid, 
1984), p. 22; Adolfo Melendez Jimenez, `Apuntes para la Historia de las Unidades de Infanteria de 
Carros de Combate del Ejercito espanol', Ej6rcito, XXVII, 312 (January 1966), p. 27; Salas 
Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 133-4; Fernandez Mateos, p. 13. On the republican armour in the 
early stage of the war, see Jose Luis Infiesta Perez, `El empleo de los carros de combate en la 
guerra de Espana', RHM XXXIX, 78 (January-June 1995), pp. 149-51; Salas Larrazäbal, Ei6rcito 
Popular,, I. 532-3, I. 574; Fernandez Mateos, p. 13. 
54 Servicio Histörico Militar, Heräldica e historiales, p. 25; Fernandez Mateos, p. 22. On the role of 
these tank units see Melendez Jimenez, `Apuntes', p. 27; and Fernandez Mateos, p. 14. Until the 
end of 1937, the Renault platoon (enlarged in 1937 with captured Renaults) was the only armoured 
unit of the 2nd Tank Regiment, turned into a parent outfit for new infantry battalions, which 
retained the regimental name: Servicio Histörico Militar, Heräldica e historiales, p. 27. From early 
October 1936 to late November 1936, the nationalist army had a company of Italian Fiat-Ansaldo 
L-3/35s, with many Spanish crews; the unit was later incorporated in the Italian volunteer corps, 
and, in February 1937, another Spanish-manned company of L-3/35s was created and later became 
a two-company group (but its war record remains obscure): Servicio Histörico Militar, Heräldica e 
historiales, pp. 30-1. Since the units equipped with the L-3/35 fought under Italian command, their 
operations will not be discussed. 
55 Infiesta, `El empleo de los carros', p. 151; Fernandez Mateos, p. 22; Mazarrasa, `Carros de 
combate', p. 28. 
56 Infiesta, `El empleo de los carros', p. 200. Technical data about Italian, German and Soviet 
armour: 
Model Weight Speed Main armament Max. armour Crew 
(tonnes) (kmph) (mm) 
L3/35 3.2 41 2 machine guns 13.5 2 
PzKpfw IB 6 40 2 machine guns 13 2 
T-26 9.2 28 1 45 mm gun 15 3 
BT-5 11.5 62.7 1 45 mm gun 13 3 
Source: Mazarrasa, Carros en Espana, pp. 34-9,42-9. Both sides also tried to make their own 
armoured vehicles, but without remarkable results: Fernandez Mateos, pp. 23-6. 
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could be manned with Spanish crews when the republican tank force 
(grouped into two battalions) went into action before the end of 
October. Though the number of Spanish tankmen increased in the 
following months, the tactical command of the armour was often 
held by Soviet officers well into 1937. This makes assessment of 
the pre-war Spanish doctrine's effectiveness difficult, since 
Soviet thinking and procedures weighed much in practice. Suffice 
to say, for this thesis' purposes, that the Soviet-led republican 
tanks did not achieve any offensive success in the early months, 
but they proved effective for delaying and defensive actions 
during the defence of Madrid and the battles around the capital 
(November 1936-March 1937). 57 
The republican army carried on expanding its armoured forces 
during 1937. Scholars disagree about the organization and strength 
of the republican armour (Infiesta thinks that Salas Larrazäbal 
often overestimates the republican strength). Republican armour 
grew from one tank brigade in early 1937 to two armoured divisions 
by mid-1938. Nevertheless, brigades and divisions were just 
administrative units. 58 
The battle of Brunete (July 1937) was the first major strategic 
offensive of the republican army which committed a sizeable tank 
force (three battalions on the main front, according to Salas 
Larrazäbal). 59 The republican army failed to take advantage of 
57 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 533-4; Jose Luis Alcofar Nassaes [pseud. of Jose Luis 
Infiesta Perez], `Los carros sovieticos durante la guerra de Espana', Defensa, IX, 96 (April 1986), 
pp. 55-60. 
58 Spring of 1937: one tank brigade (four battalion-strong? ) and one tank battalion (? ) per field 
army (excepting the northern front, where it is not clear if there ever was fully organized a four- 
battalion tank regiment). October 1937: one armoured division (one tank and one armoured car 
brigade) with an strength of 124 T-26s (four battalions). April 1938: one armoured division of two 
composite brigades of armoured cars and tanks (80 tanks) and a separate unit (20 tanks) in the 
eastern army group, and one armoured division of three armoured car and tank brigades (150 
tanks) in the central army group. This resume (only illustrative) is based on the following sources: 
Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, I. 1103, I. 1164 n 30, II. 1867-8; and Infiesta, `El empleo de los 
carros', pp. 160-1,172-5. 
59 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1255-6. 
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its superiority in armour, and insufficient training weighed in 
this failure. A few days before the battle, the headquarters of 
the Army of the Centre ordered the Tank Brigade to send tanks in 
order to carry out tactical exercises with the units spearheading 
the offensive. However, the order was cancelled two days later. 60 
The source does not provide any clear explanation of the cause, so 
it is not possible to judge fairly the soundness of this decision. 
But it seems reasonable to think that the republican troops' later 
performance was harmed by the lack of training. 
On 19 July 1937, the headquarters of the Army of Manoeuvre 
issued instructions on the use of armour after the experiences of 
the first stage of the battle. 61 The instructions listed the 
mistakes made by the republican forces: the tank commanders were 
too independent, while the infantry failed to keep contact with 
the armour when the latter gained temporary advantages during the 
fighting; there was no effort to achieve tactical surprise; and 
the tank units were engaged in frontal assaults on defended 
villages which caused too many casualties. The report urged field 
commanders to adopt a closer liaison between tank and infantry 
units, better and more secret preparation of attacks, and the use 
of enveloping manoeuvres whenever villages were attacked. 
The instructions' spirit generally followed the pre-war 
doctrine, since armour was subordinated to the infantry. Tanks 
were simply a complementary means of this arm, 
temporarily 
attached to its units, whose orders the armour should obey. 
However, the report recommended that tanks not be used 
in numbers 
60 Ejercito del Centro, Estado Mayor, Secciön de Operaciones, General Ejercito Centro to Jefe 
Brigada de Carros, 28 June 1937, AMA-ZR 59/664/9; Ejercito del Centro, Estado 
Mayor, Secciön 
de Operaciones, General Ejercito Centro to Jefe Brigada de Carros, 30 June 1937, AMA-ZR 
59/66419. 
61 Ejercito de Maniobra, Estado Mayor, 3a Secciön, Instruccion reservada nümero 28,19 
July 
1937, AMA-ZR 64/778/22. 
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below company strength (16 tanks). This last point was a change 
from the pre-war regulations, which reckoned the platoon as the 
basic fighting unit. The instructions also emphasized the 
effectiveness of using tanks in comparatively large masses. This 
certainly was a necessary reminder to correct the tendency shown 
during the battle by the republican commanders to retain tanks 
temporarily attached to their troops. 62 Such conduct led to the 
fragmentation of armour, which rendered it less effective. 
The republican army made an attempt to use mechanized forces, 
albeit in a limited way, for an advance in depth during the 
offensive against Saragossa (24 August-7 September 1937). Antonio 
Cordon (then chief of staff of the Army of the East) states that 
he was the author of the offensive's operations plan; however, 
Martinez Bande and Salas Larrazäbal give more credit for the plan 
to Colonel Rojo (chief of army general staff), a view shared by 
this writer. 63 It is more plausible that Rojo could plan for 
mechanized operations, given his knowledge of Fuller's ideas (see 
Chapter 7), although this does not mean that Cordon took no part 
in the preparation of the offensive. 
According to the republican plan, once the enemy front had been 
broken through in the Zuera sector (on the northern bank of the 
Ebro river), a motorized task force (one lorried brigade plus two 
tank companies and ten armoured cars) was to advance southwards to 
occupy the northern quarter of Saragossa and the bridges on the 
Ebro (about 24 kilometres from Zuera). On the southern bank, 
another task force (two motorized brigades plus 
forty tanks and 
ten armoured cars) was to cover a distance of 36 kilometres in one 
day from the assembly area to Saragossa. Both advances were to be 
62 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1264. 
63 Cordon, pp. 352-4; Martinez Bande, Zaragoza, p. 97; Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 
1309-10. 
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carried out on the first day, entering Saragossa by the evening. 
The ground was suitable for mechanized forces and the enemy front 
was a thinly held screen of isolated positions and fortified 
villages. However, the attack on Zuera was unsuccessful, while the 
southern task force was delayed in seizing small nationalist 
positions on the first day, and the next day (when a fast advance 
to Saragossa was still possible, according to Rojo) it engaged 
instead in the fighting for Fuentes de Ebro on its right flank. 64 
The operations plan for the whole offensive probably was too 
ambitious for the republican army's capabilities, although a more 
resolute advance of the southern task force, by-passing the 
isolated points of resistance, might have turned the battle into a 
nearer run thing than it actually was for the nationalists. But 
the episode is interesting as the most significant use of combined 
forces of armour and motorized infantry by the republicans, and it 
shows that Colonel Rojo, planner of the offensive, saw the 
potential role of mechanized forces. 
A nationalist document written sometime after the summer of 1937 
concluded that the republican armour's poor performance revealed 
limited technical and tactical training, and a shortage of 
offensive spirit. This, plus the Russian tanks' technical 
limitations, meant that their role depended heavily on their fire 
power, so they ended up being used as mobile guns. 
65 However, the 
role of mobile artillery was effective. During the battle of 
Brunete, republican tanks used on the defensive as mobile 
artillery screens were a serious obstacle for the nationalist 
6' This account of the offensive on Saragossa is based on Martinez Bande, Zaragoza, pp. 
78-126. 
Soviet military advisors allegedly urged the republican command to a last effort against 
Saragossa 
in mid-October 1937, by using a brand new regiment equipped with recently arrived 
BT-5s, in the 
Fuentes de Ebro sector; the attack was a failure: Infiesta, `El empleo de los carros', pp. 179-82; 
Fernandez Mateos, p. 35. 
65 CT, Centro Complementi e Adiestramento, Carros empleados en Espana, n. d., AMA-CGG 
8/387/57. 
328 
troops. Since the range of their anti-tank guns was too short, the 
nationalist units demanded Italian-made light guns, which were 
reckoned more effective. 66 And the nationalist command was not 
unaware of the importance of tank fire power. The document 
assessing republican armour mentioned above also complained of the 
lightness and weak fire power of the German and Italian tanks, 
which had to rely too much on the close support of infantry to 
fight against enemy strongpoints. 67 
The republican side also assessed the performance of its own 
armour in the battles of the summer of 1937. In the instructions 
on offensive operations which he wrote in late September 1937, 
Colonel Rojo stressed that armour had to avoid frontal attacks 
against strongpoints, and use envelopment instead. Tanks must 
operate through speed, must by-pass points of resistance whenever 
possible, and must advance deeply into the enemy's rear. Moreover, 
they must be closely supported by anti-tank guns. In these 
instructions, Rojo's thinking looks more open-minded about the 
capabilities of armour than the 1928 regulations, and perhaps his 
knowledge of Fuller's ideas was not unconnected with his stress on 
speed and deep penetration. 68 The mention of close cooperation 
between armour and anti-tank guns (a feature of the nationalist 
doctrine, as will be shown below) suggests that Rojo maybe knew 
(possibly through captured papers) the other side's ideas on 
armour tactics and thought it wise to follow some of them. 
69 
66 Unidentified handwritten note for the chief of the Italian mission at the nationalist general 
headquarters (Cuartel General del Generalisimo), 19 July 1937, AMA-CGG 7/369/3. 
67 C. T. V., Centro Complementi e Adiestramento, Carros empleados en Espana, n. d., AMA-CGG 
8/387/57. 
68 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Instruccion nümero cuatro. Normas generales para el desarrollo 
de las maniobras ofensivas (Madrid, 1937), p. 15. A typescript of these instructions, titled 
`Instrucciones generales para el desarrollo de la maniobra ofensiva de conjunto' and dated 21 
September 1937, is filed in AMA-ZR 55/472/8. 
69 The republican staff college actually included references to nationalist instructions on armoured 
forces in its teaching, according to evidence which can probably be dated from late 1937 onwards: 
Escuela Popular de Estado Mayor, Täctica de Infanteria, Resumen de las instrucciones del 
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Later on, the republican command continued to advise the use of 
armour in larger groups. On the eve of the offensive against 
Teruel (December 1937), the forces of the Army of the Levant were 
ordered always to use tanks en masse, usually in battalion 
7° strength. However, this kind of instruction was in contrast with 
the teaching given about the same time in the republican army's 
staff college, where the students learnt that the company was the 
tactical unit but it did not fight as a single outfit under its 
commander, who had no responsibility for the actions of the tank 
platoons. The students of the republican staff college were also 
taught that, once the objective was reached, the tanks had to 
carry out a mopping-up operation and refrain from pursuing the 
enemy. 7' This contradiction reveals problems of organization of 
the republican army, whose field commanders might well feel 
confused by the lack of a common doctrine on the employment of 
armour. 
The summer of 1937 seems to have been (in operational terms) the 
heyday of republican armour. Tanks no longer played so important a 
role for the rest of the war, and the tactical performance of the 
republican armour seems not to have differed in a significant way 
from that displayed in 1937. According to General Kindelän, the 
republican armour had even lost its offensive spirit by the time 
of the battle of Teruel. The republican tanks did not operate as 
aggressively as before and limited themselves to the role of 
accompanying artillery (though their fire power still intimidated 
the nationalist troops). 72 
enemigo a las Unidades de Tanques, n. d., AMA-ZR 55/520/1. 
70 Ejercito de Maniobra, Estado Mayor, Sc. III y IV, Directivas al Ejercito de Levante para el 
desarrollo de la operaciön dispuesta en su frente (extracto), 8 December 1937, AMA-ZR 
64/778/16. 
71 Escuela Popular de Estado Mayor, Carros de combate, n. d., AMA-ZR 55/520/1; Escuela 
Popular de Estado Mayor, Carros blindados, Segunda promociön, Conferencias 3a y 4a, n. d., 
AMA-ZR 55/520/1. 
72 Kin delän, P. 123. 
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c) Nationalist armour. 
The nationalist army's main tank unit was created on 1 October 
1936, when the first batch of Panzerkampfwagen Is (PzKpfw Is) 
formed the brand new Tank Battalion, whose commanding officer was 
Major Pujales. It was initially based near Caceres and its 
traini ng was the responsibility of a German advisory group (it 
seems that Germa n tankmen also took part in operations, at least 
occasionally). The 2nd Tank Regiment provided cadres to the unit, 
which initially had two tank companies (16 PzKpfw Is each) and one 
anti-tank gun company, and which became a two-battalion outfit by 
the end of the war. 73 This unit provided the armoured support for 
the nationalist armies in all the main campaigns and battles from 
late autumn 1936 to the end of the war . 
74 
The nationalist armoured strength was very small in the early 
weeks of war. Nevertheless, the nationalists realized that even a 
small number of tanks could mean a significant advantage. One 
month after the outbreak of the conflict, Lieutenant-colonel 
Yagüe, commander of the nationalist columns advancing towards 
Madrid from the south, wrote to Lieutenant-colonel Franco Salgado- 
Araujo (then General Franco's aide) that half a dozen tanks would 
be very useful for his troops. They would save casualties in the 
73 October 1937: the unit was renamed the First Tank Battalion and divided into two groups of 
three tank companies (two equipped with PzKpfw Is and the third one with captured T-26s). 
February 1938: affiliation to the Spanish Legion. March 1938: it was called the Legion Tank 
Battalion (Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legion) and incorporated a Renault company 
(created in December 1937), the tank school and a depot unit. October 1938: it turned into a 
regimental group (arupaciön) affiliated to the 2nd Tank Regiment, and the tank groups became 
battalions. Meanwhile, a separate composite battalion-sized unit of tanks and armoured cars 
operated with the Army of the South. This resume is based on the following sources: Servicio 
Histörico Militar, Heräldica e historiales, pp. 25-30; Infiesta, `El empleo de los carros', p. 161; 
Fernandez Mateos, p. 31; Jesüs Salas Larrazdbal, Intervenciön extranjera en la guerra de Espana 
(Madrid, 1974), p. 552-3. 
74 Madrid and the Jarama (November 1936-February 1937), Biscay (April-June 1937), Brunete 
(July 1937), Santander and Asturias (August-October 1937), Saragossa (late August-September 
1937), Teruel (December 1937-February 1938), Aragon and the Levant (March-July 1938), the 
Ebro and Catalonia (August 1938-February 1939): Servicio Historico Militar, Heräldica e 
historiales, pp. 35-141. 
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occupation of villages and small towns and provide more speed in 
the envelopment of enemy positions. 75 At this stage of the war, 
the bulk of the republican forces were poorly trained and led 
militiamen, who often panicked under the threat of being cut off 
by the nationalist troops. 
The nationalist command seems to have reached contradictory (and 
somewhat biased) conclusions after its troops' early experiences 
in fighting with or against tanks. The first operations of the 
republican armour in the autumn of 1936 had been unsuccessful due 
to the lack of coordination with the infantry. As a result of 
these combats, on the eve of the assault on Madrid (early November 
1936), the headquarters of the nationalist Army of the North 
concluded that tanks required the close support of solid, 
aggressive infantry. 76 
But, at the same time, the nationalist command probably became 
too sanguine about the capacities of its own armour against the 
stiffened enemy resistance in Madrid. Forest and built-up areas 
strengthened the fortifications in the outskirts of the city, and 
the assault troops faced better-organized republican forces. The 
assault on Madrid revealed the limitations of the nationalist 
armour and prompted the nationalist general headquarters - 
Cuartel 
General del Generalisimo (CGG) - to send instructions to the Army 
of the North about the tactical use of tanks. Tanks were said 
to 
be unsuitable for street-fighting: they were too exposed 
to enemy 
weapons while their own field of fire became more 
limited, and 
they could not give mutual support. It was better 
to keep them 
outside towns as a reaction force against enemy counterattacks. 
Tanks should not be scattered among columns, 
because their 
75 The letter is reproduced in Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida, p. 351. 
76 Ejercito del Norte, Estado Mayor, Defensa contra tanques, 5 November 1936, AMA-ZN 
15/18/73. 
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effectiveness lay in the mass. '? The battle for Madrid also proved 
that the nationalist tanks were not a match for the republicans' 
Soviet armour (the Tank Battalion - which reached a strength of 48 
PzKpfw Is - suffered the worst losses of the whole war - 36 
78 tanks) 
. 
Some lessons of the first months of war seem to have been learnt 
by the nationalist army quicker than its republican foes. Peter 
Kemp, a British volunteer who fought with a nationalist militia 
unit in the battle of the Jarama, recalled the lack of 
coordination of the republican counter-attacks in La Maranosa 
sector (17 and 18 February 1937). Despite their initial gallantry, 
the infantry alone were unable to reach the nationalist positions. 
When the republican armour at last appeared (a single unit of six 
tanks), the infantrymen were too mauled to support its advance, 
and the unsupported tanks were driven off by artillery fire. Next 
day, the republican infantry troops renewed their pressure, but 
they were surprised by a well-timed counterattack of nationalist 
armour: sixteen PzKpfw Is charged from a flank and overran the 
enemy. 79 As shown by this account, the nationalist command seemed 
to become more aware (probably due to German advisors) of the 
advantages of using tanks in comparatively large formations. 
The Tank Battalion was transferred to the Biscay front by late 
March 1937. The experience of previous operations was summed up in 
sheets providing the basic principles for the use of tanks. 
Experience had proved that, once the surprise effect had 
disappeared, the use of armour in the same place for several days 
" Cuartel General del Generalisimo, Estado Mayor, Tercera Secciön, Instrucciones sobre el 
empleo de los carros de combate, 19 November 1936, AMA-ZN 15/18/72. 
78 Salas, Intervenciön extranjer p. 549; Fernandez Mateos, pp. 33-4; Infiesta, `El empleo de los 
carros', pp. 161-3. 
79 Peter Kemp, Legionario en Espana (Barcelona, 1975), pp. 97-8,104-5 (original English title: 
Mine Were of Trouble). 
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in a row was unsuitable, since the means of the defence were 
strengthened quickly. The sheets also stressed the need for 
cooperation with motorized anti-tank units. Moving in successive, 
concealed bounds, the anti-tank guns provided a defensive screen 
against the enemy armour. Both tanks and anti-tank guns were 
integral parts of the armoured units. 80 These guidelines were 
certainly a result of the operations in the early months of war. 
The nationalist armour lacked enough capacity to exploit in depth 
initial successes, and the republican forces had proved in the 
battles around Madrid their resilience in the defence; therefore, 
it made no sense to insist on using tanks in sectors where the 
enemy could be reinforced. On the other hand, the tanks supplied 
by Germany were no match for the republican armour in fire power 
and protection, so the cooperation with anti-tank units had become 
essential. 
The nationalist field commanders were provided with these 
sheets, but they seem not to have paid much attention to them. 
Colonel von Thoma (chief German advisor on armour, who became 
commander of the Afrika Korps in 1942) wrote to General Mola 
(GOC 
Army of the North) that the Spanish commanders' determination 
to 
issue orders of their own to the tank units had prevented 
the 
nationalist infantry from being much more successful. 
81 The 
Spanish commanders on the Biscay front also 
had a tendency to 
over-use armour. Von Thoma complained to the 
CGG of the misuse of 
tanks, which fought on too rugged ground and were 
forced to cover 
long distances from one place of intervention to another; 
this 
wore tanks down and forced long repair and maintenance 
periods. 
Therefore, the nationalist general headquarters reminded 
Mola that 
armour had to be preserved to operate on ground more 
suitable for 
80 Hoja recordatoria para carros blindados, n. d., AMA-CGG 7/358/49. 
81 Von Thoma to Mola, 9 May 1937, AMA-ZN 15/21/24. 
334 
the tanks' tactics and mechanical performance . 
82 
If the nationalist Spanish commanders were not well-versed in 
tank tactics, they could hardly be innovative in the use of 
armour. Salas Larrazäbal reaches this same conclusion in his 
assessment of the performance of both sides in the battle of 
Brunete. If the nationalists actually achieved large armoured 
groupings on the battlefield, this was simply an extension of 
their practice of accumulating all their strength at the decisive 
point (as they did with their artillery and air force). 83 
The Spanish command's neglect was not limited to doctrinal 
issues alone. The nationalist armoured units paid little attention 
to maintenance and logistical problems, to von Thoma's chagrin. In 
January 1938, the CGG sent a message from von Thoma to the Army of 
the North to remind the nationalist command of the need to 
withdraw the tanks from the firing line by nightfall. If this was 
not done, mechanical maintenance was impossible, and fuel supply 
became very difficult because the trucks had to stop at a distance 
of several kilometres from the front. 84 
The administrative management of the nationalist armoured force 
was a reason for criticism as well. Colonel von Thoma affirmed, in 
a report dated 29 April 1938, that the state of affairs in 
personnel and training issues was very deficient. 
85 The training 
period was too short, given the continuous need for replacements 
in the front line. This affected especially the training of tank 
drivers, who needed several months' training. Moreover, once the 
82 Cuartel General del Generalisimo, Estado Mayor, Secciön Tercera to General Jefe del Ejercito 
del Norte, 26 May 1937, AMA-ZN 15/21/24. 
83 Salas Larrazäbal, Ejercito Popular, II. 1263-4. 
" Cuartel General del Generalisimo, Estado Mayor, Secciön Tercera to General Jefe del Ejercito 
del Norte, 7 January 1938, AMA-ZN 15/23/49. 
85 Coronel von Thoma, Informe del arma de Carros de Combate, 29 April 1938, AMA-CGG 
8/3 88/ 10. 
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Tank Battalion became an unit to be manned by the Spanish 
Legion, the pool of trainees decreased in numbers and quality: 
personnel unsuitable for the Legion infantry battalions were often 
sent compulsorily from the depots, with no regard to their 
educational qualifications. Assignment to tank units seemed like a 
punishment. This must have been shocking for the German officer, 
because in his country the tank crews were hand-picked from the 
best manpower available. 86 
Von Thoma thought that the standards of the officers were not 
better than the other ranks', either in technical or tactical 
issues. Moreover, since trained officers were transferred from 
time to time from the armoured forces to new appointments, the 
basic courses for officers had to be repeated again and again, 
with almost no chance for advanced training. 
As regards the tactical use of armour, von Thoma stated that the 
battalion and company commanders should stay with their units all 
the time. When the companies fought separated, the battalion 
commander should join the one whose tactical mission was most 
difficult. Von Thoma's advice on this matter is in clear contrast 
with the 1928 Spanish regulations, which assigned the battalion 
commander to higher headquarters with no tactical control over his 
units. 
On the other hand, the separation of the tank companies was not 
desirable because it complicated their logistical support. The 
knowledge of the crews about mechanics was so poor that breakdowns 
which could have been solved at the front often necessitated 
moving the tank long distances for its repair, since there was 
just one mobile workshop. As a consequence of the problems of 
86 Kenneth Macksey, Division Panzer. El puno acorazado (Madrid, 1974), p. 13 (original English 
title: Panzer Division. The Mailed Fist). 
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personnel and the lack of tanks for training, von Thoma concluded, 
the unit had become more and more deficient, both tactically and 
technically. 
Nonetheless, von Thoma claimed several years later that he 
improved the effectiveness of the nationalist armour, by 
persuading the nationalist commanders to use armour more 
frequently in relatively large formations with the support of 
motorized infantry. But this is a rather exaggerated statement, 
surely based on an overrating of the initial success of the 
nationalist offensive of March 1938.87 
The early stages of that offensive were the most successful 
operations of mechanized forces in the war. The bulk of the 
nationalist armour supported the attack of the Moroccan Army 
Corps. The British volunteer Peter Kemp took part, as a legionary 
infantry platoon commander, in the breakthrough and early pursuit. 
He recalled that each rifle company of his bandera (battalion) was 
preceded in the initial assault (on 9 March 1938) by a composite 
platoon of six PzKpfw Is and two Russian tanks. The total 88 
armoured support force was twenty four tanks for the three rifle 
companies. This is an impressive increase in the strength of 
armour attached to infantry units when compared with the 1928 
regulations (which proposed a usual ratio of one tank platoon per 
infantry battalion). 
After breaking through the republican lines, the tank companies, 
followed by fast-marching infantry or task forces of three or four 
lorried infantry battalions, an artillery battery and the 
essential engineer and logistical units, advanced fast along roads 
87 Basil H. Liddell Hart, El otro lado de la colina (Madrid, 1983), pp. 117-8 (original English title: 
The Other Side of the Hill); Payne, Politics, pp. 400-1,522 n 82. 
88 Infiesta, `El empleo de los carros', p. 183; Kemp, p. 196. 
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into enemy territory. 89 Under the cover of aircraft, these columns 
deployed in fighting order behind a line of tanks whenever they 
encountered local resistance. If the latter seemed to be well 
entrenched, a short preparatory shelling preceded the assault. 
Kemp recalled that, despite repeating this procedure several times 
a day, the nationalist forces had few casualties. 90 The 
nationalist advance created pockets of republican troops which 
were left isolated after the rapid seizure of the main crossroads. 
These pockets were later mopped up by cavalry forces advancing 
across country. 91 Nonetheless, these were only small-scale 
actions. There was no attempt to carry out a major envelopment of 
the republican forces. 92 This was coherent with General Franco's 
preference for an operational procedure of relentless pressure to 
straighten the bends on the front line, a procedure whose 
effectiveness made good its lack of brilliance, and which Franco 
learnt, according to Alonso Baquer, from two able Spanish colonial 
soldiers of the Moroccan campaigns, Berenguer and Capaz. 93 
Although it was no blitzkrieg, the outcomes were remarkable by 
the current standards of the war (for instance, the army corps 
which Peter Kemp's battalion belonged to advanced 38 kilometres on 
foot in one day) . 
9' The nationalist success was made easier by the 
quick collapse of the enemy's command structure. A republican 
report after the offensive stated that the front line commanders 
became more interested in the security of their headquarters than 
in the conduct of operations. The report acknowledged that the 
nationalist tactics (deep advances along several axes with little 
89 Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La llegada al mar (Madrid, 1975), p. 61. 
9° Kemp, p. 207. 
91 Luis Maria de Lojendio, Operaciones militares de la guerra de Espana. 1936-1939 (Barcelona, 
1940), pp. 456-9. 
92 On the linear character of the nationalist advance, see Payne, Politics, p. 401. 
93 Miguel Alonso Baquer, `Las ideas estrategicas en la guerra de Espana', in Hernandez Sänchez- 
Barba and Alonso Baquer, VII. 29, VII. 50. 
94 Kemp, p. 207. 
338 
regard to liaison among the columns) prevented the republican 
forces from organizing new defensive lines in depth. 95 
Despite this operational success, von Thoma was later to stress 
the poor maintenance and training of the nationalist armour by the 
time of the battle of the Ebro. He sent a new memorandum, dated 13 
September 1938, to Generalissimo Franco and General Orgaz (head of 
the manpower and ordnance support command), a copy of which was 
later sent to Davila by Lieutenant-colonel Pujales (commanding 
officer of the Legion Tank Battalion). Von Thoma stated that no 
decision had been made about the proposals he put forward in his 
April report, because the tank units had been continuously in 
action. As a result, it was now almost impossible to supply enough 
spares, and the replacement personnel was untrained because nobody 
had been sent to the armour school in half a year. Von Thoma 
proposed to withdraw one tank company at a time from the front 
line, in rotation, in order to follow a short course. During the 
twelve days of the course, officers (von Thoma emphasized this 
point) and other ranks would be taught the essentials of tanks. 
Furthermore, the tank school needed to train replacements 
continuously in one month courses. Von Thoma proposed that the 
school have 25 drivers and 25 gunners (including officers) in 
training at any time, plus 15 drivers and 15 gunners under re- 
assessment in order to relieve those who had lost proficiency. 
96 
On 3 October 1938, von Thoma sent a report on the tank strength 
of the Legion Tank Battalion's groups of companies to Orgaz, which 
provides further evidence regarding the German officer's 
statements. 11 out of 64 German tanks were being repaired; another 
95 De cömo gan6 Yagüe la batalla del Sur Ebro, para ganar despues los franquistas la del frente 
del 
Este, n. d., AMA-ZR 64/796/ 1. 
96 La Legion, Bandera de Carros de Combate, Mando to General Jefe del Ejercito del Norte, 10 
October 1938, AMA-ZN 15/27/32. 
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9 could not be used because there were no drivers for them, so 
nearly a third of the unit's German tanks were out of service. The 
situation of the Russian tanks was better, though one sixth of 
them (5 out of 32) were under repair. The reasons for this 
situation were poor maintenance (because it received insufficient 
time and the crews lacked training) and the use of armour on 
unsuitable ground (due to the incompetence of the senior 
commanders). 97 
The tactical misuse of armour had been pointed out by von Thoma 
in his September memorandum. He openly disapproved of the use of 
tanks on the Ebro battlefield. Despite the losses suffered for no 
gains, the nationalist forces carried on resorting to armour on 
unsuitable ground. Von Thoma attributed this to the nationalist 
commanders' limited knowledge of tanks. The presence of enemy 
tanks was no argument, because the republican army used them as 
artillery pieces in fixed positions, not for attacks on rocky 
ground. Lieutenant-colonel Pujales, in his introductory note to 
von Thoma's memorandum, also complained about the unsuitabilty of 
the ground, which forced tanks to move forward along paths in 
single file, without any possibility for deployment. Pujales 
concluded his note by asking Davila for the withdrawal of his 
battalion from the Ebro sector. 98 
Later operations proved that the nationalist infantry still 
fell 
short of being trained sufficiently in cooperation with armour. 
During the defensive operations in the Serös sector 
(November 
1938), the nationalist armoured units carried out support 
missions. However, after the day's fighting was over, 
the infantry 
97 Von Thoma to General Jefe de Movilizaciön, Instrucciön y Recuperaciön, 3 October 1938, 
AMA-ZN 15/27/24. 
98 La Legion, Bandera de Carros de Combate, Mando to General Jefe del Ejercito del Norte, 10 
October 1938, AMA-ZN 15/27/32. 
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withdrew in such a way that the tanks remained isolated on the 
battlefield. Nine tanks had broken down, and although five were 
recovered during the night, this involved a number of casualties. 
The CGG urged the Army of the North's command to draw the field 
commanders' attention to the misuse of armour by punishing those 
responsible for leaving behind nine tanks on the battlefield. 99 
The Spanish Civil War certainly was not a successful testing 
ground for mechanized warfare. To be fair, much of the ground 
where the main campaigns and battles were fought was unsuitable 
for a massive use of armour. Moreover, contemporary tanks were not 
developed enough (nor were the other arms trained to cooperate 
with armour) for conducting the sort of operations envisaged by 
the mechanization theorists of the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore it 
must be no surprise that the Spanish commanders did not think of 
any other use for tanks beyond the role of supporting the 
infantry. The only partial exceptions were Rojo's plan to seize 
Saragossa in 1937 and the nationalist breakthrough on the 
Aragonese front in March 1938, but these were operations limited 
in time and space. 
Nonetheless, there was a difference between the republicans and 
the nationalists. Both based their use of armour on the Spanish 
pre-war doctrine. The nationalists remained attached to this and 
the German advisers (surely aware of their armour's limitations) 
seem to have been satisfied with introducing minor tactical 
innovations (using larger tactical units, employing anti-tank guns 
in support of armour). Indeed, the evidence shows that 
the Germans 
were mainly worried about organizational matters and 
the Spanish 
commanders' poor understanding of elementary tank 
tactics. Above 
99 Cuartel General del Generalisimo, Estado Mayor, Secciön Tercera to General Jefe del Ejercito 
del Norte, 20 November 1938, AMA-ZN 15/28/17. 
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all, there was a single, coherent policy. 
By contrast, the evidence does not show such a coherence on the 
republican side. Officers were trained following the Spanish 
regulations in force before the conflict, whereas at the same time 
the republican command issued instructions (based on battlefield 
experience) which, in some points, differed significantly from the 
pre-war doctrine. How did an officer reconcile the teachings of 
the staff college (where he learnt that tanks must not pursue the 
enemy) with Rojo's instructions about advancing deep into the 
enemy rear? This problem was worsened by the nature of most of the 
republican officer corps. If even fully regular officer corps 
abroad were hard put to assimilate the procedures of armoured 
warfare, it is easy to understand why the improvised officers of 
the republican army so often failed to use armour effectively. 
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CONCLUSIONS. 
It certainly was a grim irony of history that, after almost four 
decades of preparation for regular warfare, the Spanish officers' 
professionalism was tested by a great civil war in which they had 
to fight each other. Nevertheless, this does not prevent a 
military historian from asking how professionally prepared the 
Spanish officer corps was for such a conflict. This thesis has 
highlighted two features which, on the present writer's assessment 
of the evidence available, were deeply influential on the Spanish 
army officer corps' professionalism and military doctrine: 
corporate factionalism in the branches of the service and a 
concept of war as a psychological battlefield. Corporatism weighed 
both in the military's penchant for meddling in politics during 
Alfonso XIII's reign (an activity which also obstructed much- 
needed military reforms) and the army's internal struggles about 
professional promotion and responsibilities. The psychological 
image of war shaped the intellectual outlook of officers in the 
early decades of the twentieth century and influenced the ways in 
which they coped with technological innovation. 
a) Corporate factionalism. 
Corporate factionalism was not a new phenomenon in the Spanish 
army. It had existed throughout the nineteenth century. An 
explanation of its survival into the twentieth century lies 
in the 
fact that the Restoration's military policy failed to centralize 
institutional power within the army. Instead, institutional power 
remained fragmented amongst the branches of the service, which 
had 
developed a prickly factional corporate spirit in the previous 
decades. Corporate factionalism and a deeply rooted belief in the 
military's right to meddle in politics whenever necessary were a 
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dangerous mixture because they could easily turn a professional 
friction within the army into a political showdown. And this 
happened when reformist policies threatened the vested interests 
of a section of the army. 
The most important such interests were those related to the 
procedures for promotion (because they affected the professional 
career of all the officer corps). Disagreements within the 
military about this issue unleashed the crisis of the juntas de 
defensa and the conflict of Primo de Rivera's government with the 
artillery corps. The nature of civil-military relations under the 
Restoration regime (whose ruling elite relied on the military to 
check a process of social-political change after 1900 to which the 
former was unwilling or unable to adapt) meant that such 
professional conflicts became major political issues, on which the 
survival of governments depended. 
General Cassola's miscarried reform of 1887-1888 might well have 
prevented such dangers. Cassola wanted to overcome corporate 
factionalism by taking the first steps towards introducing what 
can be called a `general staff system'. It was based on the 
creation of a general staff, which would be the highest 
professional body of the army. Besides carrying out organizational 
and planning functions, the general staff would bring 
institutional power to the centre, imposing its authority on the 
rest of the army. It would achieve this purpose by becoming an 
elite outfit, whose entrance requirements had to set the standards 
for promotion in the officer corps. And this would lead to the 
implementation of a new pattern of military career. 
The general staff system offered an officer a way for fast-track 
promotion by proving his ability in the general staff service 
344 
(i. e. the performance of staff duties, which were alternated with 
tours of regimental service in his parent corps). Actually the 
officer had to prove his professional proficiency beforehand by 
passing the entrance examinations and the syllabus of the staff 
college. Such a sieving process was supposed to select the ablest 
candidates for high command. Of course, this system was not 
necessarily a guarantee for picking up real military talent 
(gifted officers whose views did not fit the prevailing orthodoxy 
could be underrated). But it at least offered standard criteria 
for advanced promotion and for joining the elite from which 
generals were usually selected. 
Above all, it introduced a degree of fairness in selective 
promotion. The many cases of promotion achieved through the 
arbitrariness of political factionalism, nepotism, flattery or 
cronyism - instead of real professional merit - which happened 
during much of the nineteenth century had produced distrust about 
promotion by merit or selection among the Spanish officers. Within 
this environment, it was logical that many sections of the officer 
corps ended up thinking that, faute de mieux, seniority must be 
the only rule for promotion, because it was not subject to the 
whim of the officers' political or military patrons. Seniority 
promotion suppressed such a source of internal frictions and gave 
the officers a stable career pattern, so it was introduced as the 
sole way of professional advancement in peacetime after 
1889. 
Unfortunately, this decision still allowed merit (i. e. elective) 
promotions in wartime, and the overseas campaigns of 
1895-1898 and 
the Moroccan conflict (1909-1927) revived within the military the 
controversy about merit promotion. 
A major problem with seniority promotion was that officers 
had 
no incentive to excel in their professional duties. Nonetheless, 
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the worst effects of undemanding, perfunctory soldiering could be 
limited if an officer was passed over (and forced to retire) when 
he failed to satisfy minimum standards of proficiency. But there 
is some evidence that, in practice, passing over was not applied 
thoroughly by the Spanish military, even in cases of serious 
physical handicap. Officers were inclined to display corporate 
solidarity by overlooking professional flaws which had 
unfavourable repercussions on the personal records of their 
comrades. This did not help to overcome the stagnation stemming 
from saturated army lists (a legacy of the civil and overseas wars 
of the nineteenth century), which left lots of officers without 
any useful duties to perform. But stagnation in the military 
career was better than no military career at all for officers who 
did not see professional or financial advantages in leaving the 
army prematurely. 
Attachment to an undemanding promotion system was just one of 
the forces which helped to obstruct the introduction of a general 
staff system after 1890. The Spanish General Staff itself, after 
its creation in 1904, had many difficulties in asserting its 
institutional position, which produced frictions with the War 
Ministry. The disbandment of the General Staff in 1912-1916 and 
1925-1931 is a sign of the distrust it generated among politicians 
and generals who had got used to the Restoration's delicate 
balance of political-military power. 
Factionalism was also behind the resistance to introducing the 
general staff service, which would have broken the prerogatives of 
the staff corps. Indeed, the staff corps's resistance was partly 
successful, since it forced the compromise of 
1893. Although the 
staff corps officers were to share staff duties with 
the new staff 
diplomados, the corps would survive. But this compromise also 
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opened a new front of corporate rivalry, which did not disappear 
until 1932, under Azana. 
The controversy about the general staff system was not the only 
issue which divided the Spanish officer corps. Military education 
was another matter for controversy. The widespread factionalist 
outlook could take root early in the officers' minds due to an 
organization of military education based on separate corps 
academies. And this fragmented arrangement probably made it easier 
to implement syllabi which suited the parochial interests of each 
branch. Thus the specialist corps could indulge in syllabi of 
heavy scientific and technical content, to the detriment of 
professional subjects. And, in the end, all the Spanish military 
education had a rather bookish nature until the 1920s. Traces of 
these features can be found in the republican army's officer 
training organization of 1936-1939, and may help to explain why 
the republican side was not so successful in creating its own 
version of the nationalist `temporary second-lieutenants'. 
The training of these nationalist officers inherited a part of 
the ethos which had inspired military education in Franco's 
General Military Academy of 1927-1931. Following General Primo de 
Rivera's guidelines, the General Military Academy stressed the 
moral element in the training of officers, who above all must 
become tough combat leaders. And - through socializing in the same 
academy - it developed amongst the officer candidates the 
idea of 
the military as a single corporate body. The nationalist officer 
training during the Civil War could not fulfil the latter aim 
(there were several temporary officer schools), but this was 
offset by ideological commitment. 
Corporatism also weighed in the Spanish military's coping with 
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technological innovation. The automatic machine gun and the tank 
were introduced during the period covered by this thesis, and both 
weapons got entangled in corporate controversies about who should 
be their operators. Such controversies, on the other hand, may be 
inevitable whenever a new piece of ordnance displays features 
which did not fit the existing modus operandi of a branch of the 
armed services. 
Thus, by 1900, it was not clear what kind of weapon the machine 
gun was. Was it a support weapon for the infantry? Was it a 
special artillery piece? Or was it a weapon which required a brand 
new, separate tactical arm? The infantry and the artillery were 
naturally rivals in the competition for corporate control of the 
machine gun. But in the Spanish case, the institutional 
arrangements for the testing and the procurement of new weapons 
meant that the artillery corps was in charge of the process to 
choose a model of machine gun. The artillery corps, although 
claiming its right to be the legitimate operator, was 
unenthusiastic about the machine gun. This led to corporate 
procrastination which delayed the adoption of the machine gun, 
since the infantry could not intervene in technical 
responsibilities which the artillery corps kept zealously as its 
private domain. 
As a result of these circumstances, by 1907, when foreign armies 
had already started equipping themselves with machine guns, no 
decision had yet been made in Spain. Technical reasons are an 
unconvincing excuse for such a situation, since there were already 
machine gun models which were reliable and suitable 
for the needs 
of contemporary armies. Distrust of a weapon which might 
`belittle' the artillery's role on the battlefield, and a small- 
minded self-interest in protecting corporate responsibilities, are 
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better explanations of the evidence available. 
Unlike early machine guns, the tank had a faster acceptance, 
surely because it had proven its value on the battlefields of the 
First World War. Nevertheless, as happened to the machine gun, the 
infantry and the artillery contended for early tanks as well - 
even though both corps displayed limited enthusiasm towards the 
new weapon. There is evidence showing that the Spanish military 
did consider the compromise of creating a functional service which 
grouped all the tanks under a single corporate command (creating a 
fully-fledged armoured corps was doubtless too daring an idea). 
But finally, corporate factionalism prevailed and the Spanish 
armour was divided into two separate forces of infantry and 
artillery tanks. The actual consequences were not serious due to 
the Spanish tank arm's small size during the 1920s and early 
1930s. Indeed, the artillery corps seemed to have lost interest in 
having its own armour when the Civil War broke out in 1936. 
Thus the infantry was the sole corporate operator of tanks 
during the Civil War, since neither the republicans nor the 
nationalists sought to set up a separate tank corps. Therefore, it 
must be no surprise that tanks were usually employed as a support 
weapon for the infantry units and that the overall performance of 
armour, despite the presence of foreign advisers on both sides, 
was unremarkable. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the contemporary 
thinking on armoured warfare and the conditions of the Spanish 
Civil War, it would be unfair to blame the Spanish officers 
in an 
unqualified way for implementing the pre-war doctrine on armour. 
b) Warfare as a psychological contest. 
The morale-based concept of warfare - which can also be called 
, the paradigm of the psychological battlefield' - cannot be 
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overlooked when trying to understand the professional outlook of 
Spanish officers during the four decades preceding the Civil War - 
and even the period beyond it. The Spanish infantry tactical 
regulations after the 1880s tended to suit tactics to the 
effectiveness of fire power. However, a section of the military 
argued that a resolute advance in defiance of fire power was the 
best way to overcome (especially at the tactical level) the 
difficulties arising from new firearm technology. This conduct was 
not sheer retrogressive obstinacy, but it found intellectual 
support in the contemporary doctrines of anti-positivist 
irrationalism and social Darwinism. Indeed, from 1905 on, the 
doctrine of the offensive became more fashionable and took shape 
in the Spanish infantry with the 1908 provisional tactical 
regulations and the even more offensive-minded 1913 regulations. 
Most of the future senior commanders in the Civil War were 
learning their profession as students in the military academies or 
had just been commissioned when the Spanish army was adopting an 
offensive bias in its tactical doctrine. Since they did not pass 
through the grim experiences of the First World War, they did not 
feel the same urgency to change their minds that those foreign 
officers who had known first hand the realities of modern warfare 
did. Moreover, the Moroccan campaigns (where quite a few future 
senior officers in the nationalist - and later 
Franco's - army 
pushed forward their careers) were a type of conflict 
in which 
material factors could be easily underrated, whereas 
the morale- 
related ones, displayed through an offensive spirit, were 
thought 
as decisive as ever. 
Therefore, it must not be surprising that, especially 
in the 
early weeks of the Civil War, a lot of nationalist commanders 
seemed to be rather offensive-minded. Their reliance on 
the 
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virtues of the offensive might well have been a recipe for defeat, 
by encouraging them to move forward and attack against odds. But 
the nationalists were fortunate because their main enemy were the 
ill-prepared militias raised mostly by the Spanish leftist 
outfits. 
Certainly, the republican militias - despite tactical setbacks - 
prevented the nationalist forces (whose backbone were regular 
troops) from achieving several of their main objectives in 
northern Spain. This can be explained by the Spanish army's 
limited capacity to overcome even a poorly organized enemy, 
especially since much of the early fighting in the north took 
place in mountainous areas, which restrained the options for 
offensive manoeuvring. 
By contrast, in the more open theatre of operations of southern 
Spain, small nationalist columns of regular troops (from the Army 
of Africa) beat the militias again and again in the late summer 
and early autumn of 1936. These nationalist forces displayed a 
strong offensive spirit during their advance to the gates of 
Madrid. Although sheer offensive-mindness was not to be sufficient 
to seize the capital, let alone to win the war, this initial 
offensive-minded attitude of the nationalists was successful long 
enough to bring about an inferiority complex in the republican 
forces for much of the war (and the republicans' own offensive 
fiascos doubtless strengthened this feeling). This kind of 
subjective factor can weigh on the way armies perform 
in campaign 
as much as any other: the reader may think of the Union's 
Army of 
the Potomac in the first half of the American Civil War, or, 
in 
the Second World War, of the British army in the Far East until 
their troops became convinced that Japanese soldiers were not 
unbeatable in jungle warfare. 
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The initial victories could not fail to imbue a feeling of moral 
superiority in the nationalist army and its commanders, whose 
outlook was still highly influenced by the psychological concept 
of warfare as a clash of wills. This feeling also helps to explain 
the nationalist command's trust in the capacity of their troops to 
withstand heavy odds. Ambitious republican offensives against 
thinly-held fronts (Brunete, Saragossa) were disrupted by small 
nationalist garrisons which held on against overwhelming enemy 
forces. Even if these garrisons were finally overrun, their 
resistance slowed down the enemy advance and gave the nationalist 
reserves enough time to fill the gaps. On the other hand, the 
feeling of moral superiority, and the consequent unwillingness to 
accept any enemy success, may account, at least in a partial way, 
for some nationalist command decisions which prolonged the 
fighting and/or consumed resources for goals whose military 
soundness was at least questionable. Examples would include the 
determination to keep the bridgehead in the campus of Madrid 
university after the failed assault on the Spanish capital in late 
1936, or the counter-offensive in Brunete (July 1937) - an 
unsuccessful attempt to eliminate a small salient without 
significant military value. 
Another outcome of the morale-related concept of warfare was a 
strong support for manoeuvre warfare, as opposed 
to the attrition 
battles of the First World War. A very common conclusion of 
the 
contemporary Spanish military essayists was 
that the trenches of 
the Western Front were an aberration which was not to 
be repeated. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that many officers 
held doubts 
about the French-inspired, fire-power-based 
doctrine which was 
officialy adopted in 1925. Moreover, they were aware 
of Spain's 
limitations in implementing effectively a doctrine requiring many 
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material resources, and aware also of the very different 
geographical context of mountains and rugged ground which cover 
much of Spain's territory. 
These essayists envisaged that future military conflicts on 
Spanish soil would be fought through manoeuvre warfare since it 
would not be possible to develop long fronts fortified in depth. 
This kind of warfare required a type of major unit combining self- 
reliance and mobility. The existing Spanish standing infantry 
division was reckoned unsuitable by these essayists. From this 
background emerged the so-called composite brigade, probably the 
Spanish military's most original contribution to warfare in the 
twentieth century. It was not the product of a single mind, but - 
as a survey of Spanish professional literature of the 1920s and 
1930s shows -a concept which was shared by quite a few officers. 
Thus the republican army did not need much - if any - foreign 
advice or inspiration to base its force structure on the composite 
brigade. 
Turning the rump regular army and the motley assortment of 
militias available in the late summer of 1936 into a working 
military outfit was no mean organizational achievement, and credit 
must go to the republican professional officers. Unfortunately 
for 
the republican side, developing a well-thought out 
force structure 
was not enough for winning the war. The republican operational 
command structure required, in order to work effectively, 
numbers 
of officers which the republican side 
did not have. Efficient 
major unit commanders and staffs are not made overnight, 
and the 
republican officers' progress in field commands was 
too slow. The 
nationalist army, on the contrary, operated with 
a leaner command 
structure, despite having more professional officers, 
and, once 
its force structure was standardized, the division remained as 
the 
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elementary major unit. This policy was not innovative, but it did 
not scatter professional expertise (and, in view of the 
unremarkable nationalist generalship, cynics might add that it 
perhaps prevented even more incapable officers from holding senior 
commands). 
Finally, another outcome of the psychological image of warfare 
was the tendency to underrate technology. Such a tendency is shown 
clearly in the cases of the machine gun and the tank. The machine 
gun was a piece of firearm technology which seemed a symbol of a 
major contemporary tactical problem: moving troops forward in the 
firing line. Since technology was the cause of the problem, 
technology-based procedures could also provide a solution, or a 
partial one at least (indeed, the campaign of Melilla had shown 
the positive effects of using machine guns frequently on the 
battlefield) . But the contemporary military mind set 
was unwilling 
to follow a path which overturned its intellectual foundations and 
its stress on psychological factors. The machine gun's tactical 
role was based on the delivery of a huge volume of fire power, 
but 
it was underrated by the military because it did not provide 
the 
moral virtues that armies needed to conquer on the psychological 
battlefield. 
The First World War did not change such thinking much. 
Technology-based solutions to the tactical stagnation of 
trench 
warfare were reckoned as temporary remedies 
for quite exceptional 
circumstances, at best, or as aberrations, 
at worst. Although the 
Spanish army certainly was interested 
in the tank before the world 
conflict was over, this interest 
did not turn into the pursuit of 
a policy of mechanization. Financial constraints 
certainly ruled 
out the creation of a large armoured 
force. But armour did not 
arouse a remarkable enthusiasm 
in the Spanish military either. The 
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official doctrine - embodied in the Spanish 1928 tactical 
regulations - reckoned the tank as a support weapon for the 
infantry. Not that the pioneers of mechanization and their ideas 
were unknown; they were not, but they were judged too radical. 
Nonetheless, there were signs in the early 1930s (such as the 
cavalry's increasing interest in the use of armoured vehicles) 
which showed that the Spanish army did gradually develop a more 
positive attitude to mechanization. 
During the Civil War, the Spanish field commanders continued to 
be attached to the pre-war doctrine on armour and did not 
introduce any significant change. In fairness, this is not 
surprising. Armoured warfare could not be really tested in the 
Spanish Civil War because the armour used by both sides was not 
adequate (in quality or numbers) for the operations of mechanized 
armies, nor was the terrain where many of the main battles and 
campaigns were fought suitable for armoured forces. Nonetheless, 
the republicans, unlike the nationalists, seem not to have kept a 
fully coherent policy on the use of tanks. On the one hand, the 
pre-war regulations were the official doctrine, but, on the other, 
the republican command issued instructions - based on operational 
experience - which sometimes were in conflict with 
the former. 
This perhaps would have been just a minor problem 
for an army 
whose field commanders were versed 
in the essentials of tank 
warfare. But this was not the case 
in the republican army, many of 
whose commanders were not even professional 
officers. Thus the 
underperformance of the republican armour 
is hardly surprising. 
To sum up, the Spanish army was short of material 
resources (a 
situation which the army itself was 
to a large extent responsible 
for because of its reluctance to undertake reformist 
policies), 
but it was not out of date in terms of doctrine and 
knowledge of 
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military developments. Indeed, from this last point of view, it 
could bear comparison with other European armies. But its overall 
professional preparation would have been better if the narrow- 
minded tribal spirit of the corps of the service had not been an 
obstacle to implementing reforms in the way officers were trained 
and promoted, and if the psychology-based distrust of 
technological innovation had not been an obstacle to modernizing 
its weaponry. What would have been the course of the Spanish Civil 
War if the army had been better prepared and equipped is a matter 
of guesswork. But one may also wonder if the events after 1899 
which led to the civil conflict of 1936 would have happened at all 
if the exclusive interest of the Spanish military during the early 
twentieth century, untroubled by non-professional issues, had been 
preparation for war. 
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APPENDIX I. GLOSSARY. 
Agrupaciön: i) a task force, whose strength can go from a 
regimental group to an army-sized command; ii) the name of some 
regiment/brigade-sized standing outfits. 
Bandera: i) an infantry or tank battalion of the Spanish Legion; 
ii) a infantry battalion formed by volunteers of Falange (a 
Spanish fascist-inspired political party) in the Civil War. 
Cuerpo: i) a self-administering unit (it was usually the 
regiment, but smaller units down to company size could also be 
cuerpos, as well as some artillery and engineers territorial 
commands; ii) the name for the branches of the army which had been 
originally set up as single regiments (e. g. the artillery corps) 
or were not a tactical arm. 
Estado Mayor: the body of officers performing staff duties at 
the headquarters of a major unit or an equivalent military 
command; there also was the Estado Mayor General (the body of 
general officers of the army), whereas the army's General Staff 
was called Estado Mayor Central. 
Grupo: i) an artillery battalion; ii) a tactical sub-unit 
(stronger than a squadron) of a cavalry regiment; iii) a self- 
administering group (smaller than a regiment) of cavalry 
squadrons; iv) a self-administering group of companies 
in the 
engineers and the ancillary corps. 
Tercio: i) an infantry regiment-sized unit of 
the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries; ii) the name of 
the Spanish Legion 
(founded as Tercio de Extranjeros 
in 1920 and later renamed El 
Tercio) until 1937; iii) the name of some regiment/brigade-sized 
units; iv) an infantry battalion 
formed by reguetes (ultra- 
conservative monarchist volunteers) 
in the civil War. 
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APPENDIX II. ARMY UNITS. 
N. B. These translations do not follow the usage of any English- 







In the artillery, the 
artillery battalion is a 
administrative standing of 







company is called battery, 
grupo. The cavalry regiment 




was on a 
The infantry regiment was a cuerpo and, unlike the British army, 
a tactical unit (usually with three battalions). Two regiments 
formed a brigade. However, since the nineteenth century, the 
Spanish regiments have rarely fought as tactical units. Instead, 
their battalions were distributed among the higher tactical units, 
although battalions of the same regiment could be grouped 
together. During the Civil War, indeed, the nationalist infantry's 
organization resembled the British regimental system: the pre-war 
regiments (and even separate battalions) were responsible for the 
organization and training of many of the new wartime battalions, 
which remained affiliated to their parent units. In the 
republican army, each composite brigade was the parent unit of 
its own infantry battalions. 
The infantry had another regiment-sized tactical units: the 
light infantry (cazadores) and mountain infantry battalions were 
grouped in half-brigades (two or three battalions each); and 
during the Civil War, the nationalist army grouped their 
divisions' infantry in tactical units of three or four battalions, 
which were indistinctly named regiment, half-brigade or 
agrupaciön. 
A special case was the Spanish army's Moroccan regular troops 
(requlares). In these forces, the infantry battalion and the group 
of cavalry squadrons were called tabor, and infantry and cavalry 
tabores were grouped into composite regimental units (grupos de 
fuerzas requlares) for administrative purposes. 
During the Civil War, the organization of the other arms of the 
nationalist army also resembled a regimental system, although 
this 
procedure sometimes paid small attention to corporate or 
functional borders. For instance, the anti-tank gun units were 
affiliated to the Plasencia machine gun 
battalion, whereas sub- 
units of artillery regiments fought (at 
least for a while) as 
infantry troops. 
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The rank of capitän general (literally, captain-general) is the 
highest one in the Spanish military, but after 1900 it became 
essentially honorific. It must not be confused with the 
appointment of territorial captain-general, who was the general 
officer commanding one of the major military districts. 
Before 1918, the ranks of alferez (which can be literally 
translated as ensign) and teniente were called respectively 
segundo teniente (second-lieutenant) and primer teniente (first- 
lieutenant). 
For most of the Civil War, the republican army adopted a single 
general officer rank, simply called `general'. It also substituted 
the rank of mayor for that of comandante (in the Spanish army's 
usage, a mayor is the officer - whatever the rank - in charge of 
the administrative affairs of a cuerpo). 
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